Winter Patriot Community Blog

The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy
by John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt
August 22, 2006

John J. Mearsheimer
Department of Political Science
University of Chicago

Stephen M. Walt
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University

March 2006
RWP06-011

The two authors of this Working Paper are solely responsible for the views expressed in it. As academic institutions, Harvard University and the University of Chicago do not take positions on the scholarship of the individual faculty, and this article not should be interpreted or portrayed as reflecting the official position of either institution. It is reprinted on Antiwar.com with permission.

An edited and reworked version of this paper was published in the London Review of Books Vol. 28, No. 6 (March 23, 2006), and is available online at www.lrb.co.uk.

THE ISRAEL LOBBY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

U.S. foreign policy shapes events in every corner of the globe. Nowhere is this truer than in the Middle East, a region of recurring instability and enormous strategic importance. Most recently, the Bush Administration’s attempt to transform the region into a community of democracies has helped produce a resilient insurgency in Iraq, a sharp rise in world oil prices, and terrorist bombings in Madrid, London, and Amman. With so much at stake for so many, all countries need to understand the forces that drive U.S. Middle East policy.

The U.S. national interest should be the primary object of American foreign policy. For the past several decades, however, and especially since the Six Day War in 1967, the centerpiece of U.S. Middle East policy has been its relationship with Israel. The combination of unwavering U.S. support for Israel and the related effort to spread democracy throughout the region has inflamed Arab and Islamic opinion and jeopardized U.S. security.

This situation has no equal in American political history. Why has the United States been willing to set aside its own security in order to advance the interests of another state? One might assume that the bond between the two countries is based on shared strategic interests or compelling moral imperatives. As we show below, however, neither of those explanations can account for the remarkable level of material and diplomatic support that the United States provides to Israel.

Instead, the overall thrust of U.S. policy in the region is due almost entirely to U.S. domestic politics, and especially to the activities of the "Israel Lobby." Other special interest groups have managed to skew U.S. foreign policy in directions they favored, but no lobby has managed to divert U.S. foreign policy as far from what the American national interest would otherwise suggest, while simultaneously convincing Americans that U.S. and Israeli interests are essentially identical.1

In the pages that follow, we describe how the Lobby has accomplished this feat, and how its activities have shaped America’s actions in this critical region. Given the strategic importance of the Middle East and its potential impact on others, both Americans and non-Americans need to understand and address the Lobby’s influence on U.S. policy.

Some readers will find this analysis disturbing, but the facts recounted here are not in serious dispute among scholars. Indeed, our account relies heavily on the work of Israeli scholars and journalists, who deserve great credit for shedding light on these issues. We also rely on evidence provided by respected Israeli and international human rights organizations. Similarly, our claims about the Lobby’s impact rely on testimony from the Lobby’s own members, as well as testimony from politicians who have worked with them. Readers may reject our conclusions, of course, but the evidence on which they rest is not controversial.

THE GREAT BENEFACTOR

Since the October War in 1973, Washington has provided Israel with a level of support dwarfing the amounts provided to any other state. It has been the largest annual recipient of direct U.S. economic and military assistance since 1976 and the largest total recipient since World War II. Total direct U.S. aid to Israel amounts to well over $140 billion in 2003 dollars.2 Israel receives about $3 billion in direct foreign assistance each year, which is roughly one-fifth of America’s foreign aid budget. In per capita terms, the United States gives each Israeli a direct subsidy worth about $500 per year.3 This largesse is especially striking when one realizes that Israel is now a wealthy industrial state with a per capita income roughly equal to South Korea or Spain.4

Israel also gets other special deals from Washington.5 Other aid recipients get their money in quarterly installments, but Israel receives its entire appropriation at the beginning of each fiscal year and thus earns extra interest. Most recipients of American military assistance are required to spend all of it in the United States, but Israel can use roughly twenty-five percent of its aid allotment to subsidize its own defense industry. Israel is the only recipient that does not have to account for how the aid is spent, an exemption that makes it virtually impossible to prevent the money from being used for purposes the United States opposes, like building settlements in the West Bank.

Moreover, the United States has provided Israel with nearly $3 billion to develop weapons systems like the Lavi aircraft that the Pentagon did not want or need, while giving Israel access to top-drawer U.S. weaponry like Blackhawk helicopters and F-16 jets. Finally, the United States gives Israel access to intelligence that it denies its NATO allies and has turned a blind eye towards Israel’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.6

In addition, Washington provides Israel with consistent diplomatic support. Since 1982, the United States has vetoed 32 United Nations Security Council resolutions that were critical of Israel, a number greater than the combined total of vetoes cast by all the other Security Council members.7 It also blocks Arab states’ efforts to put Israel’s nuclear arsenal on the International Atomic Energy Agency’s agenda.8

The United States also comes to Israel’s rescue in wartime and takes its side when negotiating peace. The Nixon Administration re-supplied Israel during the October War and protected Israel from the threat of Soviet intervention. Washington was deeply involved in the negotiations that ended that war as well as the lengthy "step-by-step" process that followed, just as it played a key role in the negotiations that preceded and followed the 1993 Oslo Accords.9 There were occasional frictions between U.S. and Israeli officials in both cases, but the United States coordinated its positions closely with Israel and consistently backed the Israeli approach to the negotiations. Indeed, one American participant at Camp David (2000) later said, "far too often, we functioned . . . as Israel’s lawyer."10

As discussed below, Washington has given Israel wide latitude in dealing with the occupied territories (the West Bank and Gaza Strip), even when its actions were at odds with stated U.S. policy. Moreover, the Bush Administration’s ambitious strategy to transform the Middle East – beginning with the invasion of Iraq – is at least partly intended to improve Israel’s strategic situation. Apart from wartime alliances, it is hard to think of another instance where one country has provided another with a similar level of material and diplomatic support for such an extended period. America’s support for Israel is, in short, unique.

This extraordinary generosity might be understandable if Israel were a vital strategic asset or if there were a compelling moral case for sustained U.S. backing. But neither rationale is convincing.

A STRATEGIC LIABILITY

According to the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee’s (AIPAC) website, "the United States and Israel have formed a unique partnership to meet the growing strategic threats in the Middle East . . . . This cooperative effort provides significant benefits for both the United States and Israel."11 This claim is an article of faith among Israel’s supporters and is routinely invoked by Israeli politicians and pro-Israel Americans.

Israel may have been a strategic asset during the Cold War.12 By serving as America’s proxy after the Six Day War (1967), Israel helped contain Soviet expansion in the region and inflicted humiliating defeats on Soviet clients like Egypt and Syria. Israel occasionally helped protect other U.S. allies (like Jordan’s King Hussein) and its military prowess forced Moscow to spend more backing its losing clients. Israel also gave the United States useful intelligence about Soviet capabilities.

Israel’s strategic value during this period should not be overstated, however.13 Backing Israel was not cheap, and it complicated America’s relations with the Arab world. For example, the U.S. decision to give Israel $2.2 billion in emergency military aid during the October War triggered an OPEC oil embargo that inflicted considerable damage on Western economies. Moreover, Israel’s military could not protect U.S. interests in the region. For example, the United States could not rely on Israel when the Iranian Revolution in 1979 raised concerns about the security of Persian Gulf oil supplies, and had to create its own "Rapid Deployment Force" instead.

Even if Israel was a strategic asset during the Cold War, the first Gulf War (1990- 91) revealed that Israel was becoming a strategic burden. The United States could not use Israeli bases during the war without rupturing the anti-Iraq coalition, and it had to divert resources (e.g., Patriot missile batteries) to keep Tel Aviv from doing anything that might fracture the alliance against Saddam. History repeated itself in 2003: although Israel was eager for the United States to attack Saddam, President Bush could not ask it to help without triggering Arab opposition. So Israel stayed on the sidelines again.14

Beginning in the 1990s, and especially after 9/11, U.S. support for Israel has been justified by the claim that both states are threatened by terrorist groups originating in the Arab or Muslim world, and by a set of "rogue states" that back these groups and seek WMD. This rationale implies that Washington should give Israel a free hand in dealing with the Palestinians and not press Israel to make concessions until all Palestinian terrorists are imprisoned or dead. It also implies that the United States should go after countries like the Islamic Republic of Iran, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and Bashar al-Assad’s Syria. Israel is thus seen as a crucial ally in the war on terror, because its enemies are America’s enemies. This new rationale seems persuasive, but Israel is in fact a liability in the war on terror and the broader effort to deal with rogue states.

To begin with, "terrorism" is a tactic employed by a wide array of political groups; it is not a single unified adversary. The terrorist organizations that threaten Israel (e.g., Hamas or Hezbollah) do not threaten the United States, except when it intervenes against them (as in Lebanon in 1982). Moreover, Palestinian terrorism is not random violence directed against Israel or "the West"; it is largely a response to Israel’s prolonged campaign to colonize the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

More importantly, saying that Israel and the United States are united by a shared terrorist threat has the causal relationship backwards: rather, the United States has a terrorism problem in good part because it is so closely allied with Israel, not the other way around. U.S. support for Israel is not the only source of anti- American terrorism, but it is an important one, and it makes winning the war on terror more difficult.15 There is no question, for example, that many al Qaeda leaders, including bin Laden, are motivated by Israel’s presence in Jerusalem and the plight of the Palestinians. According to the U.S. 9/11 Commission, bin Laden explicitly sought to punish the United States for its policies in the Middle East, including its support for Israel, and he even tried to time the attacks to highlight this issue.16

Equally important, unconditional U.S. support for Israel makes it easier for extremists like bin Laden to rally popular support and to attract recruits. Public opinion polls confirm that Arab populations are deeply hostile to American support for Israel, and the U.S. State Department’s Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim world found that "citizens in these countries are genuinely distressed at the plight of the Palestinians and at the role they perceive the United States to be playing."17

As for so-called rogue states in the Middle East, they are not a dire threat to vital U.S. interests, apart from the U.S. commitment to Israel itself. Although the United States does have a number of disagreements with these regimes, Washington would not be nearly as worried about Iran, Ba’thist Iraq, or Syria were it not so closely tied to Israel. Even if these states acquire nuclear weapons – which is obviously not desirable – it would not be a strategic disaster for the United States. Neither America nor Israel could be blackmailed by a nuclear-armed rogue, because the blackmailer could not carry out the threat without receiving overwhelming retaliation. The danger of a "nuclear handoff" to terrorists is equally remote, because a rogue state could not be sure the transfer would be undetected or that it would not be blamed and punished afterwards.

Furthermore, the U.S. relationship with Israel actually makes it harder to deal with these states. Israel’s nuclear arsenal is one reason why some of its neighbors want nuclear weapons, and threatening these states with regime change merely increases that desire. Yet Israel is not much of an asset when the United States contemplates using force against these regimes, because it cannot participate in the fight.

In short, treating Israel as America’s most important ally in the campaign against terrorism and assorted Middle East dictatorships both exaggerates Israel’s ability to help on these issues and ignores the ways that Israel’s policies make U.S. efforts more difficult.

Unquestioned support for Israel also weakens the U.S. position outside the Middle East. Foreign elites consistently view the United States as too supportive of Israel, and think its tolerance of Israeli repression in the occupied territories is morally obtuse and a handicap in the war on terrorism.18 In April 2004, for example, 52 former British diplomats sent Prime Minister Tony Blair a letter saying that the Israel-Palestine conflict had "poisoned relations between the West and the Arab and Islamic worlds," and warning that the policies of Bush and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon were "one-sided and illegal."19

A final reason to question Israel’s strategic value is that it does not act like a loyal ally. Israeli officials frequently ignore U.S. requests and renege on promises made to top U.S. leaders (including past pledges to halt settlement construction and to refrain from "targeted assassinations" of Palestinian leaders).20 Moreover, Israel has provided sensitive U.S. military technology to potential U.S. rivals like China, in what the U.S. State Department Inspector-General called "a systematic and growing pattern of unauthorized transfers."21 According to the U.S. General Accounting Office, Israel also "conducts the most aggressive espionage operations against the U.S. of any ally."22 In addition to the case of Jonathan Pollard, who gave Israel large quantities of classified material in the early 1980s (which Israel reportedly passed onto the Soviet Union to gain more exit visas for Soviet Jews), a new controversy erupted in 2004 when it was revealed that a key Pentagon official (Larry Franklin) had passed classified information to an Israeli diplomat, allegedly aided by two AIPAC officials.23 Israel is hardly the only country that spies on the United States, but its willingness to spy on its principal patron casts further doubt on its strategic value.

A DWINDLING MORAL CASE

Apart from its alleged strategic value, Israel’s backers also argue that it deserves unqualified U.S. support because 1) it is weak and surrounded by enemies, 2) it is a democracy, which is a morally preferable form of government; 3) the Jewish people have suffered from past crimes and therefore deserve special treatment, and 4) Israel’s conduct has been morally superior to its adversaries’ behavior.

On close inspection, however, each of these arguments is unpersuasive. There is a strong moral case for supporting Israel’s existence, but that is not in jeopardy. Viewed objectively, Israel’s past and present conduct offers no moral basis for privileging it over the Palestinians.

Backing the Underdog?

Israel is often portrayed as weak and besieged, a Jewish David surrounded by a hostile Arab Goliath. This image has been carefully nurtured by Israeli leaders and sympathetic writers, but the opposite image is closer to the truth. Contrary to popular belief, the Zionists had larger, better-equipped, and better-led forces during the 1947-49 War of Independence and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) won quick and easy victories against Egypt in 1956 and against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in 1967 – before large-scale U.S. aid began flowing to Israel.24 These victories offer eloquent evidence of Israeli patriotism, organizational ability, and military prowess, but they also reveal that Israel was far from helpless even in its earliest years.

Today, Israel is the strongest military power in the Middle East. Its conventional forces are far superior to its neighbors and it is the only state in the region with nuclear weapons. Egypt and Jordan signed peace treaties with Israel and Saudi Arabia has offered to do so as well. Syria has lost its Soviet patron, Iraq has been decimated by three disastrous wars, and Iran is hundreds of miles away. The Palestinians barely have effective police, let alone a military that could threaten Israel. According to a 2005 assessment by Tel Aviv University’s prestigious Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, "the strategic balance decidedly favors Israel, which has continued to widen the qualitative gap between its own military capability and deterrence powers and those of its neighbors."25 If backing the underdog were a compelling rationale, the United States would be supporting Israel’s opponents.

Aiding a Fellow Democracy?

American backing is often justified by the claim that Israel is a fellow-democracy surrounded by hostile dictatorships. This rationale sounds convincing, but it cannot account for the current level of U.S. support. After all, there are many democracies around the world, but none receives the lavish support that Israel does. The United States has overthrown democratic governments in the past and supported dictators when this was thought to advance U.S. interests, and it has good relations with a number of dictatorships today. Thus, being democratic neither justifies nor explains America’s support for Israel.

The "shared democracy" rationale is also weakened by aspects of Israeli democracy that are at odds with core American values. The United States is a liberal democracy where people of any race, religion, or ethnicity are supposed to enjoy equal rights. By contrast, Israel was explicitly founded as a Jewish state and citizenship is based on the principle of blood kinship.26 Given this conception of citizenship, it is not surprising that Israel’s 1.3 million Arabs are treated as second-class citizens, or that a recent Israeli government commission found that Israel behaves in a "neglectful and discriminatory" manner towards them.27

Similarly, Israel does not permit Palestinians who marry Israeli citizens to become citizens themselves, and does not give these spouses the right to live in Israel. The Israeli human rights organization B’tselem called this restriction "a racist law that determines who can live here according to racist criteria."28 Such laws may be understandable given Israel’s founding principles, but they are not consistent with America’s image of democracy.

Israel’s democratic status is also undermined by its refusal to grant the Palestinians a viable state of their own. Israel controls the lives of about 3.8 million Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, while colonizing lands on which the Palestinians have long dwelt. Israel is formally democratic, but the millions of Palestinians that it controls are denied full political rights and the "shared democracy" rationale is correspondingly weakened.

Compensation for Past Crimes

A third moral justification is the history of Jewish suffering in the Christian West, especially the tragic episode of the Holocaust. Because Jews were persecuted for centuries and can only be safe in a Jewish homeland, many believe that Israel deserves special treatment from the United States.

There is no question that Jews suffered greatly from the despicable legacy of anti-Semitism, and that Israel’s creation was an appropriate response to a long record of crimes. This history, as noted, provides a strong moral case for supporting Israel’s existence. But the creation of Israel involved additional crimes against a largely innocent third party: the Palestinians.

The history of these events is well-understood. When political Zionism began in earnest in the late 19th century, there were only about 15,000 Jews in Palestine.29 In 1893, for example, the Arabs comprised roughly 95 percent of the population, and though under Ottoman control, they had been in continuous possession of this territory for 1300 years.30 Even when Israel was founded, Jews were only about 35 percent of Palestine’s population and owned 7 percent of the land.31

The mainstream Zionist leadership was not interested in establishing a bi-national state or accepting a permanent partition of Palestine. The Zionist leadership was sometimes willing to accept partition as a first step, but this was a tactical maneuver and not their real objective. As David Ben-Gurion put it in the late 1930s, "After the formation of a large army in the wake of the establishment of the state, we shall abolish partition and expand to the whole of Palestine."32

To achieve this goal, the Zionists had to expel large numbers of Arabs from the territory that would eventually become Israel. There was simply no other way to accomplish their objective. Ben-Gurion saw the problem clearly, writing in 1941 that "it is impossible to imagine general evacuation [of the Arab population] without compulsion, and brutal compulsion."33 Or as Israeli historian Benny Morris puts it, "the idea of transfer is as old as modern Zionism and has accompanied its evolution and praxis during the past century."34
This opportunity came in 1947-48, when Jewish forces drove up to 700,000 Palestinians into exile.35 Israeli officials have long claimed that the Arabs fled because their leaders told them to, but careful scholarship (much of it by Israeli historians like Morris) have demolished this myth. In fact, most Arab leaders urged the Palestinian population to stay home, but fear of violent death at the hands of Zionist forces led most of them to flee.36 After the war, Israel barred the return of the Palestinian exiles.

The fact that the creation of Israel entailed a moral crime against the Palestinian people was well understood by Israel’s leaders. As Ben-Gurion told Nahum Goldmann, president of the World Jewish Congress, "If I were an Arab leader I would never make terms with Israel. That is natural: we have taken their country. . . . We come from Israel, but two thousand years ago, and what is that to them? There has been anti-Semitism, the Nazis, Hitler, Auschwitz, but was that their fault? They only see one thing: we have come here and stolen their country. Why should they accept that?"37

Since then, Israeli leaders have repeatedly sought to deny the Palestinians’ national ambitions.38 Prime Minister Golda Meir famously remarked that "there was no such thing as a Palestinian," and even Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who signed the 1993 Oslo Accords, nonetheless opposed creating a full-fledged Palestinian state.39 Pressure from extremist violence and the growing Palestinian population has forced subsequent Israeli leaders to disengage from some of the occupied territories and to explore territorial compromise, but no Israeli government has been willing to offer the Palestinians a viable state of their own. Even Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s purportedly generous offer at Camp David in July 2000 would only have given the Palestinians a disarmed and dismembered set of "Bantustans" under de facto Israeli control.40

Europe’s crimes against the Jews provide a clear moral justification for Israel’s right to exist. But Israel’s survival is not in doubt – even if some Islamic extremists make outrageous and unrealistic references to "wiping it off the map" – and the tragic history of the Jewish people does not obligate the United States to help Israel no matter what it does today.

"Virtuous Israelis" versus "Evil Arabs"

The final moral argument portrays Israel as a country that has sought peace at every turn and showed great restraint even when provoked. The Arabs, by contrast, are said to have acted with great wickedness. This narrative – which is endlessly repeated by Israeli leaders and American apologists such as Alan Dershowitz – is yet another myth.41 In terms of actual behavior, Israel’s conduct is not morally distinguishable from the actions of its opponents.

Israeli scholarship shows that the early Zionists were far from benevolent towards the Palestinian Arabs.42 The Arab inhabitants did resist the Zionists’ encroachments, which is hardly surprising given that the Zionists were trying to create their own state on Arab lands. The Zionists responded vigorously, and neither side owns the moral high ground during this period. This same scholarship also reveals that the creation of Israel in 1947-48 involved explicit acts of ethnic cleansing, including executions, massacres, and rapes by Jews.43

Furthermore, Israel’s subsequent conduct towards its Arab adversaries and its Palestinian subjects has often been brutal, belying any claim to morally superior conduct. Between 1949 and 1956, for example, Israeli security forces killed between 2,700 and 5000 Arab infiltrators, the overwhelming majority of them unarmed.44 The IDF conducted numerous cross-border raids against its neighbors in the early 1950s, and though these actions were portrayed as defensive responses, they were actually part of a broader effort to expand Israel’s borders. Israel’s expansionist ambitions also led it to join Britain and France in attacking Egypt in 1956, and Israel withdrew from the lands it had conquered only in the face of intense U.S. pressure.45

The IDF also murdered hundreds of Egyptian prisoners-of-war in both the 1956 and 1967 wars.46 In 1967, it expelled between 100,000 and 260,000 Palestinians from the newly-conquered West Bank, and drove 80,000 Syrians from the Golan Heights.47 It was also complicit in the massacre of 700 innocent Palestinians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps following its invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and an Israeli investigatory commission found then-Defence Minister Sharon "personally responsible" for these atrocities.48

Israeli personnel have tortured numerous Palestinian prisoners, systematically humiliated and inconvenienced Palestinian civilians, and used force indiscriminately against them on numerous occasions. During the First Intifida (1987-1991), for example, the IDF distributed truncheons to its troops and encouraged them to break the bones of Palestinian protestors. The Swedish "Save the Children" organization estimated that "23,600 to 29,900 children required medical treatment for their beating injuries in the first two years of the intifida," with nearly one-third sustaining broken bones. Nearly one-third of the beaten children were aged ten and under."49

Israel’s response to the Second Intifida (2000-2005) has been even more violent, leading Ha’aretz to declare that "the IDF … is turning into a killing machine whose efficiency is awe-inspiring, yet shocking."50 The IDF fired one million bullets in the first days of the uprising, which is far from a measured response.51 Since then, Israel has killed 3.4 Palestinians for every Israeli lost, the majority of whom have been innocent bystanders; the ratio of Palestinian to Israeli children killed is even higher (5.7 to 1).52 Israeli forces have also killed several foreign peace activists, including a 23 year-old American woman crushed by an Israeli bulldozer in March 2003.53

These facts about Israel’s conduct have been amply documented by numerous human rights organizations – including prominent Israeli groups – and are not disputed by fair-minded observers. And that is why four former officials of Shin Bet (the Israeli domestic security organization) condemned Israel’s conduct during the Second Intifada in November 2003. One of them declared "we are behaving disgracefully," and another termed Israel’s conduct "patently immoral."54

But isn’t Israel entitled to do whatever it takes to protect its citizens? Doesn’t the unique evil of terrorism justify continued U.S. support, even if Israel often responds harshly?

In fact, this argument is not a compelling moral justification either. Palestinians have used terrorism against their Israeli occupiers, and their willingness to attack innocent civilians is wrong. This behavior is not surprising, however, because the Palestinians believe they have no other way to force Israeli concessions. As former Prime Minister Barak once admitted, had he been born a Palestinian, he "would have joined a terrorist organization."55

Finally, we should not forget that the Zionists used terrorism when they were in a similarly weak position and trying to obtain their own state. Between 1944 and 1947, several Zionist organizations used terrorist bombings to drive the British from Palestine, and took the lives of many innocent civilians along the way.56 Israeli terrorists also murdered U.N. mediator Count Folke Bernadotte in 1948, because they opposed his proposal to internationalize Jerusalem.57 Nor were the perpetrators of these acts isolated extremists: the leaders of the murder plot were eventually granted amnesty by the Israeli government and one of them was elected to the Knesset. Another terrorist leader, who approved the murder but was not tried, was future Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Indeed, Shamir openly argued that "neither Jewish ethics nor Jewish tradition can disqualify terrorism as a means of combat." Rather, terrorism had "a great part to play … in our war against the occupier [Britain]."58 If the Palestinians’ use of terrorism is morally reprehensible today, so was Israel’s reliance upon it in the past, and thus one cannot justify U.S. support for Israel on the grounds that its past conduct was morally superior.59

Israel may not have acted worse than many other countries, but it clearly has not acted any better. And if neither strategic nor moral arguments can account for America’s support for Israel, how are we to explain it?

The explanation lies in the unmatched power of the Israel Lobby. Were it not for the Lobby’s ability to manipulate the American political system, the relationship between Israel and the United States would be far less intimate than it is today.

What Is The Lobby?

We use "the Lobby" as a convenient short-hand term for the loose coalition of individuals and organizations who actively work to shape U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction. Our use of this term is not meant to suggest that "the Lobby" is a unified movement with a central leadership, or that individuals within it do not disagree on certain issues

The core of the Lobby is comprised of American Jews who make a significant effort in their daily lives to bend U.S. foreign policy so that it advances Israel’s interests. Their activities go beyond merely voting for candidates who are pro- Israel to include letter-writing, financial contributions, and supporting pro-Israel organizations. But not all Jewish-Americans are part of the Lobby, because Israel is not a salient issue for many of them. In a 2004 survey, for example, roughly 36 percent of Jewish-Americans said they were either "not very" or "not at all" emotionally attached to Israel.60

Jewish-Americans also differ on specific Israeli policies. Many of the key organizations in the Lobby, like AIPAC and the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations (CPMJO), are run by hardliners who generally supported the expansionist policies of Israel’s Likud Party, including its hostility to the Oslo Peace Process. The bulk of U.S. Jewry, on the other hand, is more favorably disposed to making concessions to the Palestinians, and a few groups—such as Jewish Voice for Peace—strongly advocate such steps.61 Despite these differences, moderates and hardliners both support steadfast U.S. support for Israel.

Not surprisingly, American Jewish leaders often consult with Israeli officials, so that the former can maximize their influence in the United States. As one activist with a major Jewish organization wrote, "it is routine for us to say: ‘This is our policy on a certain issue, but we must check what the Israelis think.’ We as a community do it all the time."62 There is also a strong norm against criticizing Israeli policy, and Jewish-American leaders rarely support putting pressure on Israel. Thus, Edgar Bronfman Sr., the president of the World Jewish Congress, was accused of "perfidy" when he wrote a letter to President Bush in mid-2003 urging Bush to pressure Israel to curb construction of its controversial "security fence."63 Critics declared that, "It would be obscene at any time for the president of the World Jewish Congress to lobby the president of the United States to resist policies being promoted by the government of Israel."

Similarly, when Israel Policy Forum president Seymour Reich advised Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to pressure Israel to reopen a critical border crossing in the Gaza Strip in November 2005, critics denounced his action as "irresponsible behavior," and declared that, "There is absolutely no room in the Jewish mainstream for actively canvassing against the security-related policies . . . of Israel."64 Recoiling from these attacks, Reich proclaimed that "the word pressure is not in my vocabulary when it comes to Israel."

Jewish-Americans have formed an impressive array of organizations to influence American foreign policy, of which AIPAC is the most powerful and well-known. In 1997, Fortune magazine asked members of Congress and their staffs to list the most powerful lobbies in Washington.65 AIPAC was ranked second behind the American Association of Retired People (AARP), but ahead of heavyweight lobbies like the AFL-CIO and the National Rifle Association. A National Journal study in March 2005 reached a similar conclusion, placing AIPAC in second place (tied with AARP) in the Washington’s "muscle rankings."66

The Lobby also includes prominent Christian evangelicals like Gary Bauer, Jerry Falwell, Ralph Reed, and Pat Robertson, as well as Dick Armey and Tom DeLay, former majority leaders in the House of Representatives. They believe Israel’s rebirth is part of Biblical prophecy, support its expansionist agenda, and think pressuring Israel is contrary to God’s will.67 In addition, the Lobby’s membership includes neoconservative gentiles such as John Bolton, the late Wall Street Journal editor Robert Bartley, former Secretary of Education William Bennett, former U.N. Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick, and columnist George Will.

Sources of Power

The United States has a divided government that offers many ways to influence the policy process. As a result, interest groups can shape policy in many different ways – by lobbying elected representatives and members of the executive branch, making campaign contributions, voting in elections, molding public opinion, etc.

Furthermore, special interest groups enjoy disproportionate power when they are committed to a particular issue and the bulk of the population is indifferent. Policymakers will tend to accommodate those who care about the issue in question, even if their numbers are small, confident that the rest of the population will not penalize them.

The Israel Lobby’s power flows from its unmatched ability to play this game of interest group politics. In its basic operations, it is no different from interest groups like the Farm Lobby, steel and textile workers, and other ethnic lobbies. What sets the Israel Lobby apart is its extraordinary effectiveness. But there is nothing improper about American Jews and their Christian allies attempting to sway U.S. policy towards Israel. The Lobby’s activities are not the sort of conspiracy depicted in anti-Semitic tracts like the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. For the most part, the individuals and groups that comprise the Lobby are doing what other special interest groups do, just much better. Moreover, pro-Arab interest groups are weak to non-existent, which makes the Lobby’s task even easier.68

Strategies for Success

The Lobby pursues two broad strategies to promote U.S. support for Israel. First, it wields significant influence in Washington, pressuring both Congress and the Executive branch to support Israel down the line. Whatever an individual lawmaker or policymaker’s own views, the Lobby tries to make supporting Israel the "smart" political choice.

Second, the Lobby strives to ensure that public discourse about Israel portrays it in a positive light, by repeating myths about Israel and its founding and by publicizing Israel’s side in the policy debates of the day. The goal is to prevent critical commentary about Israel from getting a fair hearing in the political arena. Controlling the debate is essential to guaranteeing U.S. support, because candid discussion of U.S.-Israeli relations might lead Americans to favor a different policy.

Influencing Congress

A key pillar of the Lobby’s effectiveness is its influence in the U.S. Congress, where Israel is virtually immune from criticism. This is in itself a remarkable situation, because Congress almost never shies away from contentious issues. Whether the issue is abortion, affirmative action, health care, or welfare, there is certain to be a lively debate on Capitol Hill. Where Israel is concerned, however, potential critics fall silent and there is hardly any debate at all.

One reason for the Lobby’s success with Congress is that some key members are Christian Zionists like Dick Armey, who said in September 2002 that "My No. 1 priority in foreign policy is to protect Israel."69 One would think that the number 1 priority for any congressman would be to "protect America," but that is not what Armey said. There are also Jewish senators and congressmen who work to make U.S. foreign policy support Israel’s interests.

Pro-Israel congressional staffers are another source of the Lobby’s power. As Morris Amitay, a former head of AIPAC, once admitted, "There are a lot of guys at the working level up here [on Capitol Hill] … who happen to be Jewish, who are willing … to look at certain issues in terms of their Jewishness …. These are all guys who are in a position to make the decision in these areas for those senators …. You can get an awful lot done just at the staff level."70

It is AIPAC itself, however, that forms the core of the Lobby’s influence in Congress. AIPAC’s success is due to its ability to reward legislators and congressional candidates who support its agenda, and to punish those who challenge it. Money is critical to U.S. elections (as the recent scandal over lobbyist Jack Abramoff’s various shady dealings reminds us), and AIPAC makes sure that its friends get strong financial support from the myriad pro-Israel political action committees. Those seen as hostile to Israel, on the other hand, can be sure that AIPAC will direct campaign contributions to their political opponents. AIPAC also organizes letter-writing campaigns and encourages newspaper editors to endorse pro-Israel candidates.

There is no doubt about the potency of these tactics. To take but one example, in 1984 AIPAC helped defeat Senator Charles Percy from Illinois, who, according to one prominent Lobby figure, had "displayed insensitivity and even hostility to concerns." Thomas Dine, the head of AIPAC at the time, explained what happened: "All the Jews in America, from coast to coast, gathered to oust Percy. And the American politicians – those who hold public positions now, and those who aspire – got the message."71 AIPAC prizes its reputation as a formidable adversary, of course, because it discourages anyone from questioning its agenda.

AIPAC’s influence on Capitol Hill goes even further, however. According to Douglas Bloomfield, a former AIPAC staff member, "It is common for members of Congress and their staffs to turn to AIPAC first when they need information, before calling the Library of Congress, the Congressional Research Service, committee staff or administration experts."72 More importantly, he notes that AIPAC is "often called upon to draft speeches, work on legislation, advise on tactics, perform research, collect co-sponsors and marshal votes."

The bottom line is that AIPAC, which is a de facto agent for a foreign government, has a stranglehold on the U.S. Congress.73 Open debate about U.S. policy towards Israel does not occur there, even though that policy has important consequences for the entire world. Thus, one of the three main branches of the U.S. government is firmly committed to supporting Israel. As former Senator Ernest Hollings (D-SC) noted as he was leaving office, "You can’t have an Israeli policy other than what AIPAC gives you around here."74 Small wonder that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon once told an American audience. "When people ask me how they can help Israel, I tell them—Help AIPAC."75

Influencing the Executive

The Lobby also has significant leverage over the Executive branch. That power derives in part from the influence Jewish voters have on presidential elections. Despite their small numbers in the population (less than 3 percent), they make large campaign donations to candidates from both parties. The Washington Post once estimated that Democratic presidential candidates "depend on Jewish supporters to supply as much as 60 percent of the money."76 Furthermore, Jewish voters have high turn-out rates and are concentrated in key states like California, Florida, Illinois, New York, and Pennsylvania. Because they matter in close elections, Presidential candidates go to great lengths not to antagonize Jewish voters.

Key organizations in the Lobby also directly target the administration in power. For example, pro-Israel forces make sure that critics of the Jewish state do not get important foreign-policy appointments. Jimmy Carter wanted to make George Ball his first secretary of state, but he knew that Ball was perceived as critical of Israel and that the Lobby would oppose the appointment.77 This litmus test forces any aspiring policymaker to become an overt supporter of Israel, which is why public critics of Israeli policy have become an endangered species in the U.S. foreign policy establishment.

These constraints still operate today. When 2004 presidential candidate Howard Dean called for the United States to take a more "even-handed role" in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Senator Joseph Lieberman accused him of selling Israel down the river and said his statement was "irresponsible."78 Virtually all of the top Democrats in the House signed a hard-hitting letter to Dean criticizing his comments, and the Chicago Jewish Star reported that "anonymous attackers … are clogging the e-mail inboxes of Jewish leaders around the country, warning -- without much evidence -- that Dean would somehow be bad for Israel."79

This worry was absurd, however, because Dean is in fact quite hawkish on Israel.80 His campaign co-chair was a former AIPAC president, and Dean said his own views on the Middle East more closely reflected those of AIPAC than the more moderate Americans for Peace Now. Dean had merely suggested that to "bring the sides together," Washington should act as an honest broker. This is hardly a radical idea, but it is anathema to the Lobby, which does not tolerate the idea of even-handedness when it comes to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Lobby’s goals are also served when pro-Israel individuals occupy important positions in the executive branch. During the Clinton Administration, for example, Middle East policy was largely shaped by officials with close ties to Israel or to prominent pro-Israel organizations – including Martin Indyk, the former deputy director of research at AIPAC and co-founder of the pro-Israel Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP); Dennis Ross, who joined WINEP after leaving government in 2001; and Aaron Miller, who has lived in Israel and often visits there.81

These men were among President Clinton’s closest advisors at the Camp David summit in July 2000. Although all three supported the Oslo peace process and favored creation of a Palestinian state, they did so only within the limits of what would be acceptable to Israel.82 In particular, the American delegation took its cues from Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, coordinated negotiating positions in advance, and did not offer its own independent proposals for settling the conflict. Not surprisingly, Palestinian negotiators complained that they were "negotiating with two Israeli teams –one displaying an Israeli flag, and one an American flag."83

The situation is even more pronounced in the Bush Administration, whose ranks include fervently pro-Israel individuals like Elliot Abrams, John Bolton, Douglas Feith, I. Lewis ("Scooter") Libby, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, and David Wurmser. As we shall see, these officials consistently pushed for policies favored by Israel and backed by organizations in the Lobby.

Manipulating the Media

In addition to influencing government policy directly, the Lobby strives to shape public perceptions about Israel and the Middle East. It does not want an open debate on issues involving Israel, because an open debate might cause Americans to question the level of support that they currently provide. Accordingly, pro-Israel organizations work hard to influence the media, think tanks, and academia, because these institutions are critical in shaping popular opinion.

The Lobby’s perspective on Israel is widely reflected in the mainstream media in good part because most American commentators are pro-Israel. The debate among Middle East pundits, journalist Eric Alterman writes, is "dominated by people who cannot imagine criticizing Israel."84 He lists 61 "columnists and commentators who can be counted upon to support Israel reflexively and without qualification." Conversely, Alterman found just five pundits who consistently criticize Israeli behavior or endorse pro-Arab positions. Newspapers occasionally publish guest op-eds challenging Israeli policy, but the balance of opinion clearly favors the other side.

This pro-Israel bias is reflected in the editorials of major newspapers. Robert Bartley, the late editor of the Wall Street Journal, once remarked that, "Shamir, Sharon, Bibi – whatever those guys want is pretty much fine by me."85 Not surprisingly, the Journal, along with other prominent newspapers like The Chicago Sun-Times and The Washington Times regularly run editorials that are strongly pro-Israel. Magazines like Commentary, the New Republic, and the Weekly Standard also zealously defend Israel at every turn.

Editorial bias is also found in papers like the New York Times. The Times occasionally criticizes Israeli policies and sometimes concedes that the Palestinians have legitimate grievances, but it is not even-handed. In his memoirs, for example, former Times executive editor Max Frankel acknowledged the impact his own pro-Israel attitude had on his editorial choices. In his words: "I was much more deeply devoted to Israel than I dared to assert." He goes on: "Fortified by my knowledge of Israel and my friendships there, I myself wrote most of our Middle East commentaries. As more Arab than Jewish readers recognized, I wrote them from a pro-Israel perspective."86

The media’s reporting of news events involving Israel is somewhat more even-handed than editorial commentary is, in part because reporters strive to be objective, but also because it is difficult to cover events in the occupied territories without acknowledging Israel’s actual behavior. To discourage unfavorable reporting on Israel, the Lobby organizes letter writing campaigns, demonstrations, and boycotts against news outlets whose content it considers anti-Israel. One CNN executive has said that he sometimes gets 6,000 e-mail messages in a single day complaining that a story is anti-Israel.87 Similarly, the pro-Israel Committee for Accurate Middle East Reporting in America (CAMERA) organized demonstrations outside National Public Radio stations in 33 cities in May 2003, and it also tried to convince contributors to withhold support from NPR until its Middle East coverage became more sympathetic to Israel.88 Boston’s NPR station, WBUR, reportedly lost more than $1 million in contributions as a result of these efforts. Pressure on NPR has also come from Israel’s friends in Congress, who have asked NPR for an internal audit as well as more oversight of its Middle East coverage.

These factors help explain why the American media contains few criticisms of Israeli policy, rarely questions Washington’s relationship with Israel, and only occasionally discusses the Lobby’s profound influence on U.S. policy.

Think Tanks That Think One Way

Pro-Israel forces predominate in U.S. think tanks, which play an important role in shaping public debate as well as actual policy. The Lobby created its own think tank in 1985, when Martin Indyk helped found WINEP.89 Although WINEP plays down its links to Israel and claims instead that it provides a "balanced and realistic" perspective on Middle East issues, this is not the case.90

In fact, WINEP is funded and run by individuals who are deeply committed to advancing Israel’s agenda. The Lobby’s influence in the think tank world extends well beyond WINEP. Over the past 25 years, pro-Israel forces have established a commanding presence at the American Enterprise Institute, the Brookings Institution, the Center for Security Policy, the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the Heritage Foundation, the Hudson Institute, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA). These think tanks are decidedly pro-Israel, and include few, if any, critics of U.S. support for the Jewish state.

A good indicator of the Lobby’s influence in the think tank world is the evolution of the Brookings Institution. For many years, its senior expert on Middle East issues was William B. Quandt, a distinguished academic and former NSC official with a well-deserved reputation for evenhandedness regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. Today, however, Brookings’s work on these issues is conducted through its Saban Center for Middle East Studies, which is financed by Haim Saban, a wealthy Israeli-American businessman and ardent Zionist.91 The director of the Saban Center is the ubiquitous Martin Indyk. Thus, what was once a non-partisan policy institute on Middle East matters is now part of the chorus of largely pro-Israel think tanks.

Policing Academia

The Lobby has had the most difficulty stifling debate about Israel on college campuses, because academic freedom is a core value and because tenured professors are hard to threaten or silence. Even so, there was only mild criticism of Israel in the 1990s, when the Oslo peace process was underway. Criticism rose after that process collapsed and Ariel Sharon came to power in early 2001, and it became especially intense when the IDF re-occupied the West Bank in spring 2002 and employed massive force against the Second Intifada.

The Lobby moved aggressively to "take back the campuses." New groups sprang up, like the Caravan for Democracy, which brought Israeli speakers to U.S. colleges.92 Established groups like the Jewish Council for Public Affairs and Hillel jumped into the fray, and a new group – the Israel on Campus Coalition – was formed to coordinate the many groups that now sought to make Israel’s case on campus. Finally, AIPAC more than tripled its spending for programs to monitor university activities and to train young advocates for Israel, in order to "vastly expand the number of students involved on campus . . . in the national pro-Israel effort."93

The Lobby also monitors what professors write and teach. In September 2002, for example, Martin Kramer and Daniel Pipes, two passionately pro-Israel neoconservatives, established a website (Campus Watch) that posted dossiers on suspect academics and encouraged students to report comments or behavior that might be considered hostile to Israel.94 This transparent attempt to blacklist and intimidate scholars prompted a harsh reaction and Pipes and Kramer later removed the dossiers, but the website still invites students to report alleged anti-Israel behavior at U.S. colleges.

Groups in the Lobby also direct their fire at particular professors and the universities that hire them. Columbia University, which had the late Palestinian scholar Edward Said on its faculty, has been a frequent target of pro-Israel forces. Jonathan Cole, the former Columbia provost, reported that, "One can be sure that any public statement in support of the Palestinian people by the preeminent literary critic Edward Said will elicit hundreds of e-mails, letters, and journalistic accounts that call on us to denounce Said and to either sanction or fire him."95 When Columbia recruited historian Rashid Khalidi from the University of Chicago, Cole says that "the complaints started flowing in from people who disagreed with the content of his political views." Princeton faced the same problem a few years later when it considered wooing Khalidi away from Columbia.96

A classic illustration of the effort to police academia occurred in late 2004, when the "David Project" produced a propaganda film alleging that faculty in Columbia University’s Middle East studies program were anti-Semitic and were intimidating Jewish students who defended Israel.97 Columbia was raked over the coals in pro-Israel circles, but a faculty committee assigned to investigate the charges found no evidence of anti-Semitism and the only incident worth noting was the possibility that one professor had "responded heatedly" to a student’s question.98 The committee also discovered that the accused professors had been the target of an overt intimidation campaign.

Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of this campaign to eliminate criticism of Israel from college campuses is the effort by Jewish groups to push Congress to establish mechanisms that monitor what professors say about Israel.99 Schools judged to have an anti-Israel bias would be denied Federal funding. This effort to get the U.S. government to police campuses have not yet succeeded, but the attempt illustrates the importance pro-Israel groups place on controlling debate on these issues.

Finally, a number of Jewish philanthropists have established Israel studies programs (in addition to the roughly 130 Jewish Studies programs that already exist) so as to increase the number of Israel-friendly scholars on campus.100 NYU announced the establishment of the Taub Center for Israel Studies on May 1, 2003, and similar programs have been established at other schools like Berkeley, Brandeis, and Emory. Academic administrators emphasize the pedagogical value of these programs, but the truth is that they are intended in good part to promote Israel’s image on campus. Fred Laffer, the head of the Taub Foundation, makes clear that his foundation funded the NYU center to help counter the "Arabic [sic] point of view" that he thinks is prevalent in NYU’s Middle East programs.101

In sum, the Lobby has gone to considerable lengths to insulate Israel from criticism on college campuses. It has not been as successful in academia as it has been on Capitol Hill, but it has worked hard to stifle criticism of Israel by professors and students and there is much less of it on campuses today.102

The Great Silencer

No discussion of how the Lobby operates would be complete without examining one of its most powerful weapons: the charge of anti-Semitism. Anyone who criticizes Israeli actions or says that pro-Israel groups have significant influence over U.S. Middle East policy – an influence that AIPAC celebrates – stands a good chance of getting labeled an anti-Semite. In fact, anyone who says that there is an Israel Lobby runs the risk of being charged with anti-Semitism, even though the Israeli media themselves refer to America’s "Jewish Lobby." In effect, the Lobby boasts of its own power and then attacks anyone who calls attention to it. This tactic is very effective, because anti-Semitism is loathsome and no responsible person wants to be accused of it.

Europeans have been more willing than Americans to criticize Israeli policy in recent years, which some attribute to a resurgence of anti-Semitism in Europe. We are "getting to a point," the U.S. Ambassador to the European Union said in early 2004, "where it is as bad as it was in the 1930s."103 Measuring anti-Semitism is a complicated matter, but the weight of evidence points in the opposite direction. For example, in the spring of 2004, when accusations of European anti- Semitism filled the air in America, separate surveys of European public opinion conducted by the Anti-Defamation League and the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press showed that it was actually declining.104

Consider France, which pro-Israel forces often portray as the most anti-Semitic state in Europe. A poll of French citizens in 2002 found that: 89 percent could envisage living with a Jew; 97 percent believe making anti-Semitic graffiti is a serious crime; 87 percent think attacks on French synagogues are scandalous; and 85 percent of practicing French Catholics reject the charge that Jews have too much influence in business and finance.105 It is unsurprising that the head of the French Jewish community declared in the summer of 2003 that "France is not more anti-Semitic than America."106 According to a recent article in Ha'aretz, the French police report that anti-Semitic incidents in France declined by almost 50 per cent in 2005; and this despite the fact that France has the largest Muslim population of any country in Europe.107

Finally, when a French Jew was brutally murdered last month by a Muslim gang, tens of thousands of French demonstrators poured into the streets to condemn anti-Semitism. Moreover, President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin both attended the victim’s memorial service in a public show of solidarity with French Jewry.108 It is also worth noting that in 2002 more Jews immigrated to Germany than Israel, making it "the fastest growing Jewish community in the world," according to an article in the Jewish newspaper Forward.109 If Europe were really heading back to the 1930s, it is hard to imagine that Jews would be moving there in large numbers.

We recognize, however, that Europe is not free of the scourge of anti-Semitism. No one would deny that there are still some virulent autochthonous anti-Semites in Europe (as there are in the United States) but their numbers are small and their extreme views are rejected by the vast majority of Europeans. Nor would one deny that there is anti-Semitism among European Muslims, some of it provoked by Israel’s behavior towards the Palestinians and some of it straightforwardly racist.110 This problem is worrisome, but it is hardly out of control. Muslims constitute less than five percent of Europe’s total population, and European governments are working hard to combat the problem. Why? Because most Europeans reject such hateful views.111 In short, when it comes to anti-Semitism, Europe today bears hardly any resemblance to Europe in the 1930s.

This is why pro-Israel forces, when pressed to go beyond assertion, claim that there is a ‘new anti-Semitism’, which they equate with criticism of Israel.112 In other words criticize Israeli policy and you are by definition an anti-Semite. When the synod of the Church of England recently voted to divest from Caterpillar Inc. on the grounds that Caterpillar manufactures the bulldozers used to demolish Palestinian homes, the Chief Rabbi complained that it would 'have the most adverse repercussions on ... Jewish-Christian relations in Britain', while Rabbi Tony Bayfield, the head of the Reform movement, said: "'There is a clear problem of anti-Zionist – verging on anti-Semitic – attitudes emerging in the grass roots, and even in the middle ranks of the Church."113 However, the Church was neither guilty of anti-Zionism nor anti-Semitism; it was merely protesting Israeli policy.114

Critics are also accused of holding Israel to an unfair standard or questioning its right to exist. But these are bogus charges too. Western critics of Israel hardly ever question its right to exist. Instead, they question its behavior towards the Palestinians, which is a legitimate criticism: Israelis question it themselves. Nor is Israel being judged unfairly. Rather, Israeli treatment of the Palestinians elicits criticism because it is contrary to widely-accepted human rights norms and international law, as well as the principle of national self-determination. And it is hardly the only state that has faced sharp criticism on these grounds.

In sum, other ethnic lobbies can only dream of having the political muscle that pro-Israel organizations possess. The question, therefore, is what effect does the Lobby have on U.S. foreign policy?

THE TAIL WAGGING THE DOG

If the Lobby’s impact were confined to U.S. economic aid to Israel, its influence might not be that worrisome. Foreign aid is valuable, but not as useful as having the world’s only superpower bring its vast capabilities to bear on Israel’s behalf. Accordingly, the Lobby has also sought to shape the core elements of U.S. Middle East policy. In particular, it has worked successfully to convince American leaders to back Israel’s continued repression of the Palestinians and to take aim at Israel’s primary regional adversaries: Iran, Iraq, and Syria.

Demonizing the Palestinians

It is now largely forgotten, but in the fall of 2001, and especially in the spring of 2002, the Bush Administration tried to reduce anti-American sentiment in the Arab world and undermine support for terrorist groups like al Qaeda, by halting Israel’s expansionist policies in the occupied territories and advocating the creation of a Palestinian state.

Bush had enormous potential leverage at his disposal. He could have threatened to reduce U.S. economic and diplomatic support for Israel, and the American people would almost certainly have supported him. A May 2003 poll reported that over 60 percent of Americans were willing to withhold aid to Israel if it resisted U.S. pressure to settle the conflict, and that number rose to 70 percent among "politically active" Americans.115 Indeed, 73 percent said that United States should not favor either side.

Yet the Bush Administration failed to change Israel’s policies, and Washington ended up backing Israel’s hard-line approach instead. Over time, the Administration also adopted Israel’s justifications for this approach, so that U.S. and Israeli rhetoric became similar. By February 2003, a Washington Post headline summarized the situation: "Bush and Sharon Nearly Identical on Mideast Policy."116 The main reason for this switch is the Lobby.

The story begins in late September 2001 when President Bush began pressuring Israeli Prime Minister Sharon to show restraint in the occupied territories. He also pressed Sharon to allow Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres to meet with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, even though Bush was highly critical of Arafat’s leadership.117 Bush also said publicly that he supported a Palestinian state.118 Alarmed by these developments, Sharon accused Bush of trying "to appease the Arabs at our expense," warning that Israel "will not be Czechoslovakia."119

Bush was reportedly furious at Sharon’s likening him to Neville Chamberlain, and White House press secretary Ari Fleischer called Sharon’s remarks "unacceptable."120 The Israeli prime minister offered a pro forma apology, but he quickly joined forces with the Lobby to convince the Bush administration and the American people that the United States and Israel faced a common threat from terrorism.121 Israeli officials and Lobby representatives repeatedly emphasized that there was no real difference between Arafat and Osama bin Laden, and insisted that the United States and Israel should isolate the Palestinians’ elected leader and have nothing to do with him.122

The Lobby also went to work in Congress. On November 16, 89 senators sent Bush a letter praising him for refusing to meet with Arafat, but also demanding that the United States not restrain Israel from retaliating against the Palestinians and insisting that the administration state publicly that it stood steadfastly behind Israel. According to the New York Times, the letter "stemmed from a meeting two weeks ago between leaders of the American Jewish community and key senators," adding that AIPAC was "particularly active in providing advice on the letter."123

By late November, relations between Tel Aviv and Washington had improved considerably. This was due in part to the Lobby’s efforts to bend U.S. policy in Israel’s direction, but also to America’s initial victory in Afghanistan, which reduced the perceived need for Arab support in dealing with al Qaeda. Sharon visited the White House in early December and had a friendly meeting with Bush.124

But trouble erupted again in April 2002, after the IDF launched Operation Defensive Shield and resumed control of virtually all of the major Palestinian areas on the West Bank.125 Bush knew that Israel’s action would damage America’s image in the Arab and Islamic world and undermine the war on terrorism, so he demanded on April 4 that Sharon "halt the incursions and begin withdrawal." He underscored this message two days later, saying this meant "withdrawal without delay." On April 7, Bush’s national security advisor, Condoleezza Rice, told reporters that, "‘without delay’ means without delay. It means now." That same day Secretary of State Colin Powell set out for the Middle East to pressure all sides to stop fighting and start negotiating.126

Israel and the Lobby swung into action. A key target was Powell, who began feeling intense heat from pro-Israel officials in Vice President Cheney’s office and the Pentagon, as well as from neoconservative pundits like Robert Kagan and William Kristol, who accused him of having "virtually obliterated the distinction between terrorists and those fighting terrorists."127 A second target was Bush himself, who was being pressed by Jewish leaders and Christian evangelicals, the latter a key component of his political base. Tom DeLay and Dick Armey were especially outspoken about the need to support Israel, and DeLay and Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott visited the White House and personally warned Bush to back off.128

The first sign that Bush was caving came on April 11 – only one week after he told Sharon to withdraw his forces – when Ari Fleischer said the President believes Sharon is "a man of peace."129 Bush repeated this statement publicly upon Powell’s return from his abortive mission, and he told reporters that Sharon had responded satisfactorily to his call for a full and immediate withdrawal.130 Sharon had done no such thing, but the President of the United States was no longer willing to make an issue of it.

Meanwhile, Congress was also moving to back Sharon. On May 2, it overrode the Administration’s objections and passed two resolutions reaffirming support for Israel. (The Senate vote was 94 to 2; the House version passed 352-21). Both resolutions emphasized that the United States "stands in solidarity with Israel" and that the two countries are, to quote the House resolution, "now engaged in a common struggle against terrorism." The House version also condemned "the ongoing support of terror by Yasir Arafat," who was portrayed as a central element of the terrorism problem.131 A few days later, a bipartisan congressional delegation on a fact-finding mission in Israel publicly proclaimed that Sharon should resist U.S. pressure to negotiate with Arafat.132 On May 9, a House appropriations subcommittee met to consider giving Israel an extra $200 million to fight terrorism. Secretary of State Powell opposed the package, but the Lobby backed it, just as it had helped author the two congressional resolutions.133 Powell lost.

In short, Sharon and the Lobby took on the President of the United States and triumphed. Hemi Shalev, a journalist for the Israel newspaper Ma’ariv, reported that Sharon’s aides "could not hide their satisfaction in view of Powell’s failure. Sharon saw the white in President Bush’s eyes, they bragged, and the President blinked first."134 But it was the pro-Israel forces in the United States, not Sharon or Israel, that played the key role in defeating Bush.

The situation has changed little since then. The Bush Administration refused to deal further with Arafat, who eventually died in November 2004. It has subsequently embraced the new Palestinian leader, Mahmoud Abbas, but has done little to help him gain a viable state. Sharon continued to develop his plans for unilateral "disengagement" from the Palestinians, based on withdrawal from Gaza coupled with continued expansion on the West Bank, which entails building the so-called "security fence," seizing Palestinian-owned land, and expanding settlement blocs and road networks. By refusing to negotiate with Abbas (who favors a negotiated settlement) and making it impossible for him to deliver tangible benefits to the Palestinian people, Sharon’s strategy contributed directly to Hamas’ recent electoral victory.135 With Hamas in power, however, Israel has another excuse not to negotiate. The administration has supported Sharon’s actions (and those of his successor, Ehud Olmert), and Bush has even endorsed unilateral Israeli annexations in the Occupied Territories, reversing the stated policy of every president since Lyndon Johnson.136

U.S. officials have offered mild criticisms of a few Israeli actions, but have done little to help create a viable Palestinian state. Former national security advisor Brent Scowcroft even declared in October 2004 that Sharon has President Bush "wrapped around his little finger."137 If Bush tries to distance the United States from Israel, or even criticizes Israeli actions in the occupied territories, he is certain to face the wrath of the Lobby and its supporters in Congress. Democratic Party presidential candidates understand these facts of life too,which is why John Kerry went to great lengths to display his unalloyed support for Israel in 2004 and why Hillary Clinton is doing the same thing today.138

Maintaining U.S. support for Israel’s policies against the Palestinians is a core goal of the Lobby, but its ambitions do not stop there. It also wants America to help Israel remain the dominant regional power. Not surprisingly, the Israeli government and pro-Israel groups in the United States worked together to shape the Bush Administration’s policy towards Iraq, Syria, and Iran, as well as its grand scheme for reordering the Middle East.

Israel and the Iraq War

Pressure from Israel and the Lobby was not the only factor behind the U.S. decision to attack Iraq in March 2003, but it was a critical element. Some Americans believe that this was a "war for oil," but there is hardly any direct evidence to support this claim. Instead, the war was motivated in good part by a desire to make Israel more secure. According to Philip Zelikow, a member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (2001-2003), executive director of the 9/11 Commission, and now Counselor to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the "real threat" from Iraq was not a threat to the United States.139 The "unstated threat" was the "threat against Israel," Zelikow told a University of Virginia audience in September 2002, noting further that "the American government doesn’t want to lean too hard on it rhetorically, because it is not a popular sell."

On August 16, 2002, eleven days before Vice President Cheney kicked off the campaign for war with a hard-line speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Washington Post reported that "Israel is urging U.S. officials not to delay a military strike against Iraq’s Saddam Hussein."140 By this point, according to Sharon, strategic coordination between Israel and the U.S. had reached "unprecedented dimensions," and Israeli intelligence officials had given Washington a variety of alarming reports about Iraq’s WMD programs.141 As one retired Israeli general later put it, "Israeli intelligence was a full partner to the picture presented by American and British intelligence regarding Iraq’s non- conventional capabilities."142

Israeli leaders were deeply distressed when President Bush decided to seek U.N. Security Council authorization for war in September, and even more worried when Saddam agreed to let U.N. inspectors back into Iraq, because these developments seemed to reduce the likelihood of war. Foreign Minister Shimon Peres told reporters in September 2002 that "the campaign against Saddam Hussein is a must. Inspections and inspectors are good for decent people, but dishonest people can overcome easily inspections and inspectors."143

At the same time, former Prime Minister Ehud Barak wrote a New York Times op-ed warning that "the greatest risk now lies in inaction."144 His predecessor, Benjamin Netanyahu, published a similar piece in the Wall Street Journal entitled "The Case for Toppling Saddam."145 Netanyahu declared, "Today nothing less than dismantling his regime will do," adding that "I believe I speak for the overwhelming majority of Israelis in supporting a pre-emptive strike against Saddam’s regime." Or as Ha’aretz reported in February 2003: "The [Israeli] military and political leadership yearns for war in Iraq."146

But as Netanyahu suggests, the desire for war was not confined to Israel’s leaders. Apart from Kuwait, which Saddam conquered in 1990, Israel was the only country in the world where both the politicians and the public enthusiastically favored war.147 As journalist Gideon Levy observed at the time, "Israel is the only country in the West whose leaders support the war unreservedly and where no alternative opinion is voiced."148 In fact, Israelis were so gung-ho for war that their allies in America told them to damp down their hawkish rhetoric, lest it look like the war was for Israel.149

The Lobby and the Iraq War

Within the United States, the main driving force behind the Iraq war was a small band of neoconservatives, many with close ties to Israel’s Likud Party.150 In addition, key leaders of the Lobby’s major organizations lent their voices to the campaign for war.151 According to the Forward, "As President Bush attempted to sell the . . . war in Iraq, America’s most important Jewish organizations rallied as one to his defense. In statement after statement community leaders stressed the need to rid the world of Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction."152 The editorial goes on to say that "concern for Israel’s safety rightfully factored into the deliberations of the main Jewish groups."

Although neoconservatives and other Lobby leaders were eager to invade Iraq, the broader American Jewish community was not.153 In fact, Samuel Freedman reported just after the war started that "a compilation of nationwide opinion polls by the Pew Research Center shows that Jews are less supportive of the Iraq war than the population at large, 52% to 62%."154 Thus, it would be wrong to blame the war in Iraq on "Jewish influence." Rather, the war was due in large part to the Lobby’s influence, especially the neoconservatives within it.

The neoconservatives were already determined to topple Saddam before Bush became President.155 They caused a stir in early 1998 by publishing two open letters to President Clinton calling for Saddam’s removal from power.156 The signatories, many of whom had close ties to pro-Israel groups like JINSA or WINEP, and whose ranks included Elliot Abrams, John Bolton, Douglas Feith, William Kristol, Bernard Lewis, Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz, had little trouble convincing the Clinton Administration to adopt the general goal of ousting Saddam.157 But the neoconservatives were unable to sell a war to achieve that objective.Nor were they able to generate much enthusiasm for invading Iraq in the early months of the Bush Administration.158 As important as the neoconservatives were for making the Iraq war happen, they needed help to achieve their aim.

That help arrived with 9/11. Specifically, the events of that fateful day led Bush and Cheney to reverse course and become strong proponents of a preventive war to topple Saddam. Neoconservatives in the Lobby – most notably Scooter Libby, Paul Wolfowitz, and Princeton historian Bernard Lewis – played especially critical roles in persuading the President and Vice-President to favor war.

For the neoconservatives, 9/11 was a golden opportunity to make the case for war with Iraq. At a key meeting with Bush at Camp David on September 15, Wolfowitz advocated attacking Iraq before Afghanistan, even though there was no evidence that Saddam was involved in the attacks on the United States and bin Laden was known to be in Afghanistan.159 Bush rejected this advice and chose to go after Afghanistan instead, but war with Iraq was now regarded as a serious possibility and the President tasked U.S. military planners on November 21, 2001 with developing concrete plans for an invasion.160

Meanwhile, other neoconservatives were at work within the corridors of power. We do not have the full story yet, but scholars like Lewis and Fouad Ajami of John Hopkins University reportedly played key roles in convincing Vice President Cheney to favor the war.161 Cheney’s views were also heavily influenced by the neoconservatives on his staff, especially Eric Edelman, John Hannah, and chief of staff Libby, one of the most powerful individuals in the Administration.162 The Vice President’s influence helped convince President Bush by early 2002. With Bush and Cheney on board, the die for war was cast.

Outside the administration, neoconservative pundits lost no time making the case that invading Iraq was essential to winning the war on terrorism. Their efforts were partly aimed at keeping pressure on Bush and partly intended to overcome opposition to the war inside and outside of the government. On September 20, a group of prominent neoconservatives and their allies published another open letter, telling the President that "even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the [9/11] attack, any strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq."163

The letter also reminded Bush that, "Israel has been and remains America’s staunchest ally against international terrorism." In the October 1 issue of the Weekly Standard, Robert Kagan and William Kristol called for regime change in Iraq immediately after the Taliban was defeated. That same day, Charles Krauthammer argued in the Washington Post that after we were done with Afghanistan, Syria should be next, followed by Iran and Iraq. "The war on terrorism," he argued, "will conclude in Baghdad," when we finish off "the most dangerous terrorist regime in the world."164

These salvoes were the beginning of an unrelenting public relations campaign to win support for invading Iraq.165 A key part of this campaign was the manipulation of intelligence information, so as to make Saddam look like an imminent threat. For example, Libby visited the CIA several times to pressure analysts to find evidence that would make the case for war, and he helped prepare a detailed briefing on the Iraq threat in early 2003 that was pushed on Colin Powell, then preparing his infamous briefing to the U.N. Security Council on the Iraqi threat.166 According to Bob Woodward, Powell "was appalled at what he considered overreaching and hyperbole. Libby was drawing only the worst conclusions from fragments and silky threads."167 Although Powell discarded Libby’s most outrageous claims, his U.N. presentation was still riddled with errors, as Powell now acknowledges.

The campaign to manipulate intelligence also involved two organizations that were created after 9/11 and reported directly to Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith.168 The Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group was tasked to find links between al Qaeda and Iraq that the intelligence community supposedly missed. Its two key members were Wurmser, a hard core neoconservative, and Michael Maloof, a Lebanese-American who had close ties with Perle. The Office of Special Plans was tasked with finding evidence that could be used to sell war with Iraq. It was headed by Abram Shulsky, a neoconservative with longstanding ties to Wolfowitz, and its ranks included recruits from pro-Israel think tanks.169

Like virtually all the neoconservatives, Feith is deeply committed to Israel. He also has long-standing ties to the Likud Party. He wrote articles in the 1990s supporting the settlements and arguing that Israel should retain the occupied territories.170 More importantly, along with Perle and Wurmser, he wrote the famous "Clean Break" report in June 1996 for the incoming Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu.171 Among other things, it recommended that Netanyahu "focus on removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq -- an important Israeli strategic objective in its own right." It also called for Israel to take steps to reorder the entire Middle East. Netanyahu did not implement their advice, but Feith, Perle and Wurmser were soon advocating that the Bush Administration pursue those same goals. This situation prompted Ha’aretz columnist Akiva Eldar to warn that Feith and Perle "are walking a fine line between their loyalty to American governments … and Israeli interests."172

Wolfowitz is equally committed to Israel. The Forward once described him as "the most hawkishly pro-Israel voice in the Administration," and selected him in 2002 as the first among fifty notables who "have consciously pursued Jewish activism."173 At about the same time, JINSA gave Wolfowitz its Henry M. Jackson Distinguished Service Award for promoting a strong partnership between Israel and the United States, and the Jerusalem Post, describing him as "devoutly pro-Israel," named him "Man of the Year" in 2003.174

Finally, a brief word is in order about the neoconservatives’ prewar support of Ahmed Chalabi, the unscrupulous Iraqi exile who headed the Iraqi National Congress (INC). They embraced Chalabi because he had worked to establish close ties with Jewish-American groups and had pledged to foster good relations with Israel once he gained power.175 This was precisely what pro-Israel proponents of regime change wanted to hear, so they backed Chalabi in return. Journalist Matthew Berger laid out the essence of the bargain in the Jewish Journal: "The INC saw improved relations as a way to tap Jewish influence in Washington and Jerusalem and to drum up increased support for its cause. For their part, the Jewish groups saw an opportunity to pave the way for better relations between Israel and Iraq, if and when the INC is involved in replacing Saddam Hussein’s regime."176

Given the neoconservatives’ devotion to Israel, their obsession with Iraq, and their influence in the Bush Administration, it is not surprising that many Americans suspected that the war was designed to further Israeli interests. For example, Barry Jacobs of the American Jewish Committee acknowledged in March 2005 that the belief that Israel and the neoconservatives conspired to get the United States into a war in Iraq was "pervasive" in the U.S. intelligence community.177 Yet few people would say so publicly, and most that did -- including Senator Ernest Hollings (D-SC) and Representative James Moran (D- VA) -- were condemned for raising the issue.178 Michael Kinsley put the point well in late 2002, when he wrote that "the lack of public discussion about the role of Israel … is the proverbial elephant in the room: Everybody sees it, no one mentions it."179 The reason for this reluctance, he observed, was fear of being labeled an anti-Semite. Even so, there is little doubt that Israel and the Lobby were key factors in shaping the decision for war. Without the Lobby’s efforts, the United States would have been far less likely to have gone to war in March 2003.

Dreams of Regional Transformation

The Iraq war was not supposed to be a costly quagmire. Rather, it was intended as the first step in a larger plan to reorder the Middle East. This ambitious strategy was a dramatic departure from previous U.S. policy, and the Lobby and Israel were critical driving forces behind this shift. This point was made clearly after the Iraq war began in a front-page story in the Wall Street Journal. The headline says it all: "President’s Dream: Changing Not Just Regime but a Region: A Pro-U.S., Democratic Area is a Goal that Has Israeli and Neo Conservative Roots."180

Pro-Israel forces have long been interested in getting the U.S. military more directly involved in the Middle East, so it could help protect Israel.181 But they had limited success on this front during the Cold War, because America acted as an "off-shore balancer" in the region. Most U.S. forces designated for the Middle East, like the Rapid Deployment Force, were kept "over the horizon" and out of harm’s way. Washington maintained a favorable balance of power by playing local powers off against each other, which is why the Reagan Administration supported Saddam against revolutionary Iran during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88).

This policy changed after the first Gulf War, when the Clinton Administration adopted a strategy of "dual containment." It called for stationing substantial U.S. forces in the region to contain both Iran and Iraq, instead of using one to check the other. The father of dual containment was none other than Martin Indyk, who first articulated the strategy in May 1993 at the pro-Israel think tank WINEP and then implemented it as Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs at the National Security Council.182

There was considerable dissatisfaction with dual containment by the mid-1990s, because it made the United States the mortal enemy of two countries who also hated each other, and it forced Washington to bear the burden of containing both of them.183 Not surprisingly, the Lobby worked actively in Congress to save dual containment.184 Pressed by AIPAC and other pro-Israel forces, Clinton toughened up the policy in the spring of 1995 by imposing an economic embargo on Iran. But AIPAC et al wanted more. The result was the 1996 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, which imposed sanctions on any foreign companies investing more than $40 million to develop petroleum resources in Iran or Libya. As Ze’ev Schiff, the military correspondent for Ha’aretz, noted at the time, "Israel is but a tiny element in the big scheme, but one should not conclude that it cannot influence those within the Beltway."185

By the late 1990s, however, the neoconservatives were arguing that dual containment was not enough and that regime change in Iraq was now essential. By toppling Saddam and turning Iraq into a vibrant democracy, they argued, the United States would trigger a far-reaching process of change throughout the Middle East. This line of thinking, of course, was evident in the "Clean Break" study the neoconservatives wrote for Netanyahu. By 2002, when invading Iraq had become a front-burner issue, regional transformation had become an article of faith in neoconservative circles.186

Charles Krauthammer describes this grand scheme as the brainchild of Natan Sharansky, the Israeli politician whose writings have impressed President Bush.187 But Sharansky was hardly a lone voice in Israel. In fact, Israelis across the political spectrum believed that toppling Saddam would alter the Middle East to Israel’s advantage. Aluf Benn reported in Ha’aretz (February 17, 2003), "Senior IDF officers and those close to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, such as National Security Advisor Ephraim Halevy, paint a rosy picture of the wonderful future Israel can expect after the war. They envision a domino effect, with the fall of Saddam Hussein followed by that of Israel’s other enemies … Along with these leaders will disappear terror and weapons of mass destruction."188

In short, Israeli leaders, neoconservatives, and the Bush Administration all saw war with Iraq as the first step in an ambitious campaign to remake the Middle East. And in the first flush of victory, they turned their sights on Israel’s other regional opponents.

Gunning for Syria

Israeli leaders did not push the Bush Administration to put its crosshairs on Syria before March 2003, because they were too busy pushing for war against Iraq. But once Baghdad fell in mid-April, Sharon and his lieutenants began urging Washington to target Damascus.189 On April 16, for example, Sharon and Shaul Mofaz, his defense minister, gave high profile interviews in different Israeli newspapers. Sharon, in Yedioth Ahronoth, called for the United States to put "very heavy" pressure on Syria.190 Mofaz told Ma’ariv that, "We have a long list of issues that we are thinking of demanding of the Syrians and it is appropriate that it should be done through the Americans."191 Sharon’s national security advisor, Ephraim Halevy, told a WINEP audience that it was now important for the United States to get rough with Syria, and the Washington Post reported that Israel was "fueling the campaign" against Syria by feeding the United States intelligence reports about the actions of Syrian President Bashar Assad.192

Prominent members of the Lobby made the same arguments after Baghdad fell.193 Wolfowitz declared that "there has got to be regime change in Syria," and Richard Perle told a journalist that "We could deliver a short message, a two-worded message [to other hostile regimes in the Middle East]: ‘You’re next’."194 In early April, WINEP released a bipartisan report stating that Syria "should not miss the message that countries that pursue Saddam’s reckless, irresponsible and defiant behavior could end up sharing his fate."195 On April 15, Yossi Klein Halevi wrote a piece in the Los Angeles Times entitled "Next, Turn the Screws on Syria," while the next day Zev Chafets wrote an article for the New York Daily News entitled "Terror-Friendly Syria Needs a Change, Too." Not to be outdone, Lawrence Kaplan wrote in the New Republic on April 21 that Syrian leader Assad was a serious threat to America.196

Back on Capitol Hill, Congressman Eliot Engel (D-NY) had reintroduced the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act on April 12.197 It threatened sanctions against Syria if it did not withdraw from Lebanon, give up its WMD, and stop supporting terrorism, and it also called for Syria and Lebanon to take concrete steps to make peace with Israel. This legislation was strongly endorsed by the Lobby—especially AIPAC—and "framed," according to the Jewish Telegraph Agency, "by some of Israel’s best friends in Congress."198 It had been on the back burner for some time, largely because the Bush Administration had little enthusiasm for it, but the anti-Syrian act passed overwhelmingly (398-4in the House; 89-4 in the Senate), and Bush signed it into law on December 12, 2003.199

Yet the Bush Administration was still divided about the wisdom of targeting Syria at this time. Although the neoconservatives were eager to pick a fight with Damascus, the CIA and the State Department were opposed. And even after Bush signed the new law, he emphasized that he would go slowly in implementing it.200

Bush’s ambivalence is understandable. First, the Syrian government had been providing the United States with important intelligence about al Qaeda since 9/11 and had also warned Washington about a planned terrorist attack in the Gulf.201 Syria had also given CIA interrogators access to Mohammed Zammar, the alleged recruiter of some of the 9/11 hijackers. Targeting the Assad regime would jeopardize these valuable connections, and thus undermine the larger war on terrorism.

Second, Syria was not on bad terms with Washington before the Iraq war (e.g., it had even voted for U.N. Resolution 1441), and it was no threat to the United States. Playing hardball with Syria would make the United States look like a bully with an insatiable appetite for beating up Arab states. Finally, putting Syria on the American hit list would give Damascus a powerful incentive to cause trouble in Iraq. Even if one wanted to pressure Syria, it made good sense to finish the job in Iraq first.

Yet Congress insisted on putting the screws to Damascus, largely in response to pressure from Israel officials and pro-Israel groups like AIPAC.202 If there were no Lobby, there would have been no Syria Accountability Act and U.S. policy toward Damascus would have been more in line with the U.S. national interest.

Putting Iran in the Crosshairs

Israelis tend to describe every threat in the starkest terms, but Iran is widely seen as their most dangerous enemy because it is the most likely adversary to acquire nuclear weapons. Virtually all Israelis regard an Islamic country in the Middle East with nuclear weapons as an existential threat. As Israeli Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer remarked one month before the Iraq war: "Iraq is a problem …. But you should understand, if you ask me, today Iran is more dangerous than Iraq."203

Sharon began publicly pushing the United States to confront Iran in November 2002, in a high profile interview in The Times (London).204 Describing Iran as the "center of world terror," and bent on acquiring nuclear weapons, he declared that the Bush Administration should put the strong arm on Iran "the day after" it conquered Iraq. In late April 2003, Ha’aretz reported that the Israeli ambassador in Washington was now calling for regime change in Iran.205 The overthrow of Saddam, he noted, was "not enough." In his words, America "has to follow through. We still have great threats of that magnitude coming from Syria, coming from Iran."

The neoconservatives also lost no time in making the case for regime change in Tehran.206 On May 6, the AEI co-sponsored an all-day conference on Iran with the pro-Israel Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and the Hudson Institute.207 The speakers were all strongly pro-Israel, and many called for the United States to replace the Iranian regime with a democracy. As usual, there were a bevy of articles by prominent neoconservatives making the case for going after Iran. For example, William Kristol wrote in the Weekly Standard on May 12 that, "The liberation of Iraq was the first great battle for the future of the Middle East …. But the next great battle – not, we hope, a military one – will be for Iran."208

The Bush Administration has responded to the Lobby’s pressure by working overtime to shut down Iran’s nuclear program. But Washington has had little success, and Iran seems determined to get a nuclear arsenal. As a result, the Lobby has intensified its pressure on the U.S. government, using all of the strategies in its playbook.209 Op-eds and articles now warn of imminent dangers from a nuclear Iran, caution against any appeasement of a "terrorist" regime, and hint darkly of preventive action should diplomacy fail. The Lobby is also pushing Congress to approve the Iran Freedom Support Act, which would expand existing sanctions on Iran. Israeli officials also warn they may take preemptive action should Iran continue down the nuclear road, hints partly intended to keep Washington focused on this issue.

One might argue that Israel and the Lobby have not had much influence on U.S. policy toward Iran, because the United States has its own reasons to keep Iran from going nuclear. This is partly true, but Iran’s nuclear ambitions do not pose an existential threat to the United States. If Washington could live with a nuclear Soviet Union, a nuclear China, or even a nuclear North Korea, then it can live with a nuclear Iran. And that is why the Lobby must keep constant pressure on U.S. politicians to confront Tehran. Iran and the United States would hardly be allies if the Lobby did not exist, but U.S. policy would be more temperate and preventive war would not be a serious option.

Summary

It is not surprising that Israel and its American supporters want the United States to deal with any and all threats to Israel’s security. If their efforts to shape U.S. policy succeed, then Israel’s enemies get weakened or overthrown, Israel gets a free hand with the Palestinians, and the United States does most of the fighting, dying, rebuilding, and paying.

But even if the United States fails to transform the Middle East and finds itself in conflict with an increasingly radicalized Arab and Islamic world, Israel still ends up protected by the world’s only superpower.210 This is not a perfect outcome from the Lobby’s perspective, but it is obviously preferable to Washington distancing itself from Israel, or using its leverage to force Israel to make peace with the Palestinians.

CONCLUSION

Can the Lobby’s power be curtailed? One would like to think so, given the Iraq debacle, the obvious need to rebuild America’s image in the Arab and Islamic world, and the recent revelations about AIPAC officials passing U.S. government secrets to Israel. One might also think that Arafat’s death and the election of the more moderate Abu Mazen would cause Washington to press vigorously and evenhandedly for a peace agreement. In short, there are ample grounds for U.S. leaders to distance themselves from the Lobby and adopt a Middle East policy more consistent with broader U.S. interests. In particular, using American power to achieve a just peace between Israel and the Palestinians would help advance the broader goals of fighting extremism and promoting democracy in the Middle East.

But that is not going to happen anytime soon. AIPAC and its allies (including Christian Zionists) have no serious opponents in the lobbying world. They know it has become more difficult to make Israel’s case today, and they are responding by expanding their activities and staffs.211 Moreover, American politicians remain acutely sensitive to campaign contributions and other forms of political pressure and major media outlets are likely to remain sympathetic to Israel no matter what it does.

This situation is deeply worrisome, because the Lobby's influence causes trouble on several fronts. It increases the terrorist danger that all states face – including America's European allies. By preventing U.S. leaders from pressuring Israel to make peace, the Lobby has also made it impossible to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This situation gives extremists a powerful recruiting tool, increases the pool of potential terrorists and sympathizers, and contributes to Islamic radicalism around the world.

Furthermore, the Lobby’s campaign for regime change in Iran and Syria could lead the United States to attack those countries, with potentially disastrous effects. We do not need another Iraq. At a minimum, the Lobby’s hostility toward these countries makes it especially difficult for Washington to enlist them against al Qaeda and the Iraqi insurgency, where their help is badly needed.

There is a moral dimension here as well. Thanks to the Lobby, the United States has become the de facto enabler of Israeli expansion in the occupied territories, making it complicit in the crimes perpetrated against the Palestinians. This situation undercuts Washington’s efforts to promote democracy abroad and makes it look hypocritical when it presses other states to respect human rights. U.S. efforts to limit nuclear proliferation appear equally hypocritical given its willingness to accept Israel’s nuclear arsenal, which encourages Iran and others to seek similar capabilities.

Moreover, the Lobby’s campaign to squelch debate about Israel is unhealthy for democracy. Silencing skeptics by organizing blacklists and boycotts – or by suggesting that critics are anti-Semites – violates the principle of open debate upon which democracy depends. The inability of the U.S. Congress to conduct a genuine debate on these vital issues paralyzes the entire process of democratic deliberation. Israel’s backers should be free to make their case and to challenge those who disagree with them. But efforts to stifle debate by intimidation must be roundly condemned by those who believe in free speech and open discussion of important public issues. Finally, the Lobby’s influence has been bad for Israel. Its ability to persuade Washington to support an expansionist agenda has discouraged Israel from seizing opportunities – including a peace treaty with Syria and a prompt and full implementation of the Oslo Accords – that would have saved Israeli lives and shrunk the ranks of Palestinian extremists. Denying the Palestinians their legitimate political rights certainly has not made Israel more secure, and the long campaign to kill or marginalize a generation of Palestinian leaders has empowered extremist groups like Hamas, and reduced the number of Palestinian leaders who would be both willing to accept a fair settlement and able to make it work. This course raises the awful specter of Israel one day occupying the pariah status once reserved for apartheid states like South Africa. Ironically, Israel itself would probably be better off if the Lobby were less powerful and U.S. policy were more evenhanded.

But there is a ray of hope. Although the Lobby remains a powerful force, the adverse effects of its influence are increasingly difficult to hide. Powerful states can maintain flawed policies for quite some time, but reality cannot be ignored forever. What is needed, therefore, is a candid discussion of the Lobby’s influence and a more open debate about U.S. interests in this vital region. Israel’s well-being is one of those interests, but not its continued occupation of the West Bank or its broader regional agenda. Open debate will expose the limits of the strategic and moral case for one-sided U.S. support and could move the United States to a position more consistent with its own national interest, with the interests of the other states in the region, and with Israel’s long-term interests as well.

John J. Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service professor of political science and the co-director of the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago, where he has taught since 1982. He graduated from West Point in 1970 and then served five years as an officer in the U.S. Air Force. He then started graduate school in political science at Cornell University in 1975. He received his Ph.D. in 1980.

Stephen M. Walt is Robert and Rene Belfer professor of international affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. He holds a B.A. in international relations from Stanford University and an M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, Berkeley. He was previously on the faculties of Princeton University and the University of Chicago.

Volume 31, Number 13 · August 16, 1984
Chomsky's 'Fateful Triangle': An Exchange
By Noam Chomsky, Edward W. Said, Michael Walzer, Reply by Avishai Margalit

In response to Israel: A Partial Indictment Volume 31, Number 11 * (June 28, 1984)
By Avishai Margalit
[This is the original article in the exchange which is a critique of Chomsky's book "Fateful Triangle". The article is available as a pay to read here.]

To the Editors:

We are told that Avishai Margalit [NYR, June 28] is a Professor of Philosophy, and yet his notion of appropriate analogy is—to say the least—defective. In reviewing Chomsky's book I had raised the question as to whether an alien immigrant population of European Jews, claiming communal or national rights in Palestine, on the basis of what God said and what an imperial power had promised them, could ever have avoided a clash with an indigenous Arab population already resident there, and unanimously against a Jewish homeland being set up on what they considered to be their land. This, says Margalit, is a nasty racist question, rather like Enoch Powell denying "colored people" the right to enter Britain. To the best of my knowledge, the blacks who were formerly British colonial subjects (and milked by Britain for centuries) make no claim to set up a black commonwealth in Britain nor, so far as I know, have they acted to drive out 65 percent of the resident population, as a prelude to occupying and ruling the whole of the British Isles, nor, to the extent that I have read and heard, is there any black leadership asserting that 2000 years ago London was promised to black residents of Uganda or Jamaica. Nor finally, has any black movement taken over Britain and legislated a Right of Return for all blacks everywhere while at the same time denying any such rights to the dispossessed and excluded inhabitants.

Any analogy between Arab Palestinians and British racists could therefore only be the result of an ideological deformation so strong as to distort even a philosopher's thinking. Put this down also to what is often referred to as the Zionist dream, although why anyone should now dream in so dishonest and tediously pious a manner as Margalit's is puzzling. The dream doubtless explains Margalit's unattractively self-congratulatory mode, especially the way he goes on about Israeli democracy. It's symptomatic of course that he makes no mention of the 650,000 Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel, who are second-class "non-Jews." The merest honesty would have compelled some acknowledgement of the basic problem: that the imposition of a rigid distinction between Jew and non-Jew has led to the numerous crises which Margalit has done an ineffective job of glossing over.
NYR David Levine Calendar

Edward Said

Columbia University

New York, New York
===============================================================================

To the Editors:

I have always admired Avishai Margalit's courageous and principled stand on the Arab-Israeli conflict, as indicated by several references in my book The Fateful Triangle, which he reviewed in the June 28 issue of The New York Review of Books, including one that only he would have been able to identify (p. 146). I was therefore disturbed by his severe misrepresentation of what I wrote, and more important, by a perspective on the central issues that I would not have expected on his part.

Margalit begins by stating that "we Israelis should, I believe, plead guilty to many of Chomsky's charges. Not to the charges as he states them, but to something not altogether unlike them." To demonstrate my alleged failure to state the charges correctly he cites the events at Khan Yunis in 1956, where, he writes, "Israel was involved, according to the UN chief inspector, General E.L.M. Burns, in the massacre of at least 275 people." Margalit has two objections to my reference to this massacre (there was another, at the Rafah refugee camp in the same area, with 111 reported killed, which he does not mention). First, he says that "knowledgeable Israeli sources" believe that the 275 figure "is too high." Second, "What is missing from this account, however, is the fact that each of the persons who were shot was identified as a fedayeen (or terrorist, in Israel's current jargon)...."

Here is what I wrote: "The Israeli occupying army carried out bloody atrocities in the Gaza Strip, killing 'at least 275 Palestinians immediately after capturing the Strip during a brutal house-to-house search for weapons and fedayeen in Khan Yunis'..." (the quote is from Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez). The Israeli claim is not "missing from this account." Margalit agrees that these "executions" were "evil." One may imagine the reaction had Israelis been slaughtered in this manner by an Arab army after an attack on Israel. In this case, the facts were suppressed for many years and are now barely known.

The figures derive from Henry Labouisse, the American director of UNRWA, who received names of 275 people killed "from sources he considers trustworthy," including "UNRWA employees, both refugees and others." The source for information on the 111 victims at Rafan 9 days later is the same. General Burns, commander of the UN Truce Supervision forces, commented that this furnished "very sad proof of the fact that the spirit that inspired the notorious Deir Yassin massacre of 1948 is not dead among some of the Israeli armed forces." I also cited corroboratory reports by the head of the Gaza observer force, Lt.-Col. R.F. Bayard of the US army, and by the editor of Al Hamishmar, Mark Gefen, who was an eyewitness to atrocities including wanton killing, for example, the murder of a doctor at Gaza hospital by an Israeli soldier. At Khan Yunis, Gefen was "shocked" to see "bloody bodies on the ground, smashed heads...no one bothered to remove them...I was still unaccustomed to the sight of a 'human' slaughter house...." He reports that atrocities continued until "Ben-Gurion himself gave orders to stop the looting, murder and robbery."

The Israeli army (IDF) claimed that people were killed in the course of resistance to their "screening operations," but the UNRWA reports and Moshe Dayan's diaries deny this claim. Note that Margalit's "fact" that "each of the persons who were shot was identified as a fedayeen" is denied by the official Israeli account, as well as by the reports cited. In fact, it seems that the army simply went on a rampage after the conquest. My own comment was that "It is an unfortunate fact that occupying armies often behave in this fashion [footnote citing examples], but then, they usually do not bask in the admiration of American intellectuals for their unique and remarkable commitment to 'purity of arms."'

One might add that "knowledgeable Israeli sources" have been notoriously unreliable, as in the case of other states with regard to their own atrocities. Recall, for example, Ben-Gurion's pretense that the 1953 Qibya massacre was not committed by the IDF, or Moshe Sharett's outraged denial of Egyptian charges concerning Israeli terrorism in Egypt in 1954 (which he knew to be accurate), and so on until the present, e.g., Israel's official claim that 340 civilians were killed and 40 buildings destroyed in the bombing of Beirut.

Margalit observes that this is "one of many unpublicized cases of Israeli brutality that Chomsky mentions." I also pointed out that across a broad spectrum of American opinion, it has regularly been claimed that "moral sensitivity is a principle of political life" in Israel and that the IDF "has from the start been animated by the same righteous anger and high moral purpose that has guided Israel through its tumultuous history" (New York Times, Time); these fables are regularly contrasted with often outright racist denunciation of Arabs (Palestinians in particular) for their violence and brutality. This pattern of deceit has been exploited with great effectiveness to enhance the vast US contribution to oppression, terror and war, with a persistent threat of superpower confrontation. I also emphasized the hypocrisy of criticism of Israel on the part of Americans who, in effect, are paying Israel to carry out the crimes that are described as flaws in this unique and magnificent record, when they become too visible to suppress. The point is not a minor one.

This is the sole example that Margalit offers to show that my account is inaccurate. Note that when his misrepresentation of what I wrote is corrected, then his conclusions are essentially the same as mine (apart from his faith in "knowledgeable Israeli sources," whatever the evidence to the contrary). This, in fact, is characteristic of his review, throughout.

Margalit's account of my discussion of the diplomatic history is similarly flawed. He claims that "to Chomsky, the Palestinians' readiness for recognition [of Israel] is evident. The evidence, for him, is the unanimous decision in April 1981 by the PLO National Council to adopt Brezhnev's explicit proposal that 'it is essential to ensure the security and sovreignty of all states of the region including those of Israel."' I do indeed cite this case, not however as "the evidence" that the PLO is ready to recognize Israel, nor even as "evidence" that it is (nothing is said here about recognition), but merely as one example of a long record of peace initiatives by the PLO and the Arab states of varying sorts.

Margalit then writes: "Another piece of evidence that Chomsky considers is the open pronouncement by the Palestinian leader Issam Sartawi that the PLO's readiness for recognition of Israel was 'crystal clear."'

Turning to the facts, first, the pronouncement was not by Sartawi but was a joint statement by Sartawi and Mattityahu Peled, whom Margalit admires as "an honorable man," one of the "good guys" (Margalit suggests that I suppress the fact that Peled and Meir Pail were in command positions during the 1956 massacres because they are on my "list of good guys"; the charge is false and baseless). Secondly, my comment on the Peled-Sartawi statement just cited is that it perhaps "exaggerates the clarity of these [PLO] declarations." Thus it is Margalit's "good guy," Peled, who states that the PLO position is "crystal clear," while I question the fact. One might note, incidentally, that Sartawi was a high-ranking PLO official while Peled, his Israeli counterpart in peace efforts, has no standing in Israeli politics.

I added that while the PLO position is not as "crystal clear" as Peled suggests, "there is no doubt about the general drift of policy of the PLO and the Arab states, the 'panic' that this has regularly inspired in Israel [citing Amos Elon], and the reaction of dismissal or simply denial of the facts in the United States."

This exhausts Margalit's discussion of my treatment of the diplomatic history. He then concludes that while there were "signals" from the PLO, "they were accompanied by too much surrounding noise.... Chomsky hears only the signals...." This charge is false, as the very case he cites demonstrates when his misrepresentations are corrected. Throughout, I present the record as it is, noting ambiguities and "noise."

In this connection, Margalit cites a statement by Farouk Kadoumi that Israel would eventually have to accept the PLO plan for a democratic secular state, nothing that "This statement does not appear in Chomsky's book." Similarly, many statements by leaders of Labor rejecting a political settlement with the Palestinians—now or ever—do not appear. I do, however, point out that the "dreams" of PLO leaders do not pose a barrier to negotiations and political settelement any more than Ben-Gurion's long-term plans for a Jewish state including Transjordan and southern Syria and Lebanon ruled him out as a participant in negotiations in the 1940s—and one can cite more recent and current examples. As I noted, my account is by no means exhaustive, though it does suffice to establish the falsity of the propaganda that is accepted with little question in the US.

Furthermore, the two cases Margalit mentions are marginal to my account. The most crucial cases Margalit ignores entirely, for example, 'Sadat's peace proposal of February 1971, which offered nothing to the Palestinians (rejected by Israel with US backing), or the January 1976 UN Security Council resolution proposed by Syria, Jordan and Egypt, calling for a two-state settlement of just the sort that Margalit himself endorses, and vetoed by the US. The PLO openly backed the resolution and indeed "prepared" it according to President Chaim Herzog, then Israel's UN Ambassador. Israel's response to the calling of the UN session was to bomb Lebanon with over fifty civilians reported killed. It refused to attend the session, and the Rabin (Labor) government announced that it would have no dealings with any Palestinians on any political issue, and no dealings with the PLO whatever stand it took.

In fact, recently released evidence reveals that Israel's evasion of Arab offers of political settlement can be dated not just to 1971 but to 1948–1949 (see, e.g., Yoram Nimrod, Monitin, February 1984).

One might usefully turn back to Margalit's article in Ramparts, April 1975, published at my initiative, in which he noted that "the Israeli leadership wants desperately to circumvent the Palestinian issue at almost any cost" and thus rejects "the Two State Solution." He urged dialogue with the PLO "on the basis of various hints and indications to the effect that the PLO would in fact be willing to consider something like the Two State Solution"; if this solution "were accepted by the PLO—well and good." A few months later, this solution was accepted by the PLO at the UN. I find it strange that he should ignore this fact.

What is noteworthy about Margalit's account is not just his falsification of the record and of my adequately qualified review of it, but also the tacit assumption throughout that the only issue is the clarity of the PLO's offers. Margalit describes Israel as "a bully" which, however, "has a right to a room of his own in the building." As he notes, I agree, but I would add that the sight of the bully standing with his foot on his victim's neck wondering whether the victim has been sufficiently forthcoming, whether his signals are clear enough, whether he adequately recognizes the legitimacy of his oppressor, is not a particularly pretty one. And I am surprised to see Margalit writing as though the stance of the bully and his protector is a matter of little significance.

While the initiatives of the Arab states and the PLO vary in clarity and precision, as I wrote, there is no doubt about the unwavering rejectionism of the US and Israel, both Labor and Likud. These have been the crucial factors blocking the kind of settlement that Margalit has always advocated. As I documented, the basic facts have been suppressed or denied in the US, thus enabling the US and Israel to pursue policies that have led to oppression, conflict and the threat of nuclear war, and will continue to do so. It is constantly proclaimed in the US that Arab intransigence and PLO rejectionism block a political settlement that recognizes the right of self-determination of Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs. In fact, the US and Israel have led the rejectionist camp. This story is one of the most spectacular achievements of contemporary Agitprop, on a par with the tales about Israel's fabled moral superiority. All of this Margalit ignores, while misrepresenting the two cases he does discuss.

Margalit notes that in early May 1984, Arafat did make an "explicit" proposal in favor of mutual recognition of Israel and the PLO. To complete the story, Israel at once rejected these offers made by Arafat in interviews in France and England and in statements on his visit to Bangladesh and China. A month later, UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar proposed an international peace conference; the proposal was rejected by Prime Minister Shamir and Shimon Peres, speaking for the Labor opposition. The US had rejected a similar proposal in January. The national press in the US has been silent about all of this.

As Margalit was writing, Labor announced its political program reiterating its famliar stand: negotiations only with Jordan and not the Palestinians, no Palestinian state, no uprooting of Jewish settlements, evacuation only of areas of dense Arab population in "Judea and Samaria"; and Shimon Peres called for expansion of Jordan Valley settlements and incorporation of the region within Israel (Ha'aretz, May 27, 4).

These latest events are consistent with US and Israeli policy for the past fifteen years. Israel has never deviated from the position expresed by Foreign Minister Abba Eban of the Labor Party that the Palestinians "have no role to play" in any peace settlement, and the US has in practice kept to the rejectionist stance inaugurated by Kissinger and maintained through the "peace process," the 1982 Reagan Plan (immediately undermined by the US government), and since, as I discuss at length, contrary to another of Margalit's false claims: that in discussing "the American side, Chomsky confines himself largely to Israel's liberal 'fellow travelers' " (the term is his, as he notes). I do indeed discuss the shameful role of Israel's "ardent supporters" (Irving Howe's self-description) and their substantial contribution to the Palestinian catastrophe, the moral degeneration and ultimate destruction of Israel, and the threat of nuclear war; but the evolution of US policy and its background is also developed in some detail.

While Margalit sees only a "one-sided polemic" against Israel, other reviewers, no less critical, have been able to perceive that in fact the book "examines the causes and the evolution of the 'special relationship' between the United States and Israel and its impact on the Palestinian people" (Prof. Michael Rubner, American-Arab Affairs), while also refraining from distortions of the sort just illustrated.

Margalit makes much of my reliance on the documentary record instead of personal impressions—a common argument; in contrast, I have never heard critics of the PLO condemned for not having lived in Palestinian refugee camps. He appears to object to the characterization I give on this basis of the positions of the two major political groupings, the Labor Alignment and Likud. I say "appears," because in fact he offers no objection and his own conclusions are consistent with those I present. It is not in question that Labor has never veered from its rejectionist position. Margalit nevertheless feels that "between the sane hypocrisies of the [Labor] Alignment and the self-righteous brutality of the Likud, I would not hesitate to prefer the Alignment," which might "exchange territories for peace" (the standard Labor formula, concealing its explicit intent to maintain control of large parts of the occupied territories). He fails to remark that my own view is not very different: "It is difficult to conjure up a picture of Labor as constituting a meaningful opposition, though one might reasonably argue that support for Labor is nevertheless justified when one considers what Begin and his cohorts are likely to do in the future."

Margalit's impressions are of interest, as are those of others, e.g., Mattityahuu Peled, who describes the Labor Party as "a major champion" of the position that "Israel's interests dictate a denial of the Palestinian's legitimate rights" (New Outlook, February 1981). The documentary record, to this day, supports Peled's judgment; a close reading of Margalit's impressions fails to reveal any significant difference.

The crucial point is that neither of the major political groupings in Israel, or even Peace Now, has come as close as the mainstream of the PLO to accepting the international consensus on a two-state political settlement, the solution that both Margalit and I regard as the only viable alternative to continued oppression and war. This fact emerges clearly from the documentary record, and Margalit's personal impressions do not contest it. All of this is, of course, radically different from the picture presented by "fellow travelers" here, or by such Israeli doves as Amos Oz, as I document.

This pattern of apparent objection and tacit agreement runs through the entire review. Thus Margalit dismisses without argument my critique of the Kahan Commission report, while recommending the "excellent analysis" by Shimon Lehrer, in Hebrew. Naturally, I agree with this recommendation, since Lehrer reaches the same conclusions that I do on essentially the same evidence, though his focus is somewhat narrower (e.g., he does not consider the disgraceful "history" or the failure to deal with crucial evidence) and he goes well beyond my criticisms, suggesting that Defense Minister Sharon and Chief of Staff Eitan should have been charged with crimes that carry penalties of up to twenty years in prison (pp. 43f.). Margalit in fact goes beyond either of us in comparing Israel's actions at Sabra-Shatila to "appointing Dr. Mengele as chief surgeon at the Hadassah Hospital."

In fact, there were a number of excellent criticisms of the report in Israel, while here there was only awe at Israel's "salvation" and "sublimity," leading to expanded aid in recognition of Israel's achievements, in a remarkable PR excercise. To my knowledge, the only critical commentary was my own (Inquiry, June 1983), included in the book under review. Margalit appears to agree with my conclusions and analysis, while making it appear that he rejects them.

Margalit discusses the Israeli opposition to the Lebanon war and alleges that "one of the factors that contributed to the virtual ineffectiveness of this opposition" was the increase in size of the professional army. Perhaps, but more important factors were the silent assent of the Labor Party throughout and the enormous popularity of the war, which reached its peak (more than 80 percent popular approval) in late August, after the destruction of southern Lebanon and the savage bombardment of Beirut. Opposition began to develop on a serious scale, both in Israel and the US, after the Sabra-Shatila massacres and after the costs of the occupation began to mount.

Margalit observes correctly that I am "full of praise for the Israeli press," on which I rely heavily. He adds: "But it is important to emphasize that it is not underground journalism that is in question here," but the mainstream press. That is clear and explicit in what I wrote.

He adds further that "One can be impressed with Israel's democracy while rejecting its colonialism." That, however, is only a partial truth. For its Jewish citizens, Israel is a democracy on the Western model, but it is also "the sovereign State of the Jewish people" (as the courts have declared), and for the 16 percent minority that is not Jewish its practices are often disgraceful, a fact also concealed by "fellow travelers" here. To take some examples that appeared in the Israeli press as Margalit was writing these words, in the occupied territories a Palestinian worker was blinded by an IDF officer while under detention for having built a house without a permit and a wellknown Palestinian artist was sentenced to six months in prison for painting a picture that included in one corner the colors that appear in the Palestinian flag (Hadashot, May 5, 16); while within the Green Line two Arab villagers were sentenced to house arrest on charges of having raised a Palestinian flag on the Day of the Land (Ha'aretz, May 6; they allege that they were tortured), and an Arab lecturer at Haifa university was arrested at 1 AM and interrogated through the night in an apparent attempt to intimidate him and make him abandon his plans to form an Arab political party (Ha'aretz, April 29). A difference, no doubt, but not one that leads us to chant praises of Israeli democracy in the manner of the "fellow travelers."

This is quite standard. Apart from harassment and intimidation, an intricate complex of legal and administrative arrangements place 92 percent of the land within the Green Line under the effective control of an organization committed to work "for the benefit of persons of Jewish religion, race or origin," and much of the development budget is similarly organized (tax-free contributions in the US are used for these purposes); and there is a regular pattern of imposed segregation, denial of right of free expression, extraordinary punishments (e.g., an inhabitant of Kafr Kassem was sentenced to a year in prison "for pretending to be a Jew in order to marry a [Jewish] woman" after being refused permission to convert, the same sentence that was meted out to an IDF officer who murdered 43 Arabs in Kafr Kassem in one hour in another 1956 massacre), and much else—as we would expect in a State that is not the State of its citizens, by law. All of this too has been suppressed for many years in the US.

Margalit's preference for personal impressions over the public record serves him poorly when he turns to my discussion of those he calls "fellow travelers," in particular, Irving Howe, Michael Walzer, and Martin Peretz. He writes: "I do not at all like what he has to say about the first two," and expresses his wish that they had much more influence than they do. I had little to say about them beyond quoting their words, and I am not surprised that Margalit does not like these words. I find it hard to believe that he wishes that their views had more influence: for example, Walzer's explicit support for the Lebanon war ("I certainly welcome the political defeat of the PLO, and I believe that the limited military operation [sic] required to inflict that defeat can be defended under the theory of just war"; September 8, 1982) and his advocacy of transfer of Israeli Arab citizens (the problems of those who are "marginal to the nation" can be "smoothed" by "helping people to leave who have to leave," in a 1972 book edited by Irving Howe and Carl Gershman; the idea that the indigenous population should be transferred has deep roots in the Zionist left, as I document). Note that Walzer goes beyond the position of right-wing extremists such as Hanan Porat, who restricts this proposal to West Bank Palestinians ("Israel can help by buying their land or giving them economic assistance to leave").

Or to turn to the man whom the Labor press describes as such a "lover of Israel" that "when no more supporters of Israel will remain in the United States—he will still be waving the blue and white flag" (Irving Howe), does Margalit really approve of his venomous attacks, always presented without evidence or argument, against those who dared to report facts that showed that all might not be well in the Holy State, or his exploitation of the widespread sympathy for Israel after its 1967 victory to slander his political enemies, as when he claimed that Israel would have to institute a bloody fascist-style dictatorship to win the support of Sartre or the New Left from Scarsdale to Palo Alto—at a time when Sartre was being honored by the Hebrew University in recognition of his support for Israel and the New Left was overwhelmingly dovish Zionist, its journals publishing such articles as the one by Margalit cited above? I doubt it. It seems odd to criticize the bearer of these tidings, not the message conveyed.

The contibution of "fellow travelers" to bringing Israel to the present state that Margalit deplores has been substantial. This fact is well-understood by the Israeli doves whom Margalit admires, for example, Peled and Pail, both of whom have denounced the American Jewish community (though as I note, their criticism is far too narrow) for its ideological fanaticism and its "idolatrous cult-worship of a Jewish fortress-state," which are driving Israel to become "a complex compound of the racist state structure of South Africa and the violent, terror-ridden social fabric of Northern Ireland," "a war-god similar to Mars" (Pail). If we attend to the documented facts, not personal impressions, we will discover that the record of apologists such as those I quoted is a dismal one over the past years.

Margalit believes that I resort to "Realpolitik" when I point out that the demand that the Palestinians not only recognize Israel but also recognize its "legitimacy" is "an unprecedented demand" that simply places "another barrier in the path of eventual negotiations and political settlement." This is not Realpolitik, but rather objection to state worship. In particular, one can hardly expect the indigenous population of the former Palestine to recognize the "legitimacy" of the "sovereign State of the Jewish people" which has displaced them; I do not think that Margalit should recognize the "legitimacy" of such a state, or for that matter that any state should be accorded inherent "legitimacy." People have the right of self-determination, and may choose to exercise it in a state form, with consequences that we may and often should deplore. The states so formed have whatever rights are accorded to states in the international system, nothing more. Margalit believes that my view is a counterpart to that of Israelis who deny self-determination to Palestinians, but he has missed the point. People have rights, including the right of self-determination. States have no inherent "legitimacy." This is indeed an unprecedented demand, and simply a further barrier to peace.

In developing this point, Margalit crucially switches his position. He begins by speaking of the demand that Palestinians recognize Israel's legitimacy, then turning to an explanation of why it is so important to insist that Palestinians "recognize Israel." He writes: "I don't believe myself that the demand for the Palestinian recognition of Israel is 'irrelevant."' Nor do I; the difference between recognition and recognition of legitimacy is fundamental. He slips from the second to the first, in the process undermining his fallacious argument.

In this connection, Margalit writes that the objection of Palestinians to Jewish immigration "has a nasty ring," "associated with Enoch Powell's brand of racism." The analogy is remarkable. Simply imagine what the reaction would have been in England if settlers had arrived with the intent of establishing a Black state in their former home, explaining to the natives that they should be transferred elsewhere (Ben-Gurion, Katznelson, Walzer, etc.), supported by external sources of wealth and power that were prodigious by the standards of the indigenous population who were under imperial rule.

Given the US role in perpetuating the Arab-Israeli conflict and the enormous stakes, regionally and beyond, it is most unfortunate that it remains so difficult to deal with the issues in a straightforward and accurate manner in American journals.

Noam Chomsky

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Cambridge, Massachusetts
==================================================================================

To the Editors:

Since I largely agree with Avishai Margalit's review of Noam Chomsky's Fateful Triangle, I am especially glad that Margalit does "not at all like" what Chomsky has to say about Irving Howe and myself. Indeed, what Chomsky has to say is not at all likable. But does Margalit "like" what Chomsky has written about Martin Peretz? His review is carefully ambiguous. Chomsky, by contrast, is recklessly forthright and all of a piece. The same graceless sarcasm, the same impersonal and self-righteous hatred, is directed against the three of us. Not without reason: the most recent essays by Howe and myself on the Middle East were published in Peretz's New Republic; and Peretz is a member of the editorial board of Dissent, which Howe and I edit, and which has recently carried a number of articles on Israeli politics. The three of us argue among ourselves, as friends; but we don't argue in the same way with Chomsky, whose forte, in any case, is not argument but ideological denunciation. So Chomsky is right to denounce the three of us together (and so many others too). And the right policy for a reviewer with Margalit's intelligence and his moral and political commitment is sympathy for all the denounced—as for all the oppressed. We can argue later.

Michael Walzer

The Institute for Advanced Study

Princeton, New Jersey
==============================================================================

Avishai Margalit replies:

Reply to Edward Said:

Even an Israeli professor of philosophy can see differences between the immigration of Jews to Palestine and the colored immigration to Britain. Not just because of the reasons Edward Said and Noam Chomsky laboriously mention, but also because of what they both neglect to mention, namely, that the Palestinians, unlike the British, did not have their own state at the time. But the point of my analogy was different. It had to do with Said's specific reason for denying the Jews' right to immigrate to Palestine. The reason he cited was the objection of the indigenous population to that immigration and the cycle of violence that was to be expected as a result of that opposition.

An expected cycle of violence is a weighty moral and political problem. But as a justification for the denial of rights—to the extent that such rights exist—it is unacceptable. That is Enoch Powell's justification.

There is in my view nothing ridiculous in the idea that Palestinians, uprooted from their land, continue to yearn to return to it and transmit this legacy from one generation to the next—even for two thousand years, if, heaven forbid, need be. I see nothing ridiculous in the idea that their descendents will eventually claim communal rights in the land from which their ancestors were forcibly expelled. After all, even now most Palestinians who talk of "return" were born after 1948 and do not use the term "return" literally.

If and when they come to claim their rights they will, as far as I'm concerned, have to invoke neither a promise from the Lord in heaven nor, for that matter, one from Lord Balfour: Zionism too did not couch its claims in the name of these Lords.

When the Messiah comes, an old Jewish saying tells us, there will be no difference between a parable and its paraphrase. When I read Said I feel as if the Messiah were already here.
==================================================================================

Reply to Noam Chomsky:

I had hoped that with some care—and luck—I might be spared Chomsky's bitter "Et tu, Avishai Margalit!" It seems that I have failed. I am genuinely saddened by the fact that Chomsky is disturbed by what he takes to be my severe misrepresentation of his views.

I have not offered Chomsky a plea bargain in which I, as an Israeli, will confess to some of the charges in return for a softening of the indictment. My intention was quite the opposite. Even in cases where I think that the facts, in part, are different from those presented by Chomsky, as in the case of Khan Yunis, I believe that an evil deed has been done—no less evil than what Chomsky holds it to be. In my view bureaucratic murder according to pre-prepared lists and without trial is as evil as murder committed by rampageous soldiers hitting innocent civilians. It is no less evil: it is a different evil.

I took Chomsky to be arguing that what occurred at Khan Yunis in 1956 was similar to what occurred in 1982 at Sabra and Shatila: the murder of innocent civilians under the guise of a house-to-house search for terrorists. I in contrast believe, on the basis of my own "reliable sources," that at Khan Yunis there was indeed a search according to prepared lists, and that the number of killings was lower than that reported by Chomsky. And yet my moral evaluation is no different from his. In fact, I am myself more alarmed by an Israel in whose name bureaucratic murders are committed by order and without trial, than by an Israel some of whose soldiers go on a murderous rampage without an order.

In general it was not my intention to claim that Chomsky has not made a real effort to arrive at a correct description of the facts. On the contrary, it is in fact impossible not to be impressed with Chomsky's heroic effort to reach the totality of printed sources dealing with the events he describes.

If asked to pinpoint the difference between Chomsky and myself, I would venture that it has relatively little to do either with the facts or with their moral evaluation. The difference between us is sometimes—not always—in the light shed by these facts, or rather the shadow they cast, on the general context to which they belong.

A clear example of this is Chomsky's account of Israel's war of independence, almost half of which is devoted to the massacre at Deir Yassin. It is quite impossible to my mind to read that section of his book without viewing the 1948 war through the prism of that massacre. To me this is a disturbing distortion: it strikes me as similar to presenting the Allies in World War II through the prism of the bombing of Dresden.

My argument here is not the trivial one, that Deir Yassin is not a "representative sample" of that war. Massacres are usually not representative. My claim is that this is in no way an "ideal type" of Israel's war of independence in the sense of its being an isolated event that happens to accentuate the characteristic features of that war.

There is, on the other hand, no difference between Chomsky and myself regarding the evaluation of the events at sabra and Shatila and their role in the general context of the Lebanon War. Where we do differ is the evaluation of the commission of inquiry set up to investigate these events. Chomsky criticizes the commission for not making a genuine effort to get down to the facts. I, however, criticize the commission for its failure, in spite of having come up with the true facts of the case, to draw the necessary conclusions.

Chomsky's example for what he takes as evidence that the commission did not really attempt to get to the truth is its having neglected to investigate the allegations that Haddad's militiamen participated in the Sabra and Shatila massacre. This is an important issue because Haddad's forces can be considered IDF forces for most practical purposes, and hence, the responsibility of Israel, should these allegations prove true, is quite direct. There is no doubt that the Phalanges were interested in implicating Haddad's forces, thereby exonerating themselves. The PLO too had a clear interest in incriminating Israel through Haddad. At any rate, this matter was diligently and thoroughly investigated by the commission. This, too, I know from my "reliable sources." Chomsky may be permitted to doubt these sources. But he may not be permitted to deny that there is between us a difference that makes a difference. It is not a case, as he claims, where I tacitly agree with him while merely creating the false impression that I disagree with him.

Chomsky quite generally tends to attribute to me too many tacit things—not necessarily, in this case, tacit knowledge or generative grammer. Thus, I find myself holding the tacit assumption that "the only issue [in the Middle East conflict] is the clarity of the PLO offer," in spite of the fact that my entire review belies this assumption. In fact, I adopt in my article the view that the Lebanon war started largely because of Begin's concern over the potential political implications of the growing moderation of the PLO. (This view, by the way, recently received surprising support from the Vice Chief of Staff, David Ivri.)

Also, I have explicitly reported the positions of the two major parties in Israel as totally rejecting the notion of a Palestinian state, not to mention negotiations with the PLO. Moreover, I have my suspicion that were Arafat to come up with a declaration that is a precise copy of Sadat's declaration, stating that he is ready to come to the Knesset in Jerusalem to talk peace, the response by any Israeli government, or, for that matter, by the Reagan administration, would be nothing more than malign neglect.

This opinion is not shared by my friends. Most of them believe that a Sadat-like dynamic would develop in such a case. Be that as it may, it is beyond me why Chomsky saw fit to make an implicit assumption about my views that he knows full well I explicitly reject. As for the PLO position, I do believe its general drift is toward accommodation with Israel. Unlike Chomsky, I do not say "there is no doubt about" it. Most of my doubts have to do with the period previous to the PLO evacuation from Beirut. They derive from statements like the following from the proposed political platform that was adopted by the 4th Fatah Conference in May 1980:

The Fatah movement is a national revolutionary independence movement whose goals are: the liberation of Palestine, a full and complete liberation; the annihilation of the Zionist entity in all of its economic, political, military, and cultural manifestations; and the establishment of an independent democratic Palestine which would rule the entire land of Palestine.[*]

The reason why I am not overimpressed with such statements, unlike Chomsky, who seems to take too seriously the declarations by the Labor-alignment leaders on the eve of elections, is that I myself have met with a sufficient number of PLO-supporting Palestinians to realize that the general drift is in another direction.

In spite of the Labor party's recent statements I believe—though I'm not sure—that its general drift is different from what it was in the days of Meir, Galili, and Dayan. To be sure, not with respect to the PLO. But in the direction of some sort of Jordanian-Palestinian combination. After all, such a combination was not far from being realized: in 1983 Arafat had promised King Hussein of Jordan to return to him "at the weekend" with a green light from his movement, but failed to show up. Perhaps in the future he will.

I claimed that Israel is a democratic country. I did not say it was a just society, or even a particularly decent one. It is democratic in the sense that it upholds the freedom of speech and of political organization. Thus, many of the 16 percent of Israeli Arab citizens vote for the Communist party. The discrimination against Arab citizens of Israel in other respects, though real and obnoxious, seems to me irrelevant to the point at issue.

It is told of a person who took a speed-reading course that, after leafing through the pages of War and Peace, he put the book down and summarized it by saying "it's about Russia." A speed leafing through Chomsky's book, as well as a slow and careful reading of it, would yield the conclusion that it is about Israel. Or, to be more precise, about Israel's relations with the Palestinians. In this sense it is a one-sided book, given its title which promises to treat three sides. To claim otherwise is a fateful attempt to triangle the circle.
===============================================================================

Reply to Michael Walzer:

In the Old Republic of Rome just one of the triumvirate crossed the Rubicon. In the triumvirate of the New Republic just one crossed the Awali River. It was Martin Peretz. He came up with an eyewitness report which reminds the reader of the Webbs' report from Soviet Russia. Hence, it was not an error of omission on my part not to come to his rescue.
Notes

[*] Raphael Israeli, ed., PLO in Lebanon: Selected Documents (St. Martin's, 1983), p. 13.

This piece by Dennis Perrin was published on his blog on January 15th. I think it's revealing, and you should read it.

Human communication takes many forms, but demonization has its own distinct flavor, and blends in nicely with any historical era. Here are two examples of what I mean.

1.

"As Germany persists in its military efforts — by ground, air and sea — to protect its citizens from deadly Jewish bullets, and as protests against Germany increase around the world, the success of the abominable Jews' double war crime strategy becomes evident.

"People forget the usual rules of morality and law. For example, when a murderer takes a hostage and fires from behind his human shield, and a policeman, in an effort to stop the shooting accidentally kills the hostage, the law of every country holds the hostage taker guilty of murder even though the policeman fired the fatal shot.

"The same is true of the law of war. The use of human shields, in the way Jews use the civilian population of their ghetto, is a war crime — as is their firing at German soldiers and Polish civilians. Every human shield that is killed by German self-defense measures is the responsibility of the Jews, but you wouldn't know that from reading the press coverage.

"Moreover, the number of civilians killed by Germany is almost always exaggerated. First, it is widely assumed that if a victim is a 'child' or a 'woman,' he or she is necessarily a civilian. The Jews often use 14-, 15-, 16-and 17-year-olds, as well as women, as terrorists. Germany is entitled under international law to treat these children and women as the combatants they have become.

"By any objective count, the number of genuinely innocent civilians killed by the Reich in Poland is lower than the collateral deaths caused by any nation in a comparable situation. Jews do everything in their power to provoke Germany into killing as many Jewish civilians as possible, in order to generate condemnation against the Aryan state."

2.

"The responsibility of global Islam for the outbreak and widening of this war has been proven so clearly that it does not need to be talked about any further. The Muslims wanted war, and now they have it. Hamas is receiving a penalty that is certainly hard, but more than deserved.

"Every Muslim is our enemy in this historic struggle, regardless of whether he vegetates in a Gaza camp or carries on his parasitic existence in Jerusalem or blows the trumpets of war in Lebanon or Iran. All Muslims by virtue of their birth and their race are part of an international conspiracy against the Jewish state. They want its defeat and annihilation, and do all in their power to bring it about.

"The excuse they give for their provocative conduct is always the same: the Palestinians are after all human beings too. We never denied that, just as we never denied the humanity of murders, child rapists, thieves and pimps. Every Palestinian is a decent Palestinian who has found a dumb and ignorant goy who thinks him decent! As if that were a reason to give Palestinians a kind of honorable escort. What nonsense.

"The Palestinians have recently found a new trick. They knew the good-natured Jewish humanitarian in us, always ready to shed sentimental tears for the injustice done to them. One suddenly has the impression that the Gazan population consists only of little babies whose childish helplessness might move us, or else fragile old ladies. The Palestinians send out the pitiable. They may confuse some harmless souls for a while, but not us. We know exactly what the situation is.

"For their sake alone we must win the war. If we lose it, these harmless-looking Palestinian men would suddenly become raging wolves. They would attack our women and children to carry out revenge. There are enough examples in history. There is no turning back in our battle against the Palestinians — even if we wanted to, which we do not.

"If Hamas and the Palestinians appeal to your sentimentality, realize that they are hoping for your forgetfulness, and let them know that you see through them and hold them in contempt.

"The Palestinians are responsible for the war. The treatment they receive from us is hardly unjust. They have deserved it all."

Beautiful sentiments, no? Can you guess who wrote them?

The first excerpt came from this lovely man. The second was penned by this gentle soul. Switch certain nouns around and damn if you can tell the difference! But the difference is clear, yes?

posted by Dennis Perrin at 10:57 AM

In case you didn't know, the first is Alan Dershowitz and the second is Josef Goebbels.

http://www.democracynow.org/2009/1/8/former_amb_martin_indyk_vs_author
DEMOCRACY NOW
January 8, 2009
Former Amb. Martin Indyk vs. Author Norman Finkelstein: A Debate on Israel’s Assault on Gaza and the US Role in the Conflict

The Israeli assault on Gaza is entering its thirteenth day. Some 700 Palestinians have been killed, with many thousands more wounded, and a humanitarian crisis is mounting. Ten Israelis have died, four by “friendly fire.” A ceasefire has not been reached, and the offensive continues. We host a debate between Martin Indyk, the former US ambassador to Israel and Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs during the Clinton administration, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution and author of, Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East, and Norman Finkelstein, author of several books, including The Holocaust Industry, Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict and Beyond Chutzpah. [includes rush transcript]

PART 1

PART 2

PART 3

PART 4

Guests:

Martin Indyk, Ambassador to Israel and Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs during the Clinton administration. He is currently the director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. He has a new book out titled Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East.

Norman Finkelstein, author of several books, including The Holocaust Industry, Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict and Beyond Chutzpah.

Rush Transcript

JUAN GONZALEZ: Tens of thousands of Palestinians have fled their homes in the southern town of Rafah as Israel intensifies the assault on the Gaza Strip. Palestinians reported Israeli air strikes hit homes, mosques and tunnels in the area. Meanwhile, Agence France-Presse quoted witnesses as saying that dozens of Israeli tanks had entered southern Gaza and were heading towards Rafah. Fierce fighting was also reported between Palestinian fighters and Israeli soldiers around Khan Yunis. Earlier today, the UN said Israeli forces fired on one of its relief convoys trying to pick up supplies. Al Jazeera reports at least one Palestinian was killed and two others injured in the attack. Meanwhile, Israel continued its bombardment of Gaza with sixty air strikes overnight. Residents described it as among the heaviest bombardments since the offensive began.

Al Jazeera reports at least 700 Palestinians, including 219 children, have died in Gaza since Israel began its assault on December 27th. More than 3,000 people have been wounded. Ten Israelis have died over the same thirteen-day period, including seven soldiers, four of them by so-called friendly fire.

On the diplomatic front, efforts to secure a truce in Gaza continue, with a senior Israeli official due to travel to Cairo to hear details of a ceasefire plan drawn up by Egypt and France. Israel said on Wednesday it accepted the “principles” of the proposal but wanted to study the plan. A Hamas delegation is expected in Cairo at some stage for parallel talks. Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas is due to arrive on Friday.

Meanwhile, the UN Security Council seems deadlocked over the crisis. Arab countries want the Council to vote on a resolution calling for a ceasefire while Britain, France and the US are pushing for a weaker statement welcoming the Egypt-France proposal.

AMY GOODMAN: We turn now to a discussion on the crisis in Gaza, the US role in the conflict and what the prospects are for the incoming Obama administration.

Martin Indyk is the former US ambassador to Israel and Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs during the Clinton administration. He’s currently the director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. He has a new book out; it’s called Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East. He’s an adviser to Hillary Clinton, who was tapped to be Obama’s Secretary of State, and is among those mentioned as a potential special envoy to the Middle East. Martin Indyk joins us from Washington, D.C.

We’re also joined by Norman Finkelstein here in New York, leading critic of Israeli foreign policy, the author of several books, including The Holocaust Industry, Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict and Beyond Chutzpah.

We turn first to Ambassador Indyk. Can you explain why you think Israel began this assault almost two weeks ago now?

MARTIN INDYK: Good morning, Amy. Thanks very much for having me on the show. I feel a little bit sandbagged here. I was not told that I was going to be in some kind of debate with Norman Finkelstein. I’m not interested in doing that. I’m also not here as a spokesman for Israel. But I will try to answer your questions as best I can.

I think that what happened here was that there was a ceasefire, an informal ceasefire, between Hamas and Israel that had lasted for about five months. Hamas decided to break that ceasefire with a prolonged series of rocket attacks on Israeli civilians in southern Israel. And the Israeli government responded with overwhelming force, designed, as they have said, to try to reestablish deterrence, to prevent Hamas from doing that again, and to try to get a ceasefire in place that would prevent Hamas from smuggling in offensive weapons into Gaza, the better to attack Israel.

AMY GOODMAN: Norman Finkelstein, your assessment of why Israel attacked now?

NORMAN FINKELSTEIN: Well, the record is fairly clear. You can find it on the Israeli website, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. Mr. Indyk is correct that Hamas had adhered to the ceasefire from June 17th until November 4th. On November 4th, here Mr. Indyk, I think, goes awry. The record is clear: Israel broke the ceasefire by going into the Gaza and killing six or seven Palestinian militants. At that point—and now I’m quoting the official Israeli website—Hamas retaliated or, in retaliation for the Israeli attack, then launched the missiles.

Now, as to the reason why, the record is fairly clear as well. According to Ha’aretz, Defense Minister Barak began plans for this invasion before the ceasefire even began. In fact, according to yesterday’s Ha’aretz, the plans for the invasion began in March. And the main reasons for the invasion, I think, are twofold. Number one, as Mr. Indyk I think correctly points out, to enhance what Israel calls its deterrence capacity, which in layman’s language basically means Israel’s capacity to terrorize the region into submission. After their defeat in July 2006 in Lebanon, they felt it important to transmit the message that Israel is still a fighting force, still capable of terrorizing those who dare defy its word.

And the second main reason for the attack is because Hamas was signaling that it wanted a diplomatic settlement of the conflict along the June 1967 border. That is to say, Hamas was signaling they had joined the international consensus, they had joined most of the international community, overwhelmingly the international community, in seeking a diplomatic settlement. And at that point, Israel was faced with what Israelis call a Palestinian peace offensive. And in order to defeat the peace offensive, they sought to dismantle Hamas.

JUAN GONZALEZ: I’d like to—Ambassador Indyk, this issue of supporters of Israel say repeatedly that Hamas is still committed to the destruction of Israel. Is your sense that over the last year or so there has been some kind of a change in the viewpoints of the Hamas leaders?

MARTIN INDYK: No, I don’t think there’s any evidence of that. Hamas is very clear that it will not make peace with Israel; it will not recognize Israel; its intention is to destroy the Jewish state, that it’s an abomination in the midst of the Arab heartland, Islamic world, and so on. And I don’t see that there’s any change in that whatsoever.

I think the change that’s taken place is a change on the ground. Hamas, having won the PA elections and then—we don’t need to go into the details of that, but essentially what happened was, as a result of a competition between Hamas and Fatah over who would rule, Hamas took control of Gaza by force in what was, in effect, a putsch against the Palestinian Authority. It therefore moved from being a terrorist organization to a terrorist government, responsible for controlling territory in Gaza and responsible for meeting the needs of one-and-a-half million Palestinians in Gaza.

There was a fundamental change in Hamas’s organization. By the way, it was a change which was hotly contested within Hamas. The external leadership of Hamas, which is based in Damascus, led by Khaled Meshal, was at the time deeply opposed to the idea of taking control of Gaza, precisely because he did not want to be responsible for meeting the needs of the Gazans. But the militants of Hamas in Gaza decided to take on Fatah and kick them out.

And as a consequence, Hamas was then placed in a dilemma. It may, over time—as they face the consequences of having to rule in Gaza, it may, over time, moderate their position. Certainly, now they have to consider, in the context of the diplomatic efforts underway that you detailed for a ceasefire, what is more important to them: continuing their ability to attack Israel from Gaza—and in that case, they will not accept the kind of arrangements that Israel is now insisting on that would prevent them smuggling in offensive weapons—or whether they want to focus on meeting the needs of the Palestinian people. For that purpose, they will need the opening of the passages so that goods and people can flow in and out of Gaza. In other words, they’re going to face a choice between whether they want to have the ability to use this ceasefire—eventually, when it will be established—to continue their what they call resistance, what normally we understand as violence and terrorism against civilians, whether they’re going to continue that or whether they’re going to focus on meeting the needs of the people that they’re responsible for in Gaza. And that dilemma, as I say, over time, may lead to a moderation, but I don’t see it yet.

AMY GOODMAN: Norman Finkelstein?

NORMAN FINKELSTEIN: Well, I think the problem of Mr. Indyk’s presentation is he constantly reverses cause and effect. Just as he said a moment ago that it was Hamas which broke the ceasefire, although he well knows it was Israel that broke the ceasefire on November 4th, he now reverses cause and effect as to how the present impasse came about. In January 2006, as he writes in his book, Hamas came to power in a free and fair election. I think those are his words. He then claims on your program and he claims in his book that Hamas committed a “putsch”—his word—in order to eliminate the Palestinian Authority. And as I’m sure Mr. Indyk well knows and as was documented in the April 2008 issue of Vanity Fair by the writer David Rose, basing himself on internal US documents, it was the United States in cahoots with the Palestinian Authority and Israel which were attempting a putsch on Hamas, and Hamas preempted the putsch. That, too, is no longer debatable or no longer a controversial claim.

Now, Mr. Indyk says that Hamas is reluctant or unclear about whether it wants to rule in Gaza. The issue is not whether it wants to rule in Gaza; the issue is can it rule in Gaza if Israel maintains a blockade and prevents economic activity among the Palestinians. The blockade, incidentally, was implemented before Hamas came to power. The blockade doesn’t even have anything to do with Hamas. The blockade came to—there were Americans who were sent over, in particular James Wolfensohn, to try to break the blockade after Israel redeployed its troops in Gaza.

AMY GOODMAN: The former World Bank president.

NORMAN FINKELSTEIN: Correct. The problem all along has been that Israel doesn’t want Gaza to develop, and Israel doesn’t want to resolve diplomatically the conflict. Mr. Indyk well knows that both the leadership in Damascus and the leadership in the Gaza have repeatedly made statements they’re willing to settle the conflict in the June 1967 border. The record is fairly clear. In fact, it’s unambiguously clear.

Every year, the United Nations General Assembly votes on a resolution entitled “Peaceful Settlement of the Palestine Question.” And every year the vote is the same: it’s the whole world on one side; Israel, the United States and some South Sea atolls and Australia on the other side. The vote this past year was 164-to-7. Every year since 1989—in 1989, the vote was 151-to-3, the whole world on one side, the United States, Israel and the island state of Dominica on the other side.

We have the Arab League, all twenty-two members of the Arab League, favoring a two-state settlement on the June 1967 border. We have the Palestinian Authority favoring that two-state settlement on the June 1967 border. We now have Hamas favoring that two-state settlement on the June 1967 border. The one and only obstacle is Israel, backed by the United States. That’s the problem.

AMY GOODMAN: So, Ambassador Indyk, why doesn’t Israel accept this ceasefire?

MARTIN INDYK: Look, Amy, I was invited on to talk about my book and the Gaza situation. I was not invited on to debate with Norman Finkelstein, and I’m not prepared to do that. So if you want to talk about the situation, I’m happy to do that, but I’m not here to be the representative of the government of Israel. You can easily invite somebody on to—

AMY GOODMAN: No, of course not. No, we’re asking your opinion. I don’t see you as the representative of Israel. But let me get your—

MARTIN INDYK: Well, why don’t we focus on some other issues, like the American role in this or something that—

AMY GOODMAN: Very good point.

MARTIN INDYK: —can get us out of this ridiculous debate, in which he’s just a propaganda spokesman for Hamas, you know.

AMY GOODMAN: Let me get your response to the current US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, what she said the other day at the UN about reaching a ceasefire agreement. Let me play a clip.

CONDOLEEZZA RICE: Hundreds of thousands of Israelis lived under the daily threat of rocket attack, and frankly, no country, none of our countries, would have been willing to tolerate such a circumstance. Moreover, the people of Gaza watched as insecurity and lawlessness increased and as their living conditions grew more dire because of Hamas’s actions, which began with the illegal coup against the Palestinian Authority in Gaza.

A ceasefire that returns to those circumstances is unacceptable, and it will not last. We need urgently to conclude a ceasefire that can endure and that can bring real security.

AMY GOODMAN: Ambassador Indyk, what is your response to the Secretary of State? You’re the adviser to the incoming Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton. Do you think the Bush administration should now be—the Obama administration coming in—should be pushing for a ceasefire right now?

MARTIN INDYK: Sorry to make one more correction before I answer: I was an adviser to Hillary Clinton during the campaign, her campaign for the presidency, but I am not advising her at the moment, so nothing I now say should be taken as representing her views.

I think that it is essential to get a ceasefire in place as quickly as possible. I think that there is a serious effort underway, as you have already detailed, to do that. I hope that it can be put in place before President-elect Obama goes into the Oval Office in, what is it, twelve days’ time and Secretary of State-designate Clinton takes up her responsibilities. If that’s not the case, then they’re going to need to work very effectively to put that in place as quickly as possible and—but then they will need to use that as a springboard to undertake an effort, not just to try to move towards a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but, in my view, it’s important to put that in the context of a new Obama-Clinton-led initiative for a comprehensive peace that would also involve negotiations between Israel and Syria and Israel and Lebanon.

President-elect Obama has said during the campaign that it would be a priority of his from day one, which I think is very important. But that desire of his to pay attention to this problem from day one has now become a necessity because of this crisis in Gaza, a necessity essentially for two reasons. Number one is to end this conflict. Let’s say three reasons. Number one—well, let’s say three reasons. Number one is to end this conflict after so many years and so many dead on both sides. But number two, those in the Arab world who want to resolve the conflict with Israel have necessarily been seriously weakened by this conflict, this crisis in Gaza. There’s a great deal of anger in the Arab street and in the Muslim world. Those who oppose settling this conflict peacefully, starting with Hamas, Hezbollah, the Iranian leadership, they, this bloc of rejectionists, have now got the wind at their backs. And it’s very important to show that moderation, compromise, reconciliation and peace can prevail over the view that they are propagating, which is that violence, terrorism and defiance can achieve a better deal for the Palestinians and the Arabs.

AMY GOODMAN: We have to break for sixty seconds. Then we’re going to come back. We’re talking to Ambassador Martin Indyk, former US ambassador to Israel. He’s currently at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. His new book is called Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East. Norman Finkelstein, also with his, his latest piece is called “Foiling Another Palestinian ‘Peace Offensive’: Behind the Latest Bloodbath in Gaza.” This is Democracy Now! We’ll be back in a minute.

[break]

AMY GOODMAN: Our guests are Ambassador Martin Indyk, his new book, Innocent Abroad—Martin Indyk is currently head of the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution—and Norman Finkelstein. Norman Finkelstein is author of several books, including The Holocaust Industry and Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict. I’m Amy Goodman, with Juan Gonzalez. Juan?

JUAN GONZALEZ: Well, Ambassador Indyk, I’d like to ask you about the timing of this Israeli offensive. Clearly, it’s in the waning days of the Bush administration and before President-elect Obama is inaugurated as president. Your sense of whether the timing had something to do with the reality that the US response, in many ways, would be muted or at least in transition as the administration is in transition?

MARTIN INDYK: Well, I think it’s important to understand that the ceasefire basically had come to an end. It was a six-month ceasefire. And so, I don’t think that the Israelis purposely decided that this was the moment to strike. If Hamas had not launched rockets, I think they would have been perfectly happy to continue with the ceasefire.

But once that rocket barrage came down, I do think that Ehud Barak, the Israeli Defense Minister, who’s really the strategist of this whole operation and is a man who I worked with very closely—when I was ambassador in Israel, he was Israeli prime minister at the time, and we were trying at the end of the Clinton administration to get a full, comprehensive peace in Clinton’s last year and Barak’s first year in office as prime minister. But what I learned in those days of working with him was that he’s a man who looks at operations with the very strict timetable. He actually dismantles clocks for a hobby. In other words, he’s kind of obsessed with timing. And we saw this very clearly—and it’s something I outline in my book—in the way that he tried to conduct the peace operations in the year 2000. And he miscalculated the timing then.

Now, he faces two dates. The first one is the one that you referred to, January 20th, when a new president comes into office here in Washington and a president, George W. Bush, who’s been very supportive of Israel and essentially, for most of the time in office, given Israel a blank check when it comes to dealing with Hamas, which he sees as a terrorist organization, and this is part of the war on terror. So, yes, I think that Barak probably calculated that he needed to get this operation over on Bush’s watch and have it finished before Barack Obama came into office.

There is another date that I think probably was even more important in his own mind, and that is the date of February 10th, in which he, along with Israel’s other politicians, will have to face the Israeli electorate in a general election, unless those elections are postponed, and that doesn’t look likely. And for that reason, as well, he needs the operation over. If, instead, the Israeli army goes in and takes control of Gaza City and Jabalya refugee camp and Rafah City in the south of Gaza, and suddenly, you know, the Israeli electorate on February 10th see that Israel is now back in occupation of Gaza, which they left because they didn’t want to stay in occupation there—they left unilaterally several years ago—and the Israeli soldiers are dying, and the whole world is condemning Israel, and there’s a crisis in US-Israel relations with the new president, they will not reward Ehud Barak at all.

So that’s why I think you see already, today, much greater interest on his part and the part of the government of Israel in working out a ceasefire. I believe that they will try, to the extent that they can do anything about it, to get that in place before Obama comes into office—

AMY GOODMAN: Norman Finkelstein, let me—

MARTIN INDYK: —so that he can show an Israeli electorate that this was a successful operation from Israel’s point of view.

AMY GOODMAN: Norman Finkelstein, do you agree with Ambassador Indyk that Israel would have continued the ceasefire if Hamas hadn’t started firing rockets into Israel?

NORMAN FINKELSTEIN: Well, the record shows that Hamas wanted to continue the ceasefire, but only on condition that Israel eases the blockade. As your viewers surely know, long before Hamas began the retaliatory rocket attacks on Israel, Palestinians were facing a humanitarian crisis in Gaza because of the blockade. The former High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, described what was going on in Gaza as a destruction of a civilization. This was during the ceasefire period.

Now, I think it’s important to keep in mind Mr. Indyk wants to talk about the book. Well, I think we should talk about the book. In fact, I stayed up ’til 1:30 a.m. to complete the book, made sure I read up to page 415, read every word of the book. The problem is, with his book, as with his presentation here, is he systematically misrepresents the record of the peace process. He’s lying not only to his readers, but to the American people. He keeps putting the burden of responsibility for the impasse in the peace process on the Palestinians.

A moment ago, he referred to the “rejectionists” who are trying to block a settlement of the conflict. What does the record show? The record shows, I said a moment ago, for the past twenty or more years, the entire international community has sought to settle the conflict in the June 1967 border with a just resolution of the refugee question. Are all 164 nations of the United Nations the rejectionists? And are the only people in favor of peace the United States, Israel, Nauru, Palau, Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Australia? Who are the rejectionists? Who’s opposing a peace?

According to Mr. Indyk’s account of the negotiations that culminated in the Camp David and Taba meetings, he says it was the Palestinians that were blocking a settlement. What does the record show? The record shows that in every crucial issue raised at Camp David, then under the Clinton parameters, and then in Taba, at every single point, all the concessions came from the Palestinians. Israel didn’t make any concessions. Every concession came from the Palestinians. The Palestinians have repeatedly expressed a willingness to settle the conflict in accordance with international law.

The law is very clear. July 2004, the highest judicial body in the world, the International Court of Justice, ruled Israel has no title to any of the West Bank and any of Gaza. They have no title to Jerusalem. Arab East Jerusalem, according to the highest judicial body in the world, is occupied Palestinian territory. The International Court of Justice ruled all the settlements, all the settlements in the West Bank, are illegal under international law.

Now, the important point is, on all those questions, the Palestinians were willing to make concessions. They were willing to allow Israel to keep 60 percent of the settlements, 80 percent of the settlers. They were willing to compromise on Jerusalem. They were willing to give up basically on the right of return. They made all the concessions. Israel didn’t make any concessions. How is this rendered in Martin Indyk’s book? It’s rendered as, quote, “Barak’s bold and courageous initiatives for peace” and “Arafat and the PLO rejecting the bold and courageous initiatives of Barak.” Constantly, he turns reality on its head.

AMY GOODMAN: Ambassador Indyk, your response to that?

MARTIN INDYK: I told you, Amy, I’m not here to debate Norman Finkelstein. That was not the ground rules that you set—

NORMAN FINKELSTEIN: I’m talking about your book.

MARTIN INDYK: —that you set for inviting me on this program. And I’m not going to respond to his ad hominem attacks.

AMY GOODMAN: But he’s talking about—

MARTIN INDYK: No. Let me just say—let me just say—

AMY GOODMAN: But we want to give you a chance to represent your own book.

MARTIN INDYK: Look, yeah. You know, that’s what I thought you were doing. Seriously, I hope your viewers and listeners will read the book and make up their own minds. I tried to give an honest accounting. It’s a self-critical book. And it’s a book in which my account of what happened is critical of—deeply critical of the mistakes that we in the American peace team made. And—but I do think that there is enough blame to go around. The book is also deeply critical of Ehud Barak. And it tries to lay out, in as honest a way as possible, from somebody, yes, who had a catbird seat—I was involved in all of those negotiations, intimately involved. And I’ve tried to account that—

AMY GOODMAN: What were those mistakes, Ambassador Indyk?

MARTIN INDYK: I’ve tried to account that honestly. And what Norman Finkelstein has done is simply distort my argument and load it up with his usual paraphernalia of legal resolutions and so on.

AMY GOODMAN: Well—

MARTIN INDYK: But if people want to understand just how difficult it is to make peace, then I hope that they will read for themselves, rather than accept his propaganda.

AMY GOODMAN: Well, let me ask what you think should happen right now. How does Barack Obama not repeat the mistakes of the past, as you outline them in Innocent Abroad?

MARTIN INDYK: Thank you. I think that one fundamental lesson from both the Clinton approach, which was to try to transform the Middle East through peacemaking, and the Bush approach, which was essentially to try to transform the Middle East through war-making, regime change and democracy promotion, is that Barack Obama, while painting a vision of a peaceful and secure and normal region, needs to be very realistic and to level with the American people about what can be achieved.

Both Clinton and Bush, different in so many respects, sought to transform the region, sought to make it over in America’s image. I think Barack Obama needs to have a more humble approach, a less arrogant approach, one that seeks to work with the region’s leaders and peoples to try to help them move towards a more peaceful world. The American role is indispensable. But we need to be wiser. We need to be more flexible. We need to understand that there are huge differences between us and them. And we need to pay a lot more attention to their culture, their values and their politics, rather than assume that they are like us. And I know that’s a very general proposition, but from that can come the getting of wisdom when it comes to the details of peacemaking.

AMY GOODMAN: Norman Finkelstein—

MARTIN INDYK: They cannot achieve peace without us, but our role needs to be much wiser.

AMY GOODMAN: What do you think needs to happen right now, Norman Finkelstein?

NORMAN FINKELSTEIN: I think it’s fairly clear what needs to happen. Number one, the United States and Israel have to join the rest of the international community, have to abide by international law. Martin Indyk dismisses it as what he calls a moment ago these legalistic resolutions. I don’t think international law should be trivialized. I think it’s a serious issue. If Israel is in defiance of international law, it should be called into account, just like any other state in the world.

And I agree on one point with Martin Indyk. Mr. Obama has to level with the American people. He has to be honest about what is the main obstacle to resolving the conflict. It’s not Palestinian rejectionism. It’s the refusal of Israel, backed by the United States government, to abide by international law, to abide by the opinion of the international community.

And the main challenge for all of us as Americans is to see through the lies. And regrettably, those lies are again being propagated by Martin Indyk in his book with his pretense that it’s the Palestinians, and not Israel and the United States, which are the main obstacles to peace.

AMY GOODMAN: Well, we’re going to have to leave it there. I thank you both for being with us, Norman Finkelstein, author of a number of books, including Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict, Beyond Chutzpah and The Holocaust Industry, and Martin Indyk. His new book is just out in this past week. It’s called Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East. Thanks for joining us from Washington, D.C.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and President George W. Bush, whose secret Palestinian intervention backfired in a big way. Photo illustration by Chris Mueller; left, by Debbie Hill/Sipa Press; right, by Issam Rimawi/ApaImages/Polaris; background by Ibraheem Abu Mustafa/Reuters/Corbis.

VANITY FAIR
April 2008
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/04/gaza200804?currentPa...
The Gaza Bombshell
by David Rose

After failing to anticipate Hamas’s victory over Fatah in the 2006 Palestinian election, the White House cooked up yet another scandalously covert and self-defeating Middle East debacle: part Iran-contra, part Bay of Pigs. With confidential documents, corroborated by outraged former and current U.S. officials, the author reveals how President Bush, Condoleezza Rice, and Deputy National-Security Adviser Elliott Abrams backed an armed force under Fatah strongman Muhammad Dahlan, touching off a bloody civil war in Gaza and leaving Hamas stronger than ever.

To hear an interview with David Rose and to see documents he uncovered, click here.

==============================================================================

The Al Deira Hotel, in Gaza City, is a haven of calm in a land beset by poverty, fear, and violence. In the middle of December 2007, I sit in the hotel’s airy restaurant, its windows open to the Mediterranean, and listen to a slight, bearded man named Mazen Asad abu Dan describe the suffering he endured 11 months before at the hands of his fellow Palestinians. Abu Dan, 28, is a member of Hamas, the Iranian-backed Islamist organization that has been designated a terrorist group by the United States, but I have a good reason for taking him at his word: I’ve seen the video.

It shows abu Dan kneeling, his hands bound behind his back, and screaming as his captors pummel him with a black iron rod. “I lost all the skin on my back from the beatings,” he says. “Instead of medicine, they poured perfume on my wounds. It felt as if they had taken a sword to my injuries.”

On January 26, 2007, abu Dan, a student at the Islamic University of Gaza, had gone to a local cemetery with his father and five others to erect a headstone for his grandmother. When they arrived, however, they found themselves surrounded by 30 armed men from Hamas’s rival, Fatah, the party of Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas. “They took us to a house in north Gaza,” abu Dan says. “They covered our eyes and took us to a room on the sixth floor.”

The video reveals a bare room with white walls and a black-and-white tiled floor, where abu Dan’s father is forced to sit and listen to his son’s shrieks of pain. Afterward, abu Dan says, he and two of the others were driven to a market square. “They told us they were going to kill us. They made us sit on the ground.” He rolls up the legs of his trousers to display the circular scars that are evidence of what happened next: “They shot our knees and feet—five bullets each. I spent four months in a wheelchair.”

Abu Dan had no way of knowing it, but his tormentors had a secret ally: the administration of President George W. Bush.

A clue comes toward the end of the video, which was found in a Fatah security building by Hamas fighters last June. Still bound and blindfolded, the prisoners are made to echo a rhythmic chant yelled by one of their captors: “By blood, by soul, we sacrifice ourselves for Muhammad Dahlan! Long live Muhammad Dahlan!”

There is no one more hated among Hamas members than Muhammad Dahlan, long Fatah’s resident strongman in Gaza. Dahlan, who most recently served as Abbas’s national-security adviser, has spent more than a decade battling Hamas. Dahlan insists that abu Dan was tortured without his knowledge, but the video is proof that his followers’ methods can be brutal.

Bush has met Dahlan on at least three occasions. After talks at the White House in July 2003, Bush publicly praised Dahlan as “a good, solid leader.” In private, say multiple Israeli and American officials, the U.S. president described him as “our guy.”

The United States has been involved in the affairs of the Palestinian territories since the Six-Day War of 1967, when Israel captured Gaza from Egypt and the West Bank from Jordan. With the 1993 Oslo accords, the territories acquired limited autonomy, under a president, who has executive powers, and an elected parliament. Israel retains a large military presence in the West Bank, but it withdrew from Gaza in 2005.

In recent months, President Bush has repeatedly stated that the last great ambition of his presidency is to broker a deal that would create a viable Palestinian state and bring peace to the Holy Land. “People say, ‘Do you think it’s possible, during your presidency?’ ” he told an audience in Jerusalem on January 9. “And the answer is: I’m very hopeful.”

The next day, in the West Bank capital of Ramallah, Bush acknowledged that there was a rather large obstacle standing in the way of this goal: Hamas’s complete control of Gaza, home to some 1.5 million Palestinians, where it seized power in a bloody coup d’état in June 2007. Almost every day, militants fire rockets from Gaza into neighboring Israeli towns, and President Abbas is powerless to stop them. His authority is limited to the West Bank.

It’s “a tough situation,” Bush admitted. “I don’t know whether you can solve it in a year or not.” What Bush neglected to mention was his own role in creating this mess.

According to Dahlan, it was Bush who had pushed legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in January 2006, despite warnings that Fatah was not ready. After Hamas—whose 1988 charter committed it to the goal of driving Israel into the sea—won control of the parliament, Bush made another, deadlier miscalculation.

Vanity Fair has obtained confidential documents, since corroborated by sources in the U.S. and Palestine, which lay bare a covert initiative, approved by Bush and implemented by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Deputy National Security Adviser Elliott Abrams, to provoke a Palestinian civil war. The plan was for forces led by Dahlan, and armed with new weapons supplied at America’s behest, to give Fatah the muscle it needed to remove the democratically elected Hamas-led government from power. (The State Department declined to comment.)

But the secret plan backfired, resulting in a further setback for American foreign policy under Bush. Instead of driving its enemies out of power, the U.S.-backed Fatah fighters inadvertently provoked Hamas to seize total control of Gaza.

Some sources call the scheme “Iran-contra 2.0,” recalling that Abrams was convicted (and later pardoned) for withholding information from Congress during the original Iran-contra scandal under President Reagan. There are echoes of other past misadventures as well: the C.I.A.’s 1953 ouster of an elected prime minister in Iran, which set the stage for the 1979 Islamic revolution there; the aborted 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, which gave Fidel Castro an excuse to solidify his hold on Cuba; and the contemporary tragedy in Iraq.

Within the Bush administration, the Palestinian policy set off a furious debate. One of its critics is David Wurmser, the avowed neoconservative, who resigned as Vice President Dick Cheney’s chief Middle East adviser in July 2007, a month after the Gaza coup.

Wurmser accuses the Bush administration of “engaging in a dirty war in an effort to provide a corrupt dictatorship [led by Abbas] with victory.” He believes that Hamas had no intention of taking Gaza until Fatah forced its hand. “It looks to me that what happened wasn’t so much a coup by Hamas but an attempted coup by Fatah that was pre-empted before it could happen,” Wurmser says.

The botched plan has rendered the dream of Middle East peace more remote than ever, but what really galls neocons such as Wurmser is the hypocrisy it exposed. “There is a stunning disconnect between the president’s call for Middle East democracy and this policy,” he says. “It directly contradicts it.”

Preventive Security

Bush was not the first American president to form a relationship with Muhammad Dahlan. “Yes, I was close to Bill Clinton,” Dahlan says. “I met Clinton many times with [the late Palestinian leader Yasser] Arafat.” In the wake of the 1993 Oslo accords, Clinton sponsored a series of diplomatic meetings aimed at reaching a permanent Middle East peace, and Dahlan became the Palestinians’ negotiator on security.

As I talk to Dahlan in a five-star Cairo hotel, it’s easy to see the qualities that might make him attractive to American presidents. His appearance is immaculate, his English is serviceable, and his manner is charming and forthright. Had he been born into privilege, these qualities might not mean much. But Dahlan was born—on September 29, 1961—in the teeming squalor of Gaza’s Khan Younis refugee camp, and his education came mostly from the street. In 1981 he helped found Fatah’s youth movement, and he later played a leading role in the first intifada—the five-year revolt that began in 1987 against the Israeli occupation. In all, Dahlan says, he spent five years in Israeli jails.

Muhammad Dahlan at his office in Ramallah, January 2008. Photograph by Karim Ben Khelifa

From the time of its inception as the Palestinian branch of the international Muslim Brotherhood, in late 1987, Hamas had represented a threatening challenge to Arafat’s secular Fatah party. At Oslo, Fatah made a public commitment to the search for peace, but Hamas continued to practice armed resistance. At the same time, it built an impressive base of support through schooling and social programs.

The rising tensions between the two groups first turned violent in the early 1990s—with Muhammad Dahlan playing a central role. As director of the Palestinian Authority’s most feared paramilitary force, the Preventive Security Service, Dahlan arrested some 2,000 Hamas members in 1996 in the Gaza Strip after the group launched a wave of suicide bombings. “Arafat had decided to arrest Hamas military leaders, because they were working against his interests, against the peace process, against the Israeli withdrawal, against everything,” Dahlan says. “He asked the security services to do their job, and I have done that job.”

It was not, he admits, “popular work.” For many years Hamas has said that Dahlan’s forces routinely tortured detainees. One alleged method was to sodomize prisoners with soda bottles. Dahlan says these stories are exaggerated: “Definitely there were some mistakes here and there. But no one person died in Preventive Security. Prisoners got their rights. Bear in mind that I am an ex-detainee of the Israelis’. No one was personally humiliated, and I never killed anyone the way [Hamas is] killing people on a daily basis now.” Dahlan points out that Arafat maintained a labyrinth of security services—14 in all—and says the Preventive Security Service was blamed for abuses perpetrated by other units.

Dahlan worked closely with the F.B.I. and the C.I.A., and he developed a warm relationship with Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, a Clinton appointee who stayed on under Bush until July 2004. “He’s simply a great and fair man,” Dahlan says. “I’m still in touch with him from time to time.”

“Everyone Was Against the Elections”

In a speech in the White House Rose Garden on June 24, 2002, President Bush announced that American policy in the Middle East was turning in a fundamentally new direction.

Arafat was still in power at the time, and many in the U.S. and Israel blamed him for wrecking Clinton’s micro-managed peace efforts by launching the second intifada—a renewed revolt, begun in 2000, in which more than 1,000 Israelis and 4,500 Palestinians had died. Bush said he wanted to give Palestinians the chance to choose new leaders, ones who were not “compromised by terror.” In place of Arafat’s all-powerful presidency, Bush said, “the Palestinian parliament should have the full authority of a legislative body.”

Arafat died in November 2004, and Abbas, his replacement as Fatah leader, was elected president in January 2005. Elections for the Palestinian parliament, known officially as the Legislative Council, were originally set for July 2005, but later postponed by Abbas until January 2006.

Dahlan says he warned his friends in the Bush administration that Fatah still wasn’t ready for elections in January. Decades of self-preservationist rule by Arafat had turned the party into a symbol of corruption and inefficiency—a perception Hamas found it easy to exploit. Splits within Fatah weakened its position further: in many places, a single Hamas candidate ran against several from Fatah.

“Everyone was against the elections,” Dahlan says. Everyone except Bush. “Bush decided, ‘I need an election. I want elections in the Palestinian Authority.’ Everyone is following him in the American administration, and everyone is nagging Abbas, telling him, ‘The president wants elections.’ Fine. For what purpose?”

The elections went forward as scheduled. On January 25, Hamas won 56 percent of the seats in the Legislative Council.

Few inside the U.S. administration had predicted the result, and there was no contingency plan to deal with it. “I’ve asked why nobody saw it coming,” Condoleezza Rice told reporters. “I don’t know anyone who wasn’t caught off guard by Hamas’s strong showing.”

“Everyone blamed everyone else,” says an official with the Department of Defense. “We sat there in the Pentagon and said, ‘Who the fuck recommended this?’ ”

In public, Rice tried to look on the bright side of the Hamas victory. “Unpredictability,” she said, is “the nature of big historic change.” Even as she spoke, however, the Bush administration was rapidly revising its attitude toward Palestinian democracy.

Some analysts argued that Hamas had a substantial moderate wing that could be strengthened if America coaxed it into the peace process. Notable Israelis—such as Ephraim Halevy, the former head of the Mossad intelligence agency—shared this view. But if America paused to consider giving Hamas the benefit of the doubt, the moment was “milliseconds long,” says a senior State Department official. “The administration spoke with one voice: ‘We have to squeeze these guys.’ With Hamas’s election victory, the freedom agenda was dead.”

The first step, taken by the Middle East diplomatic “Quartet”—the U.S., the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations—was to demand that the new Hamas government renounce violence, recognize Israel’s right to exist, and accept the terms of all previous agreements. When Hamas refused, the Quartet shut off the faucet of aid to the Palestinian Authority, depriving it of the means to pay salaries and meet its annual budget of roughly $2 billion.

Israel clamped down on Palestinians’ freedom of movement, especially into and out of the Hamas-dominated Gaza Strip. Israel also detained 64 Hamas officials, including Legislative Council members and ministers, and even launched a military campaign into Gaza after one of its soldiers was kidnapped. Through it all, Hamas and its new government, led by Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, proved surprisingly resilient.

Washington reacted with dismay when Abbas began holding talks with Hamas in the hope of establishing a “unity government.” On October 4, 2006, Rice traveled to Ramallah to see Abbas. They met at the Muqata, the new presidential headquarters that rose from the ruins of Arafat’s compound, which Israel had destroyed in 2002.

America’s leverage in Palestinian affairs was much stronger than it had been in Arafat’s time. Abbas had never had a strong, independent base, and he desperately needed to restore the flow of foreign aid—and, with it, his power of patronage. He also knew that he could not stand up to Hamas without Washington’s help.

At their joint press conference, Rice smiled as she expressed her nation’s “great admiration” for Abbas’s leadership. Behind closed doors, however, Rice’s tone was sharper, say officials who witnessed their meeting. Isolating Hamas just wasn’t working, she reportedly told Abbas, and America expected him to dissolve the Haniyeh government as soon as possible and hold fresh elections.

Abbas, one official says, agreed to take action within two weeks. It happened to be Ramadan, the month when Muslims fast during daylight hours. With dusk approaching, Abbas asked Rice to join him for iftar—a snack to break the fast.

Afterward, according to the official, Rice underlined her position: “So we’re agreed? You’ll dissolve the government within two weeks?”

“Maybe not two weeks. Give me a month. Let’s wait until after the Eid,” he said, referring to the three-day celebration that marks the end of Ramadan. (Abbas’s spokesman said via e-mail: “According to our records, this is incorrect.”)

Rice got into her armored S.U.V., where, the official claims, she told an American colleague, “That damned iftar has cost us another two weeks of Hamas government.”

“We Will Be There to Support You”

Weeks passed with no sign that Abbas was ready to do America’s bidding. Finally, another official was sent to Ramallah. Jake Walles, the consul general in Jerusalem, is a career foreign-service officer with many years’ experience in the Middle East. His purpose was to deliver a barely varnished ultimatum to the Palestinian president.

We know what Walles said because a copy was left behind, apparently by accident, of the “talking points” memo prepared for him by the State Department. The document has been authenticated by U.S. and Palestinian officials.

The “talking points” memo, left behind by a State Department envoy, urging Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas to confront Hamas. Enlarge this picture.

“We need to understand your plans regarding a new [Palestinian Authority] government,” Walles’s script said. “You told Secretary Rice you would be prepared to move ahead within two to four weeks of your meeting. We believe that the time has come for you to move forward quickly and decisively.”

The memo left no doubt as to what kind of action the U.S. was seeking: “Hamas should be given a clear choice, with a clear deadline: … they either accept a new government that meets the Quartet principles, or they reject it The consequences of Hamas’ decision should also be clear: If Hamas does not agree within the prescribed time, you should make clear your intention to declare a state of emergency and form an emergency government explicitly committed to that platform.”

Walles and Abbas both knew what to expect from Hamas if these instructions were followed: rebellion and bloodshed. For that reason, the memo states, the U.S. was already working to strengthen Fatah’s security forces. “If you act along these lines, we will support you both materially and politically,” the script said. “We will be there to support you.”

Abbas was also encouraged to “strengthen [his] team” to include “credible figures of strong standing in the international community.” Among those the U.S. wanted brought in, says an official who knew of the policy, was Muhammad Dahlan.

On paper, the forces at Fatah’s disposal looked stronger than those of Hamas. There were some 70,000 men in the tangle of 14 Palestinian security services that Arafat had built up, at least half of those in Gaza. After the legislative elections, Hamas had expected to assume command of these forces, but Fatah maneuvered to keep them under its control. Hamas, which already had 6,000 or so irregulars in its militant al-Qassam Brigade, responded by forming the 6,000-troop Executive Force in Gaza, but that still left it with far fewer fighters than Fatah.

In reality, however, Hamas had several advantages. To begin with, Fatah’s security forces had never really recovered from Operation Defensive Shield, Israel’s massive 2002 re-invasion of the West Bank in response to the second intifada. “Most of the security apparatus had been destroyed,” says Youssef Issa, who led the Preventive Security Service under Abbas.

The irony of the blockade on foreign aid after Hamas’s legislative victory, meanwhile, was that it prevented only Fatah from paying its soldiers. “We are the ones who were not getting paid,” Issa says, “whereas they were not affected by the siege.” Ayman Daraghmeh, a Hamas Legislative Council member in the West Bank, agrees. He puts the amount of Iranian aid to Hamas in 2007 alone at $120 million. “This is only a fraction of what it should give,” he insists. In Gaza, another Hamas member tells me the number was closer to $200 million.

The result was becoming apparent: Fatah could not control Gaza’s streets—or even protect its own personnel.

At about 1:30 p.m. on September 15, 2006, Samira Tayeh sent a text message to her husband, Jad Tayeh, the director of foreign relations for the Palestinian intelligence service and a member of Fatah. “He didn’t reply,” she says. “I tried to call his mobile [phone], but it was switched off. So I called his deputy, Mahmoun, and he didn’t know where he was. That’s when I decided to go to the hospital.”

Samira, a slim, elegant 40-year-old dressed from head to toe in black, tells me the story in a Ramallah café in December 2007. Arriving at the Al Shifa hospital, “I went through the morgue door. Not for any reason—I just didn’t know the place. I saw there were all these intelligence guards there. There was one I knew. He saw me and he said, ‘Put her in the car.’ That’s when I knew something had happened to Jad.”

Tayeh had left his office in a car with four aides. Moments later, they found themselves being pursued by an S.U.V. full of armed, masked men. About 200 yards from the home of Prime Minister Haniyeh, the S.U.V. cornered the car. The masked men opened fire, killing Tayeh and all four of his colleagues.

Hamas said it had nothing to do with the murders, but Samira had reason to believe otherwise. At three a.m. on June 16, 2007, during the Gaza takeover, six Hamas gunmen forced their way into her home and fired bullets into every photo of Jad they could find. The next day, they returned and demanded the keys to the car in which he had died, claiming that it belonged to the Palestinian Authority.

Fearing for her life, she fled across the border and then into the West Bank, with only the clothes she was wearing and her passport, driver’s license, and credit card.

“Very Clever Warfare”

Fatah’s vulnerability was a source of grave concern to Dahlan. “I made a lot of activities to give Hamas the impression that we were still strong and we had the capacity to face them,” he says. “But I knew in my heart it wasn’t true.” He had no official security position at the time, but he belonged to parliament and retained the loyalty of Fatah members in Gaza. “I used my image, my power.” Dahlan says he told Abbas that “Gaza needs only a decision for Hamas to take over.” To prevent that from happening, Dahlan waged “very clever warfare” for many months.

According to several alleged victims, one of the tactics this “warfare” entailed was to kidnap and torture members of Hamas’s Executive Force. (Dahlan denies Fatah used such tactics, but admits “mistakes” were made.) Abdul Karim al-Jasser, a strapping man of 25, says he was the first such victim. “It was on October 16, still Ramadan,” he says. “I was on my way to my sister’s house for iftar. Four guys stopped me, two of them with guns. They forced me to accompany them to the home of Aman abu Jidyan,” a Fatah leader close to Dahlan. (Abu Jidyan would be killed in the June uprising.)

The first phase of torture was straightforward enough, al-Jasser says: he was stripped naked, bound, blindfolded, and beaten with wooden poles and plastic pipes. “They put a piece of cloth in my mouth to stop me screaming.” His interrogators forced him to answer contradictory accusations: one minute they said that he had collaborated with Israel, the next that he had fired Qassam rockets against it.

But the worst was yet to come. “They brought an iron bar,” al-Jasser says, his voice suddenly hesitant. We are speaking inside his home in Gaza, which is experiencing one of its frequent power outages. He points to the propane-gas lamp that lights the room. “They put the bar in the flame of a lamp like this. When it was red, they took the covering off my eyes. Then they pressed it against my skin. That was the last thing I remember.”

When he came to, he was still in the room where he had been tortured. A few hours later, the Fatah men handed him over to Hamas, and he was taken to the hospital. “I could see the shock in the eyes of the doctors who entered the room,” he says. He shows me photos of purple third-degree burns wrapped like towels around his thighs and much of his lower torso. “The doctors told me that if I had been thin, not chubby, I would have died. But I wasn’t alone. That same night that I was released, abu Jidyan’s men fired five bullets into the legs of one of my relatives. We were in the same ward in the hospital.”

Dahlan says he did not order al-Jasser’s torture: “The only order I gave was to defend ourselves. That doesn’t mean there wasn’t torture, some things that went wrong, but I did not know about this.”

The dirty war between Fatah and Hamas continued to gather momentum throughout the autumn, with both sides committing atrocities. By the end of 2006, dozens were dying each month. Some of the victims were noncombatants. In December, gunmen opened fire on the car of a Fatah intelligence official, killing his three young children and their driver.

There was still no sign that Abbas was ready to bring matters to a head by dissolving the Hamas government. Against this darkening background, the U.S. began direct security talks with Dahlan.

“He’s Our Guy”

In 2001, President Bush famously said that he had looked Russian president Vladimir Putin in the eye, gotten “a sense of his soul,” and found him to be “trustworthy.” According to three U.S. officials, Bush made a similar judgment about Dahlan when they first met, in 2003. All three officials recall hearing Bush say, “He’s our guy.”

They say this assessment was echoed by other key figures in the administration, including Rice and Assistant Secretary David Welch, the man in charge of Middle East policy at the State Department. “David Welch didn’t fundamentally care about Fatah,” one of his colleagues says. “He cared about results, and [he supported] whatever son of a bitch you had to support. Dahlan was the son of a bitch we happened to know best. He was a can-do kind of person. Dahlan was our guy.”

Avi Dichter, Israel’s internal-security minister and the former head of its Shin Bet security service, was taken aback when he heard senior American officials refer to Dahlan as “our guy.” “I thought to myself, The president of the United States is making a strange judgment here,” says Dichter.

Lieutenant General Keith Dayton, who had been appointed the U.S. security coordinator for the Palestinians in November 2005, was in no position to question the president’s judgment of Dahlan. His only prior experience with the Middle East was as director of the Iraq Survey Group, the body that looked for Saddam Hussein’s elusive weapons of mass destruction.

In November 2006, Dayton met Dahlan for the first of a long series of talks in Jerusalem and Ramallah. Both men were accompanied by aides. From the outset, says an official who took notes at the meeting, Dayton was pushing two overlapping agendas.

“We need to reform the Palestinian security apparatus,” Dayton said, according to the notes. “But we also need to build up your forces in order to take on Hamas.”

Dahlan replied that, in the long run, Hamas could be defeated only by political means. “But if I am going to confront them,” he added, “I need substantial resources. As things stand, we do not have the capability.”

The two men agreed that they would work toward a new Palestinian security plan. The idea was to simplify the confusing web of Palestinian security forces and have Dahlan assume responsibility for all of them in the newly created role of Palestinian national-security adviser. The Americans would help supply weapons and training.

As part of the reform program, according to the official who was present at the meetings, Dayton said he wanted to disband the Preventive Security Service, which was widely known to be engaged in kidnapping and torture. At a meeting in Dayton’s Jerusalem office in early December, Dahlan ridiculed the idea. “The only institution now protecting Fatah and the Palestinian Authority in Gaza is the one you want removed,” he said.

Dayton softened a little. “We want to help you,” he said. “What do you need?”

“Iran-Contra 2.0”

Under Bill Clinton, Dahlan says, commitments of security assistance “were always delivered, absolutely.” Under Bush, he was about to discover, things were different. At the end of 2006, Dayton promised an immediate package worth $86.4 million—money that, according to a U.S. document published by Reuters on January 5, 2007, would be used to “dismantle the infrastructure of terrorism and establish law and order in the West Bank and Gaza.” U.S. officials even told reporters the money would be transferred “in the coming days.”

The cash never arrived. “Nothing was disbursed,” Dahlan says. “It was approved and it was in the news. But we received not a single penny.”

Any notion that the money could be transferred quickly and easily had died on Capitol Hill, where the payment was blocked by the House Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia. Its members feared that military aid to the Palestinians might end up being turned against Israel.

Dahlan did not hesitate to voice his exasperation. “I spoke to Condoleezza Rice on several occasions,” he says. “I spoke to Dayton, to the consul general, to everyone in the administration I knew. They said, ‘You have a convincing argument.’ We were sitting in Abbas’s office in Ramallah, and I explained the whole thing to Condi. And she said, ‘Yes, we have to make an effort to do this. There’s no other way.’ ” At some of these meetings, Dahlan says, Assistant Secretary Welch and Deputy National-Security Adviser Abrams were also present.

The administration went back to Congress, and a reduced, $59 million package for nonlethal aid was approved in April 2007. But as Dahlan knew, the Bush team had already spent the past months exploring alternative, covert means of getting him the funds and weapons he wanted. The reluctance of Congress meant that “you had to look for different pots, different sources of money,” says a Pentagon official.

A State Department official adds, “Those in charge of implementing the policy were saying, ‘Do whatever it takes. We have to be in a position for Fatah to defeat Hamas militarily, and only Muhammad Dahlan has the guile and the muscle to do this.’ The expectation was that this was where it would end up—with a military showdown.” There were, this official says, two “parallel programs”—the overt one, which the administration took to Congress, “and a covert one, not only to buy arms but to pay the salaries of security personnel.”

Israel and the Palestinian territories. Map by Joyce Pendola

In essence, the program was simple. According to State Department officials, beginning in the latter part of 2006, Rice initiated several rounds of phone calls and personal meetings with leaders of four Arab nations—Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. She asked them to bolster Fatah by providing military training and by pledging funds to buy its forces lethal weapons. The money was to be paid directly into accounts controlled by President Abbas.

The scheme bore some resemblance to the Iran-contra scandal, in which members of Ronald Reagan’s administration sold arms to Iran, an enemy of the U.S. The money was used to fund the contra rebels in Nicaragua, in violation of a congressional ban. Some of the money for the contras, like that for Fatah, was furnished by Arab allies as a result of U.S. lobbying.

But there are also important differences—starting with the fact that Congress never passed a measure expressly prohibiting the supply of aid to Fatah and Dahlan. “It was close to the margins,” says a former intelligence official with experience in covert programs. “But it probably wasn’t illegal.”

Legal or not, arms shipments soon began to take place. In late December 2006, four Egyptian trucks passed through an Israeli-controlled crossing into Gaza, where their contents were handed over to Fatah. These included 2,000 Egyptian-made automatic rifles, 20,000 ammunition clips, and two million bullets. News of the shipment leaked, and Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, an Israeli Cabinet member, said on Israeli radio that the guns and ammunition would give Abbas “the ability to cope with those organizations which are trying to ruin everything”—namely, Hamas.

Avi Dichter points out that all weapons shipments had to be approved by Israel, which was understandably hesitant to allow state-of-the-art arms into Gaza. “One thing’s for sure, we weren’t talking about heavy weapons,” says a State Department official. “It was small arms, light machine guns, ammunition.”

Perhaps the Israelis held the Americans back. Perhaps Elliott Abrams himself held back, unwilling to run afoul of U.S. law for a second time. One of his associates says Abrams, who declined to comment for this article, felt conflicted over the policy—torn between the disdain he felt for Dahlan and his overriding loyalty to the administration. He wasn’t the only one: “There were severe fissures among neoconservatives over this,” says Cheney’s former adviser David Wurmser. “We were ripping each other to pieces.”

During a trip to the Middle East in January 2007, Rice found it difficult to get her partners to honor their pledges. “The Arabs felt the U.S. was not serious,” one official says. “They knew that if the Americans were serious they would put their own money where their mouth was. They didn’t have faith in America’s ability to raise a real force. There was no follow-through. Paying was different than pledging, and there was no plan.”

This official estimates that the program raised “a few payments of $30 million”—most of it, as other sources agree, from the United Arab Emirates. Dahlan himself says the total was only $20 million, and confirms that “the Arabs made many more pledges than they ever paid.” Whatever the exact amount, it was not enough.

Plan B

On February 1, 2007, Dahlan took his “very clever warfare” to a new level when Fatah forces under his control stormed the Islamic University of Gaza, a Hamas stronghold, and set several buildings on fire. Hamas retaliated the next day with a wave of attacks on police stations.

Unwilling to preside over a Palestinian civil war, Abbas blinked. For weeks, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia had been trying to persuade him to meet with Hamas in Mecca and formally establish a national unity government. On February 6, Abbas went, taking Dahlan with him. Two days later, with Hamas no closer to recognizing Israel, a deal was struck.

Under its terms, Ismail Haniyeh of Hamas would remain prime minister while allowing Fatah members to occupy several important posts. When the news hit the streets that the Saudis had promised to pay the Palestinian Authority’s salary bills, Fatah and Hamas members in Gaza celebrated together by firing their Kalashnikovs into the air.

Once again, the Bush administration had been taken by surprise. According to a State Department official, “Condi was apoplectic.” A remarkable documentary record, revealed here for the first time, shows that the U.S. responded by redoubling the pressure on its Palestinian allies.

The State Department quickly drew up an alternative to the new unity government. Known as “Plan B,” its objective, according to a State Department memo that has been authenticated by an official who knew of it at the time, was to “enable [Abbas] and his supporters to reach a defined endgame by the end of 2007 The endgame should produce a [Palestinian Authority] government through democratic means that accepts Quartet principles.”

Like the Walles ultimatum of late 2006, Plan B called for Abbas to “collapse the government” if Hamas refused to alter its attitude toward Israel. From there, Abbas could call early elections or impose an emergency government. It is unclear whether, as president, Abbas had the constitutional authority to dissolve an elected government led by a rival party, but the Americans swept that concern aside.

Security considerations were paramount, and Plan B had explicit prescriptions for dealing with them. For as long as the unity government remained in office, it was essential for Abbas to maintain “independent control of key security forces.” He must “avoid Hamas integration with these services, while eliminating the Executive Force or mitigating the challenges posed by its continued existence.”

In a clear reference to the covert aid expected from the Arabs, the memo made this recommendation for the next six to nine months: “Dahlan oversees effort in coordination with General Dayton and Arab [nations] to train and equip 15,000-man force under President Abbas’s control to establish internal law and order, stop terrorism and deter extralegal forces.”

The Bush administration’s goals for Plan B were elaborated in a document titled “An Action Plan for the Palestinian Presidency.” This action plan went through several drafts and was developed by the U.S., the Palestinians, and the government of Jordan. Sources agree, however, that it originated in the State Department.

The early drafts stressed the need for bolstering Fatah’s forces in order to “deter” Hamas. The “desired outcome” was to give Abbas “the capability to take the required strategic political decisions … such as dismissing the cabinet, establishing an emergency cabinet.”

The drafts called for increasing the “level and capacity” of 15,000 of Fatah’s existing security personnel while adding 4,700 troops in seven new “highly trained battalions on strong policing.” The plan also promised to arrange “specialized training abroad,” in Jordan and Egypt, and pledged to “provide the security personnel with the necessary equipment and arms to carry out their missions.”

A detailed budget put the total cost for salaries, training, and “the needed security equipment, lethal and non-lethal,” at $1.27 billion over five years. The plan states: “The costs and overall budget were developed jointly with General Dayton’s team and the Palestinian technical team for reform”—a unit established by Dahlan and led by his friend and policy aide Bassil Jaber. Jaber confirms that the document is an accurate summary of the work he and his colleagues did with Dayton. “The plan was to create a security establishment that could protect and strengthen a peaceful Palestinian state living side by side with Israel,” he says.

The final draft of the Action Plan was drawn up in Ramallah by officials of the Palestinian Authority. This version was identical to the earlier drafts in all meaningful ways but one: it presented the plan as if it had been the Palestinians’ idea. It also said the security proposals had been “approved by President Mahmoud Abbas after being discussed and agreed [to] by General Dayton’s team.”

On April 30, 2007, a portion of one early draft was leaked to a Jordanian newspaper, Al-Majd. The secret was out. From Hamas’s perspective, the Action Plan could amount to only one thing: a blueprint for a U.S.-backed Fatah coup.

“We Are Late in the Ball Game Here”

The formation of the unity government had brought a measure of calm to the Palestinian territories, but violence erupted anew after Al-Majd published its story on the Action Plan. The timing was unkind to Fatah, which, to add to its usual disadvantages, was without its security chief. Ten days earlier, Dahlan had left Gaza for Berlin, where he’d had surgery on both knees. He was due to spend the next eight weeks convalescing.

In mid-May, with Dahlan still absent, a new element was added to Gaza’s toxic mix when 500 Fatah National Security Forces recruits arrived, fresh from training in Egypt and equipped with new weapons and vehicles. “They had been on a crash course for 45 days,” Dahlan says. “The idea was that we needed them to go in dressed well, equipped well, and that might create the impression of new authority.” Their presence was immediately noticed, not only by Hamas but by staff from Western aid agencies. “They had new rifles with telescopic sights, and they were wearing black flak jackets,” says a frequent visitor from Northern Europe. “They were quite a contrast to the usual scruffy lot.”

On May 23, none other than Lieutenant General Dayton discussed the new unit in testimony before the House Middle East subcommittee. Hamas had attacked the troops as they crossed into Gaza from Egypt, Dayton said, but “these 500 young people, fresh out of basic training, were organized. They knew how to work in a coordinated fashion. Training does pay off. And the Hamas attack in the area was, likewise, repulsed.”

The troops’ arrival, Dayton said, was one of several “hopeful signs” in Gaza. Another was Dahlan’s appointment as national-security adviser. Meanwhile, he said, Hamas’s Executive Force was becoming “extremely unpopular I would say that we are kind of late in the ball game here, and we are behind, there’s two out, but we have our best clutch hitter at the plate, and the pitcher is beginning to tire on the opposing team.”

The opposing team was stronger than Dayton realized. By the end of May 2007, Hamas was mounting regular attacks of unprecedented boldness and savagery.

At an apartment in Ramallah that Abbas has set aside for wounded refugees from Gaza, I meet a former Fatah communications officer named Tariq Rafiyeh. He lies paralyzed from a bullet he took to the spine during the June coup, but his suffering began two weeks earlier. On May 31, he was on his way home with a colleague when they were stopped at a roadblock, robbed of their money and cell phones, and taken to a mosque. There, despite the building’s holy status, Hamas Executive Force members were violently interrogating Fatah detainees. “Late that night one of them said we were going to be released,” Rafiyeh recalls. “He told the guards, ‘Be hospitable, keep them warm.’ I thought that meant kill us. Instead, before letting us go they beat us badly.”

On June 7, there was another damaging leak, when the Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported that Abbas and Dayton had asked Israel to authorize the biggest Egyptian arms shipment yet—to include dozens of armored cars, hundreds of armor-piercing rockets, thousands of hand grenades, and millions of rounds of ammunition. A few days later, just before the next batch of Fatah recruits was due to leave for training in Egypt, the coup began in earnest.

Fatah’s Last Stand

The Hamas leadership in Gaza is adamant that the coup would not have happened if Fatah had not provoked it. Fawzi Barhoum, Hamas’s chief spokesman, says the leak in Al-Majd convinced the party that “there was a plan, approved by America, to destroy the political choice.” The arrival of the first Egyptian-trained fighters, he adds, was the “reason for the timing.” About 250 Hamas members had been killed in the first six months of 2007, Barhoum tells me. “Finally we decided to put an end to it. If we had let them stay loose in Gaza, there would have been more violence.”

“Everyone here recognizes that Dahlan was trying with American help to undermine the results of the elections,” says Mahmoud Zahar, the former foreign minister for the Haniyeh government, who now leads Hamas’s militant wing in Gaza. “He was the one planning a coup.”

Zahar and I speak inside his home in Gaza, which was rebuilt after a 2003 Israeli air strike destroyed it, killing one of his sons. He tells me that Hamas launched its operations in June with a limited objective: “The decision was only to get rid of the Preventive Security Service. They were the ones out on every crossroads, putting anyone suspected of Hamas involvement at risk of being tortured or killed.” But when Fatah fighters inside a surrounded Preventive Security office in Jabaliya began retreating from building to building, they set off a “domino effect” that emboldened Hamas to seek broader gains.

Many armed units that were nominally loyal to Fatah did not fight at all. Some stayed neutral because they feared that, with Dahlan absent, his forces were bound to lose. “I wanted to stop the cycle of killing,” says Ibrahim abu al-Nazar, a veteran party chief. “What did Dahlan expect? Did he think the U.S. Navy was going to come to Fatah’s rescue? They promised him everything, but what did they do? But he also deceived them. He told them he was the strongman of the region. Even the Americans may now feel sad and frustrated. Their friend lost the battle.”

Others who stayed out of the fight were extremists. “Fatah is a large movement, with many schools inside it,” says Khalid Jaberi, a commander with Fatah’s al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which continue to fire rockets into Israel from Gaza. “Dahlan’s school is funded by the Americans and believes in negotiations with Israel as a strategic choice. Dahlan tried to control everything in Fatah, but there are cadres who could do a much better job. Dahlan treated us dictatorially. There was no overall Fatah decision to confront Hamas, and that’s why our guns in al-Aqsa are the cleanest. They are not corrupted by the blood of our people.”

Jaberi pauses. He spent the night before our interview awake and in hiding, fearful of Israeli air strikes. “You know,” he says, “since the takeover, we’ve been trying to enter the brains of Bush and Rice, to figure out their mentality. We can only conclude that having Hamas in control serves their overall strategy, because their policy was so crazy otherwise.”

The fighting was over in less than five days. It began with attacks on Fatah security buildings, in and around Gaza City and in the southern town of Rafah. Fatah attempted to shell Prime Minister Haniyeh’s house, but by dusk on June 13 its forces were being routed.

Years of oppression by Dahlan and his forces were avenged as Hamas chased down stray Fatah fighters and subjected them to summary execution. At least one victim was reportedly thrown from the roof of a high-rise building. By June 16, Hamas had captured every Fatah building, as well as Abbas’s official Gaza residence. Much of Dahlan’s house, which doubled as his office, was reduced to rubble.

Fatah’s last stand, predictably enough, was made by the Preventive Security Service. The unit sustained heavy casualties, but a rump of about 100 surviving fighters eventually made it to the beach and escaped in the night by fishing boat.

At the apartment in Ramallah, the wounded struggle on. Unlike Fatah, Hamas fired exploding bullets, which are banned under the Geneva Conventions. Some of the men in the apartment were shot with these rounds 20 or 30 times, producing unimaginable injuries that required amputation. Several have lost both legs.

The coup has had other costs. Amjad Shawer, a local economist, tells me that Gaza had 400 functioning factories and workshops at the start of 2007. By December, the intensified Israeli blockade had caused 90 percent of them to close. Seventy percent of Gaza’s population is now living on less than $2 a day.

Israel, meanwhile, is no safer. The emergency pro-peace government called for in the secret Action Plan is now in office—but only in the West Bank. In Gaza, the exact thing both Israel and the U.S. Congress warned against came to pass when Hamas captured most of Fatah’s arms and ammunition—including the new Egyptian guns supplied under the covert U.S.-Arab aid program.

Now that it controls Gaza, Hamas has given free rein to militants intent on firing rockets into neighboring Israeli towns. “We are still developing our rockets; soon we shall hit the heart of Ashkelon at will,” says Jaberi, the al-Aqsa commander, referring to the Israeli city of 110,000 people 12 miles from Gaza’s border. “I assure you, the time is near when we will mount a big operation inside Israel, in Haifa or Tel Aviv.”

On January 23, Hamas blew up parts of the wall dividing Gaza from Egypt, and tens of thousands of Palestinians crossed the border. Militants had already been smuggling weapons through a network of underground tunnels, but the breach of the wall made their job much easier—and may have brought Jaberi’s threat closer to reality.

George W. Bush and Condoleezza Rice continue to push the peace process, but Avi Dichter says Israel will never conclude a deal on Palestinian statehood until the Palestinians reform their entire law-enforcement system—what he calls “the chain of security.” With Hamas in control of Gaza, there appears to be no chance of that happening. “Just look at the situation,” says Dahlan. “They say there will be a final-status agreement in eight months? No way.”

“An Institutional Failure”

How could the U.S. have played Gaza so wrong? Neocon critics of the administration—who until last year were inside it—blame an old State Department vice: the rush to anoint a strongman instead of solving problems directly. This ploy has failed in places as diverse as Vietnam, the Philippines, Central America, and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, during its war against Iran. To rely on proxies such as Muhammad Dahlan, says former U.N. ambassador John Bolton, is “an institutional failure, a failure of strategy.” Its author, he says, was Rice, “who, like others in the dying days of this administration, is looking for legacy. Having failed to heed the warning not to hold the elections, they tried to avoid the result through Dayton.”

With few good options left, the administration now appears to be rethinking its blanket refusal to engage with Hamas. Staffers at the National Security Council and the Pentagon recently put out discreet feelers to academic experts, asking them for papers describing Hamas and its principal protagonists. “They say they won’t talk to Hamas,” says one such expert, “but in the end they’re going to have to. It’s inevitable.”

It is impossible to say for sure whether the outcome in Gaza would have been any better—for the Palestinian people, for the Israelis, and for America’s allies in Fatah—if the Bush administration had pursued a different policy. One thing, however, seems certain: it could not be any worse.

David Rose is a Vanity Fair contributing editor.

http://www.zcommunications.org/znet/viewArticle/20316
"Exterminate all the Brutes": Gaza 2009

January 20, 2009 By Noam Chomsky

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On Saturday December 27, the latest US-Israeli attack on helpless Palestinians was launched. The attack had been meticulously planned, for over 6 months according to the Israeli press. The planning had two components: military and propaganda. It was based on the lessons of Israel's 2006 invasion of Lebanon, which was considered to be poorly planned and badly advertised. We may, therefore, be fairly confident that most of what has been done and said was pre-planned and intended.

That surely includes the timing of the assault: shortly before noon, when children were returning from school and crowds were milling in the streets of densely populated Gaza City. It took only a few minutes to kill over 225 people and wound 700, an auspicious opening to the mass slaughter of defenseless civilians trapped in a tiny cage with nowhere to flee.

In his retrospective "Parsing Gains of Gaza War," New York Times correspondent Ethan Bronner cited this achievement as one of the most significant of the gains. Israel calculated that it would be advantageous to appear to "go crazy," causing vastly disproportionate terror, a doctrine that traces back to the 1950s. "The Palestinians in Gaza got the message on the first day," Bronner wrote, "when Israeli warplanes struck numerous targets simultaneously in the middle of a Saturday morning. Some 200 were killed instantly, shocking Hamas and indeed all of Gaza." The tactic of "going crazy" appears to have been successful, Bronner concluded: there are "limited indications that the people of Gaza felt such pain from this war that they will seek to rein in Hamas," the elected government. That is another long-standing doctrine of state terror. I don't, incidentally, recall the Times retrospective "Parsing Gains of Chechnya War," though the gains were great.

The meticulous planning also presumably included the termination of the assault, carefully timed to be just before the inauguration, so as to minimize the (remote) threat that Obama might have to say some words critical of these vicious US-supported crimes.

Two weeks after the Sabbath opening of the assault, with much of Gaza already pounded to rubble and the death toll approaching 1000, the UN Agency UNRWA, on which most Gazans depend for survival, announced that the Israeli military refused to allow aid shipments to Gaza, saying that the crossings were closed for the Sabbath. To honor the holy day, Palestinians at the edge of survival must be denied food and medicine, while hundreds can be slaughtered by US jet bombers and helicopters.

The rigorous observance of the Sabbath in this dual fashion attracted little if any notice. That makes sense. In the annals of US-Israeli criminality, such cruelty and cynicism scarcely merit more than a footnote. They are too familiar. To cite one relevant parallel, in June 1982 the US-backed Israeli invasion of Lebanon opened with the bombing of the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila, later to become famous as the site of terrible massacres supervised by the IDF (Israeli "Defense" Forces). The bombing hit the local hospital - the Gaza hospital -- and killed over 200 people, according to the eyewitness account of an American Middle East academic specialist. The massacre was the opening act in an invasion that slaughtered some 15-20,000 people and destroyed much of southern Lebanon and Beirut, proceeding with crucial US military and diplomatic support. That included vetoes of Security Council resolutions seeking to halt the criminal aggression that was undertaken, as scarcely concealed, to defend Israel from the threat of peaceful political settlement, contrary to many convenient fabrications about Israelis suffering under intense rocketing, a fantasy of apologists.

All of this is normal, and quite openly discussed by high Israeli officials. Thirty years ago Chief of Staff Mordechai Gur observed that since 1948, "we have been fighting against a population that lives in villages and cities." As Israel's most prominent military analyst, Zeev Schiff, summarized his remarks, "the Israeli Army has always struck civilian populations, purposely and consciously...the Army, he said, has never distinguished civilian [from military] targets...[but] purposely attacked civilian targets." The reasons were explained by the distinguished statesman Abba Eban: "there was a rational prospect, ultimately fulfilled, that affected populations would exert pressure for the cessation of hostilities." The effect, as Eban well understood, would be to allow Israel to implement, undisturbed, its programs of illegal expansion and harsh repression. Eban was commenting on a review of Labor government attacks against civilians by Prime Minister Begin, presenting a picture, Eban said, "of an Israel wantonly inflicting every possible measure of death and anguish on civilian populations in a mood reminiscent of regimes which neither Mr.Begin nor I would dare to mention by name." Eban did not contest the facts that Begin reviewed, but criticized him for stating them publicly. Nor did it concern Eban, or his admirers, that his advocacy of massive state terror is also reminiscent of regimes he would not dare to mention by name.

Eban's justification for state terror is regarded as persuasive by respected authorities. As the current US-Israel assault raged, Times columnist Thomas Friedman explained that Israel's tactics both in the current attack and in its invasion of Lebanon in 2006 are based on the sound principle of "trying to `educate' Hamas, by inflicting a heavy death toll on Hamas militants and heavy pain on the Gaza population." That makes sense on pragmatic grounds, as it did in Lebanon, where "the only long-term source of deterrence was to exact enough pain on the civilians -- the families and employers of the militants -- to restrain Hezbollah in the future." And by similar logic, bin Laden's effort to "educate" Americans on 9/11 was highly praiseworthy, as were the Nazi attacks on Lidice and Oradour, Putin's destruction of Grozny, and other notable attempts at "education."

Israel has taken pains to make clear its dedication to these guiding principles. NYT correspondent Stephen Erlanger reports that Israeli human rights groups are "troubled by Israel's strikes on buildings they believe should be classified as civilian, like the parliament, police stations and the presidential palace" - and, we may add, villages, homes, densely populated refugee camps, water and sewage systems, hospitals, schools and universities, mosques, UN relief facilities, ambulances, and indeed anything that might relieve the pain of the unworthy victims. A senior Israeli intelligence officer explained that the IDF attacked "both aspects of Hamas -- its resistance or military wing and its dawa, or social wing," the latter a euphemism for the civilian society. "He argued that Hamas was all of a piece," Erlanger continues, "and in a war, its instruments of political and social control were as legitimate a target as its rocket caches." Erlanger and his editors add no comment about the open advocacy, and practice, of massive terrorism targeting civilians, though correspondents and columnists signal their tolerance or even explicit advocacy of war crimes, as noted. But keeping to the norm, Erlanger does not fail to stress that Hamas rocketing is "an obvious violation of the principle of discrimination and fits the classic definition of terrorism."

Like others familiar with the region, Middle East specialist Fawwaz Gerges observes that "What Israeli officials and their American allies do not appreciate is that Hamas is not merely an armed militia but a social movement with a large popular base that is deeply entrenched in society." Hence when they carry out their plans to destroy Hamas's "social wing," they are aiming to destroy Palestinian society.

Gerges may be too kind. It is highly unlikely that Israeli and American officials - or the media and other commentators - do not appreciate these facts. Rather, they implicitly adopt the traditional perspective of those who monopolize means of violence: our mailed fist can crush any opposition, and if our furious assault has a heavy civilian toll, that's all to the good: perhaps the remnants will be properly educated.

IDF officers clearly understand that they are crushing the civilian society. Ethan Bronner quotes an Israeli Colonel who says that he and his men are not much "impressed with the Hamas fighters." "They are villagers with guns," said a gunner on an armored personnel carrier. They resemble the victims of the murderous IDF "iron fist" operations in occupied southern Lebanon in 1985, directed by Shimon Peres, one of the great terrorist commanders of the era of Reagan's "War on Terror." During these operations, Israeli commanders and strategic analysts explained that the victims were "terrorist villagers," difficult to eradicate because "these terrorists operate with the support of most of the local population." An Israeli commander complained that "the terrorist...has many eyes here, because he lives here," while the military correspondent of the Jerusalem Post described the problems Israeli forces faced in combating the "terrorist mercenary," "fanatics, all of whom are sufficiently dedicated to their causes to go on running the risk of being killed while operating against the IDF," which must "maintain order and security" in occupied southern Lebanon despite "the price the inhabitants will have to pay." The problem has been familiar to Americans in South Vietnam, Russians in Afghanistan, Germans in occupied Europe, and other aggressors that find themselves implementing the Gur-Eban-Friedman doctrine.

Gerges believes that US-Israeli state terror will fail: Hamas, he writes, "cannot be wiped out without massacring half a million Palestinians. If Israel succeeds in killing Hamas's senior leaders, a new generation, more radical than the present, will swiftly replace them. Hamas is a fact of life. It is not going away, and it will not raise the white flag regardless of how many casualties it suffers."

Perhaps, but there is often a tendency to underestimate the efficacy of violence. It is particularly odd that such a belief should be held in the United States. Why are we here?

Hamas is regularly described as "Iranian-backed Hamas, which is dedicated to the destruction of Israel." One will be hard put to find something like "democratically elected Hamas, which has long been calling for a two-state settlement in accord with the international consensus" -- blocked for over 30 years by the US and Israel, which flatly and explicitly reject the right of Palestinians to self-determination. All true, but not a useful contribution to the Party Line, hence dispensable.

Such details as those mentioned earlier, though minor, nevertheless teach us something about ourselves and our clients. So do others. To mention another one, as the latest US-Israeli assault on Gaza began, a small boat, the Dignity, was on its way from Cyprus to Gaza. The doctors and human rights activists aboard intended to violate Israel's criminal blockade and to bring medical supplies to the trapped population. The ship was intercepted in international waters by Israeli naval vessels, which rammed it severely, almost sinking it, though it managed to limp to Lebanon. Israel issued the routine lies, refuted by the journalists and passengers aboard, including CNN correspondent Karl Penhaul and former US representative and Green Party presidential candidate Cynthia McKinney. That is a serious crime -- much worse, for example, than hijacking boats off the coast of Somalia. It passed with little notice. The tacit acceptance of such crimes reflects the understanding that Gaza is occupied territory, and that Israel is entitled to maintain its siege, even authorized by the guardians of international order to carry out crimes on the high seas to implement its programs of punishing the civilian population for disobedience to its commands - under pretexts to which we return, almost universally accepted but clearly untenable.

The lack of attention again makes sense. For decades, Israel had been hijacking boats in international waters between Cyprus and Lebanon, killing or kidnapping passengers, sometimes bringing them to prisons in Israel, including secret prison/torture chambers, to hold as hostages for many years. Since the practices are routine, why treat the new crime with more than a yawn? Cyprus and Lebanon reacted quite differently, but who are they in the scheme of things?

Who cares, for example, if the editors of Lebanon's Daily Star, generally pro-Western, write that "Some 1.5 million people in Gaza are being subjected to the murderous ministrations of one of the world's most technologically advanced but morally regressive military machines. It is often suggested that the Palestinians have become to the Arab world what the Jews were to pre-World War II Europe, and there is some truth to this interpretation. How sickeningly appropriate, then, that just as Europeans and North Americans looked the other way when the Nazis were perpetrating the Holocaust, the Arabs are finding a way to do nothing as the Israelis slaughter Palestinian children." Perhaps the most shameful of the Arab regimes is the brutal Egyptian dictatorship, the beneficiary of most US military aid, apart from Israel.

According to the Lebanese press, Israel still "routinely abducts Lebanese civilians from the Lebanese side of the Blue Line [the international border], most recently in December 2008." And of course "Israeli planes violate Lebanese airspace on a daily basis in violation of UN Resolution 1701" (Lebanese scholar Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, Daily Star, Jan. 13). That too has been happening for a long time. In condemning Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 2006, the prominent Israeli strategic analyst Zeev Maoz wrote in the Israeli press that "Israel has violated Lebanese airspace by carrying out aerial reconnaissance missions virtually every day since its withdrawal from Southern Lebanon six years ago. True, these aerial overflights did not cause any Lebanese casualties, but a border violation is a border violation. Here too, Israel does not hold a higher moral ground." And in general, there is no basis for the "wall-to-wall consensus in Israel that the war against the Hezbollah in Lebanon is a just and moral war," a consensus "based on selective and short-term memory, on an introvert world view, and on double standards. This is not a just war, the use of force is excessive and indiscriminate, and its ultimate aim is extortion."

As Maoz also reminds his Israeli readers, overflights with sonic booms to terrorize Lebanese are the least of Israeli crimes in Lebanon, even apart from its five invasions since 1978: "On July 28, 1988 Israeli Special Forces abducted Sheikh Obeid, and on May 21, 1994 Israel abducted Mustafa Dirani, who was responsible for capturing the Israeli pilot Ron Arad [when he was bombing Lebanon in 1986]. Israel held these and other 20 Lebanese who were captured under undisclosed circumstances in prison for prolonged periods without trial. They were held as human `bargaining chips.' Apparently, abduction of Israelis for the purpose of prisoners' exchange is morally reprehensible, and militarily punishable when it is the Hezbollah who does the abducting, but not if Israel is doing the very same thing," and on a far grander scale and over many years.

Israel's regular practices are significant even apart from what they reveal about Israeli criminality and Western support for it. As Maoz indicates, these practices underscore the utter hypocrisy of the standard claim that Israel had the right to invade Lebanon once again in 2006 when soldiers were captured at the border, the first cross-border action by Hezbollah in the six years since Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon, which it occupied in violation of Security Council orders going back 22 years, while during these six years Israel violated the border almost daily with impunity, and silence here.

The hypocrisy is, again, routine. Thus Thomas Friedman, while explaining how the lesser breeds are to be "educated" by terrorist violence, writes that Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 2006, once again destroying much of southern Lebanon and Beirut while killing another 1000 civilians, was a just act of self-defense, responding to Hezbollah's crime of "launching an unprovoked war across the U.N.-recognized Israel-Lebanon border, after Israel had unilaterally withdrawn from Lebanon." Putting aside the deceit, by the same logic, terrorist attacks against Israelis that are far more destructive and murderous than any that have taken place would be fully justified in response to Israel's criminal practices in Lebanon and on the high seas, which vastly exceed Hezbollah's crime of capturing two soldiers at the border. The veteran Middle East specialist of the New York Times surely knows about these crimes, at least if he reads his own newspaper: for example, the 18th paragraph of a story on prisoner exchange in November 1983 which observes, casually, that 37 of the Arab prisoners "had been seized recently by the Israeli Navy as they tried to make their way from Cyprus to Tripoli," north of Beirut.

Of course all such conclusions about appropriate actions against the rich and powerful are based on a fundamental flaw: This is us, and that is them. This crucial principle, deeply embedded in Western culture, suffices to undermine even the most precise analogy and the most impeccable reasoning.

As I write, another boat is on its way from Cyprus to Gaza, "carrying urgently needed medical supplies in sealed boxes, cleared by customs at the Larnaca International Airport and the Port of Larnaca," the organizers report. Passengers include members of European Parliaments and physicians. Israel has been notified of their humanitarian intent. With sufficient popular pressure, they might achieve their mission in peace.

The new crimes that the US and Israel have been committing in Gaza in the past weeks do not fit easily into any standard category - except for the category of familiarity; I've just given several examples, and will return to others. Literally, the crimes fall under the official US government definition of "terrorism," but that designation does not capture their enormity. They cannot be called "aggression," because they are being conducted in occupied territory, as the US tacitly concedes. In their comprehensive scholarly history of Israeli settlement in the occupied territories, Lords of the Land, Idit Zertal and Akiva Eldar point out that after Israel withdrew its forces from Gaza in August 2005, the ruined territory was not released "for even a single day from Israel's military grip or from the price of the occupation that the inhabitants pay every day... Israel left behind scorched earth, devastated services, and people with neither a present nor a future. The settlements were destroyed in an ungenerous move by an unenlightened occupier, which in fact continues to control the territory and kill and harass its inhabitants by means of its formidable military might" - exercised with extreme savagery, thanks to firm US support and participation.

The US-Israeli assault on Gaza escalated in January 2006, a few months after the formal withdrawal, when Palestinians committed a truly heinous crime: they voted "the wrong way" in a free election. Like others, Palestinians learned that one does not disobey with impunity the commands of the Master, who continues to prate of his "yearning for democracy," without eliciting ridicule from the educated classes, another impressive achievement.

Since the terms "aggression" and "terrorism" are inadequate, some new term is needed for the sadistic and cowardly torture of people caged with no possibility of escape, while they are being pounded to dust by the most sophisticated products of US military technology - used in violation of international and even US law, but for self-declared outlaw states that is just another minor technicality. Also a minor technicality is the fact that on December 31, while terrorized Gazans were desperately seeking shelter from the ruthless assault, Washington hired a German merchant ship to transport from Greece to Israel a huge shipment, 3000 tons, of unidentified "ammunition." The new shipment "follows the hiring of a commercial ship to carry a much larger consignment of ordnance in December from the United States to Israel ahead of air strikes in the Gaza Strip," Reuters reported. All of this is separate from the more than $21 billion in U.S. military aid provided by the Bush administration to Israel, almost all grants. "Israel's intervention in the Gaza Strip has been fueled largely by U.S. supplied weapons paid for with U.S. tax dollars," said a briefing by the New America Foundation, which monitors the arms trade. The new shipment was hampered by the decision of the Greek government to bar the use of any port in Greece "for the supplying of the Israeli army."

Greece's response to US-backed Israeli crimes is rather different from the craven performance of the leaders of most of Europe. The distinction reveals that Washington may have been quite realistic in regarding Greece as part of the Near East, not Europe, until the overthrow of its US-backed fascist dictatorship in 1974. Perhaps Greece is just too civilized to be part of Europe.

Were anyone to find the timing of the arms deliveries to Israel curious, and inquire further, the Pentagon has an answer: the shipment would arrive too late to escalate the Gaza attack, and the military equipment, whatever it may be, is to be pre-positioned in Israel for eventual use by the US military. That may be accurate. One of the many services that Israel performs for its patron is to provide it with a valuable military base at the periphery of the world's major energy resources. It can therefore serve as a forward base for US aggression - or to use the technical terms, to "defend the Gulf" and "ensure stability."

The huge flow of arms to Israel serves many subsidiary purposes. Middle East policy analyst Mouin Rabbani observes that Israel can test newly developed weapons systems against defenseless targets. This is of value to Israel and the US "twice over, in fact, because less effective versions of these same weapons systems are subsequently sold at hugely inflated prices to Arab states, which effectively subsidizes the U.S. weapons industry and U.S. military grants to Israel." These are additional functions of Israel in the US-dominated Middle East system, and among the reasons why Israel is so favored by the state authorities, along with a wide range of US high-tech corporations, and of course military industry and intelligence.

Israel apart, the US is by far the world's major arms supplier. The recent New America Foundation report concludes that "U.S. arms and military training played a role in 20 of the world's 27 major wars in 2007," earning the US $23 billion in receipts, increasing to $32 billion in 2008. Small wonder that among the numerous UN resolutions that the US opposed in the December 2008 UN session was one calling for regulation of the arms trade. In 2006, the US was alone in voting against the treaty, but in November 2008 it was joined by a partner: Zimbabwe.

There were other notable votes at the December UN session. A resolution on "the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination" was adopted by 173 to 5 (US, Israel, Pacific island dependencies). The vote strongly reaffirms US-Israeli rejectionism, in international isolation. Similarly a resolution on "universal freedom of travel and the vital importance of family reunification" was adopted with US, Israel, and Pacific dependencies opposed, presumably with Palestinians in mind.

In voting against the right to development the US lost Israel but gained Ukraine. In voting against the "right to food," the US was alone, a particular striking fact in the face of the enormous global food crisis, dwarfing the financial crisis that threatens western economies.

There are good reasons why the voting record is consistently unreported and dispatched deep into the memory hole by the media and conformist intellectuals. It would not be wise to reveal to the public what the record implies about their elected representatives. In the present case it would plainly be unhelpful to let the public know that US-Israeli rejectionism, barring the peaceful settlement long advocated by the world, reaches such an extreme as to deny Palestinians even the abstract right to self-determination.

One of the heroic volunteers in Gaza, Norwegian doctor Mads Gilbert, described the scene of horror as an "All out war against the civilian population of Gaza." He estimated that half the casualties are women and children. The men are almost all civilians as well, by civilized standards. Gilbert reports that he had scarcely seen a military casualty among the 100s of bodies. The IDF concurs. Hamas "made a point of fighting at a distance -- or not at all," Ethan Bronner reports while "parsing the gains" of the US-Israeli assault. So Hamas's manpower remains intact, and it was mostly civilians who suffered pain: a positive outcome, according to widely-held doctrine.

These estimates were confirmed by UN humanitarian chief John Holmes, who informed reporters that it is "a fair presumption" that most of the civilians killed were women and children in a humanitarian crisis that is "worsening day by day as the violence continues." But we could be comforted by the words of Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, the leading dove in the current electoral campaign, who assured the world that there is no "humanitarian crisis" in Gaza, thanks to Israeli benevolence.

Like others who care about human beings and their fate, Gilbert and Holmes pleaded for a ceasefire. But not yet. "At the United Nations, the United States prevented the Security Council from issuing a formal statement on Saturday night calling for an immediate ceasefire," the New York Times mentioned in passing. The official reason was that "there was no indication Hamas would abide by any agreement." In the annals of justifications for delighting in slaughter, this must rank among the most cynical. That of course was Bush and Rice, soon to be displaced by Obama who compassionately repeats that "if missiles were falling where my two daughters sleep, I would do everything in order to stop that." He is referring to Israeli children, not the many hundreds being torn to shreds in Gaza by US arms. Beyond that Obama maintained his silence.

A few days later, under intense international pressure, the US backed a Security Council resolution calling for a "durable ceasefire." It passed 14-0, US abstaining. Israel and US hawks were angered that the US did not veto it, as usual. The abstention, however, sufficed to give Israel if not a green at least a yellow light to escalate the violence, as it did right up to virtually the moment of the inauguration, as had been predicted.

As the ceasefire (theoretically) went into effect on January18, the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights released its figures for the final day of the assault: 54 Palestinians killed including 43 unarmed civilians, 17 of them children, while the IDF continued to bombard civilian homes and UN schools. The death toll, they estimated, mounted to 1,184, including 844 civilians, 281 of them children. The IDF continued to use incendiary bombs across the Gaza Strip, and to destroy houses and agricultural land, forcing civilians to flee their homes. A few hours later, Reuters reported more than 1,300 killed. The staff of the Al Mezan Center, which also carefully monitors casualties and destruction, visited areas that had previously been inaccessible because of incessant heavy bombardment. They discovered dozens of civilian corpses decomposing under the rubble of destroyed houses or removed by Israeli bulldozers. Entire urban blocks had disappeared.

The figures for killed and wounded are surely an underestimate. And it is unlikely that there will be any inquiry into these atrocities. Crimes of official enemies are subjected to rigorous investigation, but our own are systematically ignored. General practice, again, and understandable on the part of the masters.

The Security Council Resolution called for stopping the flow of arms into Gaza. The US and Israel (Rice-Livni) soon reached an agreement on measures to ensure this result, concentrating on Iranian arms. There is no need to stop smuggling of US arms into Israel, because there is no smuggling: the huge flow of arms is quite public, even when not reported, as in the case of the arms shipment announced as the slaughter in Gaza was proceeding.

The Resolution also called for "ensur[ing] the sustained re-opening of the crossing points on the basis of the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access between the Palestinian Authority and Israel"; that Agreement determined that crossings to Gaza would be operated on a continuous basis and that Israel would also allow the crossing of goods and people between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The Rice-Livni agreement had nothing to say about this aspect of the Security Council Resolution. The US and Israel had in fact already abandoned the 2005 Agreement as part of their punishment of Palestinians for voting the wrong way in a free election in January 2006. Rice's press conference after the Rice-Livni agreement emphasized Washington's continuing efforts to undermine the results of the one free election in the Arab world: "There is much that can be done," she said, "to bring Gaza out of the dark of Hamas's reign and into the light of the very good governance the Palestinian Authority can bring" - at least, can bring as long as it remains a loyal client, rife with corruption and willing to carry out harsh repression, but obedient.

Returning from a visit to the Arab world, Fawwaz Gerges strongly affirmed what others on the scene have reported. The effect of the US-Israeli offensive in Gaza has been to infuriate the populations and to arouse bitter hatred of the aggressors and their collaborators. "Suffice it to say that the so-called moderate Arab states [that is, those that take their orders from Washington] are on the defensive, and that the resistance front led by Iran and Syria is the main beneficiary. Once again, Israel and the Bush administration have handed the Iranian leadership a sweet victory." Furthermore, "Hamas will likely emerge as a more powerful political force than before and will likely top Fatah, the ruling apparatus of President Mahmoud Abbas's Palestinian Authority," Rice's favorites.

It is worth bearing in mind that the Arab world is not scrupulously protected from the only regular live TV coverage of what is happening in Gaza, namely the "calm and balanced analysis of the chaos and destruction" provided by the outstanding correspondents of al-Jazeera, offering "a stark alternative to terrestrial channels," as reported by the London Financial Times. In the 105 countries lacking our efficient modalities of self-censorship, people can see what is happening hourly, and the impact is said to be very great. In the US, the New York Times reports, "the near-total blackout...is no doubt related to the sharp criticism Al Jazeera received from the United States government during the initial stages of the war in Iraq for its coverage of the American invasion." Cheney and Rumsfeld objected, so, obviously, the independent media could only obey.

There is much sober debate about what the attackers hoped to achieve. Some of objectives are commonly discussed, among them, restoring what is called "the deterrent capacity" that Israel lost as a result of its failures in Lebanon in 2006 - that is, the capacity to terrorize any potential opponent into submission. There are, however, more fundamental objectives that tend be ignored, though they too seem fairly obvious when we take a look at recent history.

Israel abandoned Gaza in September 2005. Rational Israeli hardliners, like Ariel Sharon, the patron saint of the settlers movement, understood that it was senseless to subsidize a few thousand illegal Israeli settlers in the ruins of Gaza, protected by the IDF while they used much of the land and scarce resources. It made more sense to turn Gaza into the world's largest prison and to transfer settlers to the West Bank, much more valuable territory, where Israel is quite explicit about its intentions, in word and more importantly in deed. One goal is to annex the arable land, water supplies, and pleasant suburbs of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv that lie within the separation wall, irrelevantly declared illegal by the World Court. That includes a vastly expanded Jerusalem, in violation of Security Council orders that go back 40 years, also irrelevant. Israel has also been taking over the Jordan Valley, about one-third of the West Bank. What remains is therefore imprisoned, and, furthermore, broken into fragments by salients of Jewish settlement that trisect the territory: one to the east of Greater Jerusalem through the town of Ma'aleh Adumim, developed through the Clinton years to split the West Bank; and two to the north, through the towns of Ariel and Kedumim. What remains to Palestinians is segregated by hundreds of mostly arbitrary checkpoints.

The checkpoints have no relation to security of Israel, and if some are intended to safeguard settlers, they are flatly illegal, as the World Court ruled. In reality, their major goal is harass the Palestinian population and to fortify what Israeli peace activist Jeff Halper calls the "matrix of control," designed to make life unbearable for the "two-legged beasts" who will be like "drugged roaches scurrying around in a bottle" if they seek to remain in their homes and land. All of that is fair enough, because they are "like grasshoppers compared to us" so that their heads can be "smashed against the boulders and walls." The terminology is from the highest Israeli political and military leaders, in this case the revered "princes." And the attitudes shape policies.

The ravings of the political and military leaders are mild as compared to the preaching of rabbinical authorities. They are not marginal figures. On the contrary, they are highly influential in the army and in the settler movement, who Zertal and Eldar reveal to be "lords of the land," with enormous impact on policy. Soldiers fighting in northern Gaza were afforded an "inspirational" visit from two leading rabbis, who explained to them that there are no "innocents" in Gaza, so everyone there is a legitimate target, quoting a famous passage from Psalms calling on the Lord to seize the infants of Israel's oppressors and dash them against the rocks. The rabbis were breaking no new ground. A year earlier, the former chief Sephardic rabbi wrote to Prime Minister Olmert, informing him that all civilians in Gaza are collectively guilty for rocket attacks, so that there is "absolutely no moral prohibition against the indiscriminate killing of civilians during a potential massive military offensive on Gaza aimed at stopping the rocket launchings," as the Jerusalem Post reported his ruling. His son, chief rabbi of Safed, elaborated: "If they don't stop after we kill 100, then we must kill a thousand, and if they do not stop after 1,000 then we must kill 10,000. If they still don't stop we must kill 100,000, even a million. Whatever it takes to make them stop."

Similar views are expressed by prominent American secular figures. When Israel invaded Lebanon in 2006, Harvard Law School Professor Alan Dershowitz explained in the liberal online journal Huffington Post that all Lebanese are legitimate targets of Israeli violence. Lebanon's citizens are "paying the price" for supporting "terrorism" - that is, for supporting resistance to Israel's invasion. Accordingly, Lebanese civilians are no more immune to attack than Austrians who supported the Nazis. The fatwa of the Sephardic rabbi applies to them. In a video on the Jerusalem Post website, Dershowitz went on to ridicule talk of excessive kill ratios of Palestinians to Israelis: it should be increased to 1000-to-one, he said, or even 1000-to-zero, meaning the brutes should be completely exterminated. Of course, he is referring to "terrorists," a broad category that includes the victims of Israeli power, since "Israel never targets civilians," he emphatically declared. It follows that Palestinians, Lebanese, Tunisians, in fact anyone who gets in the way of the ruthless armies of the Holy State is a terrorist, or an accidental victim of their just crimes.

It is not easy to find historical counterparts to these performances. It is perhaps of some interest that they are considered entirely appropriate in the reigning intellectual and moral culture - when they are produced on "our side," that is; from the mouths of official enemies such words would elicit righteous outrage and calls for massive preemptive violence in revenge.

The claim that "our side" never targets civilians is familiar doctrine among those who monopolize the means of violence. And there is some truth to it. We do not generally try to kill particular civilians. Rather, we carry out murderous actions that we know will slaughter many civilians, but without specific intent to kill particular ones. In law, the routine practices might fall under the category of depraved indifference, but that is not an adequate designation for standard imperial practice and doctrine. It is more similar to walking down a street knowing that we might kill ants, but without intent to do so, because they rank so low that it just doesn't matter. The same is true when Israel carries out actions that it knows will kill the "grasshoppers" and "two-legged beasts" who happen to infest the lands it "liberates." There is no good term for this form of moral depravity, arguably worse than deliberate murder, and all too familiar.

In the former Palestine, the rightful owners (by divine decree, according to the "lords of the land") may decide to grant the drugged roaches a few scattered parcels. Not by right, however: "I believed, and to this day still believe, in our people's eternal and historic right to this entire land," Prime Minister Olmert informed a joint session of Congress in May 2006 to rousing applause. At the same time he announced his "convergence" program for taking over what is valuable in the West Bank, leaving the Palestinians to rot in isolated cantons. He was not specific about the borders of the "entire land," but then, the Zionist enterprise never has been, for good reasons: permanent expansion is a very important internal dynamic. If Olmert is still faithful to his origins in Likud, he may have meant both sides of the Jordan, including the current state of Jordan, at least valuable parts of it.

Our people's "eternal and historic right to this entire land" contrasts dramatically with the lack of any right of self-determination for the temporary inhabitants, the Palestinians. As noted earlier, the latter stand was reiterated by Israel and its patron in Washington in December 2008, in their usual isolation and accompanied by resounding silence.

The plans that Olmert sketched in 2006 have since been abandoned as not sufficiently extreme. But what replaces the convergence program, and the actions that proceed daily to implement it, are approximately the same in general conception. They trace back to the earliest days of the occupation, when Defense Minister Moshe Dayan explained poetically that "the situation today resembles the complex relationship between a Bedouin man and the girl he kidnaps against his will...You Palestinians, as a nation, don't want us today, but we'll change your attitude by forcing our presence on you." You will "live like dogs, and whoever will leave, will leave," while we take what we want.

That these programs are criminal has never been in doubt. Immediately after the 1967 war, the Israeli government was informed by its highest legal authority, Teodor Meron, that "civilian settlement in the administered territories contravenes the explicit provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention," the foundation of international humanitarian law. Israel's Justice Minister concurred. The World Court unanimously endorsed the essential conclusion in 2004, and the Israeli High Court technically agreed while disagreeing in practice, in its usual style.

In the West Bank, Israel can pursue its criminal programs with US support and no disturbance, thanks to its effective military control and by now the cooperation of the collaborationist Palestinian security forces armed and trained by the US and allied dictatorships. It can also carry out regular assassinations and other crimes, while settlers rampage under IDF protection. But while the West Bank has been effectively subdued by terror, there is still resistance in the other half of Palestine, the Gaza Strip. That too must be quelled for the US-Israeli programs of annexation and destruction of Palestine to proceed undisturbed.

Hence the invasion of Gaza.

The timing of the invasion was presumably influenced by the coming Israeli election. Ehud Barak, who was lagging badly in the polls, gained one parliamentary seat for every 40 Arabs killed in the early days of the slaughter, Israeli commentator Ran HaCohen calculated.

That may change, however. As the crimes passed beyond what the carefully honed Israeli propaganda campaign was able to suppress, even confirmed Israeli hawks became concerned that the carnage is "Destroying [Israel's] soul and its image. Destroying it on world television screens, in the living rooms of the international community and most importantly, in Obama's America" (Ari Shavit). Shavit was particularly concerned about Israel's "shelling a United Nations facility...on the day when the UN secretary general is visiting Jerusalem," an act that is "beyond lunacy," he felt.

Adding a few details, the "facility" was the UN compound in Gaza City, which contained the UNRWA warehouse. The shelling destroyed "hundreds of tons of emergency food and medicines set for distribution today to shelters, hospitals and feeding centres," according to UNRWA director John Ging. Military strikes at the same time destroyed two floors of the al-Quds hospital, setting it ablaze, and also a second warehouse run by the Palestinian Red Crescent society. The hospital in the densely-populated Tal-Hawa neighbourhood was destroyed by Israeli tanks "after hundreds of frightened Gazans had taken shelter inside as Israeli ground forces pushed into the neighbourhood," AP reported.

There was nothing left to salvage inside the smoldering ruins of the hospital. "They shelled the building, the hospital building. It caught fire. We tried to evacuate the sick people and the injured and the people who were there. Firefighters arrived and put out the fire, which burst into flames again and they put it out again and it came back for the third time," paramedic Ahmad Al-Haz told AP. It was suspected that the blaze might have been set by white phosphorous, also suspected in numerous other fires and serious burn injuries.

The suspicions were confirmed by Amnesty International after the cessation of the intense bombardment made inquiry possible. Before, Israel had sensibly barred all journalists, even Israeli, while its crimes were proceeding in full fury. Israel's use of white phosphorus against Gaza civilians is "clear and undeniable," AI reported. Its repeated use in densely populated civilian areas "is a war crime," AI concluded. They found white phosphorus edges scattered around residential buildings, still burning, "further endangering the residents and their property," particularly children "drawn to the detritus of war and often unaware of the danger." Primary targets, they report, were the UNRWA compound, where the Israeli "white phosphorus landed next to some fuel trucks and caused a large fire which destroyed tons of humanitarian aid" after Israeli authorities "had given assurance that no further strikes would be launched on the compound." On the same day, "a white phosphorus shell landed in the al-Quds hospital in Gaza City also causing a fire which forced hospital staff to evacuate the patients... White phosphorus landing on skin can burn deep through muscle and into the bone, continuing to burn unless deprived of oxygen." Purposely intended or beyond depraved indifference, such crimes are inevitable when this weapon is used in attacks on civilians.

It is, however, a mistake to concentrate too much on Israel's gross violations of jus in bello, the laws designed to bar practices that are too savage. The invasion itself is a far more serious crime. And if Israel had inflicted the horrendous damage by bows and arrows, it would still be a criminal act of extreme depravity.

Aggression always has a pretext: in this case, that Israel's patience had "run out" in the face of Hamas rocket attacks, as Barak put it. The mantra that is endlessly repeated is that Israel has the right to use force to defend itself. The thesis is partially defensible. The rocketing is criminal, and it is true that a state has the right to defend itself against criminal attacks. But it does not follow that it has a right to defend itself by force. That goes far beyond any principle that we would or should accept. Nazi Germany had no right to use force to defend itself against the terrorism of the partisans. Kristallnacht is not justified by Herschel Grynszpan's assassination of a German Embassy official in Paris. The British were not justified in using force to defend themselves against the (very real) terror of the American colonists seeking independence, or to terrorize Irish Catholics in response to IRA terror - and when they finally turned to the sensible policy of addressing legitimate grievances, the terror ended. It is not a matter of "proportionality," but of choice of action in the first place: Is there an alternative to violence?

Any resort to force carries a heavy burden of proof, and we have to ask whether it can be met in the case of Israel's effort to quell any resistance to its daily criminal actions in Gaza and in the West Bank, where they still continue relentlessly after more than 40 years. Perhaps I may quote myself in an interview in the Israeli press on Olmert's announced convergence plans for the West Bank: "The US and Israel do not tolerate any resistance to these plans, preferring to pretend - falsely of course - that `there is no partner,' as they proceed with programs that go back a long way. We may recall that Gaza and the West Bank are recognized to be a unit, so if resistance to the US-Israeli annexation-cantonization programs is legitimate in the West Bank, it is in Gaza too."

Palestinian-American journalist Ali Abunimah observed that "There are no rockets launched at Israel from the West Bank, and yet Israel's extrajudicial killings, land theft, settler pogroms and kidnappings never stopped for a day during the truce. The western-backed Palestinian Authority of Mahmoud Abbas has acceded to all Israel's demands. Under the proud eye of United States military advisors, Abbas has assembled `security forces' to fight the resistance on Israel's behalf. None of that has spared a single Palestinian in the West Bank from Israel's relentless colonization" - thanks to firm US backing. The respected Palestinian parliamentarian Dr. Mustapha Barghouti adds that after Bush's Annapolis extravaganza in November 2007, with much uplifting rhetoric about dedication to peace and justice, Israeli attacks on Palestinians escalated sharply, with an almost 50% increase in the West Bank, along with a sharp increase in settlements and Israeli check points. Obviously these criminal actions are not a response to rockets from Gaza, though the converse may well be the case, Barghouti plausibly suggests.

The reactions to crimes of an occupying power can be condemned as criminal and politically foolish, but those who offer no alternative have no moral grounds to issue such judgments. The conclusion holds with particular force for those in the US who choose to be directly implicated in Israel's ongoing crimes -- by their words, their actions, or their silence. All the more so because there are very clear non-violent alternatives - which, however, have the disadvantage that they bar the programs of illegal expansion.

Israel has a straightforward means to defend itself: put an end to its criminal actions in occupied territories, and accept the long-standing international consensus on a two-state settlement that has been blocked by the US and Israel for over 30 years, since the US first vetoed a Security Council resolution calling for a political settlement in these terms in 1976. I will not once again run through the inglorious record, but it is important to be aware that US-Israeli rejectionism today is even more blatant than in the past. The Arab League has gone even beyond the consensus, calling for full normalization of relations with Israel. Hamas has repeatedly called for a two-state settlement in terms of the international consensus. Iran and Hezbollah have made it clear that they will abide by any agreement that Palestinians accept. That leaves the US-Israel in splendid isolation, not only in words.

The more detailed record is informative. The Palestinian National Council formally accepted the international consensus in 1988. The response of the Shamir-Peres coalition government, affirmed by James Baker's State Department, was that there cannot be an "additional Palestinian state" between Israel and Jordan - the latter already a Palestinian state by US-Israeli dictate. The Oslo accords that followed put to the side potential Palestinian national rights, and the threat that they might be realized in some meaningful form was systematically undermined through the Oslo years by Israel's steady expansion of illegal settlements. Settlement accelerated in 2000, President Clinton's and Prime Minister Barak's last year, when negotiations took place at Camp David against that background.

After blaming Yassir Arafat for the breakdown of the Camp David negotiations, Clinton backtracked, and recognized that the US-Israeli proposals were too extremist to be acceptable to any Palestinian. In December 2000, he presented his "parameters," vague but more forthcoming. He then announced that both sides had accepted the parameters, while both expressed reservations. The two sides met in Taba Egypt in January 2001 and came very close to an agreement, and would have been able to do so in a few more days, they said in their final press conference. But the negotiations were cancelled prematurely by Ehud Barak. That week in Taba is the one break in over 30 years of US-Israeli rejectionism. There is no reason why that one break in the record cannot be resumed.

The preferred version, recently reiterated by Ethan Bronner, is that "Many abroad recall Mr. Barak as the prime minister who in 2000 went further than any Israeli leader in peace offers to the Palestinians, only to see the deal fail and explode in a violent Palestinian uprising that drove him from power." It's true that "many abroad" believe this deceitful fairy tale, thanks to what Bronner and too many of his colleagues call "journalism".

It is commonly claimed that a two-state solution is now unattainable because if the IDF tried to remove settlers, it would lead to a civil war. That may be true, but much more argument is needed. Without resorting to force to expel illegal settlers, the IDF could simply withdraw to whatever boundaries are established by negotiations. The settlers beyond those boundaries would have the choice of leaving their subsidized homes to return to Israel, or to remain under Palestinian authority. The same was true of the carefully staged "national trauma" in Gaza in 2005, so transparently fraudulent that it was ridiculed by Israeli commentators. It would have sufficed for Israel to announce that the IDF would withdraw, and the settlers who were subsidized to enjoy their life in Gaza would have quietly climbed into the lorries provided to them and travelled to their new subsidized residences in the West Bank. But that would not have produced tragic photos of agonized children and passionate calls of "never again."

To summarize, contrary to the claim that is constantly reiterated, Israel has no right to use force to defend itself against rockets from Gaza, even if they are regarded as terrorist crimes. Furthermore, the reasons are transparent. The pretext for launching the attack is without merit.

There is also a narrower question. Does Israel have peaceful short-term alternatives to the use of force in response to rockets from Gaza. One short-term alternative would be to accept a ceasefire. Sometimes Israel has done so, while instantly violating it. The most recent and currently relevant case is June 2008. The ceasefire called for opening the border crossings to "allow the transfer of all goods that were banned and restricted to go into Gaza." Israel formally agreed, but immediately announced that it would not abide by the agreement and open the borders until Hamas released Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier captured by Hamas in June 2006.

The steady drumbeat of accusations about the capture of Shalit is, again, blatant hypocrisy, even putting aside Israel's long history of kidnapping. In this case, the hypocrisy could not be more glaring. One day before Hamas captured Shalit, Israeli soldiers entered Gaza City and kidnapped two civilians, the Muammar brothers, bringing them to Israel to join the thousands of other prisoners held there, almost 1000 reportedly without charge. Kidnapping civilians is a far more serious crime than capturing a soldier of an attacking army, but it was barely reported in contrast to the furor over Shalit. And all that remains in memory, blocking peace, is the capture of Shalit, another reflection of the difference between humans and two-legged beasts. Shalit should be returned - in a fair prisoner exchange.

It was after the capture of Shalit that Israel's unrelenting military attack against Gaza passed from merely vicious to truly sadistic. But it is well to recall that even before his capture, Israel had fired more than 7,700 shells at northern Gaza after its September withdrawal, eliciting virtually no comment.

After rejecting the June 2008 ceasefire it had formally accepted, Israel maintained its siege. We may recall that a siege is an act of war. In fact, Israel has always insisted on an even stronger principle: hampering access to the outside world, even well short of a siege, is an act of war, justifying massive violence in response. Interference with Israel's passage through the Straits of Tiran was part of the pretext for Israel's invasion of Egypt (with France and England) in 1956, and for its launching of the June 1967 war. The siege of Gaza is total, not partial, apart from occasional willingness of the occupiers to relax it slightly. And it is vastly more harmful to Gazans than closing the Straits of Tiran was to Israel. Supporters of Israeli doctrines and actions should therefore have no problem justifying rocket attacks on Israeli territory from the Gaza Strip.

Of course, again we run into the nullifying principle: This is us, that is them.

Israel not only maintained the siege after June 2008, but did so with extreme rigor. It even prevented UNRWA from replenishing its stores, "so when the ceasefire broke down, we ran out of food for the 750,000 who depend on us," UNRWA director John Ging informed the BBC.

Despite the Israeli siege, rocketing sharply reduced. The ceasefire broke down on November 4 with an Israeli raid into Gaza, leading to the death of 6 Palestinians, and a retaliatory barrage of rockets (with no injuries). The pretext for the raid was that Israel had detected a tunnel in Gaza that might have been intended for use to capture another Israeli soldier. The pretext is transparently absurd, as a number of commentators have noted. If such a tunnel existed, and reached the border, Israel could easily have barred it right there. But as usual, the ludicrous Israeli pretext was deemed credible.

What was the reason for the Israeli raid? We have no internal evidence about Israeli planning, but we do know that the raid came shortly before scheduled Hamas-Fatah talks in Cairo aimed at "reconciling their differences and creating a single, unified government," British correspondent Rory McCarthy reported. That was to be the first Fatah-Hamas meeting since the June 2007 civil war that left Hamas in control of Gaza, and would have been a significant step towards advancing diplomatic efforts. There is a long history of Israel provocations to deter the threat of diplomacy, some already mentioned. This may have been another one.

The civil war that left Hamas in control of Gaza is commonly described as a Hamas military coup, demonstrating again their evil nature. The real world is a little different. The civil war was incited by the US and Israel, in a crude attempt at a military coup to overturn the free elections that brought Hamas to power. That has been public knowledge at least since April 2008, when David Rose published in Vanity Fair a detailed and documented account of how Bush, Rice, and Deputy National-Security Adviser Elliott Abrams "backed an armed force under Fatah strongman Muhammad Dahlan, touching off a bloody civil war in Gaza and leaving Hamas stronger than ever." The account was recently corroborated once again in the Christian Science Monitor (Jan. 12, 2009) by Norman Olsen, who served for 26 years in the Foreign Service, including four years working in the Gaza Strip and four years at the US Embassy in Tel Aviv, and then moved on to become associate coordinator for counterterrorism at the Department of State. Olson and his son detail the State Department shenanigans intended to ensure that their candidate, Abbas, would win in the January 2006 elections - in which case it would have been hailed as a triumph of democracy. After the election-fixing failed, they turned to punishment of the Palestinians and arming of a militia run by Fatah strong-man Muhammad Dahlan, but "Dahlan's thugs moved too soon" and a Hamas pre-emptive strike undermined the coup attempt, leading to far harsher US-Israeli measures to punish the disobedient people of Gaza. The Party Line is more acceptable.

After Israel broke the June 2008 ceasefire (such as it was) in November, the siege was tightened further, with even more disastrous consequences for the population. According to Sara Roy, the leading academic specialist on Gaza, "On Nov. 5, Israel sealed all crossing points into Gaza, vastly reducing and at times denying food supplies, medicines, fuel, cooking gas, and parts for water and sanitation systems..." During November, an average of 4.6 trucks of food per day entered Gaza from Israel compared with an average of 123 trucks per day in October. Spare parts for the repair and maintenance of water-related equipment have been denied entry for over a year. The World Health Organization just reported that half of Gaza's ambulances are now out of order" - and the rest soon became targets for Israeli attack. Gaza's only power station was forced to suspend operation for lack of fuel, and could not be started up again because they needed spare parts, which had been sitting in the Israeli port of Ashdod for 8 months. Shortage of electricity led to a 300% increase in burn cases at Shifaa' hospital in the Gaza Strip, resulting from efforts to light wood fires. Israel barred shipment of Chlorine, so that by mid-December in Gaza City and the north access to water was limited to six hours every three days. The human consequences are not counted among Palestinian victims of Israeli terror.

After the November 4 Israeli attack, both sides escalated violence (all deaths were Palestinian) until the ceasefire formally ended on Dec. 19, and Prime Minister Olmert authorized the full-scale invasion.

A few days earlier Hamas had proposed to return to the original July ceasefire agreement, which Israel had not observed. Historian and former Carter administration high official Robert Pastor passed the proposal to a "senior official" in the IDF, but Israel did not respond. The head of Shin Bet, Israel's internal security agency, was quoted in Israeli sources on December 21 as saying that Hamas is interested in continuing the "calm" with Israel, while its military wing is continuing preparations for conflict.

"There clearly was an alternative to the military approach to stopping the rockets," Pastor said, keeping to the narrow issue of Gaza. There was also a more far-reaching alternative, which is rarely discussed: namely, accepting a political settlement including all of the occupied territories.

Israel's senior diplomatic correspondent Akiva Eldar reports that shortly before Israel launched its full-scale invasion on Saturday Dec. 27, "Hamas politburo chief Khaled Meshal announced on the Iz al-Din al-Qassam Web site that he was prepared not only for a `cessation of aggression' - he proposed going back to the arrangement at the Rafah crossing as of 2005, before Hamas won the elections and later took over the region. That arrangement was for the crossing to be managed jointly by Egypt, the European Union, the Palestinian Authority presidency and Hamas," and as noted earlier, called for opening of the crossings to desperately needed supplies.

A standard claim of the more vulgar apologists for Israeli violence is that in the case of the current assault, "as in so many instances in the past half century - the Lebanon War of 1982, the `Iron Fist' response to the 1988 intifada, the Lebanon War of 2006 - the Israelis have reacted to intolerable acts of terror with a determination to inflict terrible pain, to teach the enemy a lesson" (New Yorker editor David Remnick). The 2006 invasion can be justified only on the grounds of appalling cynicism, as already discussed. The reference to the vicious response to the 1988 intifada is too depraved even to discuss; a sympathetic interpretation might be that it reflects astonishing ignorance. But Remnick's claim about the 1982 invasion is quite common, a remarkable feat of incessant propaganda, which merits a few reminders.

Uncontroversially, the Israel-Lebanon border was quiet for a year before the Israeli invasion, at least from Lebanon to Israel, north to south. Through the year, the PLO scrupulously observed a US-initiated ceasefire, despite constant Israeli provocations, including bombing with many civilian casualties, presumably intended to elicit some reaction that could be used to justify Israel's carefully planned invasion. The best Israel could achieve was two light symbolic responses. It then invaded with a pretext too absurd to be taken seriously.

The invasion had precisely nothing to do with "intolerable acts of terror," though it did have to do with intolerable acts: of diplomacy. That has never been obscure. Shortly after the US-backed invasion began, Israel's leading academic specialist on the Palestinians, Yehoshua Porath - no dove -- wrote that Arafat's success in maintaining the ceasefire constituted "a veritable catastrophe in the eyes of the Israeli government," since it opened the way to a political settlement. The government hoped that the PLO would resort to terrorism, undermining the threat that it would be "a legitimate negotiating partner for future political accommodations."

The facts were well-understood in Israel, and not concealed. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir stated that Israel went to war because there was "a terrible danger... Not so much a military one as a political one," prompting the fine Israeli satirist B. Michael to write that "the lame excuse of a military danger or a danger to the Galilee is dead." We "have removed the political danger" by striking first, in time; now, "Thank God, there is no one to talk to." Historian Benny Morris recognized that the PLO had observed the ceasefire, and explained that "the war's inevitability rested on the PLO as a political threat to Israel and to Israel's hold on the occupied territories." Others have frankly acknowledged the unchallenged facts.

In a front-page think-piece on the latest Gaza invasion, NYT correspondent Steven Lee Meyers writes that "In some ways, the Gaza attacks were reminiscent of the gamble Israel took, and largely lost, in Lebanon in 1982 [when] it invaded to eliminate the threat of Yasir Arafat's forces." Correct, but not in the sense he has in mind. In 1982, as in 2008, it was necessary to eliminate the threat of political settlement.

The hope of Israeli propagandists has been that Western intellectuals and media would buy the tale that Israel reacted to rockets raining on the Galilee, "intolerable acts of terror." And they have not been disappointed.

It is not that Israel does not want peace: everyone wants peace, even Hitler. The question is: on what terms? From its origins, the Zionist movement has understood that to achieve its goals, the best strategy would be to delay political settlement, meanwhile slowly building facts on the ground. Even the occasional agreements, as in 1947, were recognized by the leadership to be temporary steps towards further expansion. The 1982 Lebanon war was a dramatic example of the desperate fear of diplomacy. It was followed by Israeli support for Hamas so as to undermine the secular PLO and its irritating peace initiatives. Another case that should be familiar is Israeli provocations before the 1967 war designed to elicit a Syrian response that could be used as a pretext for violence and takeover of more land - at least 80% of the incidents, according to Defense Minister Moshe Dayan.

The story goes far back. The official history of the Haganah, the pre-state Jewish military force, describes the assassination of the religious Jewish poet Jacob de Haan in 1924, accused of conspiring with the traditional Jewish community (the Old Yishuv) and the Arab Higher Committee against the new immigrants and their settlement enterprise. And there have been numerous examples since.

The effort to delay political accommodation has always made perfect sense, as do the accompanying lies about how "there is no partner for peace." It is hard to think of another way to take over land where you are not wanted.

Similar reasons underlie Israel's preference for expansion over security. Its violation of the ceasefire on November 4 2009 is one of many recent examples.

An Amnesty International chronology reports that the June 2008 ceasefire had "brought enormous improvements in the quality of life in Sderot and other Israeli villages near Gaza, where before the ceasefire residents lived in fear of the next Palestinian rocket strike. However, nearby in the Gaza Strip the Israeli blockade remains in place and the population has so far seen few dividends from the ceasefire." But the gains in security for Israel towns near Gaza were evidently outweighed by the felt need to deter diplomatic moves that might impede West Bank expansion, and to crush any remaining resistance within Palestine.

The preference for expansion over security has been particularly evident since Israel's fateful decision in 1971, backed by Henry Kissinger, to reject the offer of a full peace treaty by President Sadat of Egypt, offering nothing to the Palestinians - an agreement that the US and Israel were compelled to accept at Camp David eight years later, after a major war that was a near disaster for Israel. A peace treaty with Egypt would have ended any significant security threat, but there was an unacceptable quid pro quo: Israel would have had to abandon its extensive settlement programs in the northeastern Sinai. Security was a lower priority than expansion, as it still is. Substantial evidence for this basic conclusion is provided in a magisterial study of Israel's security and foreign policy by Zeev Maoz, Defending the Holy Land.

Today, Israel could have security, normalization of relations, and integration into the region. But it very clearly prefers illegal expansion, conflict, and repeated exercise of violence, actions that are not only criminal, murderous and destructive but are also eroding its own long-term security. US military and Middle East specialist Andrew Cordesman writes that while Israel military force can surely crush defenseless Gaza, "neither Israel nor the US can gain from a war that produces [a bitter] reaction from one of the wisest and most moderate voices in the Arab world, Prince Turki al-Faisal of Saudi Arabia, who said on January 6 that `The Bush administration has left [Obama] a disgusting legacy and a reckless position towards the massacres and bloodshed of innocents in Gaza...Enough is enough, today we are all Palestinians and we seek martyrdom for God and for Palestine, following those who died in Gaza'."

One of the wisest voices in Israel, Uri Avnery, writes that after an Israeli military victory, "What will be seared into the consciousness of the world will be the image of Israel as a blood-stained monster, ready at any moment to commit war crimes and not prepared to abide by any moral restraints. This will have severe consequences for our long-term future, our standing in the world, our chance of achieving peace and quiet. In the end, this war is a crime against ourselves too, a crime against the State of Israel."

There is good reason to believe that he is right. Israel is deliberately turning itself into perhaps the most hated country in the world, and is also losing the allegiance of the population of the West, including younger American Jews, who are unlikely to tolerate its persistent shocking crimes for long. Decades ago, I wrote that those who call themselves "supporters of Israel" are in reality supporters of its moral degeneration and probable ultimate destruction. Regrettably, that judgment looks more and more plausible.

Meanwhile we are quietly observing a rare event in history, what the late Israeli sociologist Baruch Kimmerling called "politicide," the murder of a nation -- at our hands.

http://www.normanfinkelstein.com/article.php?pg=11&ar=989
The Camp David II Negotiations: How Dennis Ross Proved the Palestinians Aborted the Peace Process

Issue 142 (Winter 2007) | Journal of Palestine Studies | Abstract
by Norman G. Finkelstein

This article, excerpted from a longer essay deconstructing Dennis Ross's book on the Palestinian-Israeli peace process from 1993 to 2000, focuses on the Camp David summit. In particular, it examines the assumptions informing Ross's account of what happened during the negotiations and why, and the distortions that spring from these assumptions. The article demonstrates that, judged from the perspective of Palestinians' and Israelis' respective rights under international law, all the concessions at Camp David came from the Palestinian side, none from the Israeli side. In reflecting on Ross's narrative, the author explores what he considers its "main innovation": the subordination of the normative framework of rights to the arbitrary and capricious one of "needs."
Dennis Ross's The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace[1] has been widely heralded as the definitive treatment of the Israeli-Palestinian "peace process" from the 1993 Oslo Accords through the Camp David negotiations of July 2000.[2]

The "one overriding lesson from the story of the peace process," Ross writes in his prologue, "is that truth-telling is a necessity" (p. 14). The "purpose" of his book as well as the "key to peace," he similarly concludes, "is to debunk mythologies . . . to engage in truth-telling" (p. 773). Ross's execution of this debunking and truth-telling enterprise, however, is problematic. His account of the peace process is based almost entirely on his memory and notes. Its authority derives chiefly from the fact that he was the "point person" (p. 106) for the Clinton administration on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Yet his "inside story" of the Camp David negotiations differs fundamentally on crucial points from what other participants have said and written. Rather than go over the ground already covered,[3] I will focus here on the cluster of assumptions informing Ross's account of what happened during the negotiations and why, and the distortions that spring from these assumptions.

Ross's interpretation of why Camp David failed gained wide currency almost immediately. His narrative, as is well known, assigns the lion's share of blame for the summit's collapse to Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat. Nonetheless, Ross situates the failure in a deeper Palestinian pathology.

The Root of the Problem

It is a central contention of Ross that Palestinians are in thrall to a victim syndrome. While acknowledging that they "surely have suffered" (p. 775), Ross maintains that the Palestinians' "sense of being victims has . . . fostered a sense of entitlement" (p. 42; cf. pp. 200, 686). For instance, Palestinians harbor the belief that they had been "entitled to the land" on which they were born when Zionist settlers coming from Europe sought to displace them; that the land "was theirs and had been taken" (p. 35). In Palestinian "eyes," Ross continues, "they were not responsible for what was done to the Jews in Europe" (p. 42). In their "eyes," consequently, "ending the conflict and agreeing to live with Israel's presence" constituted a significant concession (p. 44). Further, Palestinians chafed at the fact that it was Israel that determined the pace and parameters of withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian territory because they "believed they were getting what was rightfully theirs" (p. 55) and that "the land is 'theirs'" (p. 763). Their opposition to Israeli settlement expansion apparently sprang from this misapprehension as well: "it outrage[d] the Palestinians—absorbing land that they considered to be theirs" (pp. 82, 195), "perceived to be theirs" (p. 765), that "they believed was theirs or should be theirs" (p. 332; cf. 44, 55). Finally, Arafat "flew into a rage" and "ranted for several minutes" after seeing the Oslo map because of the "appearance" that the Palestinian areas comprised "isolated islands that are cut off from each other" (p. 205). It so happens, however, that what Palestinians "believed," "considered," and "perceived" to be theirs actually was theirs according to international law; that it was not just "in their eyes," but in those of any rational person that, whatever sins Palestinians might be chastised for, causing the Nazi holocaust is not one of them; and that the Oslo map did in fact shatter the Palestinian territory into a maze of fragments.

Compounding Palestinian misapprehensions regarding their legitimate claims on Palestine, according to Ross, were those regarding the United Nations and international law. For example, Ross writes:

Palestinians and many in the Arab world continued to see an American double standard. . . . They asked why was Israel permitted to effectively ignore Security Council resolutions while Saddam was forced to comply? They did not see the difference between the Security Council resolutions. Those against Iraq came as a response to Saddam's eradication of a member state of the U.N.; the resolutions required his compliance, not his acceptance. Noncompliance carried sanctions, and led to the use of force against his absorption of Kuwait. The resolutions that Palestinians and Arabs more generally focused on with regard to Israel were resolutions 242 and 338. They were adopted after the 1967 and 1973 wars. They provided the guidelines or principles that should shape negotiations to resolve the conflict between Arabs and Israelis. The terms of a final peace settlement were not established in these resolutions and they could not be mandatory on either side. But drawing distinctions between Security Council resolutions involving the Iraqis and the Israelis was not satisfying. The Arab world generally rejected the idea that Iraq faced pressure to implement Security Council resolutions while Israel did not. They wanted equal treatment. They wanted to portray all Security Council resolutions as having the force of international law. For the Arab world generally, the resolutions were their face-savers. They would resolve the conflict with Israel, but only on the basis of international law, "international legitimacy," as they called it. Here was their explanation, their justification for ending the conflict. If Iraq had to follow international legitimacy, so too, must Israel. (p. 43)
This argument poses some problems, however. Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq, we are told, focused on its violations of international law, thereby requiring "compliance" and carrying "sanctions," whereas Security Council resolutions regarding Israel focused on "principles" for a settlement, thereby requiring "acceptance" and envisaging "negotiations." Yet the international community over the last thirty years has reached broad consensus on the principles for settlement of the Israel-Palestine conflict. They are embodied in UN resolution 242 and subsequent UN resolutions calling for full Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and the establishment of a Palestinian state in these areas in exchange for recognition of Israel's right to live in peace and security with its neighbors.[4] Each year the overwhelming majority of UN member states votes in favor of this two-state settlement, while each year Israel and the United States (along with this or that South Pacific atoll) oppose it. It is unclear why principles that find overwhelming support in the UN require compliance and carry sanctions in the case of Iraq's refusal to withdraw from occupied Kuwait but not in the case of Israel's refusal to withdraw from the occupied Palestinian territory. In fact, Israel's refusal to abide by this longstanding international consensus apparently puts its occupation squarely in the same category as Iraq's illegal occupation of Kuwait. "[A]n occupation regime that refuses to earnestly contribute to efforts to reach a peaceful solution should be considered illegal," Tel Aviv University law professor Eyal Benvenisti opines:

Indeed, such a refusal should be considered outright annexation. The occupant has a duty under international law to conduct negotiations in good faith for a peaceful solution. It would seem that an occupant who proposes unreasonable conditions, or otherwise obstructs negotiations for peace for the purpose of retaining control over the occupied territory, could be considered a violator of international law.[5]
"The continued rule of the recalcitrant occupant," Benvenisti adds, should be construed "as an aggression."[6]

In addition, Arabs and Palestinians have focused not, as Ross alleges, on UN resolutions 242 and 338 when calling for Israel's compliance and sanctions against it, but rather on Israel's violation of scores of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions deploring its illegal annexation of Jerusalem (and the Syrian Golan Heights), its illegal settlement activity in the West Bank and Gaza, its illegal invasion and occupation of Lebanon (and other Arab countries), and numerous other flagrant violations of international law.[7] If the Arab world has not drawn "distinctions" between these resolutions and those directed at Iraq, it is perhaps because there are none to be drawn. It merits notice that Israel falls into a category all its own regarding compliance and sanctions. Although the Security Council has imposed sanctions on member states on some twenty different occasions since 1990, often for violations of international law identical to those committed by Israel, the U.S. veto has shielded Israel from any such sanctions.[8] Again, if the Arab world "continued to see an American double standard," it is perhaps because there in fact has been one, and if the Arab world demanded "equal treatment" for Palestinians "on the basis of international law," it is not self-evident why this should be objectionable.

Ross as Witness

Before scrutinizing Ross's influential thesis on why Camp David failed, it bears pausing for a moment on his reliability as a witness to these negotiations. Although acknowledging that he was publicly the whipping-boy for the Palestinians, Ross is emphatic that in reality they "respected me" (p. 608). He reports telling Palestinian negotiators, "You know that I understand your problems, your needs, and your aspirations very well. You know that I often explain them better than any of you do" (p. 755). Yet, the evidence suggests that, whether deservedly or not, Ross's Arab interlocutors "couldn't stand" him and believed he was "in league with the Israelis."[9]

Moreover, where Ross's allegedly verbatim account of the actual negotiations can be crosschecked, it proves misleading. Consider the volatile exchange between U.S. President Bill Clinton and the Palestinian delegation on day five of the summit. The Palestinians apparently insisted that before bargaining over land swaps, Israel had to accept the June 1967 borders as a baseline: whatever land Palestinians conceded on these borders would have to be compensated. Clinton, however, demanded that Palestinians exchange maps with Israel without Israel committing itself to the June borders as the baseline. Here is Ross's rendering of what ensued:

The President had had enough, and he let it rip. He said this was an outrageous approach. He had risked a great deal in having this summit. He had been advised not to take this risk. He disregarded this advice because he felt it necessary to do all he could to reach an agreement. But this was an outrageous waste of his time and everyone else's time. He had offered a reasonable approach that did not compromise Palestinian interests. They lost nothing by trying it, and Abu Ala was simply not willing to negotiate. No one could accept what he was asking for. He [Clinton] would not be a part of something not serious, and this wasn't serious, it was a mockery. Arafat had given his agreement to what the President was asking for and now he comes to the meetings and finds an outrageous approach—and he repeated, shouting now, "an outrageous approach." At this point, the President stood up and stalked out. (p. 668)
Yet, judging by authoritative accounts, Ross omitted a crucial passage from Clinton's reproach to the Palestinian negotiators: "This isn't the Security Council here. This isn't the UN General Assembly. . . . I'm the president of the United States."[10] Thus, even while rejecting the Palestinian position, Clinton implicitly acknowledged—correctly—that the Palestinians were merely reiterating UN resolutions and international law calling for full Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian territory, with allowance for minor and mutual land swaps.

Barak Gives, Arafat Pockets

The essence of Ross's explanation for Camp David's failure, repeatedly set forth, is that whereas Barak made huge concessions at Camp David, Arafat, having a "tendency to pocket" (p. 686), made none: "we kept moving toward [Arafat] without much movement from him" (p. 686); "the summit was about to collapse. The President had made his best effort, and now so had Barak. Arafat had said no to everything" (p. 693); "I had had it with [Arafat]. . . . here at Camp David he had not presented a single idea or single serious comment in two weeks" (p. 705); "he could not compromise or concede in order to end the conflict" (p. 767); "Palestinians . . . must give up the illusion that Arafat fostered: that they did not have to compromise on land or on refugees or on Jerusalem, and maybe most important, that they did not have to be responsible" (p. 775); "the Arafat legacy [is] rejecting compromise on the permanent status issues of Jerusalem, refugees and borders" (p. 808; cf. 749–50).

To assess Ross's thesis, it is useful first to look at the framework of what he calls the "basic trade-offs" required for resolving the conflict:

on the western border, the Palestinians get the 1967 lines, but with modifications to take account of the Israeli settlements; on the eastern border, it's sovereignty for the Palestinians, with Israel's security needs met; on refugees, it's the general principle for the Palestinians in terms of reference to UN General Assembly resolution 194 (not the "right of return") and its practical limitation for the Israelis. (p. 663)
Seen in the light of international law, it is to be noticed that the "trade-offs" Ross ticks off require fundamental concessions from Palestinians, but none at all from Israel:

* The Palestinians must relinquish title to parts of the territory Israel conquered in 1967, although the world's highest legal body, the International Court of Justice, has ruled that "all these territories (including East Jerusalem) remain occupied territories," to which Israel has no legal title.[11]
* The Palestinians must accept the permanence of Jewish settlements, although, again according to the International Court of Justice, "Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (including East Jerusalem) have been established in breach of international law."[12]
* The Palestinians must concede restrictions on the right of refugees to return to their homes, although respected human rights organizations "call for Palestinians who fled or were expelled from Israel, the West Bank or Gaza Strip, along with those of their descendants who have maintained genuine links with the area, to be able to exercise their right of return."[13]

What Ross depicts as the framework of necessary "trade-offs" and "compromises" for peace, then, consists entirely of losses for Palestinians and gains for Israel. Beyond this, Ross himself is obliged to acknowledge that Palestinians did make "meaningful concessions" on "three settlement blocs in the West Bank, accepting that the Jewish neighborhoods of East Jerusalem would be Israeli, and agreeing to Israeli early-warning sites in the West Bank" (p. 768; cf. pp. 635, 640, 667, 673-75, 723, 724-25). He also reports that Palestinians accepted the principle of swapping Israeli territory for the Palestinian territory Israel wanted to annex, as well as a cap on the number of Palestinian refugees permitted to return to Israel.[14]

Notwithstanding such concessions, in Ross's view the Israelis proved much more forthcoming. In his representation of the talks on day six of the Camp David summit, for example, he typically reports that Israel "had made big moves" (p. 674) granting Palestinian sovereignty over three outlying Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem and 90 percent of the West Bank. The Palestinian negotiators stubbornly clung, however, to the demand for equal land swaps: "once the principle of swaps was accepted, then they could work out the modifications on the border" (p. 674), and "we recognize the Israelis have needs and we can address them once the principle of swaps is accepted" (p. 674). He concludes his narrative of the session as follows:

Shlomo [Ben-Ami], in summing up, had said that he and Gilad [Sher] had come in the spirit that the President had asked. They came to make a deal, stretching well beyond their instructions. Unfortunately, he said, their Palestinian friends had not come in such a spirit, but he hoped they would consider carefully everything he had suggested and respond in kind. Saeb [Erekat] responded, appreciating the seriousness of the discussion but also claiming that he had gone very far on Jerusalem. He was out on a limb, accepting Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem that most Palestinians considered illegal. Now the two sides should continue their negotiations. Gilad got angry and said this is rock bottom for us. "You think you can just take this as a new floor and negotiate from there. We came to make a deal, not to go into the souk [market]" . . . In our meeting with the President afterward, I said this is going to confirm Barak's worst fears: he moves in a big way, Arafat pockets it, and he is expected to move again in a way that will definitely go beyond his redlines. . . .We cannot ask Barak for anything more; the Palestinians have made that impossible. . . . You have to push [Arafat] back hard and say they moved and you didn't. Enough is enough. You have to say I cannot get you anything unless you move seriously. (pp. 674–75)
Like the Israelis, Ross testily observes, "We too had had enough of the Palestinian unwillingness to negotiate" (p. 677).[15]

Even if one accepts for argument's sake Ross's depiction of the Israeli position, what he deems Israel's "big moves" fell well short of what Palestinians could rightfully claim under international law. Would Ross have reckoned it "big moves" if the PLO had recognized Israeli sovereignty over Tel Aviv's suburbs and 90 percent of its territory within the pre-June 1967 borders? Ross acknowledges that the Palestinians had offered concessions on Jerusalem and on Israeli settlements based on the June 1967 borders and the principle of land swaps. In other words, what Ross deems the Palestinian "unwillingness to negotiate" met, and even surpassed, their legal obligations, while what "Arafat pockets" is what Palestinians were legally entitled to. One doesn't recall Ross reckoning it a "tendency to pocket" when Israeli leaders obtained Palestinian recognition of Israel's 1949 borders. A fitter use of the locution would perhaps be that Israel denied Palestinians their legally sanctioned rights while simultaneously pocketing the Palestinians' full recognition of them. "We have recognized Israel and agreed to its demands for secure borders, security arrangements and cooperation and coordination in security matters," a Palestinian negotiator complained a year after Camp David. "You pocketed this incredible historical concession and made more demands."[16]

Palestinian demands appear maximal while Palestinian concessions appear minimal because Ross ignores international law. It is not just "most Palestinians" who considered Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem "illegal," but international law as well. Allowing Israel to retain many of these settlements therefore constituted a huge Palestinian concession; yet, in Ross's account it goes unnoticed because the settlements' illegality is depicted as a Palestinian "perception." Similarly, with regard to Palestinian refugees, Ross explains that Israel could not recognize the principle of their right of return (let alone its implementation) because "no Israeli prime minister could be expected to make gut-wrenching compromises on all issues" (p. 743). For Israel to recognize in principle the Palestinian right of return, however, would signify not a compromise but the bare minimum recognition of a legal obligation. The real compromise would be for Palestinians to forfeit this right—which is exactly what they did, if not in principle, then in its restricted implementation. Mutatis mutandis this likewise applies to Israel's "gut-wrenching compromises" whether at Oslo or Camp David: the Israelis might have had to settle for much less than they wanted, but the Palestinians had to settle for much less than they were owed. To curb one's desires is fundamentally different from surrendering one's rights. In disregarding international law, Ross obscures this crucial distinction. Concomitantly, he obscures the fact that throughout the peace process, all the genuine concessions came from the Palestinian side.[17]

From Rights to "Needs"

Ross does not simply ignore international law, however; he explicitly repudiates it. No doubt aware that the standard of rights is an encumbrance on his thesis, Ross substitutes for it the standard of "needs." Once having appointed himself the supreme arbiter of each side's needs, it is child's play for Ross to demonstrate Palestinian culpability. Thus, whereas Israeli demands mirrored their needs, Palestinian demands exceeded theirs: ergo, Palestinians bore sole responsibility for Camp David's failure. The case Ross mounts is irrefutable because it is tautological: Ross decided that the Palestinians were blameworthy because he decided that what Israel had offered was all the Palestinians needed.

The main innovation of Ross's narrative is to shift the framework of the peace process from rights to needs. This novel framework serves as (1) an analytic device to demonstrate Israeli flexibility and Palestinian intransigence and (2) a normative device for justifying a settlement that negates Palestinian rights. Consider Ross's representation of the negotiations on day five of the Camp David summit that climaxed in Clinton's outburst:

In response to an Israeli map that showed three different colors—brown for the Palestinian state, orange for the areas the Israelis would annex, and red for transitional areas—Abu Ala was not prepared to discuss Israeli needs unless the Israelis first accepted the principle of the territorial swap and reduced the areas they sought to annex. The President at first tried to reason with Abu Ala, explaining that he could see "why this map is not acceptable to you. But you cannot say to them, not good enough, give me something more acceptable; that's not negotiation. Why not say the orange area is too big, let's talk about your needs and see how we can reduce the orange area and turn it into brown? If we focus on the security aspect and look at the Jordan Valley, we might discuss the security issues and see if we can reduce the orange area." Shlomo agreed with that approach—thereby signaling that he was open to reducing the orange area, which amounted to close to 14 percent of the total of the West Bank outside of Jerusalem. Abu Ala continued to resist. As he did, and he repeated old arguments about the settlements being illegal and the Palestinians needing the 1967 lines, the President's face began to turn red. (pp. 667–68)
The Palestinians appear to be uncompromising because they will not negotiate Israel's needs separately from their own rights. Contrariwise, Israel appears to be reasonable because it is willing to negotiate on the basis of reciprocal needs. Needs against needs: isn't this a fair quid pro quo? Further, Israelis demonstrate flexibility by signaling willingness to reduce their needs, whereas Palestinians demonstrate inflexibility by not budging from their rights. Clinton attempts to reason with the Palestinians that the basis of negotiations is each party's presentation of its respective needs. The Palestinians respond by insisting that each party's needs must be set within, and subordinated to, the framework of rights: if Israel needs more than it is legally entitled to, then it must compensate. But, according to Clinton, a discourse of rights, not needs, is the wrong language. In the face of such unreason and intransigence, he justifiably (in Ross's judgment) explodes.

Yet, even Israel's "reduced needs" greatly exceeded its rights. Would Ross have praised Palestinians' flexibility if they had reduced their needs from 14 percent of Israeli territory to 10 percent? And would he then have faulted Israelis for having "continued to resist"? Moreover, whereas Palestinians seem uncompromising in Ross's account because they refused to forego the framework of rights, one is hard-pressed to name a conflict where negotiations were not anchored in rights. Was it incumbent upon Kuwait to negotiate its occupation on the basis of Iraqi needs? Earlier, Ross had explained that the U.S. negotiating strategy started from Israeli needs "because the Israelis held the territories, they were on the giving end" (p. 55). Was it on the basis of Iraqi needs that the United States conducted negotiations while Iraq held the territory of Kuwait?

Or consider Israel's negotiations with Egyptian president Anwar Sadat on the Israeli-occupied Sinai. Prior to the 1977 Camp David summit, Israel had emphatically insisted that Sharm al-Shaykh was "vital" to its security, with Moshe Dayan famously declaring that he would prefer "Sharm al-Shaykh without peace to peace without Sharm al-Shaykh." Similarly, when the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations at Camp David commenced, Israel asserted that the oil refineries, airfields, and settlements it had built in the Sinai constituted irreducible needs—and it bargained hard to retain them. Yet ultimately, it had to abandon all these "needs" on account of Egypt's legal title to the territory.[18]

Ross's entire narrative of Camp David is firmly embedded in this framework of needs. He reports that on the eve of the summit Israel had formulated "a basis for success": if Palestinians acquiesced in "modifying the Green Line to take account of . . . Israel's needs," while Israel made the "concession" of giving Palestinians the eastern border along the Jordan River, it "would mark the end of the conflict" (p. 636). He reports that on day one of the summit the United States proposed that the Green Line "would be modified as necessary" to meet Israeli "settlement bloc requirements." Although Palestinians had made clear that they "needed" the June 1967 border or a land swap as compensation, the United States decided "not to introduce the concept of a swap at this stage," because Palestinian needs did not carry the same imperative: it was merely something they "believed in" (p. 654). During talks preceding the Clinton Parameters, Ross reports, Palestinians objected to his advocacy of "Israeli positions that would deny the Palestinians what they needed to sell a deal: clear independence, sovereignty over the Haram, and a just solution of the refugee problem." "I was tough in my response," Ross continues. "They focused on their needs to the exclusion of the Israeli needs" (p. 724). It will be noticed that Israeli needs, in Ross's calculus, systematically trump Palestinian rights.

In his conclusion, Ross observes that the "one unmistakable insight from the past about the Arabs" is that "No Israeli concession can ever be too big" (p. 762). However much Israel gives, the Arabs never "accept that Israel has needs as well—justifying compromise" (p. 763). What he neglects to mention is that no Israeli "concession" to the Palestinians required any sacrifice of its rights, whereas the Palestinians were called upon to sacrifice basic rights for the sake of Israeli needs. The compromise Israel (and Ross) proffered was not needs for needs, but Israeli needs at the expense of Palestinian rights. Indeed, didn't Israel embrace the "needs" framework precisely because under a "rights" framework it had to withdraw fully from the occupied Palestinian territory, not to mention allow for the Palestinian right of return? The same holds true for Israel's relations with the Arab world in general. "The kind of transformation that would make it possible for the Arab world to acknowledge that Israel has needs," Ross laments, "has yet to take place" (p. 763). Translation: Arabs have yet to understand that Israel's needs trump their rights.

"[T]here can be no deal" between Israel and the Palestinians, according to Ross, "unless each side is prepared to respond to the essential needs of the other. . . . [A]greements are forged . . . on the basis of reconciling needs" (p. 771). One might be forgiven for conceiving that agreements are generally reached on the basis of law and rights. But Ross explicitly repudiates this conception. Dissenting from the opinion of some of his American colleagues, Ross recalls:

Aaron [Miller] was always arguing for a just and fair proposal. I was not against a fair proposal. But I felt the very concept of "fairness" was, by definition, subjective. Similarly both Rob [Malley] and Gamal [Helal] believed that the Palestinians were entitled to 100 percent of the territory. Swaps should thus be equal. They believed this was a Palestinian right. Aaron tended to agree with them not on the basis of right, but on the basis that every other Arab negotiating partner had gotten 100 percent. Why should the Palestinians be different? I disagreed. I was focused not on reconciling rights but on addressing needs. In negotiations, one side's principle or "right" is usually the other side's impossibility. Of course, there are irreducible rights. I wanted to address what each side needed, not what they wanted and not what they felt they were entitled to. (p. 726)
It is not immediately obvious why a standard of rights reached by broad international consensus and codified in international law is more "subjective" than a standard of needs on which there is neither consensus nor codification. On the issues at hand at Camp David, the standard of rights was notably uncontroversial in international law. Although Ross asserts as a flaw of the rights standard that the respective parties typically disagree on it, this was not the problem during these negotiations. Clinton did not want to hear about UN resolutions and international law, but not because they lacked clarity. Israeli and U.S. negotiators fumed at any mention of rights because they knew exactly where such talk would lead.

What is most peculiar about Ross's argument is his apparent belief that his personal adjudication is less arbitrary than reference to a consensual body of laws. Leaving aside the strange premise that the transitory opinion of one should count for more than the received opinion of many, it is unclear what qualifies Ross for the role of philosopher-king.[19] On a professional level, his insights on the art of diplomacy will probably not make their way into a textbook,[20] while his lengthy affiliation with a think-tank created by the Israel lobby would seem to cast doubt on his claim to objectivity.

It is his wholesale dismissal of Palestinian needs that ultimately enables Ross to prove Palestinian culpability for Camp David's failure. Regarding the Palestinian state's eastern border, Ross delineated on day one of the Camp David summit that Palestinians had only "symbolic needs" whereas Israel had "very real and legitimate . . . concerns about security" (p. 655).[21] Regarding Jerusalem, Ross reasoned on day six of Camp David that, basically, Palestinians needed a token to recoup their losses, such as having an American embassy in a village abutting the city, so that they could pretend Jerusalem was their capital: "That would be a big symbol for Arafat. I said in addition the President could lead an international delegation that Arafat could host and take to the Haram, again symbolizing for the world, especially the Arab world, Palestinian control" (pp. 681–82). Regarding land, Palestinians did not need full compensation for the territory Israel coveted. Inasmuch as Gaza is one of the most densely populated areas on earth, and inasmuch as one aspect of the solution to the refugee problem was that Palestinians would return to the Palestinian state (but not Israel), one might have supposed that Palestinians might need, at a bare minimum, full territorial compensation. But Ross decided otherwise when formulating the Clinton Parameters: "I felt strongly about 6 to 7 percent annexation [by Israel] and I was not prepared to lower the ceiling. Nor was I prepared to introduce the idea of an equivalent swap" (p. 726).[22] When even Israeli negotiators proposed a smaller percentage of Israeli annexation, Ross reports being "furious"—which gives some sense of his nonpartisan tallying of Palestinian needs (pp. 748–9).[23] On the specific matter of land swaps, Ross had proposed on the eve of the Camp David summit that Israel "symbolically" exchange territory "as a way to provide the Palestinians with an explanation for the modification of borders" (p. 639). Regarding the refugees, too, Ross consistently maintained that Palestinians had only "symbolic needs" as against "Israel's practical needs" (pp. 655, 726).[24]

Judging from Ross's account, Camp David failed because Palestinians stubbornly clung to the illusion that they had real needs. Had they understood that all they really needed was symbols, Palestinians would have leapt at the generous Israeli offer.[25] The root of the problem, again, appears to be that Palestinian "sense of entitlement": Camp David might have succeeded if only Palestinians grasped that they aren't real, actual human beings.

==================
Norman G. Finkelstein, professor of political science at DePaul University in Chicago, is the author of numerous books, most recently Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse of History (University of California Press, 2005). He would like to thank Maren Hackmann, Jeremy Pressman, and Feroze Sidhwa for their comments on an earlier draft of the extended essay from which this article is drawn. The full text is being published by IPS as a monograph titled Subordinating Palestinian Rights to Israeli "Needs."

Notes

[1] New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2004. All parenthetical page references in the body of the text refer to Ross's book.

[2] Three distinct phases marked the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations of 2000–1: the Camp David summit in July 2000, the parameters President Clinton proposed in December 2000, and the Taba negotiations in January 2001. Ross's narrative covers the first two phases, with Taba getting barely a mention. For convenience's sake, "Camp David" will denote both the summit and Clinton proposals. However, where the distinction needs to be made, "Camp David summit" will denote the first phase and "Clinton Parameters" the second.

[3] For comprehensive accounts of Camp David based on eyewitnesses, see Charles Enderlin, Shattered Dreams: The Failure of the Peace Process in the Middle East, 1995–2002 (New York: Other Press, 2002); Clayton E. Swisher, The Truth about Camp David: The Untold Story about the Collapse of the Middle East Peace Process (New York: Nation Books, 2004); and Jeremy Pressman, "Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp David and Taba?" International Security 28, no. 2 (Fall 2003), pp. 5–43.

[4] According to Ross, UN resolution 242 did "not necessarily mean withdrawal from all the territories captured in 1967" (p. 815). To support this claim he cites the authority of UN Ambassador Arthur Goldberg and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) monograph UN Security Council Resolution 242: The Building Block of Peacemaking (Washington: WINEP, 1993). In fact the consensus of the Security Council (and General Assembly) was that 242 called for full Israeli withdrawal from the territories it occupied in June 1967 apart from minor and mutual border adjustments. Goldberg himself is on record as subscribing to this interpretation during his negotiations with neighboring Arab states. In any event it is a moot point since the International Court of Justice authoritatively ruled in 2004 that Israel must withdraw from all territory conquered in the June 1967 war, including East Jerusalem, in accordance with the UN Charter principle barring acquisition of territory by force. (For details see Norman G. Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse of History [Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005], pp. 287–301.) As for the monographic evidence relied upon by Ross, its quality can be gleaned from statements such as "the Arab population of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip" is "often wrongly called 'The Palestinians'" (p. 6), and 242 "does not require the Israelis to transfer to the Arabs all, most, or indeed any of the occupied territories" (pp. 18–19).

[5] Eyal Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 145–46.

[6] Benvenisti, International Law, pp. 215–16; cf. p. 187.

[7] Norman G. Finkelstein, The Rise and Fall of Palestine: A Personal Account of the Intifada Years (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), pp. 53–56.

[8] Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression, and Self-Defense, 4th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 302. David Cortright and George A. Lopez, The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000). Marc Weller and Barbara Metzger, "Double Standards" (Negotiations Affairs Department, Palestine Liberation Organization, 24 September 2002).

[9] Swisher, The Truth about Camp David, pp. 184, 186 ("couldn't stand," quoting State Department colleague of Ross), 226–27, 228. Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, pp. 58, 232 ("in league," quoting Arafat). See also Ron Pundak, "From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong," Survival 43, no. 3 (Autumn 2001), pp. 40–41, which reports that "the American government seemed sometimes to be working for the Israeli Prime Minister, as it tried to convince (and pressure) the Palestinian side to accept Israeli offers" (emphasis in original), and "Lessons of Arab-Israel Negotiating: Four Negotiators Look Back and Ahead" (National Press Club, 25 April 2005), where Aaron Miller observes that "far too often, we functioned in this process, for want of a better word, as Israel's lawyer" (transcript available at www.mideasti.org). Pundak is Director-General of the Peres Center for Peace in Tel Aviv and participated in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations during the Oslo years, while Miller was on the American delegation at Camp David.

[10] Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, p. 202; Swisher, The Truth about Camp David, p. 275 (citing Enderlin).

[11] Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion (International Court of Justice, 9 July 2004), 43 IL M 1009 (2004), para. 78.

[12] Legal Consequences, paras. 119–120; cf. para. 99. For the World Court opinion, see also Norman G. Finkelstein, "Reconciling Irreconcilables" (forthcoming).

[13] Amnesty International, "The Right to Return: The Case of the Palestinians, Policy Statement" (30 March 2001). Human Rights Watch issued nearly identical statements; see "Human Rights Watch Urges Attention to Future of Palestinian Refugees" (22 December 2000), and "Israel, Palestinian Leaders Should Guarantee Right of Return as Part of Comprehensive Refugee Solution" (22 December 2002).

[14] Ross occasionally suggests that it was Palestinian negotiators rather than Arafat himself who offered these compromises—e.g., "We had continually moved toward [Arafat]; while his negotiators moved, he had not moved at all" (p. 708). However, Ross neither adduces evidence to sustain this claim, nor is it plausible that the positions presented by Arafat's negotiators fundamentally differed from his own. Moreover, Ross seems unaware that, were he correct, his book would make little sense: What point would there be to reporting in minute detail the positions of Palestinian negotiators if they represented no one except themselves?

[15] Echoing the Israeli negotiators, Ross writes that "the Palestinians had come more to maneuver in the souk than to negotiate a deal" (p. 675). On a side note, although the metaphor is right, the Israeli negotiators apparently got its subject wrong. According to Pundak, it was not the Palestinians but Barak who "dragged his feet and treated the talks like a Persian market. Abu Mazen—the Palestinian architect of the Oslo accord . . . —repeatedly recommended that the general principles guiding the Permanent Status Agreement be established at the outset. . . . But Barak, fearing he would 'expose' his position too early in the game, rejected this proposal" ("From Oslo to Taba," p. 39).

[16] Cited in Ron Pundak, "Camp David II: Israel's Misconceived Approach," p. 7, online at www.peres-center.org/media/upload/229.pdf.

[17] Compare these passages from Ross:

In the first meeting on territory and borders, Abu Ala tried a new tack. Whereas previously he would not discuss security until the Israelis accepted the Palestinian concept of their eastern border, now he added the condition that he would not discuss possible modifications to meet Israeli needs on the western border unless he knew that the total size of the Palestinian territory would remain unchanged. As he put it, so long as the Palestinian state would comprise the 6,500 square kilometers that currently made up the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem, he could consider modifications to meet Israeli needs; if not, he could not. This was Abu Ala's way of trying to get the Israelis to concede both the eastern border and equal swaps of territory as conditions for considering Israeli needs. This was, of course, a prescription for going nowhere. (pp. 663–64)
and

Shlomo [Ben-Ami] . . . persuasively argued it was time for both sides to give up their myths. Israel was giving up its myths: being in the Jordan Valley forever and not dividing Jerusalem. These myths were as central to Israel's belief system as the right of return was to the Palestinians. It was time for both sides to accept reality and surrender their myths. (p. 721; cf. p. 4)
In the first instance Ross deems the Palestinian tack a nonstarter because it demands from Israel the impossible "concessions" of recognizing the legitimate Palestinian border and compensating Palestinians for the Palestinian territory Israel covets, while in the second instance he puts on the same plane of unreality Israel's claim on the Jordan Valley and all of Jerusalem, and the Palestinian right of return, even if the former claim has no legal basis whereas the latter one does (leaving aside that Palestinians did in effect surrender it).

[18] See Norman G. Finkelstein, Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict, 2nd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), pp. 157–71 (Dayan quote at p. 159).

[19] Nor does Ross's administrative judgment exactly overwhelm. He reports, for example, that his colleague Toni Verstandig "had an intuitive feel for economic development" (p. 106). This feel was on full display at the Camp David summit. Interposing herself during the intense deliberations between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators over water, Verstandig said:

"I'm not going to allow these piddly issues to be a stumbling block to a peace agreement!" With that, witnesses recalled, she took the eraser, wiped off the formulations, and with a piece of chalk drew an elongated dollar sign. After slamming the chalk down and facing the group, her words would leave them speechless: "Just tell me how much!" (Swisher, The Truth about Camp David, pp. 296–97)
[20] For example, "it is good to learn your interlocutor's position before revealing your own" (p. 54), "when you have momentum, don't stop; build on it, and work around the clock" (p. 277), "when you can close an issue, do so" (p. 403), "surprise always stretches the time needed to overcome problems" (p. 437).

[21] In fact the Jordan Valley apparently had no military value for Israel. Shlomo Ben-Ami refers to it as a "mythological strategic asset" (Shlomo Ben-Ami, Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy [New York: Oxford University Press, 2006], p. 270), while Ross himself reports that "Even the IDF acknowledged that the eastern border in the Jordan Valley and along the river was less significant than historically thought" (p. 636) and that it was one of "Israel's myths" that it "could never surrender the Jordan Valley lest it give up its essential security border" (p. 774; but cf. p. 616).

[22] Some 1.4 million Gazans live on 365 square kilometers of land, or 4,000 Gazans per square kilometer, as compared to the Israeli population density of 300 per square kilometer. Ross was hardly unaware of these grim realities when he decided Palestinians could do with less territory, for he himself quotes Palestinians on this point:

Saeb [Erekat] spoke of enlarging the size of the swap area adjacent to Gaza to relieve the terrible population density there. [Muhammad] Dahlan was especially poignant on this subject, observing that we were asking for 8 percent annexation of the West Bank to accommodate 80 percent of Israel's 200,000 Israeli settlers. He pointed out that they were asking us to increase the size of the swap area to relieve the pressure on 1.2 million Palestinians living in Gaza—an area roughly equal in size to the area we now said the Israelis would need to annex for the "comfort" of their settlers in the West Bank. (p. 724)
[23] In his epilogue, Ross seems to sanction Israel's annexation of a much higher percentage of the West Bank in the event of a unilateral Israeli withdrawal. Putting aside the veracity of the various percentage-offers he cites, the basis of his revised calculation perplexes. Reporting that Israel will need to annex 15–20 percent of the West Bank to absorb about 75 percent of the settlers, he writes: "At Camp David and again in the Clinton ideas we spoke of three settlement blocs that could accommodate 80 percent of the settlers. But we were focused on an agreement that would annex these areas to Israel and for which there would be some territorial compensation to the Palestinians" (p. 798). The Clinton Parameters called for Israeli annexation of about 5 percent of the West Bank. If Israel could absorb 80 percent of the settlers on the basis of a 5 percent annexation, why does it need to annex 15–20 percent of the West Bank to absorb 75 percent of the settlers?

[24] It appears that Barak shared Ross's conception of Palestinian needs. For example, just prior to the Camp David summit he estimated that in the event of a peace settlement Israel "would need $23 billion to meet security and resettlement needs" and an additional "$10 billion in loan guarantees," whereas "he saw the Palestinians needing $5 billion" (p. 500). Israel's per capita national income hovered around $17,000, Palestine's around $1,000.

[25] Ross's contempt for Palestinians is of a piece with his treatment of Arafat. He warns Arafat that "there better not be any surprises tomorrow. No holdups, no questions, no reluctance to sign. Any of that takes place and you lose President Clinton. Understood?" (p. 207). He impresses on Arafat that "it is remarkable that the President took time out from campaigning to call you" (p. 286), and browbeats Arafat to "not let Clinton down" (pp. 301, 416). Before an encounter with Netanyahu, he threatens Arafat "Don't just come to the meeting, make sure you give me a gift from that meeting that I can take to President Clinton" (p. 302). Later, he wows Arafat, saying that "President Clinton was prepared to assume the 'risk and responsibility' of launching an American initiative to save the peace process. These words, I said, should convey great meaning to you" (p. 341), and chides Arafat that "he had disappointed President Clinton . . . there were costs for him in disappointing Clinton" (p. 372). It seems a fair inference that Ross didn't speak in this tone to Asad, and the reason is not hard to find. "Barak was also far more attracted to dealing with Hafez al-Asad than to dealing with Yasir Arafat," Ross reports. "In his eyes, Asad was everything Arafat wasn't. He commanded a real state, with a real army, with thousands of tanks and hundreds of missiles" (p. 509; cf. p. 90). Like Barak, Ross evidently respected the Syrian strongman, whereas Arafat was seen as just a two-bit terrorist.

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/15540
Volume 49, Number 11 · June 27, 2002
Camp David and After—Continued
By Ehud Barak, Benny Morris, Reply by Hussein Agha, Robert Malley

In response to Camp David and After: An Exchange (2. A Reply to Ehud Barak) (June 13, 2002)

Robert Malley and Hussein Agha ["Camp David and After: An Exchange," NYR, June 13] still don't get it (or pretend they don't). And it's really very simple—Ehud Barak and Bill Clinton put on the table during July–December 2000 a historic compromise and the Palestinians rejected it. They concede that Barak's offer at Camp David was "unprecedented" and that the upgraded (Clinton) proposals offered the Palestinians 94–96 percent of the West Bank, 100 percent of the Gaza Strip, a sovereign Palestinian state, an end to the occupation, the uprooting of most of the settlements, and sovereignty over Arab East Jerusalem—and Arafat and his aides still rejected the deal and pressed on with their terroristic onslaught.

Yet Malley and Agha continue, in effect, to blame Israel for the descent into war while producing "a smokescreen," in Barak's phrase, of sophistry and misleading nit-picking, that aims to get their man off the hook. Permeating their response is that shopsoiled Palestinian Weltanschauung, that someone else, always, is to blame for their misfortunes—Ottoman Turks, British Mandate officials, Zionists, Americans, anyone but themselves.

Malley and Agha, trying to drive home the point of permanent Palestinian innocence and victimhood, speak of "the catastrophe of 2002" in the same breath as "the catastrophe ...of 1948." But how can anyone with a minimal historical perspective compare the 1948 shattering and exile of a whole society, accompanied by thousands of deaths and the wholesale destruction of hundreds of villages, with the two or three hundred deaths, mostly of Palestinian gunmen, and the destruction of several dozen homes in the IDF's April 2002 Operation Defensive Shield, a reprisal for the murder by Palestinian suicide bombers of some one hundred Israeli civilians during the previous weeks?

The answer lies in the realm of fantasy or propaganda—and, unfortunately, much of what Malley and Agha write belongs to one of these categories. They speak of Israel's "indiscriminate attacks of the past few months." Indiscriminate? We hazard to say that no military has ever been more discriminating and gone to such lengths to avoid inflicting civilian casualties. And there were precious few bona fide civilian casualties (despite Palestinian efforts to beef up the numbers with borrowed corpses, double and triple tabulations, the inclusion of dead gunmen in "civilian" rosters, etc., and despite the fact that the gunmen, as in Jenin's refugee camp, were operating from among and behind a civilian "shield"). Human Rights Watch and other groups subsequently concluded that there was no evidence that the IDF had "massacred" anyone in the Jenin camp. Indeed, the only "indiscriminate massacres" that have taken place over the past few months have been of Israeli women, children, and the old by Palestinian suicide bombers, many of them belonging to Arafat's own Fatah organization, in cafés, malls, and buses. But the European media persists in believing the never-ending torrent of Palestinian mendacity; political correctness as well as varied economic interests and anti-Semitism dictate that no third-world people can do wrong and no first-world people, right.

Regarding Camp David and the subsequent negotiations, readers should note that Malley and Agha invariably refer to what "Arafat's negotiators" said or accepted or proposed—never to Arafat's own views and actions. And this is no accident. Arafat himself has never affirmed Israel's right to exist or its legitimacy, and has never waived the Palestinian refugees' "right of return"—and what his underlings "offer" or "accept" can always be denied or repudiated. This is the Arafat method, and Malley/Agha enter the game with gusto, while pretending to their readers that what "Arafat's negotiators" said or did carried the old man's imprimatur. They apparently forget that in their original article ["Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors," NYR, August 9, 2001] they stated: "...The Palestinians' principal failing is that from the beginning of the Camp David summit onward they were unable either to say yes to the American ideas or to present a cogent and specific counterproposal of their own." So Clinton had "stormed out" and said: "This is a fraud. I won't have the United States covering for negotiations in bad faith." The Palestinians went "through the motions rather than go for a deal," Malley and Agha then concluded.

The new Malley and Agha are busy watering this down. Arafat, they now say, did not reject Clinton's December 23, 2000, proposals; he merely "took his time" in responding. And both Barak and the Palestinians wanted to "renegotiate" the parameters, they say. This smooth, false symmetry is vintage Malley/Agha. They fail to tell their readers that the Israeli cabinet immediately and formally accepted the parameters as a basis for negotiation and that Arafat, on the other hand, according to both Clinton and Ambassador Dennis Ross, flatly rejected the parameters and slammed the door shut.

The question of the "right of return" offers a good example of Palestinian doublespeak. All Palestinian spokesmen, including Arafat (see, for example, his interview in Al-Ittihad (United Arab Emirates February 6, 2002) and Abu Alaa (at the press conference at the end of the January 2001 Taba negotiations), affirm the unreserved, uncurtailed "right of return" to Israel proper of the 1948 refugees and their descendants, of whom there are today close to four million on UN rolls. When speaking in Arabic, they assure their constituencies—in Lebanon's and Jordan's and Gaza's refugee camps—that they will return once "Jerusalem is conquered" (code for when Israel is destroyed). But when facing westward, they affirm that the "implementation" of that right will "take account of Israel's demographic concerns." Going one better, Malley/Agha state that "there is no Palestinian position on how the refugee question should be dealt with as a practical matter" and that "all" acknowledge that there can be no "massive" return. Really?

"All"—Palestinians and Israelis—un- derstand that concession of the principle will entail a gradual effort at full implementation, in this generation or the next, spelling chaos and the subversion of the Jewish state and its replacement by an Arab-majority "Palestine," a twenty-third Arab state. The demand for the right of return, in the deepest sense, is a demographic mechanism to achieve Israel's destruction, says Barak. This prospect does not greatly trouble Malley and Agha, who (naively? duplicitously?) admonish their readers not to exercise themselves overmuch "on the question of whether the Palestinian leadership recognized Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state." But surely that's the core of the problem—the Palestinian leadership's desire to ultimately undermine the Jewish state.

The origins of the current violence are a further case in point. Malley and Agha, after trotting out some qualifications, leave their readers with the clear impression that the Sharon visit was what caused the intifada. But Israeli intelligence (and the CIA, according to Barak) has strong evidence that the Palestinian Authority had planned the intifada already in July 2000. For example, in March 2001 the PA's communications minister, Imad Faluji, told residents of the Ein al-Hilwe refugee camp outside Sidon: "Whoever thinks that the Intifada broke out because of the despised Sharon's visit to the al-Aqsa Mosque is wrong, even if this visit was the straw that broke the back of the Palestinian people. This intifada was planned in advance, ever since President Arafat's return from the Camp David negotiations, where he turned the table upside down on President Clinton." (Al-Safir, Lebanon, March 3, 2001). Barak characterizes Arafat "and some (not all) of his entourage" as "serial liars."

Arafat's credentials as a serial liar are impressive, Malley/Agha's protestations notwithstanding. Take, for example, Arafat's interview with Al-Ittihad on February 6, 2002, in which he blamed the Israeli security service, the Shin Bet, for carrying out suicide bombings against Israeli soldiers and civilians; the attack on the Dolphinarium night club in 2001, in which about twenty-five Israeli youngsters died, he blamed on an IDF soldier. Arafat routinely tells anyone who will listen that Israeli troops use "poison gas" and "radioactive materials" against Palestinian civilians (Arafat on Abu Dhabi TV/Palestine TV, March 29, 2002).

To Western audiences Arafat usually affirms his interest in peace or "the peace of the braves" (a Palestinian baseball team?), as he puts it. To Arab audiences, he speaks only of battle and planting the Palestinian flag on Jerusalem's walls (as Saladin planted his flag on Jerusalem's walls, after defeating the Crusaders, back in 1189) and of sacrificing "one million shuhada [martyrs, meaning suicide bombers]" in "redeeming Palestine." On May 10, 1994, he told a Muslim audience in Johannesburg that he was engaged in the Oslo peace process much as Mohammed had briefly acquiesced in a truce with the Quraish tribe of Mecca, only to unilaterally revoke it and slaughter them several years later. For good measure, Ara-fat in that speech said there is no "permanent state of Israel," only a "permanent state of Palestine."

It is worth noting that Malley/Agha conclude by proposing a settlement based on the establishment of "a sovereign, nonmilitarized Palestinian state based on the 1967 lines, with an equal exchange of land to accommodate demographic realities" and the return of refugees to the area that becomes the Palestinian state. But this, almost precisely, is the deal that Clinton and Barak proposed back in 2000—and Arafat violently rejected.

The time has come for the world to judge Arafat by what he does and not by the camouflaging defensive rhetoric tossed out by sophisticated polemicists, Barak says. He refers to Saddam Hussein and Arafat as "the terroristic odd couple" of 1991, who are now back for a second inning, with Saddam helping to fuel the present conflict by inciting the Arab world to join in and, like the Saudis, by paying gratuities to the families of suicide bombers. It is time that the West's leaders, who initially dealt with Saddam and Milosevic as acceptable, responsible interlocutors, now treat Arafat and his ilk in the Palestinian camp as the vicious, untrustworthy, unacceptable reprobates and recidivists that they are.

Benny Morris and Ehud Barak
Robert Malley and Hussein Agha reply:

One might be tempted to dismiss much of what Benny Morris and Ehud Barak write as hollow demagoguery were it not so pernicious and damaging to the future of both the Israeli and Palestinian people. In the past, and through his words and actions, Barak helped to set in motion the process of delegitimizing the Palestinians and the peace process, thereby enabling Ariel Sharon to deal with them as he saw fit and absolve himself of all responsibility for Israel's diplomatic, security, and economic predicament. Now, the inability to reach a peace deal in the seven months between Camp David and Taba has become, in Barak's and Morris's version, a tale in which Arab cultural deficiency and the Palestinians' inherent desire to destroy Israel are the dominant themes. As Shimon Peres has famously put it, Barak is making an ideology out of his failure. It is time he dealt with the failure, put aside the ideology, and let Israelis and Palestinians return to the far more urgent and serious task of peacemaking.

To begin, a few words about Morris's and Barak's rejoinder, a catalog of misrepresentations that scarcely deserves more. They distort what we wrote about the tragic events of the last few months, the reactions to President Clinton's December 23 ideas, the right of return, the importance of Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state, and the origins of the current intifada. They turn what the world saw as Sharon's dangerously provocative walk on the Haram/Temple Mount into an innocent stroll. They charge the Palestinians with trying to evade all responsibility but then proceed to evade all responsibility on Barak's part, placing the entire burden of failure on the Palestinians while adding for good measure the usual tired accusations about Arab doublespeak, European media bias, "varied economic interests," and even political correctness. They refer to the "Arafat method" by which negotiators, and not Arafat himself, laid out Palestinian positions, without acknowledging that it was precisely the method routinely and quite openly practiced by Barak. Indeed, the desire not to commit himself personally was the reason Barak provided for his refusal to hold substantive discussions with Arafat at Camp David and it is also the reason why he both declined to give his negotiators specific instructions during the Taba talks and asked not to be fully briefed by them.

Then there is the issue of Barak's astonishing remarks about Palestinian and Arab culture that he now seeks to obfuscate. Yet his words in the initial interview were unequivocal. "They are products of a culture in which to tell a lie...creates no dissonance," he pronounced. "They don't suffer from the problem of telling lies that exists in Judeo-Christian culture. Truth is seen as irrelevant." And so on. But, plainly, factual accuracy and logical consistency are not what Morris and Barak are after. What matters is self-justification by someone who has chosen to make a career—and perhaps a comeback—through the vilification of an entire people.

For that, indeed, is the real issue that warrants attention. In Morris's and Barak's crude account, Barak made a most generous offer, the "vicious" Palestinian leadership turned it down because they wanted to get rid of Israel, and all the rest is gossip. But is a man who believes that a whole race or culture is immune to the truth well placed to make such a sweeping assessment or, for that matter, well equipped to strike a historic deal with the people about whom he holds such prejudiced views? Barak deserves credit for understanding the need to end the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the importance of separation between the two peoples as part of a final peace agreement. But it is worth recalling that Barak opposed the Oslo accords from the outset; before 1996 he was against the inclusion of Palestinian statehood in the Labor Party's platform; he insisted on renegotiating an agreement with the Palestinians signed by his predecessor and then failed to carry it out; and, today, he takes pride in having made fewer tangible concessions to the Palestinians than Benjamin Netanyahu, the right-wing prime minister who preceded him. Are these truly the qualifications one would expect of a man who claims to sit in judgment of the peacemaking capabilities of others?

What is clear from his reply and other recent statements is Barak's utter lack of self-doubt. Yet, by the time he was defeated by Ariel Sharon, less than two years after coming into office, he had antagonized both the religious right and the secular left, not for the sake of high principle but through poor management. His governing coalition had disintegrated. Arab-Israelis had lost all confidence in him. His own Labor Party was adrift and strongly critical of him. He was unable to reach an agreement with Syria. And relations with much of the Arab world were at a lower point than they had been under his hard-line predecessor. The Palestinians, in short, were only one on a lengthy list of people whom he successfully managed to alienate or had failed to deal with successfully. In view of this record, might there not be room to wonder whether Barak's tactics, approach, and cast of mind had at least something to do with the breakdown of the peace process?

Finally there is the question of what, today, Barak stands by and stands for. What, in his opinion, actually happened at Taba in January 2001, and does he accept the positive assessment provided by his official Israeli delegation? It is an assessment he ignores in his reply and that is worth repeating here:

The two sides declare that they have never been closer to reaching an agreement and it is thus our shared belief that the remaining gaps could be bridged with the resumption of negotiations following the Israeli elections.

That statement contradicts the claim made by Barak, and frequently heard from others, that the Palestinians simply turned their backs on a possible agreement. Would Barak be prepared, today, to resume where things were left off and seek to complete the negotiations, as he pledged at the time and as he repeated to the Israeli public throughout his reelection campaign? The question whether a peace agreement can still be reached, in the current situation of appalling daily violence, has become more urgent than ever. We know what President Clinton's ideas were for an Israeli– Palestinian agreement. We know the positions of more than a few Israeli political leaders who in recent weeks have unveiled their own peace formulas. We even know what the official Palestinian proposal is—though it may or may not be something the Israeli people can accept. But can Barak, who likes to tell the left that he went further than everyone else and the right that he gave less than anyone else, let us know what are his specific proposals for a final peace agreement with the Palestinians?

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/15501
Volume 49, Number 10 · June 13, 2002
Camp David and After: An Exchange (1. An Interview with Ehud Barak)
By Benny Morris

In response to Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors (August 9, 2001)

1. An Interview with Ehud Barak

The following interview with Ehud Barak took place in Tel Aviv during late March and early April. I have supplied explanatory references in brackets with Mr. Barak's approval.

The call from Bill Clinton came hours after the publication in The New York Times of Deborah Sontag's "revisionist" article ("Quest for Middle East Peace: How and Why It Failed," July 26, 2001) on the Israeli–Palestinian peace process. Ehud Barak, Israel's former prime minister, on vacation, was swimming in a cove in Sardinia. Clinton said (according to Barak):

What the hell is this? Why is she turning the mistakes we [i.e., the US and Israel] made into the essence? The true story of Camp David was that for the first time in the history of the conflict the American president put on the table a proposal, based on UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, very close to the Palestinian demands, and Arafat refused even to accept it as a basis for negotiations, walked out of the room, and deliberately turned to terrorism. That's the real story—all the rest is gossip.

Clinton was speaking of the two-week-long July 2000 Camp David conference that he had organized and mediated and its failure, and the eruption at the end of September of the Palestinian intifada, or campaign of anti-Israeli violence, which has continued ever since and which currently plagues the Middle East, with no end in sight. Midway in the conference, apparently on July 18, Clinton had "slowly"—to avoid misunderstanding—read out to Arafat a document, endorsed in advance by Barak, outlining the main points of a future settlement. The proposals included the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state on some 92 percent of the West Bank and 100 percent of the Gaza Strip, with some territorial compensation for the Palestinians from pre-1967 Israeli territory; the dismantling of most of the settlements and the concentration of the bulk of the settlers inside the 8 percent of the West Bank to be annexed by Israel; the establishment of the Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem, in which some Arab neighborhoods would become sovereign Palestinian territory and others would enjoy "functional autonomy"; Palestinian sovereignty over half the Old City of Jerusalem (the Muslim and Christian quarters) and "custodianship," though not sovereignty, over the Temple Mount; a return of refugees to the prospective Palestinian state though with no "right of return" to Israel proper; and the organization by the international community of a massive aid program to facilitate the refugees' rehabilitation.
Little Bookroom / Savoir Fare London

Arafat said "No." Clinton, enraged, banged on the table and said: "You are leading your people and the region to a catastrophe." A formal Palestinian rejection of the proposals reached the Americans the next day. The summit sputtered on for a few days more but to all intents and purposes it was over.

Barak today portrays Arafat's behavior at Camp David as a "performance" geared to exacting from the Israelis as many concessions as possible without ever seriously intending to reach a peace settlement or sign an "end to the conflict." "He did not negotiate in good faith, indeed, he did not negotiate at all. He just kept saying 'no' to every offer, never making any counterproposals of his own," he says. Barak continuously shifts between charging Arafat with "lacking the character or will" to make a historic compromise (as did the late Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1977–1979, when he made peace with Israel) and accusing him of secretly planning Israel's demise while he strings along a succession of Israeli and Western leaders and, on the way, hoodwinks "naive journalists"—in Barak's phrase—like Sontag and officials such as former US National Security Council expert Robert Malley (who, with Hussein Agha, published another "revisionist" article on Camp David, "Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors"[*]). According to Barak:

What they [Arafat and his colleagues] want is a Palestinian state in all of Palestine. What we see as self-evident, [the need for] two states for two peoples, they reject. Israel is too strong at the moment to defeat, so they formally recognize it. But their game plan is to establish a Palestinian state while always leaving an opening for further "legitimate" demands down the road. For now, they are willing to agree to a temporary truce à la Hudnat Hudaybiyah [a temporary truce that the Prophet Muhammad concluded with the leaders of Mecca during 628–629, which he subsequently unilaterally violated]. They will exploit the tolerance and democracy of Israel first to turn it into "a state for all its citizens," as demanded by the extreme nationalist wing of Israel's Arabs and extremist left-wing Jewish Israelis. Then they will push for a binational state and then, demography and attrition will lead to a state with a Muslim majority and a Jewish minority. This would not necessarily involve kicking out all the Jews. But it would mean the destruction of Israel as a Jewish state. This, I believe, is their vision. They may not talk about it often, openly, but this is their vision. Arafat sees himself as a reborn Saladin—the Kurdish Muslim general who defeated the Crusaders in the twelfth century—and Israel as just another, ephemeral Crusader state.

Barak believes that Arafat sees the Palestinian refugees of 1948 and their descendants, numbering close to four million, as the main demographic-political tool for subverting the Jewish state.

Arafat, says Barak, believes that Israel "has no right to exist, and he seeks its demise." Barak buttresses this by arguing that Arafat "does not recognize the existence of a Jewish people or nation, only a Jewish religion, because it is mentioned in the Koran and because he remembers seeing, as a kid, Jews praying at the Wailing Wall." This, Barak believes, underlay Arafat's insistence at Camp David (and since) that the Palestinians have sole sovereignty over the Temple Mount compound (Haram al-Sharif—the noble sanctuary) in the southeastern corner of Jerusalem's Old City. Arafat denies that any Jewish temple has ever stood there—and this is a microcosm of his denial of the Jews' historical connection and claim to the Land of Israel/Palestine. Hence, in December 2000, Arafat refused to accept even the vague formulation proposed by Clinton positing Israeli sovereignty over the earth beneath the Temple Mount's surface area.

Barak recalls Clinton telling him that during the Camp David talks he had attended Sunday services and the minister had preached a sermon mentioning Solomon, the king who built the First Temple. Later that evening, he had met Arafat and spoke of the sermon. Arafat had said: "There is nothing there [i.e., no trace of a temple on the Temple Mount]." Clinton responded that "not only the Jews but I, too, believe that under the surface there are remains of Solomon's temple." (At this point one of Clinton's [Jewish] aides whispered to the President that he should tell Arafat that this is his personal opinion, not an official American position.)

Repeatedly during our prolonged interview, conducted in his office in a Tel Aviv skyscraper, Barak shook his head—in bewilderment and sadness—at what he regards as Palestinian, and especially Arafat's, mendacity:

They are products of a culture in which to tell a lie...creates no dissonance. They don't suffer from the problem of telling lies that exists in Judeo-Christian culture. Truth is seen as an irrelevant category. There is only that which serves your purpose and that which doesn't. They see themselves as emissaries of a national movement for whom everything is permissible. There is no such thing as "the truth."

Speaking of Arab society, Barak recalls: "The deputy director of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation once told me that there are societies in which lie detector tests don't work, societies in which lies do not create cognitive dissonance [on which the tests are based]." Barak gives an example: back in October 2000, shortly after the start of the current Intifada, he met with then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Arafat in the residence of the US ambassador in Paris. Albright was trying to broker a cease-fire. Arafat had agreed to call a number of his police commanders in the West Bank and Gaza, including Tawfik Tirawi, to implement a truce. Barak said:

I interjected: "But these are not the people organizing the violence. If you are serious [in seeking a cease-fire], then call Marwan Bargouti and Hussein al-Sheikh" [the West Bank heads of the Fatah, Arafat's own political party, who were orchestrating the violence. Bargouti has since been arrested by Israeli troops and is currently awaiting trial for launching dozens of terrorist attacks].

Arafat looked at me, with an expression of blank innocence, as if I had mentioned the names of two polar bears, and said: "Who? Who?" So I repeated the names, this time with a pronounced, clear Arabic inflection—"Mar-wan Bar-gou-ti" and "Hsein a Sheikh"—and Arafat again said, "Who? Who?" At this, some of his aides couldn't stop themselves and burst out laughing. And Arafat, forced to drop the pretense, agreed to call them later. [Of course, nothing happened and the shooting continued.]

But Barak is far from dismissive of Arafat, who appears to many Israelis to be a sick, slightly doddering buffoon and, at the same time, sly and murderous. Barak sees him as "a great actor, very sharp, very elusive, slippery." He cautions that Arafat "uses his broken English" to excellent effect.

Barak was elected prime minister, following three years of Benjamin Netanyahu's premiership, in May 1999 and took office in July. He immediately embarked on his multipronged peace effort—vis-à-vis Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinians—feeling that Israel and the Middle East were headed for "an iceberg and a certain crash and that it was the leaders' moral and political responsibility to try to avoid a catastrophe." He understood that the year and a half left of Clinton's presidency afforded a small window of opportunity inside a larger, but also limited, regional window of opportunity. That window was opened by the collapse of the Soviet Empire, which had since the 1950s supported the Arabs against Israel, and the defeat of Iraq in Kuwait in 1991, and would close when and if Iran and/or Iraq obtained nuclear weapons and when and if Islamic fundamentalist movements took over states bordering Israel.

Barak said he wanted to complete what Rabin had begun with the Oslo agreement, which inaugurated mutual Israeli–Palestinian recognition and partial Israeli withdrawals from the West Bank and Gaza Strip back in 1993. A formal peace agreement, he felt, would not necessarily "end the conflict, that will take education over generations, but there is a tremendous value to an [official] framework of peace that places pacific handcuffs on these societies." Formal peace treaties, backed by the international community, will have "a dynamic of their own, reducing the possibility of an existential conflict. But without such movement toward formal peace, we are headed for the iceberg." He seems to mean something far worse than the current low-level Israeli–Palestinian conflagration.

Barak says that, before July 2000, IDF intelligence gave the Camp David talks less than a 50 percent chance of success. The intelligence chiefs were doubtful that Arafat "would take the decisions necessary to reach a peace agreement." His own feeling at the time was that he "hoped Arafat would rise to the occasion and display something of greatness, like Sadat and Hussein, at the moment of truth. They did not wait for a consensus [among their people], they decided to lead. I told Clinton on the first day [of the summit] that I didn't know whether Arafat had come to make a deal or just to extract as many political concessions as possible before he, Clinton, left office."

Barak dismisses the charges leveled by the Camp David "revisionists" as Palestinian propaganda. The visit to the Temple Mount by then Likud leader Ariel Sharon in September 2000 was not what caused the intifada, he says.

Sharon's visit, which was coordinated with [Palestinian Authority West Bank security chief] Jibril Rajoub, was directed against me, not the Palestinians, to show that the Likud cared more about Jerusalem than I did. We know, from hard intelligence, that Arafat [after Camp David] intended to unleash a violent confrontation, terrorism. [Sharon's visit and the riots that followed] fell into his hands like an excellent excuse, a pretext.

As agreed, Sharon had made no statement and had refrained from entering the Islamic shrines in the compound in the course of the visit. But rioting broke out nonetheless. The intifada, says Barak, "was preplanned, pre-prepared. I don't mean that Arafat knew that on a certain day in September [it would be unleashed].... It wasn't accurate, like computer engineering. But it was definitely on the level of planning, of a grand plan."

Nor does Barak believe that the IDF's precipitate withdrawal from the Security Zone in Southern Lebanon, in May 2000, set off the intifada. "When I took office [in July 1999] I promised to pull out within a year. And that is what I did." Without doubt, the Palestinians drew inspiration and heart from the Hezbollah's successful guerrilla campaign during 1985–2000, which in the end drove out the IDF, as well as from the spectacle of the sometime slapdash, chaotic pullout at the end of May; they said as much during the first months of the intifada. "But had we not withdrawn when we did, the situation would have been much worse," Barak argues:

We would have faced a simultaneous struggle on two fronts, in Palestine and in southern Lebanon, and the Hezbollah would have enjoyed international legitimacy in their struggle against a foreign occupier.

The lack of international legitimacy, Barak stresses, following the Israeli pullback to the international frontier, is what has curtailed the Hezbollah's attacks against Israel during the past weeks. "Had we still been in Leb-anon we would have had to mobilize 100,000, not 30,000, reserve soldiers [in April, during 'Operation Defensive Wall']," he adds. But he is aware that the sporadic Hezbollah attacks might yet escalate into a full-scale Israeli– Lebanese–Syrian confrontation, something the pullback had been designed—and so touted—to avoid.

As to the charge raised by the Palestinians, and, in their wake, by Deborah Sontag, and Malley and Agha, that the Palestinians had been dragooned into coming to Camp David "unprepared" and prematurely, Barak is dismissive to the point of contempt. He observes that the Palestinians had had eight years, since 1993, to prepare their positions and fall-back positions, demands and red lines, and a full year since he had been elected to office and made clear his intention to go for a final settlement. By 2002, he said, they were eager to establish a state,

which is what I and Clinton proposed and offered. And before the summit, there were months of discussions and contacts, in Stockholm, Israel, the Gaza Strip. Would they really have been more "prepared" had the summit been deferred to August, as Arafat later said he had wanted?

One senses that Barak feels on less firm ground when he responds to the "revisionist" charge that it was the continued Israeli settlement in the Occupied Territories, during the year before Camp David and under his premiership, that had so stirred Palestinian passions as to make the intifada inevitable:

Look, during my premiership we established no new settlements and, in fact, dismantled many illegal, unauthorized ones. Immediately after I took office I promised Arafat: No new settlements—but I also told him that we would continue to honor the previous government's commitments, and contracts in the pipeline, concerning the expansion of existing settlements. The courts would force us to honor existing contracts, I said. But I also offered a substantive argument. I want to reach peace during the next sixteen months. What was now being built would either remain within territory that you, the Palestinians, agree should remain ours—and therefore it shouldn't matter to you—or would be in territory that would soon come under Palestinian sovereignty, and therefore would add to the housing available for returning refugees. So you can't lose.

But Barak concedes that while this sounded logical, there was a psychological dimension here that could not be neutralized by argument: the Palestinians simply saw, on a daily basis, that more and more of "their" land was being plundered and becoming "Israeli." And he agrees that he allowed the expansion of existing settlements in part to mollify the Israeli right, which he needed quiescent as he pushed forward toward peace and, ultimately, a withdrawal from the territories.

Regarding the core of the Israeli-American proposals, the "revisionists" have charged that Israel offered the Palestinians not a continuous state but a collection of "bantustans" or "cantons." "This is one of the most embarrassing lies to have emerged from Camp David," says Barak.

I ask myself why is he [Arafat] lying. To put it simply, any proposal that offers 92 percent of the West Bank cannot, almost by definition, break up the territory into noncontiguous cantons. The West Bank and the Gaza Strip are separate, but that cannot be helped [in a peace agreement, they would be joined by a bridge].

But in the West Bank, Barak says, the Palestinians were promised a continuous piece of sovereign territory except for a razor-thin Israeli wedge running from Jerusalem through from Maale Adumim to the Jordan River. Here, Palestinian territorial continuity would have been assured by a tunnel or bridge:

The Palestinians said that I [and Clinton] presented our proposals as a diktat, take it or leave it. This is a lie. Everything proposed was open to continued negotiations. They could have raised counter-proposals. But they never did.

Barak explains Arafat's "lie" about "bantustans" as stemming from his fear that "when reasonable Palestinian citizens would come to know the real content of Clinton's proposal and map, showing what 92 percent of the West Bank means, they would have said: 'Mr. Chairman, why didn't you take it?'"

In one other important way the "revisionist" articles are misleading: they focused on Camp David (July 2000) while almost completely ignoring the follow-up (and more generous) Clinton proposals (endorsed by Israel) of December 2000 and the Palestinian– Israeli talks at Taba in January 2001. The "revisionists," Barak implies, completely ignored the shift—under the prodding of the intifada—in the Israeli (and American) positions between July and the end of 2000. By December and January, Israel had agreed to Washington's proposal that it withdraw from about 95 percent of the West Bank with substantial territorial compensation for the Palestinians from Israel proper, and that the Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem would become sovereign Palestinian territory. The Israelis also agreed to an international force at least temporarily controlling the Jordan River line between the West Bank and the Kingdom of Jordan instead of the IDF. (But on the refugee issue, which Barak sees as "existential," Israel had continued to stand firm: "We cannot allow even one refugee back on the basis of the 'right of return,'" says Barak. "And we cannot accept historical responsibility for the creation of the problem.")

Had the Palestinians, even at that late date, agreed, there would have been a peace settlement. But Arafat dragged his feet for a fortnight and then responded to the Clinton proposals with a "Yes, but..." that, with its hundreds of objections, reservations, and qualifications, was tantamount to a resounding "No." Palestinian officials maintain to this day that Arafat said "Yes" to the Clinton proposals of December 23. But Dennis Ross, Clinton's special envoy to the Middle East, in a recent interview (on Fox News, April 21, 2002), who was present at the Arafat–Clinton White House meeting on January 2, says that Arafat rejected "every single one of the ideas" presented by Clinton, even Israeli sovereignty over the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem's Old City. And the "Palestinians would have [had] in the West Bank an area that was contiguous. Those who say there were cantons, [that is] completely untrue." At Taba, the Palestinians seemed to soften a little—for the first time they even produced a map seemingly conceding 2 percent of the West Bank. But on the refugees they, too, stuck to their guns, insisting on Israeli acceptance of "the right of return" and on Jerusalem, that they have sole sovereignty over the Temple Mount.

Several "revisionists" also took Barak to task for his "Syria first" strategy: soon after assuming office, he tried to make peace with Syria and only later, after Damascus turned him down, did he turn to the Palestinians. This had severely taxed the Palestinians' goodwill and patience; they felt they were being sidelined. Barak concedes the point, but explains:

I always supported Syria first. Because they have a [large] conventional army and nonconventional weaponry, chemical and biological, and missiles to deliver them. This represents, under certain conditions, an existential threat. And after Syria comes Lebanon [meaning that peace with Syria would immediately engender a peace treaty with Lebanon]. Moreover, the Syrian problem, with all its difficulties, is simpler to solve than the Palestinian problem. And reaching peace with Syria would greatly limit the Palestinians' ability to widen the conflict. On the other hand, solving the Palestinian problem will not diminish Syria's ability to existentially threaten Israel.

Barak says that this was also Rabin's thinking. But he points out that when he took office, he immediately informed Arafat that he intended to pursue an agreement with Syria and that this would in no way be at the Palestinians' expense. "I arrived on the scene immediately after [Netanyahu's emissary Ronald] Lauder's intensive [secret] talks, which looked very interesting. It was a Syrian initiative that looked very close to a breakthrough. It would have been very irresponsible not to investigate this because of some traditional, ritual order."

The Netanyahu-Lauder initiative, which posited an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights to a line a few kilometers east of the Jordan River and the Sea of Galilee, came to naught because two of Netanyahu's senior ministers, Sharon and Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai, objected to the proposed concessions. Barak offered then President Hafiz Assad more, in effect a return to the de facto border of "4 June 1967" along the Jordan River and almost to the shoreline at the northeastern end of the Sea of Galilee. Assad, by then feeble and close to death, rejected the terms, conveying his rejection to President Clinton at the famous meeting in Geneva on March 26, 2000. Barak explains,

Assad wanted Israel to capitulate in advance to all his demands. Only then would he agree to enter into substantive negotiations. I couldn't agree to this. We must continue to live [in the Middle East] afterward [and, had we made the required concessions, would have been seen as weak, inviting depredation].

But Barak believes that Assad's effort, involving a major policy switch, to reach a peace settlement with Israel was genuine and sincere.

Barak appears uncomfortable with the "revisionist" charge that his body language toward Arafat had been unfriendly and that he had, almost consistently during Camp David, avoided meeting the Palestinian leader, and that these had contributed to the summit's failure. Barak:

I am the Israeli leader who met most with Arafat. He visited Rabin's home only after [the assassinated leader] was buried on Mount Herzl [in Jerusalem]. He [Arafat] visited me in my home in Kochav Yair where my wife made food for him. [Arafat's aide] Abu Mazen and [my wife] Nava swapped memories about Safad, her mother was from Safad, and both their parents were traders. I also met Arafat in friends' homes, in Gaza, in Ramallah.

Barak says that they met "almost every day" in Camp David at mealtimes and had one "two-hour meeting" in Arafat's cottage. He admits that the time had been wasted on small talk—but, in the end, he argues, this is all part of the "gossip," not the real reason for the failure. "Did Nixon meet Ho Chi Minh or Giap [before reaching the Vietnam peace deal]? Or did De Gaulle ever speak to [Algerian leader] Ben Bella? The right time for a meeting between us was when things were ready for a decision by the leaders...." Barak implies that the negotiations had never matured or even come close to the point where the final decision-making meeting by the leaders was apt and necessary.

Barak believes that since the start of the intifada Israel has had no choice—"and it doesn't matter who is prime minister" (perhaps a jab at his former rival and colleague in the Labor Party, the dovish-sounding Shimon Peres, currently Israel's foreign minister)—but to combat terrorism with military force. The policy of "targeted killings" of terrorist organizers, bomb-makers, and potential attackers began during his premiership and he still believes it is necessary and effective, "though great care must be taken to limit collateral damage. Say you live in Chevy Chase and you know of someone who is preparing a bomb in Georgetown and intends to launch a suicide bomber against a coffee shop outside your front door. Wouldn't you do something? Wouldn't it be justified to arrest this man and, if you can't, to kill him?" he asks.

Barak supported Sharon's massive incursion in April—"Operation Defensive Wall"—into the Palestinian cities—Nablus, Jenin, Bethlehem, Ramallah, Qalqilya, and Tulkarm—but suggests that he would have done it differently:

More forcefully and with greater speed, and simultaneously against all the cities, not, as was done, in staggered fashion. And I would argue with the confinement of Arafat to his Ramallah offices. The present situation, with Arafat eyeball to eyeball with [Israeli] tank gun muzzles but with an in-surance policy [i.e., Israel's promise to President Bush not to harm him], is every guerrilla leader's wet dream. But, in general, no responsible government, following the wave of suicide bombings culminating in the Passover massacre [in which twenty-eight Israelis were murdered and about 100 injured in a Netanya hotel while sitting at the seder] could have acted otherwise.

But he believes that the counter-terrorist military effort must be accompanied by a constant reiteration of readiness to renew peace negotiations on the basis of the Camp David formula. He seems to be hinting here that Sharon, while also interested in political dialogue, rejects the Camp David proposals as a basis. Indeed, Sharon said in April that his government will not dismantle any settlements, and will not discuss such a dismantling of settlements, before the scheduled November 2003 general elections. Barak fears that in the absence of political dialogue based on the Camp David–Clinton proposals, the vacuum created will be filled by proposals, from Europe or Saudi Arabia, that are less agreeable to Israel.

Barak seems to hold out no chance of success for Israeli–Palestinian negotiations, should they somehow resume, so long as Arafat and like-minded leaders are at the helm on the Arab side. He seems to think in terms of generations and hesitantly predicts that only "eighty years" after 1948 will the Palestinians be historically ready for a compromise. By then, most of the generation that experienced the catastrophe of 1948 at first hand will have died; there will be "very few 'salmons' around who still want to return to their birthplaces to die." (Barak speaks of a "salmon syndrome" among the Palestinians—and says that Israel, to a degree, was willing to accommodate it, through the family reunion scheme, allowing elderly refugees to return to be with their families before they die.) He points to the model of the Soviet Union, which collapsed roughly after eighty years, after the generation that had lived through the revolution had died. He seems to be saying that revolutionary movements' zealotry and dogmatism die down after the passage of three generations and, in the case of the Palestinians, the disappearance of the generation of the nakba, or catastrophe, of 1948 will facilitate compromise.

I asked, "If this is true, then your peace effort vis-à-vis the Palestinians was historically premature and foredoomed?"

Barak: "No, as a responsible leader I had to give it a try."

In the absence of real negotiations, Barak believes that Israel should begin to unilaterally prepare for a pullout from "some 75 percent" of the West Bank and, he implies, all or almost all of the Gaza Strip, back to defensible borders, while allowing a Palestinian state to emerge there. Meanwhile Israel should begin constructing a solid, impermeable fence around the evacuated parts of the West Bank and new housing and settlements inside Israel proper and in the areas of the West Bank that Israel intends to permanently annex (such as the Etzion Block area, south of Bethlehem) to absorb the settlers who will be moving out of the territories. He says that when the Palestinians will be ready for peace, the fate of the remaining 25 percent of the West Bank can be negotiated.

Barak is extremely troubled by the problem posed by Israel's Arab minority, representing some 20 percent of Israel's total population of some 6.5 million. Their leadership over the past few years has come to identify with Arafat and the PA, and an increasing number of Israeli Arabs, who now commonly refer to themselves as "Palestinian Arabs," oppose Israel's existence and support the Palestinian armed struggle. A growing though still very small number have engaged in terrorism, including one of the past months' suicide bombers. Barak agrees that, in the absence of a peace settlement with the Palestinians, Israel's Arabs constitute an irredentist "time bomb," though he declines to use the phrase. At the start of the intifada Israel's Arabs rioted around the country, blocking major highways with stones and Molotov cocktails. In response, thirteen were killed by Israeli policemen, deepening the chasm between the country's Jewish majority and Arab minority.

The relations between the two have not recovered and the rhetoric of the Israeli Arab leadership has grown steadily more militant. One Israeli Arab Knesset member, Azmi Bishara, is currently on trial for sedition. If the conflict with the Palestinians continues, says Barak, "Israel's Arabs will serve as [the Palestinians'] spearpoint" in the struggle:

This may necessitate changes in the rules of the democratic game ...in order to assure Israel's Jewish character.

He raises the possibility that in a future deal, some areas with large Arab concentrations, such as the "Little Triangle" and Umm al-Fahm, bordering on the West Bank, could be transferred to the emergent Palestinian Arab state, along with their inhabitants:

But this could only be done by agreement—and I don't recommend that government spokesmen speak of it [openly]. But such an exchange makes demographic sense and is not inconceivable.

Barak is employed as a senior adviser to an American company, Electronic Data Systems, and is considering a partnership in a private equity company, where he will be responsible for "security-related" ventures. I asked him, "Do you see yourself returning to politics?" Barak answered,

Look, the public [decisively] voted against me a year ago. I feel like a reserve soldier who knows he might be called upon to come back but expects that he won't be unless it is absolutely necessary. But it's not inconceivable. After all, Rabin returned to the premiership fifteen years after the end of his first term in office.

At one point in the interview, Barak pointed to the settlement campaign in heavily populated Palestinian areas, inaugurated by Menachem Begin's Likud-led government in 1977, as the point at which Israel took a major historical wrong turn. But at other times Barak pointed to 1967 as the crucial mistake, when Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza (and Sinai and the Golan Heights) and, instead of agreeing to immediate withdrawal from all the territories, save East Jerusalem, in exchange for peace, began to settle them. Barak recalled seeing David Ben-Gurion, Israel's founder and first prime minister (1948–1953 and 1955– 1963), on television in June 1967 arguing for the immediate withdrawal from all the territories occupied in the Six- Day War in exchange for peace, save for East Jerusalem.

Many of us—me included—thought that he was suffering from [mental] weakness or perhaps a subconscious jealousy of his successor [Levi Eshkol, who had presided over the unprecedented victory and conquests]. Today one understands that he simply saw more clearly and farther than the leadership at that time.

How does Barak see the Middle East in a hundred years' time? Would it contain a Jewish state? Unlike Arafat, Barak believes it will, "and it will be strong and prosperous. I really think this. Our connection to the Land of Israelis is not like the Crusaders'.... Israel fits into the zeitgeist of our era. It is true that there are demographic threats to its existence. That is why a separation from the Palestinians is a compelling imperative. Without such a separation [into two states] there is no future for the Zionist dream."
Notes

[*]The New York Review, August 9, 2001.

Letters

June 13, 2002: Robert Malley, Camp David and After: An Exchange (2. A Reply to Ehud Barak)

Attention ! Explosive book ! I just finished reading it and I'm still wondering if I haven't been dreaming all this time. Lenni Brenner, a Trotskyist Jew, documents the history of the Zionist movement and its various branches, from the start of the 20th century in anti-semitic Russia, to 1945 and the Nazi Germany's Holocaust.

What you will discover in these pages will shock you, but it will also bring some understanding as to why Zionism is a flawed ideology. Also, you will never again feel you need to defend from a Zionist accusing you of antisemitism. You'll probably be more inclined to return the accusation with a few quotes from other Zionists who were not so pro-Jew as they'd have you believe today.

Here is an introduction of the book taken from the London Times:
Who told a Berlin audience in March 1912 that “each country can absorb only a limited number of Jews, if she doesn’t want disorders in her stomach. Germany already has too many Jews”?

No, not Adolf Hitler but Chaim Weizmann, later president of the World Zionist Organization and later still the first president of the state of Israel.

And where might you find the following assertion, originally composed in 1917 but republished as late as 1936: “The Jew is a caricature of a normal, natural human being, both physically and spiritually. As an individual in society he revolts and throws off the harness of social obligation, knows no order nor discipline”?

Not in Der Stürmer but in the organ of the Zionist youth organization, Hashomer Hatzair.

As the above quoted statement reveals, Zionism itself encouraged and exploited self-hatred in the Diaspora. It started from the assumption that anti-Semitism was inevitable and even in a sense justified so long as Jews were outside the land of Israel.

It is true that only an extreme lunatic fringe of Zionism went so far as to offer to join the war on Germany’s side in 1941, in the hope of establishing “the historical Jewish state on a national and totalitarian basis, and bound by a treaty with the German Reich”. Unfortunately this was the group which the present Prime Minister of Israel chose to join.[*]

That fact gives an extra edge of topicality to what would in any case be a highly controversial study of the Zionist record in the heyday of European fascism by Lenni Brenner, and American Trotskyist writer who happens also to be Jewish. It is short (250 pages), crisp and carefully documented. Mr Brenner is able to cite numerous cases where Zionists collaborated with anti-Semitic regimes, including Hitler’s; he is careful also to put on record the opposition to such policies within the Zionist movement.

In retrospect these activities have been defended as a distasteful but necessary expedient to save Jewish lives. But Brenner shows that most of the time this aim was secondary. The Zionist leaders wanted to help young, skilled and able-bodied Jews to emigrate to Palestine. They were never in the forefront of the struggle against fascism in Europe.

That in no way absolves the wartime Allies for their callous refusal to make any serious effort to save European Jewry. As Brenner says, “Britain must be condemned for abandoning the Jews of Europe”; but, “it is not for the Zionists to do it.”

The rest of the book is fully available online here.

[*] Menachem Begin. The introduction was published in 1984

Occupation of Palestine
http://visualwikipedia.com/en/Occupation_of_Palestine

THE PALESTINIAN ISRAELI CONFLICT
A CHRONOLOGY (1947-2007)
http://web.mit.edu/cis/www/mitejmes/Chronology%20of%20a%20Conflict.pdf

The Long Road to Annapolis: Historical Timeline of Palestine from 1917-2007
By John Tarleton
From the December 8, 2007 issue
http://www.indypendent.org/2007/12/09/the-long-road-to-annapolis/

1917—Great Britain gains control of all of historic Palestine at the end of World War 1 and issues the Balfour Declaration committing the British government to supporting a “Jewish national home” in Palestine. At the time, Jews make up less than 10 percent of Palenstine’s population and own about 2 percent of its own land.

1948—A U.N. partition gives 57 percent of Palestine to the new state of Israel, which is immediately recognized by the United States. Fighting breaks out. When the smoke clears, Israel controls 78 percent of Palestine and 800,000 Palestinians have fled into exile. The myth of “a land without a people, for a people without a land” is turned into reality. In 1947, Jews made up a third of Palenstine’s total population and owned less than 7 percent of the land.

1964—The Palestine Liberation Organization is founded. The PLO Charter calls for Israel to be abolished and replaced by a single binational state where both Jews and Arabs could live.

1967—Israel seizes control of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem (the other 22 percent of Palestine) at the end of the Six-Day War and begins the military occupation and colonization of the Territories that continues to this day. U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338 are passed, calling for a permanent Middle East peace deal based on Israel returning to its pre-1967 borders for recognition of its right to exist.

1988—The PLO acknowledges Israel’s right to exist and signals support for a two-state solution.

1993-2000—The PLO and Israel sign the Oslo Accords in which the PLO again recognizes Israel’s right to exist while the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state is put off until “final status” negotiations are completed. The Palestinian Authority (PA) is established to carry out police functions that the Israelis are no longer willing to do.

2000-2003—Exasperated by the rapid buildup of Israeli settlements and Jewish-only roads since the signing of Oslo, Palestinian militants launch the second Intifada in September 2000. Eight-hundred and thirty-three Israelis and 2,239 Palestinians are killed over the next 39 months. Retired general Ariel Sharon becomes Israel’s prime minister and launches the construction of a 25-foot-high wall that will eventually extend 400 miles and cut deep into the West Bank, in some cases surrounding whole Palestinian villages.

2003—Mahmoud Abbas is installed as the Palestinian Prime Minister at the insistence of the United States and Israel. The Bush administration then launches a much-touted “Roadmap” to a Palestinian state by 2005 that requires Palestinians to make all the major concessions while Israel is allowed to continue the occupation and a policy of “targeted” assassinations.

2004—In a shift of longstanding U.S. policy, President Bush openly supports Sharon’s position that a final peace should not be based on pre-1967 borders. Bush’s stance delights not only the Israelis but millions of Christian Zionists ithat are an integral part of his electoral base.

2005—Israel hands over the Gaza Strip to the Palestinians but continues to exert complete control over its borders, airspace and economy.

2006—Riding a wave of resentment against corruption in the Palestinian Authority, the Islamic militant group Hamas wins Palestinian parliamentary elections. The United States and Israel reject any negotiations with Hamas and launch a punishing international embargo that cuts off most international funding for the Authority. Israel also kidnaps dozens of elected legislators and government officals, imprisoning them to this day.

2007—The United States and Israel throw their full support behind Abbas, who remains in control of the West Bank after his forces were routed from the Gaza Strip in June. Five months later the Annapolis conference is convened with the goal of reaching a final peace agreement by the end of 2008. The democratically elected Hamas government is not invited to the talks.

===========================================================================
Palestine Israel Conflict Timeline
http://www.buzzle.com/articles/palestine-israel-conflict-timeline.html

The Palestine-Israel conflict is one among the unresolved and bloodiest conflicts of the world. Several attempts were made to enforce peace but the conflict still festers. Read on to know about its history.
Palestine Israel Conflict Timeline
1920: The British started ruling Palestine.

1947: The British handed over the responsibility of solving the Zionist-Arab problem to the United Nations. The United Nations voted to divide Palestine into Jewish and Arab states. Jerusalem received an international status.

1948: Israel was declared as the first Jewish state on 14 May. The British left Palestine. Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Egypt declared war on Israel.

1949: Israel and the Arab states agreed to armistice. Israel gained about 50% more territory than was originally allotted to it by the United Nations Partition Plan.

1959: Yasser Arafat and Khalil al-Wazir established the Palestinian political party Fatah.

1964: The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was formed.

1965: First military operation of Fatah took place inside the armistice line.

1967: There was a six-day war between Israel and its Arab neighbors from June 5 to June 11. Israel destroyed the Egyptian air force on the ground, conquered and occupied Sinai and Gaza. It then conquered the West Bank from Jordan and Golan Heights from Syria. U.N. Security Resolution 242 called on Israel to withdraw from territories it occupied in the war. Israel refused, but the U.N. Security Council did not take any action. Instead, Arab states refused to recognize Israel as a state, and Arab terrorist organizations were formed to fight against the Israeli occupation.

1972: A Palestinian militant faction known as Black September killed 11 Israeli athletes at the Olympic Games in Munich, Germany.

1973: Since they were unable to regain the territory they had lost in 1967 by diplomatic means, Egypt and Syria launched major offensives against Israel on the Jewish festival of the Day of Atonement or Yom Kippur. The clashes are also called as the Ramadan war. Initially, Egypt and Syria made significant advances in Sinai and the Golan Heights. These were reversed by Israel after three weeks of fighting. U.N. Security Council Resolution 338 called for a ceasefire and for the implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242. Israel pushed on into Syria beyond the Golan Heights, although they later gave up some of these gains. In Egypt, Israel regained territory and advanced to the western side of the Suez Canal. The United States, the Soviet Union and the United Nations all made diplomatic interventions to bring about ceasefire agreements between the combatants and Israel withdrew its forces back across the Suez Canal into Sinai.

1974: The Rabat Arab League Summit recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people

1979: Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin signed a bilateral Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty at Camp David. Israel returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt. Arab states boycotted Egypt for negotiating a peace treaty with Israel.

1982: Israel invaded Lebanon to fight PLO. Operation "Peace for Galilee" had the objective of wiping out Palestinian guerrilla bases near Israel's northern border, although Defense Minister Ariel Sharon pushed all the way to Beirut and expelled the PLO from the country. After ten weeks of intense shelling by the Israeli forces, the PLO agreed to leave Beirut under the protection of a multinational force to relocate to other Arab countries.

1987: A mass uprising or intifada by the Palestinians against the Israeli occupation began in Gaza and quickly spread to the West Bank. Protest took the form of general strikes, boycott of Israeli products, civil disobedience, graffiti, and barricades, but it was the stone-throwing demonstrations against the heavily armed occupation troops that captured international attention. The Israeli defense forces responded brutally and there was heavy loss of life among Palestinian civilians. More than 1,000 Palestinians died in clashes, which lasted until 1993. The Palestinian organization, ‘Hamas’ was formed by Sheikh Ahmad Yassin of the Gaza wing of the Muslim Brothers in the Occupied Territories.

1988: Palestinian Independence Declaration took place at the 19th Palestinian National Council, Algiers. PLO leader, Yasser Arafat, denounced terrorism in the UN General Assembly.

1993: There were secret negotiations held near Oslo, Norway, between Israel and the PLO which resulted in a treaty that included mutual recognition, limited self-rule for Palestinians in Jericho and Gaza, and provisions for a permanent treaty that would resolve the status of Gaza and the West Bank The Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles (DOP) was signed at a White House ceremony by PLO official Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) and Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres.

1994: Yasser Arafat, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres won the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts.

1995: Yitzhak Rabin and Peres signed an agreement expanding Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and giving the Palestinian Authority control over six large West Bank towns.

1996: Yasser Arafat won the first-ever elections held by Palestinians.

1997: Israel and the Palestinians reached an agreement on Israeli redeployment in the West Bank city of Hebron.

1998: The Wye River Plantation talks resulted in an agreement for Israeli redeployment and release of political prisoners and renewed Palestinian commitment to correct its violations of the Oslo Accords including excess police force, illegal arms and incitement in public media and education.

2000: The Al-Aqsa Intifada started. There were mass protests and general strikes. There were also suicide bomb attacks and rockets were fired into Israeli residential area.

2002: After a series of suicide attacks early in 2002, Israel re-occupied almost all of the West Bank in March and again in June. Palestinian cities were regularly raided and remained cut off from each other, under seige and curfew for very long periods of time. In April, Israeli forces entered and captured the refugee camp in the northern West Bank city of Jenin.

2004: PLO leader Yasser Arafat died on November 11.

2005: Yaseer was succeeded by Mahmoud Abbas as President of the Palestinian Authority in January, 2005. The Israeli Disengagement Plan took effect. This involved dismantling settlements in Gaza and four settlements in the northern part of the West Bank, but expanding the remaining settlements in the West Bank.

2006: ‘Hamas’ won parliamentary elections in the West Bank and Gaza and was democratically elected as the government of the Palestinian Authority.

2007: Trilateral Israeli-Palestinian-American summit with US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and President Abbas ended with no progress.

http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_King-Crane_Report
The King-Crane Report
From World War I Document Archive
The King-Crane Commission Report, August 28, 1919

Report of [the] American section of Inter-allied Commission of mandates in Turkey. An official United States government report by the Inter-allied Commission on Mandates in Turkey. American Section

NB: This document is reproduced from the: "First publication of King-Crane report on the Near East, a suppressed official document of the United States government." "Turkish nationalist pact" and the "Balfour declaration" are included in the introduction (p. i-iii)
First printed as the "King-Crane report on the Near East" in Editor & publisher. [New York, Editor & Publisher Co., 1922] v. 55, no. 27, 2d section (Dec. 2) xxviii p. illus. (incl. map)

Report of American Section of Inter-Allied Commission on Mandates in Turkey

An Official United States Government Report

"Dr. Henry Churchill King was born at Hillsdale, Mich., in 1858. He is president of Oberlin College and one of America's best known educators as well as the author of numerous volumes on theology, education and philosophy. During 1918-1919 he was director of religious work for the YMCA in France. In September, 1919, he was appointed to serve on the American Section of the Peace Conference Inter-Allied Commission on Mandates in Turkey."

"Charles R. Crane was born at Chicago, Ill., in 1858. He was engaged in the manufacturing business in that city for more than a quarter of a century. He was a member of President Wilson's Special Diplomatic Commission to Russia in 1917; was a member of the American Section of the Peace Conference Inter-Allied Commission on Mandates in Turkey in 1919; American Ambassador to China from May 1920, to June 1921."

I. THE REPORT UPON SYRIA

The American Commissioners of the projected International Commission on Mandates in Turkey, herewith submit their final report upon the Syrian portion of their task.

The Commission's conception of its mission was defined in the following statement, which was given to the press wherever the Commission went:

"The American Section of the International Commission on Mandates in Turkey, in order that their mission may be clearly understood are furnishing to the press the following statement, which is intended to define as accurately as possible the nature of their task, as given to them by President Wilson.

"The American people-having no political ambitions in Europe or the Near East; preferring, if that were possible, to keep clear of all European, Asian, or African entanglements but nevertheless sincerely desiring that the most permanent peace and the largest results for humanity shall come out of this war- recognize that they cannot altogether avoid responsibility for just settlements among the nations following the war, and under the League of Nations. In that spirit they approach the problems of the Near East.

"An International Commission was projected by the Council of Four of the Peace Conference to study conditions in the Turkish Empire with reference to possible mandates. The American Section of that Commission is in the Near East simply and solely to get as accurate and definite information as possible concerning the conditions, the relations, and the desires of all the peoples and classes concerned in order that President Wilson and the American people may act with full knowledge of the facts in any policy they may be called upon hereafter to adopt concerning the problems of the Near East-whether in the Peace Conference or in the later League of Nations.

"This statement of the mission of the Commission is in complete harmony with the following paragraph from the Covenant of the League of Nations, particularly referring to portions of the former Turkish Empire:

"'Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.' "

The Commission had in its survey of Syria the assistance of Dr. Albert H. Lybyer, Dr. George R. Montgomery, and Capt. William Yale, U. S. A., as advisors; of Capt. Donald M. Brodie, U. S. A., as secretary and treasurer; of Dr. Sami Haddad, instructor in the School of Medicine of the Syrian Protestant College of Beirut, as physician and interpreter; of Mr. Laurence S. Moore as business manager; and of Sergt.-Major Paul O. Toren as stenographer. The advisors had all been previously connected as experts with the Peace Conference in Paris, and had been students of the special problems of the Near East.

The report naturally falls into three divisions: Data, General, Considerations, and Recommendations .

The Commission had already familiarized itself before leaving Paris with the full and varied reports and material coming into the office of the Western Asia Division of the experts of the American Section of the Peace Conference, and with considerable other literature bearing on the Near East. The survey of Syria was made in the light of all this previous study.

The method of the Commission, in its inquiry in Syria, was to meet in conference individuals and delegations who should represent all the significant groups in the various communities, and so to obtain as far as possible the opinions and desires of the whole people. The process Itself was inevitably a kind of political education for the people, and, besides actually bringing out the desires of the people, had at least further value in the simple consciousness that their wishes were being sought. We were not blind to the fact that there was considerable propaganda; that often much pressure was put upon individuals and groups that sometimes delegations were prevented Tom reaching the Commission, and that the representative authority of many petitions was questionable. But the Commission believes that these anomalous elements in the petitions tend to cancel one another when the whole country is taken into account, and that, as in the composite photograph, certain great, common emphases are unmistakable.

The Commissioners were struck, on the other hand, with the large degree of frankness with which opinions were expressed to them, even where there was evident fear of consequences. In this respect the American Section had an evident advantage, which could not have held for a mixed Commission. Moreover, the nearly universal recognition of the fact that America sought no additional territory was favorable to a frank expressed of opinion.

The direct data, furnished by the inquiry in Syria, are given in a series of tables, prepared by the Secretary of the Commission, and based immediately upon the Conferences of the Commission and the petitions there presented.

The area and towns covered by the Commission's inquiry are shown in the following itinerary for June 10 to July 21, 1919, and in the table of the towns, classified according to the different divisions of the Occupied Enemy Territory Administrations-British, French, and Arab These tables show that the Commission visited 36 of the more important towns of Syria, scattered through all the military areas, and heard delegations from other important centers. It should be noted that the list does not include at all the names of hosts of villages in the vicinity of towns visited, which were also represented by delegations before the Commission. Our records show that there were 1,520 such villages. Cilicia was briefly included in the Syrian inquiry, because it is disputed territory claimed both by Syria and by the Turkish-speaking portion of the former Turkish Empire

THE ITINERARY

June 10 Commission arrived in Jaffa.
11, 12 Interviews at Jaffa.
13 By auto to Tel-a-Viv, Richon-le-Sion and Jerusalem.
14 Jerusalem. Official calls.
15 (Sunday)
16 Jerusalem. Interviews
17 To Bethlehem, Hebron and Beersheba by auto. Interviews at Bethlehem and Hebron.
18 Interviews at Beersheba, including Gaza delegations. To Jerusalem by auto.
19, 20 Jerusalem. Interviews.
21 By auto to Ramallah and Nablus. Interviews at both places.
22 By auto to Jenin and Nazareth. Interviews at Jenin.
23 Interviews at Nazareth. To Haifa (Mt. Carmel Monastery) by auto. Interviews.
24 To Acre by auto. Interviews. To Nazareth by auto.
25 To Damascus by auto via Tiberias Capernaum
26 Damascus. Official calls.
27, 28 Damascus. Interviews.
29 (Sunday).
30 Damascus. Interviews
July 1 To Amman and Dera by train. Interviews at both places.
2, 3 Damascus. Interviews
4 To Baalbek by auto
5 Baalbek. Interviews. To Beirut by auto.
6 Beirut (Alieh)
7, 8 Beirut. Interviews
9 To Jebeil, Batrum, and Bkerke, by auto. Interviews at each place
10 To Sidon and Tyre by auto. Interviews at both places.
11 To Ainab, Baabda, and Zahle by auto. Interviews at each place.
12 To Tripoli by yacht. Interviews.
13 To Alexandretta by yacht. Interviews.
14 To Ladikiya by yacht. Interviews. To Tripoli by yacht
15 To Homs by auto
16 Interviews at Homs. To Hama by auto. Interviews. To Aleppo by tram
17 Aleppo.
18, 19 Aleppo. Interviews
20 To Adana by train
21 Adana. Interviews To Mersina by train, via Tarsus. Interviews at Tarsus

and Mersina. Commission left Mersina on U. S. Destroyer "Hazelwood"
for Constantinople.

CITIES AND VlLLAGES OF SYRIA AT WHICH DELEGATIONS WERE RECEIVED BY THE AMERICAN COMMISSION

I-O. E. T. A. (South)-Under British Military Administration-Comprises Palestine west of Jordan line.

Acre.
Beersheba-(Gaza).*
Bethlehem
Haifa
Hebron
Jaffa (Ludd, Ramleh)
Tenin.
Jerusalem
Nablus
Nazareth (Safed, Tiberias).
Ramallah.
Richon-le-Sion.
Tel-a-Viv.

II-O. E. T. A. (East)-Under Arab Military Administration-Comprises all of Syria east of Jordan line and Lebanon boundary

Aleppo.
Amman (Es-Salt)
Baalbek
Damascus.
Deraa.
Hama.
Homs.
Moalaka

III-O. E. T. A. (West)-Under French Military Administration-Comprises Lebanon and Coastal Regions north to Alexandretta.

Ainab.
Alexandretta (Antioch).
Baabda.
Betrun.
Beirut.
Bkerke.
Tebeil
Ladikiya.
Sidon.
Tripoli.
Tyre.
Zahle.

IV-O. E. T. A. (North)-Under French Military Administration-Comprises Cilicia.

Adana.
Mersina.
Tarsus.

*Delegations were received from cities and villages name in parenthesis.

The Secretary's Summarized Statement l of Significant conclusions brought out in the Tables of Petitions, gives added information and discussion, greatly needed for a proper interpretation of the petitions and of our entire survey; and is therefore made the concluding section of the Secretary's presentation of data.
POPULATION ESTIMATES

An estimate of the population of the different districts is added at this point, for a better understanding of the tables and discussion which follow. The figures in all cases must be regarded as only approximate, but may be taken as giving a fairly accurate view of the proportions of the population.

O. E. T. A. South O. E. T. A. West O. E. T. A. East Totals
Moslems 515,000 600,000 1,250,000 2,365 000
Christians 62,500 400 000 125,000 587 560
Druses 60,000 80,000 140,000
Jews 65,000 15,000 30,000 110,000
Others 5,000 20 000 20 000 45,000
Totals 647,500 1,095,009 1,505,000
Grand Total 3,247,500

CLASSIFIED LIST OF DELEGATIONS RECEIVED

The tables showing the classes and number of delegations met by the Commission, should make clear how varied the population is, and also that no vital interest or element of the population has been omitted in the inquiry. At the same time it should be carefully borne in mind that the number of delegations is no proper index of the proportions of the population. The Christian population is divided into so many small groups that it is represented in the tables by a larger number of delegations than the Moslem
majority.

O. E. T. A
South East West Total
I-Political Groups:
1. Mayors and Municipal Councils 12 9 13 34
2. Administrative Councils 2 7 6 15
3. Councils of Village Chiefs 22 20 23 65
4. Arab Sheikhs 6 22 2 30
5. Arab Societies 2 1 2 5
6. Moslem Christian Committees 3 1 0 4
Total Political Groups 47 60 46 153

II-Economic and Social Groups:
1. Professions and Trades 1 6 10 17
2. Farmers, etc. 1 4 1 6
3. Young Men's Clubs 1 5 1 7
4. Chambers of Commerce I O 0 1
5. Miscellaneous Groups 1 1 8 10
Total Economic and Social Groups 5 16 20 41

III-Religious Groups:
A -Christians-
1. General Christian Groups (Composite) 7 3 3 13
2. General Catholic Groups 0 0 5 5
*3. Christian Ladies 0 3 2 5
4. Protestants 9 5 7 22
5. Latins 9 2 4 15
6. Greek Orthodox 7 6 12 25
7. Greek Catholic 8 5 6 19
8. Maronites 7 2 7 16
9. Armenians (general groups) 1 0 3 4
10. Armenian Catholics 0 1 0 1
11. Armenian Orthodox 0 2 0 2
12. Syrian Catholics 1 2 1 4
13. Syrian Orthodox 0 3 0 3
14. Chaldean Catholics 1 1 0 2
15. Copts 1 0 0 1
16. Abyssinans 2 0 0 2
53 36 50 139
B -Moslems
1. Muftis and Ulema 7 7 10 24
2. Moslem Notables 2 10 3 15
3. Moslems (Sunnites) 9 2 10 21
4 Shiites 0 0 2 2
5. Moslem Ladies 0 2 1 3
6. Turkish Moslems 0 0 4 4
7. Ismailites 0 0 2 2
8. Dervishes 0 1 0 1
9. Circassians 0 2 0 2
18 24 32 74
C -Other Religious Groups
1. Jews 14 2 5 21
2. Druses 1 1 5 7
3. Samaritans 1 0 0 1
4. Persians 1 0 0 1
5. Nusairiyeh 0 0 5 5
17 10 3 35
Total Religious Groups 88 63 97 248
Grand Totals 140 139 163 442

*The simple statement that the women of the East left their historic seclusion to appear before a Commission of American men is a revelation of the new role women are playing in the nationalistic movements in the Orient.
PETITION SUMMARIES-SYRIA COMPLETE

The tables of summaries of petitions made to the Commission, written or oral or both, reveal the range of the discussions in the conferences, and the chief positions taken by the people. They are given by Military Districts, as well as for Syria as a whole, because the petitions vary considerably with the Districts.
Total Number of Petitions Received: 1863.

No. Per Cent.
A -Territorial Limits
*1 For United Syria 1500 80.4
2 For Separate Palestine 6 0.32
3 For Separate Palestine under British if French have Syrian Mandate 2 0.1
4 For Autonomous Palestine within Syrian State 24 1.29
5 For Independent Greater Lebanon 203 10.9
6 Against Independent Greater Lebanon 1062 57.0
7 For Autonomous Lebanon within Syrian State 33 1.76
8 For Inclusion of Bokaa with Damascus 4 0.21
9 For Inclusion of Bokaa with Lebanon 11 0.59
10 For Inclusion of Cilicia within Armenian State 3 0.16
11 For Inclusion of Cilicia with Syrian State 2 0.1

B -Independence:
1 For Absolute Independence of Syria 1370 73.5
2 For Independence of Iraq (Mesopotamia) 1278 68.5
3 For Independence of ail Arab Countries 97 5.2

C -Form of Government
1 For Democratic Kingdom 1107 59.3
2 For Emir Feisal as King 1102 59
3 For Democratic Representative Government 34 1.82
4 For Guarding of Rights of Minorities 1023 54.9
5 Arabic to be Official Language 5 .27
6 For Abolition of Foreign Capitulations 10 53
7 For Autonomy of all Provinces of Syria 19 1.02

D -Choice of Mandate
1 British-
a For British Mandate 66 3.53
b For British Mandate if Mandate is obligatory 0
c For British "Assistance" 4 0.21
Total British First Choice 70 3.75
d For British Mandate as Second Choice 41 2.19
**e For British "Assistance" as Second Choice 1032 55.3
2 French-
For French Mandate 271 14.52
For French Mandate if Mandate is obligatory 1 0.05
For French "Assistance" 2 0.1
Total French First Choice 274 14.68
For French Mandate as Second Choice 3 0.15
For French "Assistance" as Second Choice 0
3 American-
For American Mandate 57 3.05
For American Mandate if Mandate is obligatory 8 0.4
For American "Assistance" 1064 57.0
Total American First Choice 1129 60.0
For American Mandate as Second Choice 8 0.4
For American "Assistance" as Second Choice 3 0.15
4 Choice of Mandate left to Damascus Conference 23 1.23

E -Zionist Program
1. For Complete Zionist Program (Jewish State and Immigration) 11 0.59
2. For Modified Zionist Program 8 0.4
3. Against Zionist Program 1350 72.3

F -Protests and Criticisms:
1 Anti-British-
General Anti-British Statements 3 0.15
Specific Criticisms of Administration 0
Protests against Interference with free access to Commission 0
2 Anti-French-
a General Anti-French Statements 1129 60.5
b Specific Criticisms of Administrations 24 1.29
c Protests against Interference with free access to Commission 11 0.59
3 Anti-Arab-
a General Anti-Arab Statements 35 1.87
b Specific Criticisms of Administration 4 0.2
c Protests against Interference with free access to Commission 0
4 *** Against 22d Article of League Covenant 1033 55.3
5 Against Secret Treaties, especially treaties dividing Syria 988 52.9

*"United Syria" means a Syria without Palestine treated as a separate country. In effect, it is intended as a declaration against Zionism.

**The high figures given for American and British "assistance," rather than for a mandate, are because the people ask first for complete independence.

***The reason for opposition to Article XXII is set forth by the secretary later in the report.
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT CONCLUSIONS.

I. The Value of the Petitions as an Estimate of Public Opinion in Syria:

The 1863 petitions received by the American Commission in Syria and the summary tables prepared from them cannot of course be regarded as a mathematically accurate analysis of the real desires of the peoples of Syria. There are at least five unavoidable difficulties that have qualified their accuracy.

1. The number of the petitions from the different sections of Syria is not proportional to their respective populations, e. g., O. E T. A. [Note: These initials stand for "Occupied Enemy Territory Administration," but are commonly used as a word, "Oeta," as "British Oeta," "French Oeta," or "Arab Oeta."] South, with thirteen cities at which delegations were received is represented by only 260 petitions, while 1,157 petitions were received from O. E T. A. East, in which but eight cities were visited. As the Commission progressed northward the petitions became more numerous, due to the increased time afforded for knowledge of the Commission's coming, for the preparation of petitions, for the activities of propaganda agents, and for the natural crystallization of public opinion.

2. The number of petitions from the different religious organizations is not proportional to the numerical strength of the religious faiths. This Is especially true of the verbal requests made by delegations. In O. E. T. A. South, for instance, on account of the number of sects of the Christian faith, 53 delegations of Christians were received, and only eighteen delegations of Moslems, whereas the Moslem population is fully eight times as large as that of the Christian. This disparity does not, however, hold for the total number of petitions, verbal and written, as it was corrected in part by the large number of petitions from Moslem villages presented to the Commission at Aleppo and other northeastern points.

3. A number of petitions show clearly the influence of organized propaganda. This is sometimes evidenced in the petitions themselves by numerous similarities of phrasing, by many identical wordings, and by a few instances in which printed forms, obviously intended as models for written documents, have been signed and given to the Commission.

In addition to the internal evidence, there were also many external indications of systematic efforts to influence the character of the petitions. The same Arab agent was observed in four cities of Palestine, assisting in the preparation of petitions. Similar activities on the part of French sympathizers were observed In Beirut.

4. In addition to this general propaganda, which was entirely legitimate as well as natural and inevitable, it is certain that a small number of petitions were fraudulently secured. In two cases the signatures were in the same handwriting. Three instances of "repeater" signatures were discovered. In addition, the seals of new organizations, purporting to be Trade Unions of Beirut, were discovered to have been ordered by the same propaganda agent a few days before the arrival of the Commission. All possible precautions were taken to insure authenticity of petitions and signatures, but in view of the character of the Commission's survey and the limited facilities for close checking, the genuineness of all cannot be guaranteed.

5 The value of the individual petitions varies also with the number of signatures, although mere numbers cannot be taken as the only criterion. For example, some petitions signed by only a small Municipal Council may represent a larger public opinion than a petition signed by a thousand villagers. The number of signatures is 91,079;* 26,324 for the Petitions of O. E. T. A. South, 26,884 for the Petitions of O. E. T. A West, and 37,871 for the Petitions of O. E. T. A. East. This represents a general average of 49 signatures for each petition. The number of signatures varies widely from this average, but the totals for the different programs are fairly well equalized.

Yet despite these five qualifications, it is believed that the petitions as summarized present a fairly accurate analysis of present political opinion in Syria. The great majority of irregularities offset one another. The preponderance of Christian petitions in Palestine is balanced by the flood of Moslem appeals at Aleppo. The activities of French sympathizers in Tripoli probably did not influence the character of the petitions presented much more than the contrary efforts of the Independent Program representatives in Amman.

The petitions are certainly representative. As the classified list of delegations received by the Commission clearly indicates, the petitions came front a wide range of political, economic, social, and religious classes and organizations. It was generally known throughout Syria that the American Commission would receive in confidence any documents that any individual or group should care to present. In the few cities in which the military authorities sought to exert control, directly or indirectly, over the delegations, without exception the opposition parties found opportunities to present their ideas to the Commission, if not always orally, at least in writing.

*NOTE: These figures indicate the magnitude of the popular interest in the Commission's work and the vast amount of material it had to handle. The reader should again be reminded that "O. E. T. A. South" was British, or Palestine, "O. E. T. A. West" was French, or Syrian; "O. E. T. A. East" was Arab, and "O. E. T. A. North" was French.

II. Definite Programs Revealed in the Petitions:

Before considering the special requests contained in the petitions, it is advisable to present the six distinct political programs that were clearly revealed in the petitions, and that in some instances were developed during the investigation of the Commission. Of the 1,863 petitions for Syria, 1,364 are exact copies of some of these programs and many others have close resemblances. They are:

l. The Independence Program. The first petitions received by the Commission, those at Jaffa on June 11, except in the case of the Zionist statements, do not give evidence of any agreed and elaborated policy for the future of Syria. The petitions varied greatly in content and wording. There were, however, four of the twenty petitions at Jaffa that contained what may be termed an Independence Program with three "planks" in its platform:

(a) The Political Unity of Syria, including Cilicia on the north, the Syrian Desert on the east, and Palestine, extending as far as Rafa on the south

(b) Absolute Independence for Syria;

(c) Opposition to a Zionist State and Jewish Immigration.

This program became the dominant note in the petitions presented in O. E. T. A. South. At Jerusalem eight of the twenty-three petitions received contained the Independence Program with practically identical wording. At Haifa and Nazareth, two of the last cities visited in the district, it constituted 35 and 10 respectively of the 60 and 18 petitions presented. Of the 260 petitions from O. E. T. A. South, 83, or 32 per cent, were simply the Independence Program, while many others closely resembled it. One printed form of this program was received by the Commission as a petition at Jenin, June 22, and doubtless other printed copies had been models for many of the petitions received in the last cities visited.

2. The "Damascus" Program: The original Independence Program was expanded on July 2 by the General Syrian Congress' meeting at Damascus into what came to be known as the Damascus Program. This program contained the three points of the Independence Program modified by asking "assistance" for the Syrian State from America, or, as second choice, from Great Britain, and expanded by adding:

(a) A rejection of Art. 22 of the League Covenant;

(b) A rejection of all French claims to Syria

(c) A protest against secret treaties and private agreements (by inference the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration);

(d) Opposition to independence for Greater Lebanon;

(e) Request for a democratic, non-centralized government under Emir Feisal; and

(f) A request for the independence and economic freedom of Mesopotamia.

Three petitions with the Damascus program in full had been received by the Commission prior to its adoption by the Syrian Congress. After that date 1,047 of the 1,473 petitions received during that period contained this program. Of that number 964 were on printed blanks, of which there were seven distinct "forms" with the program printed in full.

3. The Lebanon Programs: There are three distinct types of Lebanese programs that appear in the petitions:

(a) The French Independent Greater Lebanon. This program asks for complete independence and separation from Syria for the Greater Lebanon, including the Valley of Bekaa and in some instances Tripoli. France is asked for as the mandatory Power. 139 of the 146 petitions received in O. E. T. A. West contain this program, with practically identical wording. Of these twenty are on three varieties of printed forms.

(b) The Independent Lebanon Program. Another distinct program asks for the same points with the exception of a French Mandate. 33 of the 36 petitions with the wording of this program are on two varieties of printed forms. In eight instances requests for a mandate are added in writing.

(c) The Autonomous Lebanon Program. This program asks for a greater Lebanon as an autonomous province within a United Syrian State. No mandate is mentioned. 49 petitions are copies of this program, three of them on a printed form.

4. The Zionist Program: Eleven petitions with varying wording favor the Zionist Program of a Jewish State and extensive Jewish immigration. These are all from Jewish delegations. Eight other petitions express approval of the Zionist colonies in Palestine without endorsement of the complete program. :Four of these latter are statements by Arab peasants that they are on good terms with the Jewish colonies.

F-Protests and Criticisms

Another distinct classification is that of protests and criticisms. Criticisms against nations have been divided into: (a) General statements criticising national claims, character or policies, without making specific references, b) specific criticisms, usually of alleged mismanagement or corruption in the local military administration (c) protests against the interference of the local military authorities with free access to the American commission.

1. Three general anti-British statements were presented.

2. The general anti-French statements were much more numerous, 1,129 (60.5 per cent) due largely to the fact that such a protest is included in the Damascus program. There were also 24 specific criticisms of French administration in O. E. T. A. West, and 11 protests against deportation, armed guards, threats, and intimidation said to have been used by the French administrative authorities in O. E. T. A, West, to prevent individuals with anti-French views from appearing before the commission.

3. General criticism of the Arab government appeared in 35 petitions, always from Christian sources, and expressing fear as to the fate of the Christians under an independent Arab rule. In addition the administration of O. E. T. A. East is criticized in four petitions.

4. The Damascus program protest against applying Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations to Syria is included in 1,033 (55.3 per cent) petitions. This article states that "certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a state of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatary, until such time as they are able to stand alone." This protest is in line with the Damascus program plea for complete independence and the fear already referred to that a mandate might impair the full freedom of Syria. It is interesting to note that this protest did not appear until after the 22nd Article had been published in a statement given by the Commissioners to all the newspapers in Damascus.

5. One more protest is a part of 988 (52 per cent) petitions, a protest against secret treaties, treaties dividing Syria without the consent of the Syrians, and private agreements. The Sykes-Picot agreement and the Balfour declaration are not mentioned, but it is usually understood that they are referred to. This protest is included in the Damascus program and also received support from other elements

These statements-chiefly tabular- prepared by the secretary, of the results of the inquiry into Syrian opinion, need to be supplemented by a historical account prepared by the General Adviser Dr. Lybyer. This account will help to put concretely the entire situation, and to give the atmosphere of our inquiry, and so complete the basic data as presented in the field.

THE STORY OF THE TOUR

The whole area visited by the commission during the 42 days from June 10 to July 21 is Occupied Enemy Territory under the supreme authority of General Allenby. The administration is conducted under the Turkish laws, with small local modifications, in many cases continuing in office part or all of the officials left behind by the Turks. A system of military governors and officers assigned to special duties, such as financial and medical advice, liaison work, etc., parallels the civil administration. The whole area is in four portions, known respectively as O. E. T. A. (Occupied Enemy Territory Administration) South, West, East and North, and administered under the guidance respectively of English, French, Arab, and French officers. The order of description followed below is by these areas, and is nearly coincident with the itinerary of the commission, the only exception being that much of O. E. T. A. East was visited before O. E. T. A West. Fifteen days were spent in the South, ten in the West fifteen in the East, and two in the North.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE CLAIMS

III-Specific Requests as Given in the Tables:

A-Territorial Limits:

1. The largest percentage for any one request is that of 1,500 petitions (80.4 per cent) for United Syria, including Cilicia, the Syrian Desert, and Palestine. The boundaries of this area are usually defined as "The Taurus Mountains on the north- the Euphrates and Khabur Rivers, and the line extending east of Abu Kamal to the east of Al Juf on the east; Rafa and the line running from Al Juf to the south of Akaba on the south, and the Mediterranean Sea on the West." In addition to being the first plank of the Damascus program, a United Syria received strong support from many Christians in all the O. E. T. As., as the number of petitions indicates.

2. In opposition to Syrian Unity, six of the nineteen pro-zionist petitions ask for a separate Palestine, and presumably it is implied in the others.

3. In addition, two Christian groups in Palestine asked for a separate Palestine under the British, in preference to a United Syria under the French.

4. Twenty-four petitions, chiefly from Christian sources in O. E. T. A. South, asked for an autonomous Palestine within the Syrian State. For many other delegations this was doubtless implied in the general request for independence and a non-centralized government.

5. In opposition also to a United Syria are the 203 petitions (16.9 per cent) asking for an independent Greater Lebanon. One hundred and ninety-six of these came from Lebanon and 139 are copies of the French-Lebanon program.

6. The request for a United Syria is made even more emphatic by the 1,062 protests against an Independent Greater Lebanon. These include the Damascus program petitions and some from Protestant and other Christian sources in Lebanon.

7. Thirty-three Lebanese delegations representing both Moslems and Christians, fearing the economic future of a separate Lebanon, asked for autonomy within a Syrian State. Others also regarded autonomy as implied in the request for independence and a non-centralized government.

8-9. The Valley of Bekaa is usually regarded as an integral part of Greater Lebanon. Eleven petitions, however make especial reference to its inclusion, while eight ask that the Valley remain in the Damascus area.

10-ll. Similarly, while Cilicia is definitely included in the demand for a United Syria made by 1,500 petitions, two petitions asked specifically for it, while three requested that it be given to the Armenian State.

B-Independence:

1. The second largest percentage of all, 1,370 (73.5 percent), is for "Absolute Independence," the second cardinal point of the Damascus program, supported generally by all Moslem delegations. It is certain from the oral statements that accompanied the petitions that the term "Absolute Independence" was seldom used in the sense of an entire freedom from any foreign guidance, such as that of a mandatory under the League of Nations, inasmuch as the request was frequently combined with a choice of mandate, and in all but a few cases with either a choice of mandate or a request for foreign "assistance." While a few of the Young Arab clubs certainly desired freedom from all foreign control, the great majority asked for independence and defined a mandate to mean only economic and technical assistance, because of a widespread fear that the mandatory arrangement would be used to cloak colonial annexation.

2-3. Only a slightly smaller number, 1,278 (68.5 per cent), asked for the independence of Iraq, or Mesopotamia. To these should be added 93 of the 97 petitions for the independence of all Arab countries as in only four petitions do both requests appear, and the second includes the first. The phrasing "for all Arab countries" was first used in Palestine, and dropped for the special mention of Iraq in the Damascus program. A total of 1,371 petitions, therefore, asked for the independence and economic freedom of the Iraq regions.

C-Form of Government;

1-2. The establishment of a "democratic, non-centralized, constitutional" kingdom is one of the points of the Damascus program, as the number of petitions for it 1,107 (59.3 per cent), indicate. All but five of these petitions, also, ask that Emir Feisal be made the king. These petitions were especially numerous in O. E. T. A. East, where 1,005 of 1,157 request both a kingdom and the Emir as king. This part of the program had apparently not been developed when the commission was in Palestine, as only five of 260 O. E. T. A. South petitions referred to a kingdom, and only two mentioned Emir Feisal.

3. A request for a democratic representative government, presumably of a republican character, came to the commission from 26 Christian groups in O. E. T. A. West, and eight groups in O. E. T. A. East, a total of 34 (1.8 per cent) . This request was usually made in opposition to the Moslem idea of a Syrian kingdom under Feisal.

4. The request for proper safe-guarding of the rights of minorities included in the Damascus program was also made by many of the Christian groups in the Lebanon. The total is 1,023 (54.9 per cent)~ This request received a more united support from both Moslems and Christians than any other, except anti-Zionism.

5-6. Five requests for the retention of Arabic as the official language (rather than Hebrew) and ten requests for the abolition of foreign capitulations (officially annulled by the Turks, but without sanction of the Powers), came from scattered points in O. E. T. A. South.

7. Nineteen (1.02 per cent) petitions were received for the autonomy of all the provinces of Syria. This is in addition to the separate requests for autonomy of Lebanon and Palestine. Once more it should be said that many regarded a large measure of local autonomy as implicit in the general idea of a democratic. non-centralized government, but these nineteen groups made special reference to it.

D-Choice of Mandate:

With regard to choice of mandate, five classes of requests had to be distinguished, as shown in the tables. In addition to definite requests for a given nation as the mandatory power, a few groups gave their preference, "if a mandatory is obligatory," i. e., rather under protest, while the great majority asked for "assistance" rather than a mandatory, because of a misunderstanding, and the fear referred to above that a "mandate" is a convenient cloak for colonial aggression. Petitions of these three classes have therefore been grouped in the summary as "Total first choice." In addition preferences for second choice of mandate and "assistance" have been tabulated.

1. The total of the petitions asking for Great Britain as first choice is 66 (3.5 per cent). Forty-eight came from Palestine; 13 are from Greek Orthodox delegations, and four from the Druses. The second choice total is 1,073 (57.5 per cent), due to the 1032 requests for British "assistance" if America declined, in accordance with the Damascus program.

2. The French total for first choice is 274 (14.68 per cent), all but 59 of them from the Lebanon district. The second choice total is three.

3. The 1,064 requests for American "assistance " according to the Damascus program, with 57 selections of America as mandatory power, and eight more if a mandate is obligatory, make up the first choice total of 1,129 (60,5 per cent). The second choice total is 11.

4. Twenty-three petitions received at Jenin, Haifa, and Nazareth just before the Damascus program was adopted, left the choice of mandate to the Syrian Congress. This means, therefore, an additional 23 for American first choice and British second choice total.

E-Zionism

1-2-3. The petitions favoring the Zionist program have been analyzed above in the discussion of programs. In opposition to these are the 1,350 (72.3 per cent) petitions protesting against Zionist claims and purposes. This is the third largest number for any one point and represents a more widespread general opinion among both Moslems and Christians than any other. The anti-Zionist note was especially strong in Palestine, where 222 (85.3 per cent) of the 260 petitions declared against the Zionist program. This is the largest percentage in the district for any one point.

I-THE AREA UNDER BRITISH OCCUPATION

(O. E. T. A. SOUTH)

1. Narrative.-Owing to changes of plan at a late date, the commission arrived in Jaffa at a time when the British authorities were not expecting it, and the program followed there was arranged mainly without their help. The endeavor was made to ascertain the opinions and desires of every important group, sect, and organization, of a few well-informed representative individuals, and of significant minorities or sub-divisions, especially in cases where there seemed to be disposition, for any reason, to suppress these. Because of the numerous sub-divisions of the Christians and particularly of the Roman Catholics, it was inevitable that from the beginning the commission would give a disproportionate number of interviews and amount of time to them. The commissioners had prepared a statement of their purposes, to be found elsewhere in this report, which was read to important groups, and given to the press in lieu of interviews. Care was taken to make it clear, in response to frequent questioning, that the policy of the United States in regard to accepting a mandate anywhere was unformed and unpredictable, and that the commission had no power of decision. Automobiles were secured from the American Committee for Relief in the Near East, in order to be as little as possible dependent upon others than Americans. Word was given out that the commission would not accept general social invitations or consent to demonstrations.

On leaving Jaffa the commission stopped at two Jewish schools and took luncheon at the Hichon-le-Sion colony, where it met the chief men of several Jewish colonies, as well as the members of the central Zionist Commission.

A week was spent in Jerusalem, with two days out for visiting Bethlehem, Hebron, and Beersheba. A limited amount of hospitality was accepted in a quiet way from the British and French officials. In order that none might be offended the heads of the various religious groups were received, although some of them, as for instance the Copts and Abyssinians had little to say along the line of the inquiry

After leaving Jerusalem, a rapid journey was made through northern Palestine, delegations being received at Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, Nazareth, Haifa and Acre. At most of these places groups came in, not only front the surrounding country, but from other administrative centers which it was impossible to visit.

2. THE ATTITUDE OF THE OCCUPYING GOVERNMENT.-The British officials, from Major General Sir Arthur Money, who was in command of O. E. T. A. South, down to the youngest officer, were courteous, obliging, and helpful. Most of them had had Indian, Egyptian, or Soudanese experience before the Great War. As a body they gave an impression of ability, efficiency, and a serious effort to administer the country for the good of the people.

It should be noted here that General Allenby detailed to accompany the commission as aid Lt. Col. J. K. Watson, who had served for years in a similar capacity with Lord Kitchener and later with the Khedive of Egypt. His thoughtfulness, kindness, and efficiency though the circumstances of travel were often trying, were unfailing, and the comfort, good health, and success in the investigation of the Commission were largely furthered by him.

3. Wishes of the People.-The Moslems constitute about four-fifths of the actual population of Palestine, according to a recent British census. Except for certain official groups they were practically unanimous for the independence of United Syria, and were responsive to the current political influences. The organizations met at Jaffa took the position that Syria is capable of self-government without a mandatory power, but if one should be insisted upon by the Peace Conference, they preferred the United States.

At Jerusalem, however, and in all other places in Palestine, the program of independence was affirmed. For the most part, the question of a mandate was referred, either in writing, or more often in response to questions, to the approaching Syrian Congress at Damascus, at which they would have representation. Some Moslems, especially in the South, maintained emphatically that they could accept no mandate whatever. It is evident that since the Damascus Congress later declared for American assistance, with the British as second choice, and emphatic refusal of the French,: this is the program to which the great majority of the Moslems of Palestine are committed. Probably most of them had it in mind when they declared for reference to Damascus.

The Christians of Palestine, who altogether constitute less than ten per cent of the population, showed more difference of opinion. Some groups in the north, as the Latin Catholics of Tiberias and Haifa and most of the Christians of Nazareth, were with the Moslems for independence and the reference to Damascus. Maronites and Greek Catholics, and usually the Latin Catholics, were for a French mandate. The Greek Orthodox everywhere, according to an agreed program, were for a British mandate, as were several scattering groups. None asked directly for the United States, though the opinion was expressed that if there were assurance that we would come if asked, most Christians would favor this solution. The Christians were in general strongly in favor of a mandatory power, which should exercise a real control. The Jews, who constitute a little more than ten per cent of the population, were all for Zionism, under a British mandate. The Moslem and Christian population was practically unanimous against Zionism, usually expressing themselves with great emphasis. This question was closely connected with that of the unity of all Syria under one Government.

4. Zionism.-The Jews of Palestine declared themselves unanimously in favor of the Zionistic scheme in general, though they showed difference of opinion in regard to the details and the process of its realization. The elements of agreement may be stated as follows:

(a) Palestine, with a fairly large area, to be set aside at once as a "national home" for the Jews.

(b) Sooner or later the political rule of the land will become organized as a "Jewish Commonwealth,"

(c) At the start authorization will be given for the free immigration of Jews from any part of the world; for the unrestricted purchase of land by the Jews, and for the recognition of Hebrew as an official language.

(d) Great Britain will be the mandatory power over Palestine, protecting the Jews and furthering the realization of the scheme.

(e) The Great Powers of the world have declared in favor of the scheme, which merely awaits execution.

Differences exist especially along two lines:

(a) Whether the Jewish Commonwealth should be set up soon or after a considerable lapse of time.

(b) Whether the chief emphasis should be upon a restoration of the ancient mode of life, ritual, exclusiveness and particularism of the Jews, or upon economic development in a thoroughly modern fashion, with afforestation, electrification of water-power, and general full utilization of resources.

5. The Custody of the Holy Places.-For four centuries the Turk has served as guardian of the peace between Moslems, Christians and Jews, and even between the different sects of each, in the Holy Land. Nor has his function been merely nominal: being really a foreigner and having upon himself the responsibility of government, he has on the whole well maintained the status quo, or policed slow and delicate changes in one direction or another. Now that his authority is gone, a substitute must be provided, whatever be the new regime. This might be the mandatory power. If, however, any Roman Catholic power should receive the mandate, trouble would arise from the fact than at present the Catholics feel unfairly treated and claim increase of privilege at the expense of the Greek Orthodox. A Catholic power would be tempted promptly to disturb the equilibrium, especially during the eclipse of the power of Russia.

There is already a "Custodian of the Holy Places" for the Roman Catholics. Might not this idea be extended to the constitution of a permanent Commission for the Holy Places, on which might be placed this man, and representatives of Greek Orthodox Christianity, Protestant Christianity, Sunnite Islam, Shiite Islam, and Judaism? The Commission might be given authority and means to guard and care for all the places in Palestine that are sacred to the three religions, and to adjudicate all disputes about their custody. Its composition should ensure conservatism and promote harmony.

II-THE AREA UNDER FRENCH OCCUPATION

1. The Commission reached Beirut after having visited Palestine and the southern half of the territory occupied by the Arab forces. Two days were spent in interviews in the city, and visits were paid by automobile to points from Tyre to Batrun. General Allenby was kind enough to place his yacht the "Maid of Honor" at the disposal of the Commission, and thus Tripoli, Alexandretta and Ladikiya were seen. Delegations were thus heard from every part of O. E. T A. West. Arrangements as to program, demonstrations, and the like, were in general maintained as in other areas. The French officials were at great pains to arrange suitably for the hearings of the Commission, and to provide for its comfort and well-being.

The women of the Moslem Trades School at Beirut had woven a rug for presentation to the Peace Conference, which is interesting as being a map, patterned so as to show the area claimed by Syrian Nationalists for United Syria.

2. Wishes of the People.-In general the situation was in accordance with that in Palestine and the Damascus area. With few exceptions the Moslems were for American or British assistance according to the "Damascus Program"; the Druses were for an English Mandate, the Maronites and all varieties of Catholics were for France. But the Greek Orthodox were divided, instead of standing for a British Mandate as usually in Palestine and Damascus. The Ismailians were mostly for France, and the Nusairiyeh were divided.

Those who stood for a French Mandate were of different opinions as regards the place and relationship of Lebanon in Syria. From Tyre to Tripoli they mostly followed a rigid formula which calls for a Greater Lebanon, absolutely independent of the rest of Syria, and under France; the supporters of this view showed no response to the idea of Syrian national unity, and apparently wish to become French citizens at an early moment.

Others desire the unity of Syria under the French Mandate, preferring ordinarily that the Lebanon District should be enlarged and given a high degree of autonomy.

In the Lebanon proper the majority is probably sincerely for a French, as opposed to a British mandate. The Commission could not inquire whether those who declared for France were well disposed toward an American Mandate, in case this were possible and a French Mandate for any reason undesirable; but there were a number of emphatic assurances that the great majority of the population, including even the Maronites, prefers America to any other; this is said to be based upon America's unselfish part in the war, her generosity before and after the armistice, and the personal relationships established by the large number of Lebanese who have gone to live for shorter or longer periods in the United States and to return home loyal.

The Druses ask emphatically to be left out of the Lebanon in case it be given to France,

But outside the Lebanon proper, in the areas which it is proposed to include in the "Greater Lebanon," such as Tyre, Sidon, "Hollow Syria," and Tripoli, a distinct majority of the people is probably averse to French rule. This includes practically all the Sunnite Moslems, most of the Shiites, a part of the Greek Orthodox Christians, and the small group of Protestants. Most of these ask earnestly for America, with Britain as second choice; the balance for Britain with America as second choice.

In the rest of the O.E.T.A. West, north of the proposed Greater Lebanon, the majority is probably against a French Mandate in any circumstances. A considerable proportion of the remainder are averse to a separation from the interior of the country, and place the unity of Syria above their preference for France.

It is worthy of note that whereas the Syrian nationalists everywhere distinctly and by name rejected the assistance of France, no one who supported France declared for a specific rejection of England or America. In a number of instances, however, the fear was expressed by Christians that England, if made the mandatory power, would show more favor to Moslems than to Christians.

3. The Lebanon.---The mountainous area set off in 1861 to be under the nominal protection of six European powers, with a Christian governor, has been a particular interest of France ever since. The population is largely Maronite and Roman Catholic. As in the case of all regions that have been removed from the direct jurisdiction of the Porte, progress has been comparatively rapid; roads have been built, trees planted, and a large number of stone houses erected. Money earned in America has helped greatly in these improvements. The Maronite ecclesiastical and monastic organizations have increased greatly in wealth in these years

The Lebanon has been freed from the burden of military service, and taxes have consequently been light. The area has been predominantly Christian and the Christians have enjoyed rather more than their proportion of the offices. Druses on the other hand have shown a tendency to emigrate to join their brethren in the Hauran, and they resent the inequalities of treatment to which they have been subjected.

The French policy of "colonization" shows its fruits in many inhabitants of this area, as well as of Beirut and other parts of Syria, who feel that they know French better than Arabic, and who are apt to hold themselves as of a distinctly higher order of civilization than the people of the interior. It is among these that the idea of a complete political separation of the Lebanese area from the rest of Syria has taken root.

The propinquity of this area led the Turkish government to be lenient and favorable to Christians and others in adjacent regions, so that no very sharp line of difference of prosperity is visible. Nevertheless the appeal of lighter taxes and military service, greater security and opportunities for office-holding has an effect upon Christians in neighboring areas, so that many of them incline toward a Greater Lebanon under a permanent French mandate. But there is a considerable party, even among the pro-French, who are opposed to becoming a part of France. This is in fact the official Maronite position.

Any revision of the situation should not diminish the security of the inhabitants of the Lebanon, but should raise the rest of Syria to a like security. This can be provided for in a United Syria by a sufficient measure of local autonomy. Care should be taken to avoid leaving this portion of the country in a position of perpetual special privilege, in which the common burdens would rest more heavily on other areas.

III-THE AREA UNDER ARAB OCCUPATION

1. The Commission spent nine days in Damascus, six of which were filled up with interviews, held with representatives of religious and political groups, councils and boards of the Government, and prominent officials and other notable persons of every grade, including even the Emir Feisal and General Allenby. More time was spent here than anywhere else in Syria, because Damascus will he the capital of United Syria, if such be created, and an Arab government over O. E. T. A. East is already in operation there, showing much activity and endeavoring by accomplishment, display, and intrigue to prepare the way for the larger unity. During the Commission's visit, the "Syrian Congress" met, whose charter and program are described below. The bazars were placarded with the signs "We want absolute independence," and these were removed by government orders. The interview of the Commission with the Mufti, Radi, and Ulema was published with considerable accuracy in the local newspapers (of course by no act or permission of the Commission) and this gave rise to animated discussions on the part of the people and the press. The Commission accepted hospitality from the Emir Feisal on two occasions.

In the midst of the stay in Damascus a trip was taken southward to Amman and Deraa for the purpose of conferring with people from the edge of the desert. The note received from all Moslems was for complete independence without protection or a mandatory power; but recognizing that they need financial and economic advice, they proposed after the recognition of independence to ask advisers from America. Eloquent Arab orators appealed to America, as having freed them, to uphold their independence before the Peace Conference, saying that they hold our country responsible before God for completing the work we have begun. The Christians, who are few in these areas, were in great fear. They desire that a strong mandatory power be appointed over Syria, so that they may have full protection; they prefer that Britain be that power, and that the area be annexed to and governed with Palestine.

After leaving Damascus, a day was spent at Baalbek, where was encountered first the struggle for and against annexing "Hollow Syria" (known as the Bekaa) to the Greater Lebanon. After ten days in O. E. T. A. West, the Arab area was entered again by the road from Tripoli to Homs. Delegations were heard at Homs and Hama, after which three days were spent in Aleppo. Besides hearing delegations of all important Allepine groups and opinions, visits were paid to the centers of relief for refugee Armenians.

The claim for the independence of Mesopotamia was presented very vigorously in the north. Certain groups at Aleppo were much interested, however, in pushing the boundary of Syria well to the east, so as to include the Syrian desert.

2. Attitude of the Occupying Government. -The higher Arab officials include a number of men of dignity, ability, intelligence, and apparent honesty and patriotism. Practically all are Syrian born. Some of them, as General Haddad Pasha, chief of police and gendarmerie, and Said Pasha Zoucair, financial adviser, have been trained under British Administration in Egypt, and others, as Col. Yussef Bey, aide-de-camp of the Emir Feisal, General Jaafar Pasha, Military Governor of Aleppo, and Ihsan Allah Djabri, Mayor of Aleppo, have had their education and experience in the Turkish service. Most of the lower officials in this area (as well as in the other O. E. T. A. regions) have simply been continued from the Turkish regime, and in many cases are said to practice extortions and malversations much as under the former Government.

Every effort was made to do honor to the Commission and execute its wishes. Sometimes ostentatious attempts were made to give the impression of absolute non-interference with freedom of access to an expression before the Commission.

3. Wishes of the People.- The declarations in O. E. T. A. East were much nearer to unanimity than in the South or the West, as may be seen by a glance at the Tables of "Petition Summaries." The greater part of the declarations both oral and written. conformed to the resolutions of the Syrian Congress at Damascus, which is discussed separately below. This program was reached by the action of conflicting forces, in the presence of a general feeling that it was overwhelmingly important for reasons of national safety to reach unity of expression. The pressure brought to bear by the Government and the different political parties was of undoubted weight in bringing into line opinions of a more extreme sort, such as those in favor of independence in the highest degree and those which called for a perpetual strong mandatory control. But on the whole there can be no doubt that the main elements of this program represent the popular will as nearly as that can be expressed in any country.

The people of the area declared themselves almost unanimously for United Syria, for its complete independence, and against any help from France, and against the Zionist program. The Moslems were in nearly unanimous agreement upon a request for American assistance. The Jews asked for autonomy for themselves, and the Zionist scheme for their brethren in Palestine. The Druses were for the Arab Government under a British mandate. The Christians were divided, partly by sects and partly by geographical location. All of the few Christians in the south, including Latin Catholics were for a British mandate, with America in case for any reason Britain cannot come. So also were the Greek Orthodox of Damascus and a portion of the Greek Orthodox farther north. The small groups of Protestants were for an Anglo-Saxon mandate, some preferring America and some Britain. The Orthodox Syrians were for America. All the Catholics (except at Amman and Deraa) and the Maronites were for France. Nearly all of the Christians were for a strong mandatory control.

4. The Syrian Congress at Damascus.- From the time of reaching Jerusalem, the Commission began to be told of a congress that was in preparation, to be held soon at Damascus, which would for a large part of the population determine the question of a mandate. Sessions were held while the Commission was at Damascus, and on the last day there, a deputation presented to the Commission the program that had been prepared.

The Congress was not elected directly by the people, or by a fresh appeal to the people, the reason given being that time was lacking to revise the voting lists and carry through a new scheme. At the last Turkish election, before the war, electors were chosen to select deputies for the Turkish parliament. The survivors of these electors chose the members of the Damascus Congress. Criticisms were made against the plan of choice to the effect that it was unconstitutional and extra-constitutional, that the electors had mostly belonged to the Party of Union and Progress, and that the members of the Congress were not distributed in proportion to population. Sixty-nine members attended, and about 20 others from the west and north had been elected, but bad not arrived. There were a number of Christians in the Conference, but no Jews, though some Jews among the electors were said to have given their approval. Much evidence goes to show that the program prepared represents well the wishes of the people of Syria. The program is as follows:

"We, the undersigned, members of the General Syrian Congress, meeting in Damascus on Wednesday, July 2, 1919, made up of representatives from the three Zones, viz., the Southern, Eastern, and Western, provided with credentials and authorizations by the inhabitants of our various districts, Moslems, Christians, and Jews, have agreed upon the following statement of the desires of the people of the country who have elected us to present them to the American Section of the International Commission; the fifth article was passed by a very large majority; all the other articles were accepted unanimously.

"1. We ask absolutely complete political independence for Syria within these boundaries. The Taurus System on the North; Rafeh and a line running from Al-Juf to the south of the Syrian and the Mejazian line to Akaba on the south; the Euphrates and Khabur Rivers and a line extending east of Abu Kamal to the east of Al-Juf on the east; and the Mediterranean on the west

"2. We ask that the Government of this Syrian country should be a democratic civil constitutional Monarchy on broad decentralization principles, safeguarding the rights of minorities, and that the King be the Emir Feisal who carried on a glorious struggle in the cause of our liberation and merited our full confidence and entire reliance.

"3 Considering the fact that the Arabs inhabiting the Syrian area are not naturally less gifted than other more advanced races and that; they are by no means less developed than the Bulgarians, Serbians, Greeks, and Roumanians at the beginning of their independence, we protest against Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, placing us among the nations in their middle stage of development which stand in need of a mandatory power.

"4. In the event of the rejection by the Peace Conference of this just protest for certain considerations that we may not understand, we, relying on the declarations of President Wilson that his object in waging war was to put an end to the ambition of conquest and colonization, can only regard the mandate mentioned in the Covenant of the League of Nations as equivalent to the rendering of economical and technical assistance that does not prejudice our complete independence. And desiring that our country should not fall a prey to colonization and believing that the American Nation is farthest from any thought of colonization and has no political ambition in our country, we will seek the technical and economic assistance from the United States of America, provided that such assistance does not exceed twenty years.

"5. In the event of America not finding herself in a position to accept our desire for assistance we will seek this assistance from Great Britain, also provided that such assistance does not infringe the complete independence and unity of our country, and that the duration of such assistance does not exceed that mentioned in the previous article.

"6. We do not acknowledge any right claimed by the French Government in any part whatever of our Syrian country and refuse that she should assist us or have a hand in our country under any circumstances and in any place.

"7. We oppose the pretentions of the Zionists to create a Jewish commonwealth in the southern part of Syria, known as Palestine, and oppose Zionist migration to any part of our country; for we do not acknowledge their title, but consider them a grave peril to our people from the national, economical, and political points of view. Our Jewish compatriots shall enjoy our common rights and assume the common responsibilities.

"8. We ask that there should be no separation of the southern part of Syria, known as Palestine, nor of the littoral western zone which includes Lebanon, from the Syrian country. We desire that the unity of the country should be guaranteed against partition under whatever circumstances.

"9. We ask complete independence for emancipated Mesopotamia and that there should be no economical barriers between the two countries.

"10. The fundamental principles laid down by President Wilson in condemnation of secret treaties impel us to protest most emphatically against any treaty that stipulates the partition of our Syrian country and against any private engagement aiming at the establishment of Zionism in the southern part of Syria, therefore we ask the complete annulment of these conventions and agreements.

"The noble principles enunciated by President Wilson strengthen our confidence that our desires emanating from the depths of our hearts, shall be the decisive factor in determining our future; and that President Wilson and the free American people will be supporters for the realization of our hopes, thereby proving their sincerity and noble sympathy with the aspiration of the weaker nations in general and our Arab people in particular.

"We also have the fullest confidence that the Peace Conference will realize that we would not have risen against the Turks, with whom we had participated in all civil, political, and representative privileges, but for their violation of our national rights, and so will grant us our desires in full in order that our political rights may not be less after the war than they were before, since we have shed so much blood in the cause of our liberty and independence.

"We request to he allowed to send a delegation to represent us at the Peace Conference to defend our rights and secure the realization of our aspirations."

The program mostly speaks sufficiently for itself. Various points in it are commented upon elsewhere in this report. It is the most substantial document presented to the Commission, and deserves to be treated with great respect. The result of an extensive and arduous political process, it affords a basis on which the Syrians can get together, and as firm a foundation for a Syrian national organization as can be obtained. The mandatory power will possess in this program a commitment to liberal government which will be found to be very valuable in starting the new state in the right direction.

CILICIA

1. General-

(a) The Commission did not endeavor to give thorough hearings in this region, feeling that it is not seriously to be considered a part of Syria, and desiring not to open up as yet the question of the Turkish-speaking portion of the former Turkish Empire.

(b) The population statistics vary considerably, but there can be no doubt of a marked Moslem majority in Cilicia before the war, now probably somewhat increased.

2. Wishes of the People

(a) The Turks here, like most of those heard previously, wish to retain Turkish unity under the house of Osman, and leave the question of what shall be the Mandatory Power, if any, to the Turkish Government at Constantinople.

(b) The Arabs (who are mainly Turkish-speaking, but are chiefly Nusairiyeh or Alouites) ask for union with Syria under a French mandate.

(c) The other Christians, a small minority are mostly for France, particularly the Greeks who are working in close relation with the French in the northern regions of Turkey.

(d) The Armenians (who are also chiefly Turkish-speaking) ask for the union of Cilicia with Armenia under an American mandate.

(e) The other Christians, a small minority, are mostly for France, particularly the Greeks who are working in close relation with the French in the northern regions of Turkey.

MESOPOTAMIA

It was impossible for the Commission to visit Mesopotamia at this time. Earnest requests to make such a visit were presented at Damascus and Aleppo, accompanied by complaints that the British occupying forces are restricting freedom of speech, movement, and political action, and that they show signs of an intention to allow extensive immigration from India, to the great detriment of the rights and interests of the inhabitants of the region.

A committee at Aleppo presented a program for Mesopotamia which parallels closely the "Damascus Program" for Syria. An abstract of their claims follows:

1. Mesopotamia should be completely independent, including Diarbekir, Deir-ez-Zor, Mosul, Bagdad, and Muhammerah.

2. The Government should be a constitutional civil kingdom.

3. The king should be a son of the King of the Hejaz, either Abdullah or Zeid.

4. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations is protested against.

5. No outside government should interfere in the country.

6. After the recognition of independence technical and economical assistance is to be asked for from America

7. Objection is raised to all immigration and especially to that of Hindus and Jews.

8. The complete independence of Syria is asked for.

9. It is asked that there be no interference of France in Syria.

It will be noticed that conformably to the custom of all nascent nations, wide boundaries are claimed, which would involve difficulties with adjacent areas, such as Deir-ez-Zor with Syria, Diarbekir with Armenia, and Muhammerah with Persia.

The Orthodox [Nestorian?-Ed.] Syrian Patriarch, from Der Zafran, near Mardin, met the Commission at Homs. He stated that 90,000 of his people were slain in 1915; when the British came in 1918, all were willing to submit to their rule; but emissaries came from Constantinople to stir up the Kurds and Arabs in favor of independence, and now the situation is much worse, the area occupied by his people should go with Mesopotamia, under the mandate of either America or Britain.

The entire data have been given, thus so fully as to make it possible to test at every point the legitimacy of the inference drawn from the data, and of the final recommendations for action by the Peace Conference.

Further data from our final inference and recommendations were afforded by comprehensive reports of the entire survey, made by all three advisers. The recommendations of the Commissioners have thus been shaped in the light of surveys made from different points of view, and taking into account a wide range of considerations-local, national racial, and religious considerations both of principle and of practical policy; and of the world's dire need of a peace everywhere justly and so permanently based.

II-GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The Commissioners have sought to make their survey of Syria, and the report upon Syria now submitted, in the spirit of the instructions given them by the Council of Four, and especially in harmony with the resolutions adopted on January 30, 1919, by the Representatives of the United States, Great Britain France, Italy and Japan, and with the Anglo-French Declaration of November 9, 1918, both quoted at length in the Commission's instructions. The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth of the resolutions adopted on January 30th are particularly pertinent to this report, and should be here recorded. The general purpose of the Peace Conference Concerning these areas in the former Turkish Empire is here clearly disclosed.

2. For similar reasons, and more particularly because of the historical mis-government by the Turks of subject peoples and the terrible massacres of Armenians and others in recent years, the Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine and Arabia must be completely severed from the Turkish Empire. This is without prejudice to the settlement of other parts of the Turkish Empire.

3. The Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that advantage should be taken of the opportunity afforded by the necessity of disposing of these colonies and territories formerly belonging to Germany and Turkey which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, to apply to these territories the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in the constitution of the League of Nations.

4. After careful study they are satisfied that the best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should he entrusted to advanced nations who, by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical positions, can best undertake this responsibility, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as mandatories on behalf of the League of Nations.

5. The Allied and Associated Powers are of opinion that the character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions, and other similar circumstances.

6. They consider that certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory power until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory power....

In every case of mandate, the mandatory state shall render to the League of Nations an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

The Anglo-French Declaration [Note: This Charter of Freedom, issued a few days prior to the Armistice, is the standard by which the Near East judges the post-Armistice conduct of Europe.] was spread broadcast throughout Syria and Mesopotamia, and, as bearing directly upon our problem, may also well be called to mind at this point:

The aim which France and Great Britain have in view in prosecuting in the East the war let loose by German ambition is the complete and final liberation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the native population.

In order to give effect to these intentions, France and Great Britain have agreed to encourage and assist the establishment of native governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia already liberated by the Allies, and in the territories which they are proceeding to liberate, and they have agreed to recognize such governments as soon as they are effectively established. So far from desiring to impose specific institutions upon the populations of these regions, their sole object is to ensure, by their support and effective assistance, that the governments and administrations adopted by these regions of their own free will shall be exercised in the normal way. The function which the two Allied Governments claim for themselves in the liberated territories is to insure impartial and equal justice for all; to facilitate the economic development of the country by encouraging local initiative; to promote the diffusion of education; and to put an end to the division too long exploited by Turkish policy.

Of this Declaration, M. Pichon very properly said in the French Chamber December 29, 1918: "Of course we admit the complete freedom of the Conference, and its right to give these agreements their proper conclusions, but these agreements are binding both upon England and upon us." This statement is the more significant because it is exactly these two peoples of the Allies who are immediately related to the problems in the Arabic-speaking portions of the Turkish Empire. Our survey made it clear that this Anglo-French Declaration and similar utterances of the Peace Conference, and President Wilson's Fourteen Points, had made a deep impression upon the Syrian people and lay in the background of all their demands. The promises involved not only cannot justly be ignored by the Peace Conference, but should be faithfully fulfilled. This is particularly true of the British-French Declaration; for it is completely in accord with the repeated statements of the aims of the Allies, and was expressly directed to the Arabic-speaking portions of the Turkish Empire especially Syria and Mesopotamia.

It is noted that these resolutions of January 30, 1919, and this Declaration of November 9, 1918, clearly look to complete separation of the Arabic-speaking areas from Turkey propose that Syria and Mesopotamia shall not be colonies in the old sense at all; shall not be exploited for the benefit of the occupying power; but shall rather be directly encouraged and assisted in developing national independence as quickly as possible. And the Declaration makes the promises equally binding for Syria and Mesopotamia.

The resolutions and declaration invoked in the instructions given to our Commission thus form the basis of the whole policy of sending a Commission, and of ascertaining the desires of the people.

The sincerity of the professed aims of the Allies in the war, therefore, is peculiarly to be tested in the application of these aims in the treatment of the Arabic-speaking portions of the former Turkish Empire. For the promises here made were specific and unmistakable. It is worth consideration, too, that the whole policy of mandatories under the League of Nations might here be worked out with special success, and success here would encourage the steady extension of the policy elsewhere, and do something so significant for world progress as to help to justify the immeasurable sacrifices of the war. There is also probably no region where the Allies are freer to decide their course in accordance with the principles they have professed.

The gravity of the Syrian problem is further to be seen in certain well-known facts. The fact that the Arabic-speaking portion of the Turkish Empire has been the birthplace of the three great religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, and that Palestine contains places sacred to all three, makes inevitably a center of interest and concern for the whole civilized world. No solution which is merely local or has only a single people in mind can avail.

As a portion of the bridge-land uniting Europe, Asia, and Africa, too-where in a peculiar degree the East and the West meet-Syria has a place of such strategic importance, politically and commercially, and from the point of view of world civilization, as also to make it imperative that the settlement here brought about should be so just as to give promise of permanently good results for the whole cause of the development of a righteous civilization in the world. Every part of the former Turkish Empire must be given a new life and opportunity under thoroughly changed political conditions.

The war and the consequent breaking up of the Turkish Empire, moreover, give a great opportunity-not likely to return -to build now in Syria a Near East State on the modern basis of full religious liberty, deliberately including various religious faiths, and especially guarding rights of minorities. It is a matter of justice to the Arabs, in the recognition of the Arab people and their desire for national expression, and of deep and lasting concern to the world, that an Arab state along modern political lines should be formed. While the elements are very various, the interests often divisive, and much of the population not yet fitted for self-government, the conditions are nevertheless as favorable as could be reasonably expected under the circumstances to make the trial now. The mixed and varied populations have lived together with a fair degree of unity under Turkish domination, and in spite of the divisive Turkish policy. They ought to do far better under a state on modern lines and with an enlightened mandatary.

In any case, the oversight of a mandatory power, and of the League of Nations, would prevent this attempt from taking such a course as that taken by the Young Turk Movement. The Arabs, too, will know that this is their best opportunity for the formation of an Arab State, and will be put on their mettle to achieve a distinct success. The insight and breadth of sympathy revealed by Emir Feisal make him peculiarly well fitted, also, for the headship of a State involving both Oriental and Occidental elements. The trial at least could safely be made under a sympathetic mandatary Power, and made with good promise of success. If the experiment finally failed division of territory could still follow. But to begin with division of territory along religious lines is to invite increasing exclusiveness, misunderstanding, and friction. As Dr. W. M. Ramsay has said concerning certain other portions of the Turkish Empire:

"The attempt to sort our religions and settle them in different localities is wrong and will prove fatal. The progress of history depends upon diversity of population in each district." And there is real danger in breaking Syria up into meaningless fragments.

Any policy adopted, therefore, for Syria should look to "the establishment of a national government and administration deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the native populations," and should treat it as far as possible in harmony with its natural geographic and economic unity. This is the natural course to be taken, if at all feasible. It is directly in line with the expressed purpose of the Peace Conference.

And it is the plain object of the desires and ambitions of a large majority of the population concerned.

It is interesting, also, to find that both British and French officers in Syria seemed agreed in the belief that the unity of all Syria under one mandatary was desirable; and that there were certain to be constant friction and dangers to peace among British, French, and Arabs, if both British and French remained in the country.

On the other hand, the practical obstacles to the unity of Syria are: The apparent unwillingness of either the British or the French to withdraw from Syria-the British from Palestine, or the French from Beirut and the Lebanon; the intense opposition of the Arabs and the Christians to the Zionist Program; the common Lebanese demand for complete separate independence; the strong feeling of the Arabs of the East against any French control; the fear on the part of many Christians of Moslem domination; and the lack of as vigorous a Syrian national feeling as could be desired. These obstacles will be discussed in the recommendations of the Commissioners.

In the light, now, of these practical obstacles to the unity of Syria, of the general considerations favoring that unity, and of the wide range of data secured by our survey, we turn to our recommendations.

III-RECOMMENDATIONS

The commissioners make to the Peace Conference the following recommendations for the treatment of Syria:

We recommend, as most important of all, and in strict harmony with our Instructions, that whatever foreign administration (whether of one or more powers) is brought into Syria, should come in not at all as a colonizing Power in the old sense of that term, but as a Mandatary under the League of Nations with the clear consciousness that "the well-being and development" of the Syrian people form for it a "sacred trust."

(1 ) To this end the mandate should have limited term, the time of expiration to be determined by the League of Nations, in the light of all the facts as brought out from year to year, in the annual reports of the Mandatary to the League or in other ways.

(2) The Mandatary Administration should have, however, a period and power sufficient to ensure the success of the new state, and especially to make possible carrying through important educational and economic undertakings, essential to secure founding of the State.

(3) The Mandatary Administration should be characterized from the beginning by a strong and vital educational emphasis, in clear recognition of the imperative necessity of education for the citizens of a democratic state, and for the development of a sound national spirit. This systematic cultivation of national spirit is particularly required in a country like Syria, which has only recently come to self-consciousness.

(4) The Mandatary should definitely seek, from the beginning of its trusteeship, to train the Syrian people to independent self-government as rapidly as conditions allow, by setting up all the institutions of a democratic state, and by sharing with them increasingly the work of administration, and so forming gradually an intelligent citizenship, interested unselfishly in the progress of the country, and forming at the same time a large group of disciplined civil servants.

( 5 ) The period of "tutelage" should not be unduly prolonged, but independent self-government should be granted as soon as it can safely be done, remembering that the primary business of governments is not the accomplishment of certain things, but the development of citizens.

(6) It is peculiarly the duty of the Mandatary in a country like Syria, and in this modern age, to see that complete religious liberty is ensured. both in the constitution and in the practice of the state, and that a jealous care is exercised for the rights of all minorities. Nothing is more vital than this for the enduring success of the new Arab State.

(7) In the economic development of Syria, a dangerous amount of indebtedness on the part of the new state should be avoided, as well as any entanglements financially with the affairs of the Mandatary Power. On the other hand the legitimate established privileges of foreigners such as rights to maintain schools, commercial concessions, etc., should be preserved, but subject to review and modification under the authority of the League of Nations in the interest of Syria. The Mandatary Power should not take advantage of its position to force a monopolistic control at any point to the detriment either of Syria or of other nations; but it should seek to bring the new State as rapidly as possible to economic independence as well as to political independence.

Whatever is done concerning the further recommendations of the Commission, the fulfillment of at least the conditions now named should be assured, if the Peace Conference and the League of Nations are true to the policy of mandataries already embodied in "The Covenant of the League of Nations." This should effectively guard the most essential interests of Syria, however the machinery of administration is finally organized. The Damascus Congress betrayed in many ways their intense fear that their country would become, though under some other name, simply a colonial possession of some other Power. That fear must be completely allayed.

B. We recommend, in the second place that the unity of Syria be preserved, in accordance with the earnest petition of the great majority of the people of-Syria

(1) The territory concerned is too limited, the population too small and the economic, geographic, racial and language unity too manifest, to make the setting up of independent states within its boundaries desirable, if such division can possibly be avoided. The country is very largely Arab in language, culture, traditions, and customs.

(2) This recommendation is in line with important "general considerations" already urged, and with the principles of the League of Nations, as well as in answer to the desires of the majority of the population concerned.

(3) The precise boundaries of Syria should be determined by a special commission on boundaries, after the Syrian territory has been in general allotted. The Commissioners believe, however, that the claim of the Damascus Conference to include Cilicia in Syria is not justified, either historically or by commercial or language relations. The line between the Arabic-speaking and the Turkish-speaking populations would quite certainly class Cilicia with Asia Minor, rather than with Syria. Syria, too, has no such need of further seacoast as the large interior sections of Asia Minor.

(4) In standing thus for the recognition of the unity of Syria, the natural desires of regions like the Lebanon which have already had a measure of independence, should not be forgotten. It will make for real unity, undoubtedly, to give a large measure of local autonomy, and especially in the case of strongly unified groups. Even the "Damascus Program" which presses so earnestly the unity of Syria, itself urges a government "on broad decentralization principles."

Lebanon has achieved a considerable degree of prosperity and autonomy within the Turkish Empire. She certainly should not find her legitimate aspirations less possible within a Syrian national State. On the contrary, it may be confidently expected that both her economic and political relations with the rest of Syria would be better if she were a constituent member of the State, rather than entirely independent of it.

As a predominantly Christian country too, Lebanon naturally fears Moslem domination in a unified Syria. But against such domination she would have a fourfold safeguard; her own large autonomy: the presence of a strong mandatary for the considerable period in which the constitution and practice of the new State would be forming, the oversight of the League of Nations, with its insistence upon religious liberty and the rights of minorities; and the certainty that the Arab Government would feel the necessity of such a state, if it were to commend itself to the League of Nations. Moreover, there would be less danger of a reactionary Moslem attitude, if Christians were present in the state in considerable numbers, rather than largely segregated outside the state, as experience of the relations of different religious faiths in India suggests.

As to predominantly Christian country, it is also to be noted that Lebanon would be in a position to exert a stronger and more helpful influence if she were within the Syrian state, feeling its problems and needs and sharing all its life, instead of outside it absorbed simply in her own narrow concerns. For the sake of the larger interests, both of Lebanon and of Syria, then, the unity of Syria is to be urged. It is certain that many of the more thoughtful Lebanese themselves hold this view. A similar statement might be made for Palestine; though, as "the Holy Land" for Jews and Christians and Moslems alike, its situation is unique, and might more readily justify unique treatment, if such treatment were justified anywhere. This will be discussed more particularly in connection with the recommendation concerning Zionism.

C. We recommend, in the third place that Syria be placed under one Mandatary Power, as the natural way to secure real and efficient unity.

(1) To divide the administration of the provinces of Syria among several mandataries, even if existing national unity were recognized- or to attempt a joint mandatary of the whole on the commission plan: -neither of these courses would be naturally suggested as the best way to secure and promote the unity of the new State, or even the general unity of the whole people. It is conceivable that circumstances might drive the Peace Conference to some such form of divided mandate, but it is not a solution to be voluntarily chosen, from the point of view of the larger interests of the people, as considerations already urged indicate.

(2) It is not to be forgotten either, that, however they are handled politically the people of Syria are there, forced to get on together in some fashion. They are obliged to live with one another-the Arabs of the East and the people of the coast, the Moslems and the Christians. Will they be helped or hindered, in establishing tolerable and finally cordial relations, by a single mandatary ? No doubt the quick mechanical solution of the problem of difficult relations is to split the people up into little independent fragments. And sometimes, undoubtedly, as in the case of the Turks and Armenians, the relations are so intolerable as to make some division imperative and inevitable. But in general, to attempt complete separation only accentuates the differences and increases the antagonism. The whole lesson of the modern social consciousness points to the necessity of understanding "the other half," as it can be understood only by close and living relations. Granting reasonable local autonomy to reduce friction among groups, a single mandatary ought to form a constant and increasingly effective help to unity of feeling throughout the state, and ought to steadily improve group relations.

The people of Syria, in our hearings, have themselves often insisted that, so far as unpleasant relations have hitherto prevailed among various groups, it has been very largely due to the direct instigation of the Turkish Government. When justice is done impartially to all; when it becomes plain that the aim of the common government is the service of all classes alike, not their exploitation, decent human relations to be secured-a foundation which could not be obtained by dividing men off from one another in antagonistic groups.

The Commissioners urge, therefore, for the largest future good of all groups and regions alike, the placing of the whole of Syria under-a single mandate.

D. We recommend, in the fourth n place, that Emir Feisal be made head of the new united Syrian State.

(1) This is expressly and unanimously asked for by the representative Damascus Congress in the name of the Syrian people, and there seems to be no reason to doubt that the great majority of the population of Syria sincerely desire to have Emir Feisal as ruler.

(2) A constitutional monarchy along democratic lines, seems naturally adapted to the Arabs, with their, long training under tribal conditions, and with their traditional respect for their chiefs. They seem to need; more than most people, a king as the personal symbol of the power of the State.

(3) Emir Feisal has come, too, naturally into his present place of power, and there is no one else who could well replace him. He had the great advantage of being the son of the Sherif of Mecca, and as such honored throughout the Moslem world. He was one of the prominent Arab leaders who assumed responsibility for the Arab uprising against the Turks, and so shared in the complete deliverance of the Arab-speaking portions of the Turkish Empire. He was consequently hailed by the "Damascus Congress" as having "merited their full confidence and entire reliance." He was taken up and supported by the British as the most promising candidate for the headship of the new Arab State-an Arab of the Arabs, but with a position of wide appeal through his Shefifian connection, and through his broad sympathies with the best in the Occident. His relations with the Arabs to the east of Syria are friendly, and his kingdom would not be threatened from that side. He undoubtedly does not make so strong an appeal to the Christians of the West Coast, as to the Arabs of the East, but no man can be named who would have a stronger general appeal. He is tolerant and wise, skillful in dealing with men, winning in manner, a man of sincerity, insight, and power. Whether he has the full strength needed for his difficult task it is too early to say, but certainly no other Arab leader combines so many elements of power as he, and he will have invaluable help throughout the mandatary period.

The Peace Conference may take genuine satisfaction in the fact that an Arab of such qualities is available for the headship of this new state in the Near East.

ZIONISM

E. We recommend, in the fifth place, serious modification of the extreme Zionist program for Palestine of unlimited immigration of Jews, looking finally to making Palestine distinctly a Jewish State.

(1) The Commissioners began their study of Zionism with minds predisposed in its favor, but the actual facts in Palestine, coupled with the force of the general principles proclaimed by the Allies and accepted by the Syrians have driven them to the recommendation here made.

(2) The commission was abundantly supplied with literature on the Zionist program by the Zionist Commission to Palestine; heard in conferences much concerning the Zionist colonies and their claims; and personally saw something of what had been accomplished. They found much to approve in the aspirations and plans of the Zionists, and had warm appreciation for the devotion of many of the colonists and for their success, by modern methods, in overcoming natural obstacles.

(3) The Commission recognized also that definite encouragement had been given to the Zionists by the Allies in Mr. Balfour's often quoted statement in its approval by other representatives of the Allies. If, however, the strict terms of the Balfour Statement are adhered to -favoring "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people," "it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights existing in non-Jewish communities in Palestine"-it can hardly be doubted that the extreme Zionist Program must be greatly modified.

For "a national home for the Jewish people" is not equivalent to making Palestine into a Jewish State; nor can the erection of such a Jewish State be accomplished without the gravest trespass upon the "civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine." The fact came out repeatedly in the Commission's conference with Jewish representatives, that the Zionists looked forward to a practically complete dispossession of the present non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, by various forms of purchase.

In his address of July 4, 1918, President Wilson laid down the following principle as one of the four great "ends for which the associated peoples of the world were fighting"; "The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery." If that principle is to rule, and so the wishes of Palestine's population are to be decisive as to what is to be done with Palestine, then it is to be remembered that the non-Jewish population of Palestine-nearly nine tenths of the whole-are emphatically against the entire Zionist program. The tables show that there was no one thing upon which the population of Palestine were more agreed than upon this. To subject a people so minded to unlimited Jewish immigration, and to steady financial and social pressure to surrender the land, would be a gross violation of the principle just quoted, and of the people's rights, though it kept within the forms of law

It is to be noted also that the feeling against the Zionist program is not confined to Palestine, but shared very generally by the people throughout Syria as our conferences clearly showed. More than 72 per cent-1,350 in all-of all the petitions in the whole of Syria were directed against the Zionist program. Only two requests-those for a united Syria and for independence-had a larger support This genera] feeling was only voiced by the "General Syrian Congress," in the seventh, eighth and tenth resolutions of the statement. (Already quoted in the report.)

The Peace Conference should not shut its eyes to the fact that the anti-Zionist feeling in Palestine and Syria is intense and not lightly to be flouted. No British officer, consulted by the Commissioners, believed that the Zionist program could be carried out except by force of arms. The officers generally thought that a force of not less than 50,000 soldiers would be required even to initiate the program. That of itself is evidence of a strong sense of the injustice of the Zionist program, on the part of the non-Jewish populations of Palestine and Syria. Decisions, requiring armies to carry out, are sometimes necessary, but they are surely not gratuitously to be taken in the interests of a serious injustice. For the initial claim, often submitted by Zionist representatives, that they have a "right" to Palestine, based on an occupation of 2,000 years ago, can hardly be seriously considered.

There is a further consideration that cannot justly be ignored, if the world is to look forward to Palestine becoming a definitely Jewish state, however gradually that may take place. That consideration grows out of the fact that Palestine is "the Holy Land" for Jews, Christians, and Moslems alike. Millions of Christians and Moslems all over the world are quite as much concerned as the Jews with conditions in Palestine especially with those conditions which touch upon religious feeling and rights. The relations in these matters in Palestine are most delicate and difficult. With the best possible intentions, it may be doubted whether the Jews could possibly seem to either Christians or Moslems proper guardians of the holy places, or custodians of the Holy Land as a whole.

The reason is this: The places which are most sacred to Christians-those having to do with Jesus-and which are also sacred to Moslems, are not only not sacred to Jews, but abhorrent to them. It is simply impossible, under those circumstances, for Moslems and Christians to feel satisfied to have these places in Jewish hands, or under the custody of Jews. There are still other places about which Moslems must have the same feeling. In fact, from this point of view, the Moslems, just because the sacred places of all three religions are sacred to them have made very naturally much more satisfactory custodians of the holy places than the Jews could be. It must be believed that the precise meaning, in this respect, of the complete Jewish occupation of Palestine has not been fully sensed by those who urge the extreme Zionist program. For it would intensify, with a certainty like fate, the anti-Jewish feeling both in Palestine and in all other portions of the world which look to Palestine as "the Holy Land."

In view of all these considerations, and with a deep sense of sympathy for the Jewish cause, the Commissioners feel bound to recommend that only a greatly reduced Zionist program be attempted by the Peace Conference, and even that, only very gradually initiated. This would have to mean that Jewish immigration should be definitely limited, and that the project for making Palestine distinctly a Jewish commonwealth should be given up.

There would then be no reason why Palestine could not be included in a united Syrian State, just as other portions of the country, the holy places being cared for by an International and Inter-religious Commission, somewhat as at present under the oversight and approval of the Mandatary and of the League of Nations. The Jews, of course, would have representation upon this Commission.

The recommendations now made lead naturally to the necessity of recommending what power shall undertake the single Mandate for all Syria.

(1) The considerations already dealt with suggest the qualifications, ideally to be desired in this Mandatary Power: First of all it should be freely desired by the people. It should be willing to enter heartily into the spirit of the mandatary system, and its possible gift to the world, and so be willing to withdraw after a reasonable period, and not seek selfishly to exploit the country. It should have a passion for democracy, for the education of the common people and for the development of national spirit. It needs unlimited sympathy and patience in what is practically certain to be a rather thankless task, for no Power can go in honestly to face actual conditions (like land-ownership, for example) and seek to correct these conditions, without making many enemies. It should have experience in dealing with less developed peoples, and abundant resources in men and money.

(2) Probably no Power combines all these qualifications, certainly not in equal degree. But there is hardly one of these qualifications that has not been more or less definitely indicated in our conferences with the Syrian people and they certainly suggest a new stage in the development of the self-sacrificing spirit in the relations of peoples to one another. The Power that undertakes the single mandate for all Syria, in the spirit of these qualifications will have the possibility of greatly serving not only Syria but the world, and of exalting at the same time its own national life. For it would be working in direct line with the high aims of the Allies in the war, and give proof that those high aims had not been abandoned. And that would mean very much just now, in enabling the nations to keep their faith in one another and in their own highest ideals.

(3) The Resolutions of the Peace Conference of January 30, 1919, quoted in our instructions, expressly state for regions to be "completely severed from the Turkish Empire," that "the wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory Power." Our survey left no room for doubt of the choice of the majority of the Syrian people. Although it was not known whether America would take a mandate at all; and although the Commission could not only give no assurances upon that point, but had rather to discourage expectation; nevertheless, upon the face of the returns, America was the first choice of 1,152 of the petitions presented-more than 60 per cent-while no other Power had as much as 15 per cent for first choice.

And the conferences showed that the people knew the grounds upon which they registered their choice for America. They declared that their choice was due to knowledge of America's record, the unselfish aims with which she had come into the war, the faith in her felt by multitudes of Syrians who had been in America; the spirit revealed in American educational institutions in Syria, especially the College in Beirut, with its well known and constant encouragement of Syrian national sentiment, their belief that America had no territorial or colonial ambitions, and would willingly withdraw when the Syrian state was well established as her treatment both of Cuba and the Philippines seemed to them to illustrate; her genuinely democratic spirit, and her ample resources.

From the point of view of the desires of the "people concerned," the Mandate should clearly go to America.

(4) From the point of view of qualifications, too, already stated as needed in the Mandatary for Syria, America as first choice of the people, probably need not fear careful testing, point by point, by the standard involved in our discussion of qualifications, though she has much less experience in such work than Great Britain, and is likely to show less patience and though her definite connections with Syria have been less numerous and close than those of France. She would have at least the great qualification of fervent belief in the new mandatary system of the League of Nations, as indicating the proper relations which a strong nation should take toward a weaker one. And though she would undertake the mandate with reluctance, she could probably be brought to see, how logically the taking of such responsibility follows from the purposes with which she entered the war and from her advocacy of the League of Nations.

(5) There is the further consideration that America could probably come into the Syrian situation, in the beginning at least, with less friction than any other Power. The great majority of Syrian people, as has been seen, favor her coming, rather than that of any other power. Both the British and the French would find it easier to yield their respective claims to America than to each other. She would have no rival imperial interests to press. She would have abundant resources for the development of the sound prosperity of Syria, and this would inevitably benefit in a secondary way the nations which have had closest connection with Syria, and so help to keep relations among the Allies cordial. No other Power probably would be more welcome, as a neighbor, to the British, with their large interests in Egypt, Arabia and Mesopotamia; or to the Arabs and Syrians in these regions; or to the French with their long-established and many-sided interests in Beirut and the Lebanon.

(6) The objections to recommending at once a single American Mandate for all Syria are: first of all, that it is not certain that the American people would be willing to take the Mandate- that it is not certain that the British or French would be willing to withdraw, and would cordially welcome America's coming, a situation which might prove steadily harassing to an American administration; that the vague but large encouragement given to the Zionist aims might prove particularly embarrassing to America, on account of her large influential Jewish population- and that if America were to take any mandate at all, and were to take but one mandate, it is probable that an Asia Minor Mandate would be more natural and important. For there is a task there of such peculiar and worldwide significance as to appeal to the best in America, and demand the utmost from her, and as certainly to justify her in breaking with her established policy concerning mixing in the affairs of the Eastern hemisphere. The Commissioners believe, moreover, that no other Power could come into Asia Minor, with hands so free to give impartial justice to all the peoples concerned.

To these objections as a whole, it is to be said, that they are all of such a kind that they may resolve themselves; and that they only form the sort of obstacles that must be expected, in so large and significant an undertaking. In any case they do not relieve the Commissioners from the duty of recommending the course which, in their honest judgment, is the best courses and the one for which the whole situation calls.

The Commissioners, therefore, recommend, as involved in the logic of the facts, that the United States of America be asked to undertake the single Mandate for all Syria.

If for any reason the mandate-for Syria is not given to America, then the Commissioners recommend, in harmony with the express request of the majority of the Syrian people, that the mandate be given to Great Britain. The tables show that there were 1,073 petitions in all Syria for Great Britain as Mandatary, if America did not take the mandate. This is very greatly in excess of any similar expression for the French.

On the contrary-for whatever reason -more than 60 per cent of all the petitions, presented to the Commission, directly and strongly protested against any French Mandate. Without going into a discussion of the reasons for this situation, the Commissioners are reluctantly compelled to believe that this situation itself makes it impossible to recommend a single French mandate for all Syria.

The feeling of the Arabs of the East is particularly strong against the French. And there is grave reason to believe that the attempt to enforce a French Mandate would precipitate war between the Arabs and the French, and force upon Great Britain a dangerous alternative. The Commissioners may perhaps be allowed to say that this conclusion is contrary to their own earlier hope, that-because of France's long and intimate relations with Syria, because of her unprecedented sacrifices in the war, and because the British Empire seemed certain to receive far greater accessions of territory from the war-it might seem possible to recommend that France be given the entire mandate for Syria. But the longer the Commission remained in Syria, the more clear it became that that course could not be taken.

The Commissioners recommend, therefore that if America cannot take the mandate for all Syria, that it be given to Great Britain; because of the choice of the people concerned; because she is already on the ground and with much of the necessary work in hand; because of her trained administrators; because of her long and generally successful experience in dealing with less developed peoples; and because she has so many of the qualifications needed in a Mandatary Power, as we have already considered them.

We should hardly be doing justice however, to our sense of responsibility to the Syrian people, if we did not frankly add some at least of the reasons and misgivings, variously expressed and implied in our conferences, which led to the preference for an American mandate over a British mandate. The people repeatedly showed honest fear that in British hands the mandatary power would become simply a colonizing power of the old kind; that Great Britain would find it difficult to give up the colonial theory, especially in case of a people thought inferior; that she would favor a civil service and pension budget too expensive for a poor people; that the interests of Syria would be subordinated to the supposed needs of the Empire; that there would be, after all, too much exploitation of the country for Britain's benefit; that she would never be ready to withdraw and give the country real independence; that she did not really believe in universal education, and would not provide adequately for it, and that she already had more territory in her possession-in spite of her fine colonial record-than was good either for herself or for the world.

These misgivings of the Syrian people unquestionably largely explain their demand for "absolute independence," for a period of "assistance" of only twenty years, their protest against Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations etc. They all mean that whatever Power the Peace Conference shall send into Syria, should go in as a true mandatary under the League of Nations, and for a limited term. Anything else would be a betrayal of the Syrian people.

It needs to be emphasized, too, that under a true mandatary for Syria, all the legitimate interests of all the nations in Syria would be safeguarded. In particular, there is no reason why any tie that France has had with Syria in the past should be severed or even weakened under the control of another mandatary power, or in an independent Syria.

There remains only to be added, that if France feels so intensely concerning her present claims in Syria, as to threaten all cordial relations among the Allies, it is of course possible to give her a mandate over the Lebanon (not enlarged) separated from the rest of Syria, as is desired by considerable groups in that region. For reasons already given, the Commissioners cannot recommend this course, but it is a possible arrangement.
Respectfully submitted,

CHARLES R. CRANE,

HENRY C. KING.

II-THE REPORT UPON MESOPOTAMIA

In view of the Resolutions, passed by the Peace Conference on January 30, 1919, and of the Anglo-French Declaration of November 9, 1918-on the eve of the Armistice-both of which documents class Syria and Mesopotamia together to be treated in the same way, and make to them the same promises and assurances, the Commissioners recommend that the Peace Conference, adopt for Mesopotamia a policy in general parallel to that recommended for Syria, in order that the Anglo-French Declaration may not become another "scrap of paper."

1. We accordingly recommend, as most important of all, and in strict harmony with our instructions, that whatever foreign administration is brought into Mesopotamia should come into Mesopotamia not at ail as a colonizing power in the old sense of that term, but as a mandatary under the League of Nations, with clear consciousness that "the well-being and development" of the Mesopotamian people form for it a sacred trust. To this end the Mandate should have a limited term, the time of expiration to be determined by the League of Nations, in the light of all the facts as brought out from year to year, whether in the annual reports of the Mandatary to the League or in other ways.

The entire text of the first recommendation for Syria, with its subordinate recommendations, applies point by point to Mesopotamia as truly as to Syria.

If the Peace Conference. the League of Nations, and the appointed Mandatary Power loyally carry out the policy of mandataries embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations, the most essential interests of Mesopotamia would be fully safeguarded-but only so.

2. We recommend, in the second place that the unity of Mesopotamia be preserved: the precise boundaries to be determined by a special commission on boundaries, after the mandate. has been assigned. It should probably include at least the Vilayets of Basra, Bagdad, and Mosul. And the Southern Kurds and Assyrians might well be linked up with Mesopotamia. The wisdom of a united country needs no argument in the case of Mesopotamia.

3. We recommend, in the third place, that Mesopotamia be placed under one Mandatary Power, as the natural way to secure real and efficient unity. The economic, political, social and educational development of the people all call for such a unified mandate. Only waste confusion, friction, and injury to the people's interests could come from attempting a division and "spheres of influence" on the part of several nations. But this implies that the Mandatary Power shall not itself be an exploiting power, but shall sacredly guard the people's rights.

4. Since it is plainly desirable that there be general harmony in the political and economic institutions and arrangements of Mesopotamia and Syria, and since the people themselves should have chief voice in determining the form of government under which they shall live we recommend that the Government of Mesopotamia, in harmony with the apparent desires of its people, be a Constitutional Monarchy, such as is proposed for Syria; and that the people of Mesopotamia be given opportunity to indicate their choice of Monarch, the choice to be reviewed and confirmed by the League of Nations. It may be fairly assumed that the 1,278 petitions from Syrians for the independence of Mesopotamia-68.5 per cent of the total number received-reflects the feeling in Mesopotamia itself; and such contact as we have been able to secure with Mesopotamians confirms the assumption, and leads to the belief that the program, presented at Aleppo by representative Mesopotamians, headed by Jaafar Pasha, Military Governor of the Aleppo District, and practically parallel to the Damascus Program, would be generally supported by the Mesopotamian people. Whether this support extends to each item in the program alike, and so to the naming of a King from the sons of the King of the Hedjaz, we have not sufficient data to determine, and so have recommended that a plebiscite be taken upon that point; although there is British evidence that many Mesopotamians have expressed themselves in favor of one of the sons of the King of the Hedjaz as Emir.

5. The Mesopotamian Program expresses its choice of America as Mandatary, and with no second choice. Undoubtedly there has been a good deal of feeling in Mesopotamia against Great Britain, and the petitions specifically charge the British authorities in Mesopotamia with considerable interference with freedom of opinion, of expression, and of travel,-much of which might be justified in time of military occupation. But feeling so stirred might naturally breed unwillingness to express desire for Great Britain as Mandatary.

On the other hand, the material in the pamphlet called "Copies and Translations of Declarations and other Documents relating to Self-Determination in Iraq" (Mesopotamia) was called out by an attempt on the part of the British Government in Mesopotamia to secure the opinions of leading men of all groups concerning "self-determination." This material just because reported directly to British officials, is doubtless somewhat more favorable to the British than it would otherwise be; hut it gives unquestionably good evidence of much opinion likely to choose a British mandate. And after all the range of choice of a mandatary, of sufficient power and experience and of essential justice, is decidedly limited, and it is by no means improbable that if the Mesopotamians were confronted by a refusal of America to take a mandate for Mesopotamia, they would make Great Britain at least second choice, as the majority of the Syrians did. There is supplementary evidence also upon this point.

Now it seems so unlikely that America could or would take a mandate for Mesopotamia, in addition to the possible consideration of Syria and Asia Minor, that the Commissioners recommend that the Peace Conference assign the mandate for Mesopotamia to Great Britain: because of the general reasons already given for recommending her as mandatary in Syria if America does not go in there, because she is probably best of all fitted for the particular task involved, in view of her long relations with the Arabs; in recognition of the sacrifices made by her in delivering Mesopotamia from the Turks, though with no acknowledgment of right of conquest, as her own statements expressly disclaim; because of the special interests she naturally has in Mesopotamia on account of its nearness to India and its close connections with Arabia; and because of work already done in the territory.

These reasons make it probable that the largest interests of the people of Mesopotamia as a whole will be best served by a British Mandate, in spite of the fact that from the point of view of world-interests, in the prevention of jealousy, suspicion, and fear of domination by a single Power, it were better for both Britain and the world that no further territory anywhere be added to the British Empire. A British mandate however, will have the decided advantage of tending to promote economic and educational unity throughout Mesopotamia and Syria whether Syria be under Great Britain or America-and so will reflect more fully than ever before, the close relations in language, customs, and trade between these parts of the former Turkish Empire.

In a country so rich as Mesopotamia in agricultural possibilities, in oil, and in other resources, with the best intentions there will inevitably be danger of exploitation and monopolistic control by the Mandatary Power, through making British interests supreme, and especially through large Indian immigration. This danger will need increasingly and most honestly to be guarded against. The Mesopotamians feel very strongly the menace particularly of Indian immigration, even though that immigration should be confined to Moslems. They dread the admixture of another people of entirely different race and customs, as threatening their Arabic civilization.

Respectfully submitted,

HENRY C KING,

CHARLES R. CRANE

III-REPORT UPON NON-ARABIC SPEAKING PORTIONS OF FORMER OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The method of inquiry, in making our survey of the Asia Minor portion of our task has necessarily differed from that followed in the study of Syria. For our ultimate duty, according to our instructions, is to form an opinion of the divisions of territory and assignment of mandates which will be most likely to promote the order, peace, and development" of the peoples concerned.

Now we faced in Turkey a unique situation as to mandates. In Syria we were in a region already virtually separated from the Turkish Empire, a region whose boundaries were in general clear, and a region recognized as under a temporary government In such a territory, it was entirely feasible to go from community to community to seek the desires of the peoples concerning a mandate. -None of these conditions held for Asia Minor.

For in the case of the proposed State of Armenia, for example, the territory was not yet set off, nor its boundaries even approximately known; the Armenians were not largely present in any of the territory to be assigned; the wishes of the Armenians themselves as to mandates were already known, and the wishes of the rest of the population could not be taken primarily into account, since the establishment of the Armenian State would be in a sense penal for the Turkish people, and naturally to be accepted only as a necessity.

If a Constantinopolitan State were to be set off similar difficulties, in getting the wishes of the people upon a mandate, would be encountered. For the primary interest in such a State is a world interest, rather than a local one; the population would be likely to shift considerably with so new a policy, and so the choice of the present population, especially in such troublous times, would not be particularly significant; and the fact that a large element of the population belongs to the official class would make an unbiased opinion hardly possible.

Even in the portions of Asia Minor sure to be left with the Empire, an inquiry for choice of mandate, like that conducted in Syria, was not practicable. For the Peace Conference had not declared-at least up to the present-that Turkey must have a mandatory power over her, and consequently it was largely within her own choice whether she should have any mandatory at all. She had also long been an independent country, so that the mandate would be inevitably somewhat modified and adjusted through agreement with the mandatary.

Moreover, even if an inquiry for choice of mandatary were feasible, It would be most difficult to get trustworthy results. For it is perfectly clear that opinion in Constantinople is not free to express itself. The Government pressure in various forms upon individuals and groups, and the partisan censorship of the press, are both manifest. In the case of an American mandate, too, it was not known whether America would take it at all, so that there was fear of punishment from some other power, if declarations were made for America and she did not actually accept the mandate. Like conditions held in the interior, and there is even less understanding there of the political situation, so that it was felt that there would not be much gain from further inquiry in other parts of the Empire, in addition to the frequent reports by various investigators to which we already had access.

The plainly imperative need of the whole country for as prompt a settlement as possible of its fate also led the Commission to give up visits to various parts of the Empire, in order not to defer its report and so possibly delay action by the Peace Conference. The Commissioners have had the less hesitancy hastening their report, because it was believed that the essential facts upon which recommendations must be based were already in hand.

In this situation, the method for our inquiry in Asia Minor has been: To build, first of all, on our two months' study in Paris of the Turkish problems in the course of which we used the reports and other material of the Western Asia division of the American experts, and had many conferences with experts there, and with able authorities coming direct from Turkey- to take full advantage of all the general work done in the survey of Syria, as part of the former Turkish Empire, with its fundamentally similar problems and its incidental side-lights; especially to see as many representative groups and individuals as possible in Constantinople, and so to get reports on all phases of our inquiry, and from all parts of Asia Minor; to supplement the information so received with reports, for recent months, of the American Embassy and Consular Offices (through the kind co-operation of Admiral Bristol and Commissioner Ravndal ) and to supplement still further with reports of personal investigations by American Missionaries knowing the country thoroughly, and by representatives of the American Commission on Relief in the Near East, and of American business corporations.

In this way a large mass of valuable material has been brought together and studied by all three advisers-Dr. Albert H. Lybyer, Dr. George R. Montgomery and Capt. William Yale, U. S. A.-who summarized their inferences from it, and reported on special phases of the common problem. To test our conclusions, expert advice at all possible points was also sought from American and other leaders -many of them personally known by members of the Commission. The report of the Commissioners is based on the whole of the resulting evidence.

Our report falls naturally into five divisions; Pertinent action already taken by the Peace Conference dangers from a selfish division and exploitation of the Turkish Empire; considerations looking to a proper division of Turkey; resulting problems; and the Commission's recommendations.

I-PERTINENT ACTION ALREADY TAKEN BY THE PEACE CONFERENCE

To begin with, the action creating the Commission, of which the Commissioners now reporting make the American Section, was taken by the Council of Four. Our instructions were called: "Instructions for Commissioners from the Peace Conference to make inquiry in certain portions of the Turkish Empire which are to be permanently separated from Turkey and put under the guidance of governments acting as mandatories under the League of Nations." The Instructions then go on to say: "It is the purpose of the Conference to separate from the Turkish Empire certain areas comprising, for example, Palestine, Syria, the Arab countries to the cast of Palestine and Syria, Mesopotamia, Armenia, Cilicia and perhaps additional areas in Asia Minor, and to put their development under the guidance of governments which are to act as mandatories of the League of Nations."

So far as concerns Asia Minor, this commits the Conference to two courses of action: Permanent separation from the Turkish Empire of "Armenia, Cilicia, and perhaps additional areas in Asia Minor"; and dealing with these territories under the mandatory, not colonial system.

That this is the deliberate purpose of the Council is further shown by the added statement: "It is expected that this will be done in accordance with the following resolutions, adopted by the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan at a conference held at the Quai d'Orsay on January 30, 1919."

1. Having regard to the record if the German administration in the colonies formerly part of the German Empire, and to the menace which the possession by Germany of submarine bases in many parts of the world would necessarily constitute to the freedom and security of all nations, the Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that in no circumstances should any of the German Colonies be restored to Germany.

2. For similar reasons, and more particularly because of the historical mis-government by the Turks of subject peoples and the terrible massacres of Armenians and others in recent years, the Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine and Arabia must be completely severed from the Turkish Empire. This is without prejudice to the settlement of other parts of the Turkish Empire.

3. The Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that advantage should be taken of the opportunity afforded by the necessity of disposing of these colonies and territories formerly belonging to Germany and Turkey which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, to apply to these territories the principles that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in the constitution of the League of Nations.

4. After careful study they are satisfied that the best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who, by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical positions, can best undertake this responsibility, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as mandatories on behalf of the League of Nations.

5. The Allied and Associated Powers are of opinion that the character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions, and other similar circumstances.

6. They consider that certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory power until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory power . . .

In every case of mandate, the mandatory state shall render to the League of Nations an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

The resolutions clearly assert several things:

(1) That in settling the issues of the Turkish Empire, account may rightfully be taken of any "menace" to "the freedom and security of all nations";

(2) That "the historical misgovernment by the Turks of subject peoples and the terrible massacres of Armenians and others in recent years" constitute a special reason for separation of territory, but "without prejudice to the settlement of other parts of the Turkish Empire";

(3) That this separation of territory should be taken as a special opportunity to apply "the principle that the well-being and development of subject peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in the constitution of the League of Nations";

(4) That this principle should be carried out through the mandatory system which the remaining resolutions carefully define.

The instructions of the Commission then continue: "And it is agreed that the administration of these mandates shall be in the spirit of the following document which was formally presented to the President of the United States on behalf of the Governments of Great Britain and France":

The aim which France and Great Britain have in view in prosecuting in the East the war let loose by German ambition is the complete and final liberation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the native populations.

In order to give effect to these intentions France and Great Britain have agreed to encourage and assist the establishment of native governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia already liberated by the Allies and in the territories which they are proceeding to liberate, and they have agreed to recognize such governments as soon as they are effectively established. So far from desiring to impose specific institutions upon the populations of these regions, their sole object is to ensure, by their support and effective assistance, that the governments and administrations adopted by these regions of their own free will shall be exercised in the normal way. The function which the two Allied Governments claim for themselves in the liberated territories is to ensure impartial and equal justice for all, to facilitate the economic development of the country by encouraging local initiative, to promote the diffusion of education, and to put an end to the divisions too long exploited by Turkish policy.

This is as admirable a statement of the spirit in which mandates should be administered as could be asked, and reflects honor on the two great Allies from whom it originally came.

Taken as a whole, the action of the Peace Conference, in which all the Allies have shared, reflected in the forming of the Commission on Mandates and embodied in the Instructions to the Commission, form a solid basis for the policy to be adopted in Asia Minor. It is no sentimental program, but it is just on the one hand, and considerate on the other. If the Conference proceeds, in its further dealings with Turkey, honestly and strongly and consistently to build on the foundations so prepared, essential justice will be done to all the peoples concerned, rankling wrongs will be set right, and the purposes of the Allies will be just so far vindicated.

And the Peace Conference should not shut its eyes to the fact that vindication is greatly needed just now. For there are set directly over against such a procedure as that now outlined and to which the Peace Conference is in principle and in all honesty committed, the still active policies of the old diplomacy of secret treaties and understandings and of division of spoils among victors. The direct consequences of such selfish and ultimately self-destructive policies are to be seen in all the world today. It is to be feared that some of the highest aims of the Allies in the war have already been well nigh lost because of these policies creeping in, in all manner of "settlements." It concerns the Peace Conference to decide whether the same fateful method is to be followed in Turkey.

II-THE DANGERS OF A SELFISH DIVISION AND EXPLOITATION OF THE TURKISH EMPIRE

In considering recommendations concerning the future administration of large parts of the former Turkish Empire, involving millions of people, it is imperative that the Peace Conference should make clear to itself from the beginning the serious dangers involved in the selfish and divisive national and corporate policies into which the Allies have been drifting in their treatment of the Turkish Empire and should squarely challenge that drift at once.

No doubt this policy of selfish exploitation in Turkey is in its entirety not the deliberate aim of any Power. Much confusion has unavoidably prevailed. The demands upon the Allies and upon the Peace Conference have been beyond human power wholly to meet. Under the pressure of immediate necessity for some kind of action, many steps have been taken in good faith, which have later proved temptations to selfish advantage, and provocations to jealousy and suspicion. The situation, too, has been most complex, by reason of previous engagements, and of countless inter-relations of interest-private, party, national and international. This complexity has often made it honestly difficult to disentangle exactly the right course.

But, however the drift toward selfish exploitation of the Turkish Empire has come about, there should be no mistake about the fact or its dangers. It needs to be said and heeded that Constantinople is once again a nest of selfish, suspicious hateful intrigue, reaching out over the whole Empire, if not the world. What will it mean if this policy is allowed to prevail? In definitely raising this question, the Commissioners are not for an instant supposing that there is any easy and inexpensive solution of the Turkish problem. The justest solution at best will not be wholly welcome to Turkey, and will encounter her opposition. But in such a solution the Allies could at least know that their sacrifices were being; made for the establishment of progressively righteous relations among men, not for sowing the seeds of endless and bitter discord. In seeking, then, a practical plan for the righteous treatment of the Turkish Empire, the Allies should bear clearly in mind that their fidelity to their announced aims in the war is here peculiarly to be tested; and that, in the proportion in which the division of the Turkish Empire by the Allies is made a division of spoils by victors, and is primarily determined by the selfish national and corporate interests of the Allies, in just that proportion will grave dangers arise.

(1) Such a division, in the first place, would have to be forced upon the peoples concerned-not chosen by them. Every separate occupation of territory would be resented, and felt to be a constant injustice. The feeling of the Turkish people concerning the occupation of the Smyrna region by the Greeks is illustrative. They cannot be convinced that such seizure of territory can be harmonized with the professed principles of the Allies in the war. In such a case there is no possibility of laying the foundations of truly cordial relations with the Turkish people.

(2) In the second place, just because these occupations of territory have to be forced upon the Turks, a large number of troops would be required to establish and maintain each occupation. With the intolerable burdens which the war has brought upon all the nations, and with the insistent demands for the demobilization of troops, this would be certain to prove an increasingly serious situation. The number of troops required for an occupation looked upon as temporary and for police purposes, is no measure of the forces required to maintain an aggressive and permanent seizure of territory, as the Turks themselves proved to their sorrow both in Macedonia in 1903-06 and in Yemen through a series of years. The selfishly divisive policy will go far toward turning Turkey into an armed camp, and breeding a constant state of brigandage.

(3) It should not be forgotten, either in the third place, that this selfishly divisive policy would naturally provoke violent retaliation, as in the whole region of Smyrna. Such retaliation, too, is likely to be visited not only upon the immediate aggressors, but also upon the Christian populations generally. For a selfish division and exploitation of territory may easily induce in the Turks the attitude, that, since the worst from outside is probably to come upon them in any case, they may as well take the occasion to rid themselves entirely of those whom they look upon as internal enemies. In that case, the Allies would have to share the guilt of the Turks.

(4) Such selfish exploitation of Turkey, also, would not only certainly call out the resentment of the most solid portion of the American people, as emphatically not illustrating the ends for which America came into the war, but would also tend to alienate the best sentiment among all the Allies. To eliminate from the cause of the Allies this weight of moral judgment would involve a loss of influence in the world-already greatly diminished-not lightly to be faced.

(5) Such exploitation would mean, too, the deliberate sowing of dissension of the gravest kind among the Allies themselves, threatening the moral unity of their cause and entailing serious world consequences. This situation has already come to pass in no small degree. Only moral blindness can deny it. Suspicion and distrust are rife, and the meanest kind of intrigue against one another has been seen in not a few situations.

It may be doubted if the moral unity of the Allies is more than a fraction of what it was in the war or in the early days of the Armistice. Now that is a calamity well nigh immeasurable and it can be cured by no mechanics. Are the Allies to go on increasing this moral dissension among the world's leaders, and deliberately inviting the moral shipwreck of the world by their policies in Turkey?

(6) Coupled with similar decisions already reached, selfish division and exploitation in Turkey would also go far to convince men of independent moral judgment all over the world-including many previously ardent upholders of the cause of the Allies-that the aims of the Allies had become as selfish and ruthless as those of the Germans had been. That would carry with it its own fateful consequences.

For example, no thoughtful man who had the opportunity of watching in France the stream of American officers and soldiers and of able men enlisted for various forms of service to the soldiers, as they came and went, could fail to see among those men, as the Armistice went on, the spread, like a contagion, of depression and disillusionment as to the significance of the war aims, because of the selfish wrangling of the nations.

The fact should be squarely faced that thousands of Americans who served in the war have gone home disillusioned, greatly fearing, if not convinced, that the Allies had not been true to their asserted war aims, and have been consequently driven to an almost cynical view of the entire conflict-cynicism that made them feel like withdrawing all further American help, and henceforth washing their hands of the whole European imbroglio. This attitude has been reflected in many other American citizens who had been devoted supporters of the Allied cause. Now that is not a good result for America, for the Allied Powers or for the world.

But that situation, and similar situations among the best in all the Allies, can be changed only by some clear demonstration that somewhere and on a large and impressive scale, the often asserted high and unselfish aims of the Allies have been honestly carried out. That would come like an invigorating breeze out of the North, bringing new faith in men and in the genuineness of human ideals and endeavor. That opportunity is offered, in a peculiar degree, in the righteous settlement of the problems of the Turkish Empire.

No namby-pamby, sickly sentimental treatment is called for here. There are great and lasting wrongs in Turkey which must be set right. And there are world relations and interests honestly to be recognized and permanently to be satisfied. For the sake of justice to Turkey herself and to all her subject peoples; for the sake of the honor of the Allies and the renewed confidence of men in them, for the stemming of the tide of cynicism and selfish strife; for a fresh and powerful demonstration of moral soundness in the race; the Allies should recognize the grave danger of all selfish exploitation of Turkey, and turn their backs on every last vestige of it.

III CONSIDERATION LOOKING TO A PROPER DIVISION OF THE TURKISH EMPIRE

But if a selfishly exploiting division of the Turkish Empire is not justified it may be asked: Why is it necessary to divide Asia Minor, at least, at all? For: such a division there are at least two, great reasons: First, the hideous misgovernment and massacres of the Turkish rule- and second, Turkey's utter inadequacy to the strategic world position in which she is placed.

I. In the first place. there cannot be left out of account the hideous mis-government of Turkey for centuries, even for citizens of the Turkish race.

(1) One may recognize fully the agreeable and attractive personal qualities of the Turks that commonly make them the best liked, probably, of all the peoples of the Empire, and that almost unconsciously turn most foreigners who stay long in the country into pro-Turks. One may recognize, too, that there has long been in the Turkish Government a kind of negative, indolent tolerance of other peoples, that allowed them much of the time to go on in their own ways, though constantly despised, robbed, oppressed. It may be granted, also, that the Turks have been successful in keeping, through long periods, widely scattered areas together and giving them a sort of unity, by the method of "divide and rule," of leaving regional governments pretty largely to themselves so long as the Turkish revenues were obtained, and of using other races very largely as officials. It is only fair, also, to remember the very considerable amount of demoralization caused by the perpetual intriguing of European powers in Turkish affairs.

(2) But while all this may be freely admitted, it must still be clearly seen that the Government of the Turkish Empire has been for the most part a wretched failure, in spite of generally good laws. For that Government has been characterized by incessant corruption, plunder and bribery. It might almost be called a government of simple exploitation. So that Ramsay, who judges the Turk leniently, feels obliged to say: "The Turk is not naturally a good officer or a good official.... Bribery is the universal rule." And he speaks of the deep-seated mingled hatred and fear on the part even of the Turkish peasantry for government officials. In fact it is hardly too much to say that Turkish history shows gross neglect of the most ordinary and essential duties of a government in the Empire as a whole.

(3) And the treatment of the other subject races has been still worse than that of the Turks. For them nothing has been secure-whether property, lives, wives, or children. To all this have been added the horrible massacres of the Armenians, especially since Ab-dul-Hamil's time, and somewhat similar deportations of the Greeks. Both races have proved themselves abler, more industrious, enterprising, and prosperous than the Turks, and so have made themselves feared and hated doubtless not altogether without some provocation on their part in certain cases. And these massacres have been due to deliberate and direct government action, in which the Turkish people themselves have been too willing to share. They have not been crimes of the passion of the moment. And they have involved cruelties horrible beyond description.

For it must not be forgotten that this thing was not done in a corner. The evidence for few events in history has been more carefully gathered, sifted and ordered. The Bryce report upon "The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915-16," leaves no room for doubt of the essential facts. It is idle to attempt to deny it, or appreciably to mitigate its force.

Lord Bryce, himself a trained historian, says of the report: "Nothing has been admitted the substantial truth of which seems open to reasonable doubt." And in estimating the value of the evidence, he calls attention to these Facts: (1) "Nearly all of it comes from eye witnesses", (2) "the main facts rest upon evidence coming from different and independent sources"; (3) "facts of the same, or of a very similar nature, occurring in different places, are deposed to by different and independent witnesses," -including Danish and German witnesses; (4) "the volume of this concurrent evidence from different quarters is so large as to establish the main facts beyond all question"; (5) "in particular it is to be noted that many of the most, shocking and horrible accounts are those for which there is the most abundant testimony from the most trustworthy neutral witnesses. None of these cruelties rest on native evidence alone." And, he adds: "A recollection of previous massacres will show that such crimes are a part of a long settled and often repeated policy of Turkish rulers.... The attempts made to find excuses for wholesale slaughter and for the removal of a whole people from its homes leaves no room for doubt as to the slaughter and the removal. The main facts are established by the confession of the criminals themselves.... The disapproval of palliations which the Turks have put forward is as complete as the proof for the atrocities themselves."

Mr. Moorfield Storey, ex-president of the American Bar Association, records the natural verdict of one skilled in the weighing of evidence, when he writes to Lord Bryce: "In my opinion, the evidence which you print is as reliable as that upon which rests our belief in many of the universally admitted facts of history, and I thins it establishes beyond all reasonable doubt the deliberate purpose of the Turkish authorities practically to exterminate the Armenians, and their responsibility for the hideous atrocities which have been perpetrated upon that unhappy people."

It is not pleasant to call these dark facts to mind, but unfortunately there is only the slightest evidence that the Turkish Government of people as a whole have recognized or repudiated the crime of the Armenian massacres, or done anything appreciable to set them right. Some small groups of Turks have characterized these crimes aright, but there is almost nothing to show repentance or the fruits of repentance on the part of the great majority of the people or of their leaders, or to give reasonable hope that the massacres might not be repeated; though there is doubtless some excuse for the comparative indifference with which these massacres have been regarded by the Turks, because of a certain amount of revolutionary activity on the part of Armenians in some cases, and because of the widespread wretchedness and want and sufferings of the whole Turkish population in ten years of war and disorder.

Now these crimes-black as anything in human history-cannot be simply forgotten and left out of account in seeking a righteous solution of the Turkish problem. If the rankest conceivable wrongs are not to be passed over in silence, it is inevitable that any just solution of the Turkish problem must contain that small measure of justice which it is now possible to render in this case.

It is strange that Lord Bryce in reviewing all the evidence concerning the Armenian massacres of 1915-16 should feel compelled to say: "The record of the rulers of Turkey for the last two of three centuries, from the Sultan on his throne to the district Mutessarif, is, taken as a whole, an almost unbroken record of corruption, of justice, of an oppression which often rises into hideous cruelty.... Can anyone still continue to hope that the evils of such a government are curable? Or does the evidence contained in this volume furnish most terrible and convincing proof that it cannot longer be permitted to rule over subjects of a different faith?"

Is it strange that he should be unable to shake off the conviction that these facts are inevitably knit up with a proper solution of the problem of Turkey? "It is evidently desirable," he writes, "that the public opinion of the belligerent nations-and, I may add, of neutral peoples also should be enabled by knowledge of what has happened in Asia Minor and Armenia, to exercise its judgment on the course proper to be followed when, at the end of the present war, a political re-settlement of the Nearer East has to be undertaken."

Surely the Peace Conference was justified in its resolution: "more particularly because of the historical mis-government by the Turks of subject peoples and the terrible massacres of Armenians and others in recent years, the Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that Armenia must be completely severed from the Turkish Empire."

That the formation of a separate Armenian State is the deliberate intention of the Peace Conference seems further indicated in the later actions of the Conference concerning Armenia, like the appointment of Colonel Haskell as High Commissioner in Armenia on behalf of the four Great Powers, and the appointment of Major General Harbord by President Wilson to investigate conditions in Armenia. Many incidental things also indicate the general expectation on the part of the Allies that an Armenian State will be formed.

(4) The great and primary reason for this decision by the Peace Conference, is undoubtedly to be found in the Armenian massacres which have just been reviewed. But it might still be asked whether the situation created by the massacres could be met only by the formation of a separate Armenia. For such a separation it must be admitted, involves very difficult problems. Why, then, is it necessary to set off an Armenian State? What are the reasons?

The only possible substitute for a separated Armenia is a general mandate by one of the Great Powers over all Asia Minor, which should ensure equal rights to all elements of the population-to all races, and to all religions. If such a mandate were honestly carried out, we should certainly hope for a far better government on modern lines. But under the proposed mandatory system of the League of Nations, it is intended that the mandate shall be for a limited period. Even if that period were considerably prolonged, what would happen when the Mandatary withdrew ? It is impossible to be sure, if the Turks still constituted the majority, that the state would not slump back into many of its old evils including oppression of other races. The history of the Turks, unfortunately, gives all too small reason to hope for more.

The reasons for a separate Armenia then, may be said to be because of the demonstrated unfitness of the Turks to rule over others, or even over themselves; because of the adoption of repeated massacres as a deliberate policy of State; because of almost complete lack of penitence for the massacres, or repudiation of the crime-they rather seek to excuse them- because practically nothing has been done by the Turks in the way of repatriation of Armenians or of reparations to them-a condition not naturally suggesting a repetition of the experiment of Turkish rule, because, on the contrary, there is evidence of intense feeling still existing against the Armenians, and implicit threatening of massacre, because there has been sufficient proof that the two races cannot live peaceably and decently together, so that it is better for both that they have separate states, because of complete failure of the strong clauses of the Treaty of 1878 to protect the Armenians; because the most elementary justice suggests that there must be at least some region in Turkey where Armenians can go and not have to live under Turkish rule, because nothing less than that could give to the Armenians any adequate guarantee of safety, consequently, nothing less will satisfy the conscience of the world upon this point; because in this day of opportunity for small nations under the League of Nations, the Armenians have surely earned the right, by their sufferings, their endurance, their loyalty to principles, their unbroken spirit and ambition, and their demonstrated industry, ability and self-reliance, to look forward to a national life of their own; because such a separate state would probably make more certain decent treatment of Armenians in other parts of Turkey; and because there is no adequate substitute for such a state. In the interests of the Armenians, of the Turks, and of the peace of the world alike, the formation of a separate Armenian State is to be urged.

II. But the reasons for some righteous division of Turkey do not lie simply in that "historical mis-government." which justly challenges her rule over any other people; but also in her utter unfitness for the strategic world position in which she is placed. The very fact of her age-long misrule, coupled with her occupation of territory of critical significance to the world, constitutes her a "menace to the freedom and security of all nations," and makes unusual restriction in her case necessary, for the greater good of the world and of her own subject peoples

(1) For Turkey is held, as Dominian has said, by "a people whose incompetence to convert nature's gifts into use or profit is historically patent."[ Dominian, "Frontiers of Language and Nationality In Europe," p. 236.)] But striking as has been their economic failure, the failure of the Turks has been far more than merely external or material. She has acted rather as a kind of blight upon all the peoples she has conquered. As Ramsey-possibly too strongly-puts it: "The action of the Turks in every department of life has simply been to ruin, never to rebuild.... They destroyed the intellectual and moral institutions of a nation, they broke up and dissolved almost the entire social fabric; they undermined every educating and civilizing influence in the land, and they brought back a great part of the country to the primitive simplicity of nomadic life.... There is hardly a social institution in Asia Minor, showing any degree of social constructiveness, that is not an older Anatolian creation, Moslemized in outward form, and usually desecrated in the process."[ Ramsey, "Impressions of Turkey " pp. 264.]

(2) Now the evil of this blighting influence of Turkish rule is vastly increased because of the critical significance of the territory which she occupies. First of all, in the words of another, "Turkey is before everything else a roadway-a bridge-land.... No solution of the political problem involved can be attained without full consideration of its geographic aspects.... Turkey has been a highway of commerce and civilization between Europe on the one hand and Asia and Africa on the other.... The through roads converging into the Turkish territory are probably the oldest commercial routes of the world. At any rate they connote the sites on which the most ancient civilization rose."

By position, then, Turkey lies "at the junction of three continents, and therefore on the main field of history," and is "the site of convergence of the main avenues of continental travel"; and becomes, thus, in a peculiar degree, "the meeting place of races which are generally associated with the three continents which the country unites. Aryan, Tatar, and Semitic peoples therefore are strongly represented in the land."

With this advantage of position her remarkable topography combined to "create Turkey's relation with the world beyond its borders." "This relation was facilitated by the admirable set of natural routes which lead in and out of the country", by the Mediterranean Sea, Aegean Sea, Turkish Straits, and the Black Sea, "the shores of which are closely dotted with the terminals of great avenues from northeastern Europe as well as all of northern and central Asia . . . and by 'the rift Valley of Syria."' Hence "the Eastern question is as old as the history of civilization on this particular spot of the inhabited world"-always "this momentous international problem of determining which people or nation shall control the Straits between Europe and Asia, who shall get toll from the enormous transit trade of the region." [See Dominian, pp. 248, 222, 228 230, 231]

Now under the new conception of a League of Nations, and of mandatory powers who are to think of the "well-being and development" of peoples temporarily placed under their care as a "sacred trust of civilization," it is proposed to change this age-old Eastern question from one of a selfish scramble among the nations to one of recognizing here a great and distinctly international or world interest; to make definite provision for this world interest, and yet not only with full justice to the Turkish people more immediately concerned, but to their greater advantage. For, except for a practically all-powerful nation, a position like that of Turkey, makes the land inevitably a perpetual prey of warring powers, so that Dominian could say quite truthfully of Turkey: "The land staggers under the load of misfortune which its central position in the Eastern Hemisphere has heaped upon it" The situation has been inevitably one of exceeding difficulty for Turkey.

Is it not high time, then, in this crisis of the world's history, and after the immeasurable sacrifices of the Great War, that intelligent men should recognize the stupid futility of the old method of incessant political and commercial national strife, and face this age-long Eastern question in a totally new spirit?

(3) But because Turkey has been so markedly a "bridge-land," it became also "the debatable land"; so that Ramsey can say that at the present day the central movement in Asia is, what it always has been, a conflict between the Eastern and Western spirit. "About 1070, most of Asia Minor became Oriental in language and in Government." "For near]y eight centuries the Oriental element reigned supreme, in Asia Minor and swept far into Europe.... But step by step Asia has been driven back, and in Asia Minor the old struggle has recommenced." "On the west coast of Asia Minor the Greek element has increased enormously in strength while the Turkish element has grown weaker." The Oriental element "dies out in these parts by a slow but sure decay." "A revival of Orientalism" was planned and directed by Abd-ul-Hamid and by the later Young Turk movement." "But even in the Eastern part of Asia Minor, the Oriental spirit is doomed." "Orientalism is ebbing and dying in the country."[Ramsey, "Impressions of Turkey," pp. 127, 129, 131, 157, 158.]

Ramsey's analysis is probably correct and important. But is there not something far greater to be looked for, than that gradual driving out of the "Oriental spirit" in Turkey? In one sense, doubtless, that spirit is doomed and must go. We are to be done with Oriental domination in Turkey, it may be hoped, when we get states which know in their citizens no privileged and unprivileged classes, but only equals before the law. But are we not also to he freed from Occidental domination? Was it not one of the greatest of the convictions of the Allies in the war, that no nation, no "Kultur," however great and fine it might be, was good enough to blot out all others ?

Are there not priceless Oriental values, gratefully to be recognized and sedulously to be preserved? And may not Turkey, just because she has been, through the ages, "bridge-land" and "debatable land," become in some rich and high sense mediating-land as well between the Occident and the Orient, teaching the nations how to combine the quietism of the East, and the pragmatism of the West; the religious dependence of the East, and the scientific mastery of natural forces of the West- the mental and spiritual fellowship of tie East, and the mental and spiritual independence of the West?

As illustrative of the spiritual values still resident in Islam, for example, may be mentioned the remarkable and inspiring achievements of the Senussi sect, in establishing a vast state in a most barren, unpromising land, and in up-lifting, organizing, and harmonizing a most backward and degenerated population in the heart of Africa within a comparatively few years, and under influences purely Moslem. Such a state should not be needlessly encroached upon. It rather affords ample warrant for expecting that under new democratic processes and in due time the Moslems will prove themselves able to build up and manage their own states in the Arabian and Anatolian peninsulas. If the Entente powers are sincere in their declarations not further to harass the Moslem world and so give excuse for a pan-Islamic movement, they should also at once definitely and publicly renounce all further political encroachments on that world, and outline a clear policy of uplifting the Moslems, already subject to their control, by enlarged opportunities both in education and in public service.

(4) With the vision of such larger possible goals for this "bridge-land" and "debatable land" of the Eastern Hemisphere, one approaches the problem of the control of Constantinople and the Straits in a different spirit. The situation is so unique, the relations so complex and far-reaching, the responsibilities so heavy, and the possibilities so enthralling, that no one nation can be equal to the task,-least of all a nation with Turkey's superlatively bad record of misrule. No situation in the world demands so compellingly international rule-not only to put an end here to the selfish scramble and perpetual intrigue of the nations, but also, above all, to rise to the possibilities of this strategic opportunity, for the benefit of all the race.

This calls for a Constantinopolitan State, directly and permanently vested in the League of Nations, but best managed probably through a single mandatary as trustee, steadily responsible to the League and removable by the League.

Such a solution, at first sight, will undoubtedly be unwelcome to most Turks. But Turkey is simply not conceivably equal to a great world responsibility- and the larger world interests must prevail. Moreover it is certainly better for Turkey herself to be delivered from this intolerable responsibility, and to have her own government taken out of the midst of what has been through the centuries a center of boundless intrigue. The common people of Turkey would lead a much happier life in a state freed from outreaching imperialism, and at liberty to devote itself to the welfare of its own citizens.

III. If one turns aside now for a moment from the immediate problem of Asia Minor to that of the former Turkish Empire as a whole, other reasons for division of the Turkish Empire may be suggested.

(1) For one thing, there would be real danger, even under a mandate, in keeping intact the Turkish Empire as a whole-the danger of a later revival of the Turkish Empire and a repetition of its past history, on account of the often revived jealousies of the Powers. That danger is not to be lightly regarded.

(2) The Turkish Empire, too, as it has existed, is not truly a unit from any point of view,-certainly not the Arabic and the non-Arabic-speaking portions. Its interests-except those of good government-are not one. It is hardly too much to say that however much the land has been a single unit with reference to intercontinental travel and trade, the fact remains that it has been clearly subdivided within itself. There would probably be distinct gain. consequently, in similarly dividing its problems, and seeking separate solutions for them. Syria, Mesopotamia, and Arabia, for example each has a kind of unity of its own.

It was natural, therefore, that the Peace Conference should have resolved that Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Arabia should be completely severed from the Turkish Empire. The first three have already been dealt with in the preceding reports of this Commission. It may be briefly pointed out here, however, that these areas are naturally cut off from Turkey, because of their different language, customs, and civilization that the people do not wish further connection with Turkey, but were rather greatly rejoiced to be freed forever from the Turkish yoke; and that there is opportunity in the Arabic-speaking portions of the former Turkish Empire for at least two strong national states- Syria, including Palestine, and Mesopotamia, in accordance with the hopes of the Peace Conference and the desires of the people themselves. Both Syria and Mesopotamia should be, of course, under mandatories for a time.

IV. The considerations now dealt with looking to a righteous division of the Turkish portion of the former Ottoman Empire, clearly involve the setting off of an Arabian State, and of a Constantinopolitan State; but as clearly imply the continuance of a distinctly Turkish State, with guarantees of justice to all its constituent peoples. The resulting problems, now to be considered. therefore, naturally become: The problem of a separate Armenia; the problem of an international Constantinopolitan State; the problem of a continued Turkish State, the problem of the Greeks and of other minority races.

I-THE PROBLEM OF A SEPARATE ARMENIA

(1) The reasons why it is necessary that a separate Armenian State should be set up, have already been fully given. They need not be restated.

(2) The conception of such a State. It is well to have in mind the exact nature of the State proposed in this report in order to prevent misunderstandings on any side.

It is not proposed in such a state to establish the rule of a minority of Armenians over a majority of other peoples. That would inevitably seem to the Turks to be very unjust, and would at once excite resentment and unremitting opposition. Moreover, such an arrangement would be unfair to the Armenians as well. For it would place them from the start in a false and untenable position. It would put them, too, under great temptation to abuse of power. And it would be no fair trial of a truly Armenian State. It would of course, also make any mandate mean little or nothing, if not make it entirely impossible.

But such a separated State should furnish a definite area into which Armenians could go with the complete assurance that there they would never be put under the rule of the Turks. It should be also a region in which Armenians could gradually concentrate, and from which the Turkish population might tend increasingly to withdraw; though no compulsion should be put on any people.

All this necessitates a strong Mandatory Power. The State could not even start without such help. This separated State should be therefore a state definitely under the rule of a Mandatory Government, organized on modern lines to do justice to all elements of the population: and a state from which the Mandatory should not withdraw, until the Armenians constituted an actual majority of the entire population, or at least until the Turks were fewer than the Armenians. This would necessarily mean that full Armenian self-government would be long delayed. And that fact should be definitely faced as inevitable. The conditions are such that there is no defensible alternative.

(3) The term of the Mandate is practically involved in the conception of the State, which is forced upon us. It cannot be a short-term mandate, not because of any reluctance to withdraw on the part of the Mandatory, but because under the peculiar circumstances, a true Armenian State cannot be established in a brief period of time, however ardent the desires of both the Armenians and the, Mandatory Power. For the Armenians cannot safely undertake the government independently, until they constitute an actual majority. There is also the added consideration of the natural need of considerable time for the amalgamation and consolidation of the Armenian people, as against some tendency to split up into fragments. The mandate must be long enough, too, to make the people thoroughly ready for both self-government and self-protection, through an increasing use of Armenians in the government even from the beginning.

(4) An American Mandate Desired. It seems universally recognized that the Armenians themselves desire an American Mandate. And this choice is apparently generally approved by America's Allies. The Turks, too, though not wishing any separate Armenian State, would probably favor an American Mandate for Armenia, if there must be an Armenia at all.

(5) The conditions upon which America would be justified in taking the mandate for Armenia may be said to be: The genuine desire of the Armenians; the cordial moral support of the Allies in carrying out the mandate; willingness on the part of the Armenians to bear with a pretty long mandatory term, for the reasons already stated, and to give up all revolutionary committees that Armenia should have territory enough to ensure a successful development; and that the peculiarly difficult mandate for Armenia should not be the only mandate given America in Turkey. None of these conditions, perhaps, call for comment, except the last, which will come up for later consideration.

(6) The Extent and Boundaries of the Armenian State. The General Adviser, Dr. Lybyer, has expressed so exactly the conditions of the Commissioners concerning the extent and boundaries of the Armenian State. that his statement may well replace any other discussion of this question:

1. The Armenians should be provided with a definite territory, and organized as soon as practicable into a self-governing independent state. Otherwise the questions of their safety and of their ceasing to be a center of world disturbance cannot be answered.

2. This area should be taken from both Turkish and Russian territory. The wars of the Nineteenth century divided the proper Armenian land between these two empires.

3. The Armenians are entitled to an amount of Turkish territory which takes into account their losses by the massacres of 1894-6, 1908-9, and 1915-16. These losses may be estimated at one million. [This estimate of Armenian losses by mandate in the past thirty years is especially valuable in the light of conflicting statements]

4. They should not be given an excessive amount of Turkish territory, if their state is to be practicable.

a. The Turks, Kurds, and other races should not be left with a just grievance, since that would solidify their traditional hostility, and embitter them against the League of Nations.

b. It has been questioned, even by many of themselves, whether the Armenians are ready for self-government at present; certainly an imperial rule by them over other people should not be thought of for the present or the future.

c. It is too much to ask of the League of Nations or a mandatory power that they undertake to hold down and perhaps squeeze out a large majority, in order that a small minority may have time to multiply and fill the land.

d. There is a limit beyond which the project of ever producing an Armenian majority is actually not feasible; that is to say, if the Armenians are assigned too large an area, they will never be able to occupy and hold it.

e. The idea has been suggested that Armenia should be developed as a wall of separation or a buffer state between the two Moslem areas occupied by Turks and Arabs. This might be done by a compact, homogeneous state with considerable population and resources, but it is a burden which the Armenian state cannot be expected to bear within a conceivable time.

5. The proposed large Armenia, to extend from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, is probably impossible of realization, and therefore should not be planned for. It encounters all the objections previously mentioned.

a. In 1914 and before 1894 the Armenians were in a small minority in such an area, probably never exceeding twenty-five per cent. If they should he given the control, the majority populations would be injured, in violation of all "Wilsonian principles" and war aims. With allowance for the estimated million who perished, and assuming that all these could have been gathered into the territory, the Armenians would still now number only about one-third of the total population.

b There never was an Armenia which ruled all this territory. The real Armenia, as maps and records show, was a highland country which at one time reached the Caspian Sea, which came near to the Black Sea without reaching it, and which never came to the Mediterranean Sea. The Lesser Armenia of the Middle Ages in the Cilician region was the result of the expulsion and flight of Armenians from further east,-a process which scattered them over a large area, in which they have ever since been in a minority almost everywhere. The demand for both areas is therefore an imperialistic claim, based historically upon an overstrained interpretation of facts.

c. The Armenians are reduced, allowing for the return of survivors, to about ten per cent of the population in the large area proposed. Assuming an optimistic amount of migration of other Armenians into, and of Turks and Kurds out of the land, the Armenians still would constitute only about one-fourth of the population (See appended table of estimates of population.) The situation of mandatory power would be extremely difficult in defending this minority, which would as future owners and rulers of the land, be much more obnoxious to the majority than at present.

d. No European power will undertake so difficult a task, and it must therefore be left to the United States. If the American people should be induced to begin the process, and this should turn out to be fundamentally unjust, they would modify their intention. The chances are considerable that the large Armenia would never become an Armenian state at all, but a mixed state, composed of minorities of Armenians, Turks, Kurds, etc., which would not maintain internal order or security against external aggression without the support of a strong mandatory power. This would disappoint both the Armenians, who could never control the government, and the mandatory power, which could never leave the country.

6. On the contrary, an Armenia reduced to the Armenian highlands in both Turkey and Russia, with an outlet on the Black Sea, would have a good chance of establishment and continuance. The Turkish area which the Russians held in 1917 may be taken approximately as the Turkish portion of this "small Armenia," and the present territory of Russian Armenia as the remainder. Engineers could overcome the physical obstacles to internal and external communication.

a. The Turks and Kurds could not rightfully complain of such an area, because it is the historical Armenia, and because if the million dead Armenians could be restored and brought into the land, the Armenians would have about one-half the population (see table). Migration of Turks and Kurds from this area can be more easily accomplished than from the larger land, inasmuch as a considerable proportion of them fled before the Russians, and thus are in a dislocated condition.

b. The Armenians might become the majority of the actual population within a few years, and with that in view, and with the smaller area, they could be given a larger share in the administration from the start, and trained more rapidly to self-government,

c. The duration of the mandate would be materially shortened, with a solider ethnical foundation and a more compact area. The mandatory would need far fewer troops, and would be put to much less expense.

d. The doubts as to the possibility of erecting an Armenian state in the larger area are reduced for the smaller land. The mandatory power could with a prospect of success, keep in mind the giving of control to the Armenians, since they would after a time not be a minority, causing trouble by incessant pushing for special privileges of an economic and political nature, but a majority with a just right to a larger place.

e. This land having secure frontiers, as was tried out thoroughly during the great war, gives promise of self-defensibility. A state reaching to the Mediterranean is a far more difficult matter, with its long frontiers, containing each a number of vulnerable spots, and its permanent difficulties of internal communication, due to the broken configuration of the land. Its very existence might moreover be regarded by the Turks and Arabs as a provocation.

f. The economic opportunity of an Armenia on this basis would be ample; all essentials for food, fuel, and shelter can be obtained locally, and surpluses are easily to be produced which can be exchanged for other wares

i. In Turkish Armenia the Armenians were able to live and often to prosper, and yet they paid considerable taxes and were subject to frequent robbery.

ii. In Russian Armenia the Armenians have thriven greatly, under only moderately favorable conditions.

iii. This area is crossed by commercial routes of immemorial importance, notably through Erzingan and Erzerum between Anatolia and Persia and Trans-Caucasia, and through Trebizond toward the Persian Gulf. This guarantees the importance of several towns at nodal points, such as Sars, Erivan, Erzerum, Mush, and Van, and suggests valuable possibilities in the direction of transportation, trade, and manufacture for export.

7. All this is argued with the best interests of the Armenians in mind, on the basis of genuine friendliness toward them, and of concern to give them a real and not an illusory opportunity. They are in genuine danger of grasping at too much and losing all.

If they establish themselves securely in the more restricted area, and if Anatolia fails to develop as a well knit and successful states there is no reason why the question should not be resumed later of connecting Cilicia with Armenia.

ESTIMATES OF THE POPULATION OF AN ARMENIAN STATE

The appended tables are the result of an effort to compare the population of Armenian areas to two plans. That which includes a "Larger Turkish Armenia" was worked out by the American Division of Western Asia at the Peace Conference, and can be examined more fully in the records of the Conference. It represents probably subject to minor alterations, the best possible arrangement on the basis of giving an outlet on both the Black and Mediterranean Seas; the frontiers follow natural features, and the connection with Cilicia is made as narrow as practicable. The "Smaller Turkish Armenia" suggested in the text cuts off for Armenia in Turkey substantially that portion of the Armenian plateau which was held by Russia in her period of advance during the great war. The phrase "Differential Area" was chosen to represent what is left after subtracting "Smaller Turkish Armenia" from "Larger Turkish Armenia," and extends from Mersina to Kharput and north to the Black Sea.

A. Before 1914. This table is estimated from the statistics prepared by Drs. Magie and Westermann. Percentages are attached. The Moslems are not separated into groups, they include about 400,000 Lazes on the Black Sea coast between Trebizond and Batum; about one half are Turks: most of the remainder are Kurds, some of whom are Shiite or Kizilbash, and the remainder Sunnite. Dr. Magie's figures may under-estimate the Armenians in some areas. Certainty will never be attained as to the numbers of the different elements in Turkey until a scientific ethnological survey has been made under disinterested control.

Area % Moslems % Armenians % Greeks % Others Total
Larger Turkish Armenia. 71 3,073,000 21.5 933,000 6.5 289,000 1 34,000 4,329,000
Differential area 73 1,697.000 20 461,000 6 136,000 1 18,000 2,312 000
Smaller Turkish Armenia 68 1,376,000 2354 472,000 7.5 153,000 1 16,000 2,017,000

B. In 1920. It may be assumed that in 1920 order will be restored so that all survivors can return, of the Armenians who were deported or who fled into Russia, and of the Turks and Kurds who fled from the territory occupied Dr. threatened by Russia. An estimate follows, in which it is guessed that in the "Smaller Turkish Armenia" 50 per cent of the Armenians and Syrian Christians have perished, and 20 per cent of the Greeks and Moslems. The Armenians of the "Differential Area" had not the same opportunity to escape into Russia, and it is guessed that 75 per cent of these have perished.

Area % Moslems % Armenians % Greeks % Others Total
Larger Turkish Armenia 80 2,459,000 11 351,000 8 232 000 1 17,000 3,059,000
Differential area 85 1,358,000 7 115,000 7 110,000 1 9,000 1,592,000
Smaller Turkish Armenia 75 1,101,000 16 236,000 8 122,000 1 8,000 1,467,000
Estimated losses in whole area 615,000 582,000 57,000 17,000 12,270,000

C. In order to give the Armenians the benefit of their entire losses in Turkey during the war, one million may be added to the numbers of Armenians according to each plan. This of course has no relation to the practicability of established an Armenian State, but it displays the justice, on the basis of majority, of assigning them the "Smaller Turkish Armenia."

Area % Moslems % Armenians % Greeks % Others Total
Larger Turkish Armenia. 60 2,459,000 33.5 1,351,000 6 232,000 2 17 000 4,059,000
Smaller Turkish Armenia 45 1,101,000 50 1,236,000 5 122,000 8 000 2 467 000

D. In 1925.-It may be assumed that on either plan, changes will take place between 1920 and 1925 in the following manner: 20 per cent of the Moslems will leave, and 300.000 Armenians will come from other parts of Turkey and the world. No account is taken of natural increase, but this would act against the percentage of the Armenians, because they lost men in far greater proportion than women, and because they are less numerous than the Moslems, particularly when the larger area is considered. It appears that in normal times before the war Armenians increased more rapidly than Moslems, because of differences in social systems and military service; conditions will probably reduce these differences in the future.

Area % Moslems % Armenians % Greeks % Others Total
Larger Armenia 60.5 1,967,000 23 651,000 8 232.000 0.5 17,000 2,867,000
Differential area 1,086,000 115,000 110,000 9,000
Smaller Armenia 57 881,000 35 536,000 8 122,000 0.5 8,000 1,547,000

E. It remains to add Russian Armenia to the Turkish areas considered. The assumption has been made that Russian Armenia will contain in 1920, after the Turkish Armenians have gone home, a population of about one and one half times as great as that estimated by Mr. Lynch, in his "Armenia," Vol. I, p. 451. His actual figures, as of about 1890, for the Russian part of the Armenian plateau, are: Armenians 519,238, Moslems 459,580, Greeks, 47,76S, others 69,129, total 1,095,710.

Area % Moslems % Armenians % Greeks % Others Total
Russian Armenia 40 600,000 50 750,000 3 50,000 7 100 000 1 500 000
Larger Turkish Armenia with Russian Armenia 67 3,059,000 24 1,101,000 6 282,000 3 117,000 4,559,000
Smaller Turkish Armenia with Russian Armenia 57 1,701,000 33 986,000 6 172,000 4 108,000 2,967,000

F. Finally it may be assumed between 1920 and 1925, 250,000 Armenians from the remainder of Russia and from other parts of the world, and that a like number of Moslems will emigrate. Again no account is taken of natural increase, which might make a small addition to the Armenian percentage.

Area % Moslems % Armenians % Greeks % Others Total
Russian Armenia 23 350,000 67 1,000,000 3 50,000 7 100,000 1,500,000
Larger Turkish Armenia with Russian Armenia 53 2,317,000 38 1,651,000 6.5 282,000 2.5 17,000 4,367,000
Smaller Turkish Armenia with Russian Armenia 40 1,231,000 50 1,536,000 6 172,000 4 108,000 3,047,000

The whole calculation then shows a possibility under favorable conditions that by 1925 the Armenians can be in a small majority in an Armenia erected on the smaller basis. They would constitute about two-thirds of the population in the Russian portion, and a little over one-third in the Turkish portion.

In an Armenia on the larger basis they would not exceed 40 per cent for the whole area in 1925, and would then constitute about two-thirds of the population in the Russian portion, and not over one-fourth in the Turkish portion.

II-THE PROBLEM OF A SEPARATE CONSTANTINOPOLITAN STATE

(1) The Conception of such a State. In facing the problem of a separate Constantinopolitan State, there should be, first of all, a clear understanding of the nature of the state proposed.

The definite plan for a League of Nations with its mandatory system, it should be noted gives new help in the solution of this difficult question. It is proposed that the Constantinopolitan State, as a great international interest, should be directly in charge of the League of Nations for the good of all the nations; in the sure conviction that even "national interests are often promoted better by international cooperation than by international competition."

The State would be administered through a mandatory for the League-a Mandatory appointed by the League, responsible to the League, and removable at the will of the League, but held permanent except for cause; for it is plain that there should not be any unnecessary shifting in the administrative power.

The Mandatory, moreover, should be a real mandatory for the League, a trustee for international interests, not a power using its position to advance its own national interests. To this end, the Mandatory should be territorially and strategically disinterested.

The Constantinopolitan State could be administered by an International Commission, [NOTE: This plan bas proved a war-breeding failure] like the notably successful Commission on the Danube; but the problem here is more complex, and the single Mandatory would seem to have some decided advantages over the Commission plan. In the case of the Constantinopolitan State, for example, there would be actual governmental functions to be exercised, as there are not in the same sense in the control of traffic on the Danube. These could be better handled by a regularly organized government. The Mandatory, too, as directly controlled by the League of Nations, would be even more truly international than an international commission of the old kind. And, practically, a single mandatory would naturally be better able to avoid friction, wrangling, and divided counsels, and so to prevent exasperating and dangerous delays. It would also have more immediate power behind it.

Such a State should include Constantinople, and have charge of its administration. This is the more demanded, for Constantinople is a markedly cosmopolitan city, where the Turks are probably not even in the majority. This state should also have a reasonable territory on; either side of the Straits. All fortifications should be abolished. This international territory would of course be open to all people for any legitimate purposes. Like the District of Columbia in America, it would be a natural place for great educational and religious foundations, so that such Moslem institutions could remain and be further built up. The Turkish population, equally of course, would be free to stay. But Constantinople would not longer be the capital of Turkey. In the administration of the State, however, all possible consideration should be given to Moslem sentiment, and reasonable practical adjustments arranged. The Sultan might even conceivably continue to reside at Constantinople if that were desired under the conditions named.

(2) The Reasons for such a State. What are the reasons which make the establishment of an international Constantinopolitan State, as now conceived, imperative, in the final settlement of this war?

(i) President Wilson himself, in the twelfth of his Fourteen Points, made much of by the Turks, points at least in this direction, when he writes: "The Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees." It would seem that that end could be accomplished in no way so surely and so permanently, as by an International State under the League of Nations. The need at least, of some such internationalization is manifest, when it is remembered that the Straits hare been closed almost continuously since 1911.

(ii) Woolf hardly overstates the need of drastic action in this matter, when he says: "Constantinople and the narrow straits upon which it stands have occasioned the world more trouble, have cost humanity more in blood and suffering during the last five hundred years, than any other single spot upon the earth. Certainly during the last hundred years it has been the chief European center of international unrest. From it, and about it, have radiated continually international rivalries and hatreds and suspicions. It was the direct origin and cause of a large number of the wars fought in the nineteenth century. It is not improbable that when Europe in her last ditch has fought the last battle of the Great War, we shall find that what we have again been fighting about is really Constantinople." Now, this perpetual centre of intrigue and endless cause of trouble must be done away with.

(iii) The close of this greatest of wars, with its many new adjustments and particularly with the break-up of the old Turkish Empire, gives an unrivaled opportunity to clear up, in a permanent way, once and for all this great plaguespot of the world. If this opportunity is now neglected, or grasped only in nerveless vacillating and selfish fashion we shall have again the old intolerable situation. We are confronted by a great challenge. Timid counsels should not prevail. As Woolf puts it: "Constantinople is the test of the Great War's result. If it can be, and is, given to any one State, it means the rule of the world by war- if . . . it be administered by all for all, Constantinople means the rule of the world by peace."

(iv) The responsibility for so fateful and strategic a world-center is also too heavy for any single power, however great, to carry; least of all Turkey with her terrible record of mis-government and massacre. It would be hard to choose out of any list of leading nations a nation less fitted for this world task than she. She has completely forfeited any claim to such a responsibility.

(v) Moreover, as we have already seen, it would be to the distinct advantage of Turkey's own new democratic government to be definitely withdrawn from this center of intrigue. Thoughtful Turkish leaders already realize the evils which have come from this intrigue, and might well welcome-even though with natural reluctance-the kind of surgery which should sever their State from such a seat of infection. At the same time, the Turks remaining within the bound tries of the International State, under a competent mandatory, would certainly have the best government they have ever had.

(vi) The situation, furthermore, cannot be dealt with adequately or with any final satisfaction, except internationally and through an international state. And the League of Nations and the Mandatory System, as planned by the Peace Conference, would seem to suggest both a new and stable method for establishing and administering such a state, and a method growing directly out of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Until such an International State is definitely established, there will be endless intrigues on the part of various Powers to possess or control the Straits. So long as a state as weak as Turkey has any kind of hold upon this critically significant territory, intrigues will be encouraged. The Greeks, for example, have already declared their ambition to have Constantinople in their hands, and are conducting a campaign of propaganda to that end. That is typical of what may be expected to go on, until a thorough-going and permanent solution of the problem of the Straits is adopted, in an International State.

(vii) It deserves to be especially emphasized that the reason for the establishment of an International Constantinopolitan State, is not to humiliate Turkey or any Moslem interest, but simply to face squarely and honestly a situation which is a constant menace both to the peace of Turkey and to the peace of the world; and, deceiving ourselves no longer with vain makeshifts, to determine upon the only fundamental solution. No such fundamental readjustment can be made, doubtless, without some disturbance and sacrifices, but it can be counted certain that all related interests-economic, political, social and religious-will in the end gain from a permanent solution of this vexing world-question.

(3) Extent and Boundaries: The discussion of the extent and boundaries of the Constantinopolitan State is by the General Adviser, Dr. Lybyer, and puts clearly the elements of that problem, anticipating a complete study on the ground by the special Boundaries Commission later recommended.

1. The primary reason for the setting off of a separate area at Constantinople, to be forever under a special regime controlled by the League of Nations, is that the straits between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, being a concern of many nations, who cannot remain satisfied with the ownership of any one power, should be permanently and freely open.

2. Inasmuch as the Sea of Marmora is small, and in a sense may be regarded as simply an enlargement of the Straits, a minimum boundary must include not only the whole of both sides of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, but also the entire shore of the Sea of Marmora. The American experts in International Law at Paris pronounced that serious complications might arise if an independent state should reach these waters at any point.

3. Constantinople is also the place where railways make the crossing between Europe and Western Asia, arrangements for the stations and yards of these need to be taken into account.

4. On account of the ready access by water and rail the economic support of the city does not need to be provided for completely within the boundaries of the state, except as regards the water supply. It would be convenient, of course, to have room for dairy and vegetable farming, in view of the trouble of crossing frontiers.

5. Inasmuch as the population has always been greatly mixed,-a condition which will undoubtedly continue, and since it may be assumed that the League of Nations will provide for the security of all elements without privilege or favor, there is no need to adjust the boundary to racial groups.

6. On the European side, it is better, all things considered, to leave with Constantinople the present remnant of Turkey in Europe, accepting the Turco-Bulgarian frontier of 1915 subject to minor modifications. The Constantinople area needs no more land than is included in an adjustment of the Enos-Midia line, as shown on the accompanying map; but the question of disposing of the remainder of "Turkish Thrace" is so acute, that the best solution is to leave this also with Constantinople

i. This area was ceded to the Balkan Allies early in 1913, and assigned to Bulgaria, but it was recovered by Turkey after the second Balkan war If Bulgaria continues to be kept out of her rightful lands in Macedonia, she has some ground for claiming Turkish Thrace as a region for the settlement of refugees. As regards Turkish and Bulgarian Thrace, there has been a considerable exchange of population since 1915, so that few Bulgarians remain in the area, while the number of Turks has been increased .

ii. Greece has claimed the territory, but statistics submitted by the Greeks do not estimate that before 1912 the Greek population of the territory between the Enos-Midia line and the present Bulgarian frontier was more than 147,000, or 42 per cent of the whole. Their own statements show that a large proportion of this number migrated between 1912 and the Great War. They do not state the reciprocal fact that an approximately equal number of Turks migrated from territory acquired by Greece in 1913 and settled here, so that there was not a mere expulsion of Greeks, but a fair exchange of population. The Greek population was then probably not over 25 per cent of the whole in 1914. It is less at present, but changes during the Great War should hardly be taken into account. The claims of Greece to this area cannot be justified.

iii. On the basis of population, Turkish Thrace was really Turkish in 1914, the proportion reaching at least 60 per cent.

iv. There is no prospect that, without violent changes, any other element than the Turkish will become a majority of the population within a considerable time. In case this should ultimately happen, in such a way as to make alterations of boundaries desirable, the League of |Nations could transfer a portion of Thrace out of the Constantinople area.

7. On the Asiatic side, the frontier beginning on the Black Sea coast a short distance east of the mouth of the Sakaria River might run east of the river to Ak Sofu Dagh, cross to Geuk Dagh, pass southwestward to the ridge between Isnik and Yeni Shehir, and proceed westward along the heights south of Mudania, and Pandernwa as far as the boundary of the Sanjak of Bigha, which it might follow to the sea south of Mt. Ida.

i The line between the Black Sea and Ismid is located east of the Sakaria, including the marshy area near the river's mouth, in order to facilitate engineering problems of drainage, and provide an area suitable for dairy farming within the reach and control of Constantinople.

ii. Brusa would better be left to the Turks, because it has no relation to the defense of the Straits; because the local population is predominantly Turkish; and because the Turks are sentimentally attached to this as the first Ottoman capital. To take from them all three capitals, Constantinople, Adrianople, and Brusa, would be very severe.

iii. The Troad Peninsula, while predominantly Turkish, constitutes such a separate physical area that it cannot well be divided. Therefore, for the defense of the Dardanelles, it must all go with the Straits.

8. The total population of this area would be at the outset about two millions, of whom about 60 per cent would be Turks, 25 per cent Greeks, and 10 per cent Armenians. The proportion of Turks would be likely in time to decrease, and that of Greeks and Western Europeans to increase, especially in Constantinople and the smaller cities of the area.

III-THE PROBLEM OF A TURKISH STATE

We have now frankly recognized the necessity, in bare justice to the Armenians, for an Armenia separated from Turkey, and the equal necessity for a separated Constantinopolitan State, in response to a just and imperative world interest

Turkey is thus called upon to surrender her sovereignty over certain modest portions of Asia Minor, but in no way treated as her own conquerors treated territories won in war.

(1) General Extent. But in pursuance of this different spirit shown in conquest, if the principles of national unity and of self-determination are to be truly applied to the Turkish people, Anatolia, the bulk of Asia Minor remaining, with ample outlets to the sea, should be left for a Turkish State, but under such conditions as may sacredly guard the rights of all minorities, whether racial or religious. This would give to Turkey a comparatively very large area-larger than France,-having a population one-fourth that of France-of approximately ten millions, of whom some eight millions are Moslems (about seven millions Turks) and one and one-half millions Greeks. This should assure to the new Turkey an ample opportunity of development. In the interests of a reasonable self-determination for some of the smaller racial groups, it may be also necessary to allow their transfer, if they so choose, to Syria or Mesopotamia, or to grant them at least local autonomy.

(2) Reasons for a Mandate for the Turkish State. It seems to be generally recognized by the Turkish people themselves, that the surest and speediest road out of their present evil conditions is way of a mandate under the League Nations, and so shifting from an imperialistic state to a democratic one. And from every point of view that appears desirable. Indeed, it seems impossible to expect any satisfactory change in the government of Turkey by any other method. And if the Turks had not themselves suggested a mandatory, the Peace Conference might well have felt obliged to require one.

This general statement, indeed, may be said to include the specific reasons why Turkey should have a mandate; to secure genuinely good government, without oppression, bribery, or corruption, for the Turks themselves; to guarantee the rights of all minorities, racial or religious; to deliver Turkey from the demoralization of incessant intrigue from outside; to secure, without selfish exploitation by the Mandatory or any other outside Power, Turkey's economic development and economic independence, for there is not the slightest doubt that she has been living far below her material possibilities; in line with the Allied settlement with Germany, to disband the most of the Turkish Army and do away with all military conscription, depending upon a well organized gendarmerie for the larger police duties of the State,-all this for the better good of the common people and to break the power of intriguing imperialists over them, to put beneath all Turkish life a national system of universal education that should lift her entire people, to train the various peoples of the State steadily into self-government; in a word, to make of Turkey a state of a high order on a modern basis of equal rights to all before the law, and of full religious liberty. This would inevitably result in a state not purely (though predominantly) Turkish in race and in control, a cosmopolitan state in which various racial stocks were contained and in whose government all representatively shared.

(3) Turkey's Desire for An American Mandate. For the reasons given in an earlier section of the report-especially since the Peace Conference had not declared that Turkey must herself have a mandate, and because a free expression was not allowed-it has been very difficult to get clearly decisive evidence of the desires of the people of Turkey upon the choice of mandate. But many indications tend to confirm the opinion that the great majority of thoughtful Turkish leaders sincerely desire an American mandate.

That a nation so long independent should seek a mandate, in any sense of the term, is sufficiently remarkable, and it tends to confirm the opinion of a trustworthy and university-trained Turkish journalist, who wrote: "The Turks have been so hardly tried by the events in the past, that most of them are ready to submit themselves to some regular schooling, instead of making any hazardous experiments with new, ignorant leaders." And he thus sums up Turkish public opinion concerning a mandate for Turkey:

The following divisions can be noticed: (1) the large majority which realizes that the country has only the choice between an American mandate and an eternal chaos, coupled with foreign occupation and the loss of national unity; (2) a minority which does not like to discuss any settlement which implies a theoretical restriction of sovereignty; (3) a minority of supporters of an English solution.

As giving an idea of the strength of the American majority, he calls attention to "The elements which make it up":

The National Congress, a body formed in Constantinople several months ago by the delegates of fifty-three different Turkish societies and organizations, is one of the chief supporters of the American mandate. As all the Turkish intellectual organizations are represented in the Congress, it may almost be considered as representative of the educated classes in general. The National League, containing about forty of the most respected citizens and Senators is also for the American mandate. This means at the same time, the majority of the Senatu The "Nationalist" Party in Anatolia in general are in favor of the American mandate. The professors of different faculties of the university favor the American mandate. So do most of the lawyers, teachers technicians, and merchants. At present, most of the papers with large circulations are taking the same view of things. This state of things is very surprising, because there is, on the one hand, a very active propaganda for the English mandate; on the other hand the Americans do not make any propaganda.

Another journalist gave detailed corroborative evidence looking in the same direction. For example, he said that he had been carrying on a campaign in his Constantinople paper for three months for an American Mandate, and that this campaign had called out only two letters protests while, on the contrary, many words of approval had come from men of all parties.

The delegations who have met the Commission, when the question of mandate was taken up, have generally favored an American Mandate. A delegation representing the intellectual leaders among the women, including presidents of educational institutions and of national and provincial educational associations, were especially emphatic in declaring for an American Mandate. The general judgment of the most trustworthy observers whom the Commission were able to consult confirmed these results. The delegates of a Congress held a few months ago at Smyrna, and representing 1,800,000 people, have declared for an American Mandate. The Congress at Sivas held on the 20th of August, probably the most representative recent gathering of the Turkish people, is expected by those in closest touch with the movement for which it stands, to declare for an American Mandate.

On the whole, it is highly probable that a large majority of the Turkish people, wishing a mandate at all, would favor the American Mandate.

(4) Territorial Conditions in Anatolia. To complete the survey of the problems involved in a reconstitution of the Turkish State in Anatolia, a general discussion, in brief summary, of territorial conditions in Anatolia-touching also upon various subject races-seems called for. This is also furnished by the General Adviser.

I. After setting off definitely from the Turkish Empire as it was in 1914 all the Arabic-speaking areas, Armenia, and the Constantinopolitan State, there remains a large mass of territory, in which the greatest single element of population is Turkish (this word being limited to those persons whose mother tongue is Turkish and who profess the Mohammedan religion). Claims have been advanced toward setting off portions of this remaining area, by Kurds for "Kurdistan ;" by Greeks for "Pontus,"-an area along the Black Sea coast from Sinope to Batum; by Syrians for Cilicia; by Italians for Adalia and the whole southwest, and by Greeks for Smyrna and the west. The only one of these portions that is advisable, in the opinion of the Commission, actually to handle separately at present, is "Kurdistan." All will be discussed briefly in the order named.

II. Kurdistan. The Kurds claim a very large area, on the basis of their distribution, but since they are greatly mixed with Armenians, Turks, and others, and divided among themselves into Kizilbash, Shiite and Sunnites it seems best to limit them to the natural geographical area which lies between the proposed Armenia on the north and Mesopotamia on the south, with the divide between the Euphrates and the Tigris as the western boundary, and the Persian frontier as the eastern boundary. A measure of autonomy can be allowed them under close mandatory rule, with the object of preparing them for ultimate independence or for federation with neighboring areas in a larger self-governing union. It is possible to shift most of the comparatively small numbers of both Turks and Armenians out of this area by voluntary exchange of population and thus obtain a province containing about a million and a half people, nearly all Kurds. Full security must needs be provided for the Syrian, Chaldean and Nestorian Christians who dwell in the area. This plan would probably provide for all of the Sunnite Kurds in Turkey, and the Kizilbash group lies almost wholly to the west. The area contemplated looks more to the south than the west and lies wholly about the upper waters of the Tigris and its tributaries. It would seem better, therefore, unless the population itself strongly prefers the other plan. to place it under the control of the power which cares for Mesopotamia, than to connect it with Armenia across the mountains at the north, or with Anatolia with which it would have only narrow contact at the west.

III. "Pontus." About one-half of the area asked for by the Greeks of "Pontus" should be included in the Armenian State, in order to give it access to the sea. The remainder is needed by Anatolia for the same reason. There were approximately 200,000 Greeks in each of these portions in 1914. This would seem to he too small a minority in both Armenia and Anatolia to be erected into an autonomous province. The rights of these Greeks can in each state he provided for fully by general laws, enforced in each case by the mandatory power until such time as the states are ready for self-government with adequate protection of minorities.

IV. Cilicia. Cilicia is claimed by both Armenians and Syrians, in each case by a minority which did not exceed 25 per cent in 1914. Reasons are stated above for not giving it to the former. It is unimportant to Syria as an outlet, since that area has many ports. But it is very valuable to the areas both at the northeast and the north. It should not be separated economically from Anatolia at present. and if at any future time the Armenians should receive it, provisions would have to be made for the use of its ports by the interior regions of Anatolia from Kaisariyeh to Konia.

The region between Cilicia and Armenia, containing Albistan, Malatia and Kharput is claimed by the Armenians, but should also be left with Anatolia. It contained in 1914 a mixture of Turks, Kizlbash, Armenians, Sunnite Kurds and others, proportioned apparently in the order named. Strong mandatory control would be difficult because of the distance from the coast across rough mountainous country but it would be very necessary, lest the region become a hunting ground for Turkish, Kurdish, and Armenian bands, each anxious to acquire the territory for its people.

V. Adalia and the Southwest. Italy's claim to the southwest of Asia Minor rests upon nothing that is compatible with the principles of the Commission's instructions. There are no Italians native to the country, and no evidence exists that the population desires Italy as a mandatory over them. In this region the Moslems are to the Greek Orthodox Christians as ten to one. None of this area should be separated from Anatolia.

VI. Smyrna and the West. The problem of the west coast is a difficult one, not because of the intrinsic situation, but because of the persistency of the Greek Government in demanding an area there, and of the fact that a Greek army is in occupation.

Nowhere except perhaps in the Sanjak of Smyrna and certain coastal Kazas is the Greek Orthodox population in a majority, and the complete proof that it is in majority there awaits an impartial census. If any question existed previously as to the unwillingness of the majority of the population in the area now occupied by the Greeks to be annexed to Greece, or to have Greece as a mandatory, the question has been answered by the circumstances of the occupation.[NOTE: This is an allusion to the massacres of Moslems by Greeks, and subsequent atrocities upon the occasion of the landing at Smyrna May 15, 1915. An official Inter-Allied inquiry has confirmed the fact of the atrocities.] The question has also been answered as to whether the Balkan State of modern Greece has reached such a degree of civilization that it can be entrusted with mandatory rule over a people of different faith and hostile feeling.

The Greek army and all authority of the Greek Government ought to be withdrawn from an area where better order was kept by twelve British officers than can be maintained by one hundred thousand Greek troops. There can be no settled peace until either a Greek conquest has swept far to the interior, with great destruction of property and life, or until the Greek power is wholly removed. In the latter case the question would still remain: Should an area in Western Asia Minor be set off as a special Greek region and placed under a separate mandate? The answer is in the negative for the following reasons:

(1) The character of the country is such that no good natural boundary can be found except high up in the hills If such a boundary be traced, the population within it would be so markedly Moslem (about three to one) that the area could have no special Greek character.

(2) If, on the other hand, a more or less arbitrary line be drawn farther west, it would not constitute a good barrier for defense against smugglers or brigand bands.

(3) Any line drawn now would be regarded, more or less, as an economic barrier, cutting off Smyrna and other coast cities from some of the trade with the interior, to mutual disadvantage.

(4) Neither Greeks nor Turks in Western Asia Minor would believe anything except that it is the intention of the League of Nations to permit Greece later to annex the territory set off, and perhaps to extend her holdings further. The elements would therefore be present for a Macedonian system of sustained brigand warfare, which could be kept down only by more military effort and expenditure than any mandatory power cares to assume.

Shall any measures be taken then to develop a special Greek area in Asia Minor? The maximum that would seem to be advisable at the present would be that a strong mandatory power should be entrusted with a single mandate for all Anatolia, and should take special pains to protect Greeks and Turks alike and preserve order in the west, with the possibility of a limited locally autonomous Greek area. The question of a future separated Greek area could then be left in abeyance, to be brought up again if circumstances justify.

VII. A Mandate for Anatolia. While the instructions of this Commission do not directly mention the assignment by the League of Nations of a mandatory nation to assist the Turks, many of the Turks themselves have suggested such a plan, and some have presented urgent requests for America as the mandatory power. The need of supervision over finance, public works, education, internal order, and all the processes of government is hardly less for the Turks, despite their centuries of political experience, than for the Armenians, Syrians, and Mesopotamians. It is in fact impossible to discern any other method of setting Western Asia in order. The Turks if left to themselves in a condition of poverty, ignorances and general exhaustion, with a feeling that they had been unjustly treated and then abandoned by all the world, could not fail to be a source of trouble and disturbance until another crisis, with perhaps another great war, would necessitate some such solution as is now suggested but under conditions less favorable to success.

VIII. The Desirability of a Single Mandatory for Armenia, Anatolia, and Constantinople. While it is desirable that Armenia, Anatolia, and Constantinople should be placed under separate mandates, and governed by separated administrations, it is also desirable that the three mandates should be held by one great power.

(1) Those areas have been held together for several centuries, and have a great number of close ties of all sorts, the delicate adjustment of which can be best accomplished under one power.

(2) Unity of economic control, with similar commercial laws, coinage, weights, and measures, and language of business is advantageous to all concerned.

(3) Problems of repatriation and exchange of populations, can be arranged more justly and promptly under one mandatory.

(4) The adjustment of the public debt will be easier.

(5) The building of railroads and the improvement of routes of travel can be better arranged.

(6) Police control and repression of brigandage will be far simpler. On the contrary the holding of the three areas by separate powers permits the taking of refuge by bandits and criminals across the borders.

(7) Unity is urged by many well-informed foreigners, looking from various points of view. Many of these favor not merely a single mandatory power, but a single mandate. Practically all the benefits can be obtained by the first plan that could be obtained by the second, and many serious difficulties can be avoided, such as arise from persecution of Armenians, interference with navigation, and complications of intrigue.

( Friction which might arise between three mandatories, and which might conceivably lead to a great war, could be eliminated.

(9) The transition would be more easily acceptable by the Turkish people, than if two or three powers should take control of the three areas. The fact that the mandatory would probably establish a central control in Constantinople would aid the transition still further.

In the foregoing discussion of Territorial Conditions in Anatolia, various minority people have been briefly studied. It seems necessary to consider further, at this point, only the rather pressing problems of the Greeks.

IV-THE PROBLEM OF THE GREEKS

(1) The situation of the Greeks is not that of the Armenians. The Greeks have suffered much in deportations by the Turks, but there have been no such extensive massacres of the Greeks as of the Armenians. The Greeks, too, in the adjacent Greek Islands, have a possible congenial refuge within former Turkish territory, such as the Armenians do not have. The Greeks also have, in territories recently acquired by Greece, opportunities for settlement on Greek soil, for which there is no parallel for the Armenians. The general situation of the Greeks, too, in diminished numbers, is much less desperate than that of the Armenians. Moreover, the Greeks are more widely scattered in small groups through Turkey than the Armenians. The drastic remedy of establishing a state for the Greeks completely separated from Turkey, seems, therefore, both less possible and very much less desirable.

(2) The Results of the Greek Occupation of Smyrna do not seem to indicate that the Greeks of Turkey should now be given rule over others or be granted their own full independence. Local autonomy in a territory strictly confined to a district in which they were in a decided majority would seem the most that could be recommended at present.

(3) The ability of the Greeks is not in question, nor their enthusiasm for education. On the contrary, both factors make it the more probable that they could continue to hold their own within the Turkish State. Indeed, the special gifts of the Greeks generally make them particularly successful as colonists. The probability is that they would lose on the whole rather than gain, in being completely set off from Turkey. In spite of the violent antagonisms of recent years, Ramsey may well be right in saying: "The Turks and the Greeks will united make a happier country than either race could by itself." The two races supplement each other.

(4) There is to be added, that the apparent purpose of the Turks to ask for a mandate, and of the Peace Conference to appoint such a mandate, gives promise of a new Turkey, in which the rights of the Greeks would be fully guarded at least for the terms of the mandate.

A trial certainly should be made by the Greeks of life in the Turkish State under the new conditions, before further independence should be sought. The constitution of a new Turkey on modern lines, the steady watchers and influence of the Mandatory, and the supervision of the League of Nations and the right of appeal to it-all combine to give the Greeks every assurance of fair treatment and equality of opportunity, at least during the term of the mandate. It will be the business, too, of the Mandatory to do all possible to develop the whole people into capacity for self-government. The help of a national system of education, too, would do much to assure that the abuses of the old time would not return, and the term of the mandate would naturally continue until there was good promise of Turkey's success as a modem state. Even after the mandate had expired, the League of Nations could still act, upon necessity to prevent all gross invasions of the rights of minorities.

In the light of all these considerations it could seem best not to set off any independent Greek territory for the present, in the belief that in the long run the better good both of the Greeks and of the Turks is to be found in their union in one cosmopolitan state.

V-RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations, dealing with mandates in the Asia Minor portion of the former Ottoman Empire, follow naturally upon the preceding discussions of pertinent action already taken by the Peace Conference; of dangers arising from a selfish division and exploitation of Turkey; of considerations looking to a proper division of Turkey; and of problems naturally resulting. For the recommendations built directly on foundations already laid by the Peace Conference. They aim to prevent a selfish exploitation and division of Turkey. They intend not less surely to ground such division of Turkey as is recommended solely upon considerations of justice and the good of all men. And in this spirit they endeavor honestly to face the grave problem arising, and to seek their solution in the light of the full discussion which precedes. That discussion has been so full, that the Recommendations of the Commissioners need do little more than summarize conclusions, except upon two points-the reasons for a general American Mandate, and the conditions upon which such a mandate might be taken by America.

The Commissioners Recommend

1 The formation, under a Mandatory of an Armenian State, completely separated from Turkey, as defined in the preceding section of the report, for reasons already fully given.

It is consequently recommended that Cilicia should not be separated from Anatolia at present.

2. The similar formation. under a Mandatory, of an International Constantinopolitan State, completely separated from Turkey, as defined in the preceding section, also for reasons already fully given.

3. The appointment of a Mandatory for the continued Turkish State, in line with the apparent wishes of the majority of the Turkish people; the major terms of the Mandate to be defined by the Peace Conference or the League of Nations, and further adjustments to be arranged between the Mandatory and Turkey. The reasons for the Mandate and its necessary scope have been already fully given.

4. That. for the reasons already stated, no independent territory be set off for the Greeks; though local autonomy be granted to that portion of the Sanjak of Smyrna which has a decided majority of Greeks, but under the general mandate for Turkey.

5. That a commission or commissions on boundaries in Asia Minor be appointed to study on the ground and to exactly define the boundaries of the states named in the first three recommendations, and the precise limits of any locally autonomous area in Smyrna. The definition of the boundaries of the Turkish State would require the study and definition of the northern boundaries of Syria and Mesopotamia as well, with special reference to allowing to the Kurds a measure of autonomy under close mandatory rule, possibly in connection with Mesopotamia, and with the clear understanding that the rights of the Syrian, Chaldean, and Nestorian Christian minorities in this whole region shall be carefully guarded.

6. A general single mandate for the whole of Asia Minor (not assigned to Mesopotamia or Syria) to include under it the mandate for Armenia, the mandate for the Constantinopolitan State, and the mandate for the continued Turkish State, each with a governor of its own to insure full attention to its particular interests besides a governor-general over the whole. The various interrelations and common concerns of the constituent states would thus be studied and cared for, as well as their individual needs. The reasons for such a general mandate have been fully given and need not be repeated here.

7. That the United States of America be asked to take this general single mandate, together with its inclusive mandates for the Armenian State, the Constantinopolitan State, and the continued Turkish State. This recommendation is made for the following reasons which need to be developed in full:

(1) As already pointed out, it seems to be generally desired that America should take the mandate for Armenia. In this, both the Armenians and the Allies seem agreed-and even the Turks, if there must be an Armenian State at all. Nevertheless, America cannot wisely take this mandate without at the same time taking a mandate for the rest of Asia Minor as well.

For, in the first place, this Armenian mandate would be in many respects the most difficult of all: because it would begin in relations of bitter hostility; because the State would have to built from the bottom under most peculiar circumstances; and because the mandate would have to be prolonged against the impatience of the Armenians. And these difficulties would all be accentuated, if the surrounding conditions could not be determined. It concerns the world that this Armenian State should clearly succeed. its mandatory should not be needlessly handicapped.

In the second place, the problems of the different States in Asia Minor are too closely related to be wisely entrusted to entirely different Powers, with different ideals and methods. That situation would inevitably tend to produce friction, waste, and bad feeling, and unsatisfactory conditions in one state would naturally spread to other states also.

In the third place, if the rest of Turkey, outside of a modest Armenian State, were divided into spheres of influence and exploitation areas, the direct hindrance to the working out of a truly conceived mandate in Armenia would be well nigh insuperable.

The American mandate for Armenia, thus, calls for a general mandate over all of Asia Minor.

(2) America is also the most natural Power to take the mandate for the International Constantinopolitan State as well as for Armenia, for the simple reason that she is the only Great Power territorially and strategically disinterested. The mandatory for this international state should be herself strong, to discourage any further intrigue for control of the Straits, disinterested, to command the confidence of all the nations concerned, and in unmistakably earnest sympathy with the aim of such a state, and with those international means by which this aim is to be achieved,-the League of Nations and its mandatory system. These needed qualifications are best met by America. Now the full fruits of such an international state cannot be secured unless the rest of Asia Minor is made a fit environment for such a state, practically embodying the same great principles

The mandate for the Constantinopolitan State also calls for a general mandate over all Asia Minor.

(3) It is to be added that America is also the most natural Power for the mandate over the New Turkish State, because the Turkish people want her, and generally trust her, as the evidence previously given indicates, and because America is peculiarly prepared to meet the needs of the Turkish people in this crisis in their history, as the reasons to be given for a general American mandate will later bring out.

The desired American mandate for the new Turkish State, then, calls also for a general mandate over all Asia Minor.

(4) The best solution for mandates in Asia Minor would seem then to be, to combine all three mandates in a composite mandate, which would be put in the hands of America as the single mandatory

The general reasons for a single mandatory for all Asia Minor, already given are not to be lightly regarded. They give solid grounds for a composite supervisory mandate.

The further direct reasons for making America that single mandatory should now be considered. To begin with, there is the recognized fact that all the other Great Allies are already heavily loaded with colonial responsibilities, which of itself suggests a special obligation here for America. But the positive reasons-if there are any-lie necessarily in some special fitness of America for the particular task in hand-a fitness growing naturally out of her experience as a great growing democracy, largely freed hitherto from European entanglements. Those reasons, that is, lie inevitably in certain dominant national convictions of America, in a certain idealistic international faith; in her record in these international relations, and in the indications of her duty at this critical point in human history. All of these considerations concern the Turkish situation.

In the first place, we have found both the Syrian and Turkish peoples recognizing that at the foundation of the common life of America were to be found certain great dominant convictions. They saw that she had a passion for peace and for the possibility of its attainment, in spite of all sordid manifestations to the contrary, and that to bring such a righteous peace nearer, she entered this war. They saw that she had a passion for democracy, for the common man everywhere, in spite of inconsistencies at home and abroad, and could treat men of all races with a genuine respect born of some insight into their own individual gifts. They felt sure that she would not go into any situation simply to dominate, and to stamp American customs on a people. They knew that, because she really believed in democracy, she had also a passion for universal education, as possible for the rank and file of every nation, and as absolutely essential to a democracy. They believed, therefore, that as a mandatary she would gird herself to help a people fulfill its own highest possibilities. They believed, indeed, that she had a passion for the development of a national spirit in every people, not as narrow conceit, but as faith in a divine individuality, to which the people must be true, if they were to be significant members of that larger fellowship of nations for which the world longs. They instinctively felt, thus, that she combined in a way fairly unique, educational emphasis with respect for the values of another people. They knew, too, that with a high religious idealism, America somehow combined belief in the principle of the separation of Church and State in governmental administration, for the highest good both of religion and of the state, and was thus especially fitted to render help to a state like Turkey at so peculiarly critical a point in her transition from an imperialistic to a democratic state on modern lines and with complete religious liberty.

In the second place, with these mastering convictions, the Syrians and Turkish people believed that America combined a certain idealistic international faith, in her stubborn belief in the League of Nations and in the possibilities of its mandatory system, when honestly carried out. She was naturally prepared, therefore, they believed, to throw herself into the responsibilities of a mandate; steadfastly to seek to train the people entrusted to her care into self-government and into economic independence; and promptly to withdraw when that task was complete; for she would measure the success of her stewardship by both the completeness and the promptness with which her task was accomplished.

In the third place, both the Syrian and the Turkish people, in expressing their desire for an American mandate, have laid steady emphasis upon the assurance which came from America's record in dealing with other peoples. They believed in her unselfish aims in the war and that she was now seeking for no share in the spoils of the war. They believed that she had no territorial or imperialistic ambitions. They believed in her high and unselfish aims in dealing with Cuba and the Philippines. They believed that she was not involved in any joint plan for an exploiting division of either Syria or Turkey. They believed in the high quality of her relief service and especially of her educational service in both countries-a service so fine, that so competent and impartial an observer as Ramsey can say: "I firmly believe that Robert College has done more to render possible a safe solution of the 'Eastern Question' in Turkey than all the ambassadors of all the European Powers have succeeded in doing to render that solution difficult." They believed that, so far was America from scheming to obtain a mandate in Asia, she was honestly reluctant to undertake such a mandate of any kind.

In the fourth place, America is peculiarly fitted to be the single Mandatory Power for all Asia Minor, not only because of her national convictions, her international faith, and her record, but also because the course of duty for her would seem to lie in this direction.

It is no part of the task of the commissioners to determine whether America is now willing to accept the general single mandate for Turkey, with its three involved subordinate mandates. It is their business to point out where, in their honest judgment, that mandate belongs (if proper conditions can be fulfilled) and so given an opportunity to the Peace Conference to put the resulting obligation squarely up to the American people.

Can America deny all obligation in this matter of a mandate for Turkey? She has believed perhaps more than any other people, in the high possibilities of the League of Nations: but, if the League of Nations is not to be a sham and a delusion, all nations must be willing to bear their share in the resulting responsibilities. America, certainly, cannot be an exception. She came into the war, too with the ardent faith and hope that a more democratic world might result. Is she willing to carry those war purposes through to the end? Here in Turkey is an unrivaled opportunity to try these purposes out, for the good not only of a single people, but of the entire world; for here in Turkey has been through centuries a center of intrigue and strife that has engulfed all nations in its consequences. Moreover, America's intervention in the war went far to determine the war's issue. Was that intervention justified? America must still do her utmost to complete the proof.

But America's obligation goes still deeper, in this desperate hour of human need. Men still need peace-long deferred. They need far better provision for bodily wants. They need simple, homely happiness. But beneath all this, they need renewed faith in one another and in one another's honest purposes of good.

The war destroyed that faith between the hostile forces, the settlements of the war, it is to be feared, have gone far to destroy that faith among the Allies themselves. It is not roseate dreaming, but practical politics of the most imperative sort, to do something to bring back men's faith in men. If we can see the radical necessity of such faith, to prevent or break a financial panic are we to see less clearly in times like these, of a moral world panic? Cynicism and disillusionment, as we have seen, are rife. Can they be conquered? Only by indisputable examples to the contrary. It may be doubtful, then: if America could do anything so significant for the human race today, as to prove that she had not forgotten her own ideals and purposes in the war, but was willing to give a new and even greater proof of them in undertaking unselfishly a difficult and distasteful, but highly important and far-reaching task-by taking on the general mandate for Turkey (as well as for Syria, if the Peace Conference thought best). In fidelity to herself does not America owe that demonstration to the world ? It is hard to estimate the immense effect of so important a mandate under the League of Nations being carried through with absolutely honest unselfishness. It would make a reality of the League of Nations; it would make a reality of the mandatory system. It would set a new standard in international relations. It would renew men's faith in one another. It would help to save America herself from a disastrous reaction from her genuinely high aims in the war.

Nothing has been said of America's ment of Turkey's large resources, though it is not suggested that the financial relations of Turkey to America should be finally other than those of self-respecting independence. Turkey's present condition, however, is so necessitous in a thousand ways, that very large amounts of capital would be initially required, and returns at first would be small and slow. But before the mandate ended a fair return on capital, put into direly needed public improvements and the development of natural resources, might properly be expected at the same time that Turkey's own interests were guarded against selfish and monopolistic exploitation. Ample means for the economic develop America should not come into the Turkish Mandate with the expectation of large financial profits. But if even so favorable a result as that indicated proved quite impossible, America might well spend millions to insure relations of peace and good will among nations, rather than the billions required for another war, sure to come if the present cynical national selfishness and lack of good will are not checked.

As against the considerations now presented, it might be urged that the very suggestion of so large and significant a mandate for America is itself proof that America too is grasping imperialistic power. The answer is, that America's idea of a mandate is emphatically that a mandate is for limited term (so that even if a mandate for Syria were added to the mandate for Turkey the whole would mean no long retention of power by America, except as the League of Nations should continue her as mandatory over the Constantinopolitan State, that she literally does not want this mandate, except to meet her fair share of responsibility in the world today; that she would have to be persuaded by a campaign of education to take it on; and that she ought not to take it at all, if certain important conditions cannot be fulfilled.

(5) Considerations on which America would be justified in taking a composite general mandate for Asia Minor. Those conditions are: That she is really wanted by the Turkish people, that Turkey should give evidence that she is ready to do justice to the Armenians, not only by the allotment of the territory within her borders, recommended for the Armenian State, but also by encouraging the repatriation of Armenians, and by seeing that all possible just reparation is made to them as they return to their homes; that Turkey should also give evidence that she is ready to become a modern constitutional state, and to abolish military conscription; that Russia should be ready to renounce all claims upon Russian Armenia; that the Allies should cordially welcome America's help in the difficult situation in Turkey, and especially that all plans for cutting up Turkey, for the benefit of outside peoples, into spheres of influence and exploitation areas should be abandoned.

These conditions are necessary to a successful solution of the Turkish problem. Unless they are fulfilled, America ought not to take the mandate for Asia Minor. And the Commissioners do not recommend that the mandate be given to America if these conditions cannot be essentially met.
Respectfully submitted,

HENRY C. KING,
CHARLES R. CRANE.
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The plot against Gaza
By Jonathan Cook

Przekroj Magazine (Warsaw)

16 January 2009

Israel has justified its assault on Gaza as entirely defensive, intended only to stop Hamas firing rockets on Israel’s southern communities. Although that line has been repeated unwaveringly by officials since Israel launched its attack on 27 December, it bears no basis to reality. Rather, this is a war against the Palestinians of Gaza, and less directly those in the West Bank, designed primarily to crush their political rights and their hopes of statehood.

The most glaring evidence contradicting the Israeli casus belli is the six-month ceasefire between Hamas and Israel that preceded the invasion. True, Hamas began firing its rockets as soon as the truce came to an end on 19 December, but Israel had offered plenty of provocation. Not least it broke the ceasefire by staging a raid into Gaza on 4 November that killed six Hamas members. Even more significantly, it maintained and tightened a blockade during the ceasefire period that was starving Gaza’s 1.5 million inhabitants of food, medicine and fuel. Hamas had expected the blockade lifted in return for an end to the rockets.

A few days before Israel’s attack on Gaza, Yuval Diskin, the head of Israel’s domestic security service, the Shin Bet, noted Hamas’ commitment to the ceasefire and its motives in restarting the rocket fire. “Make no mistake, Hamas is interested in maintaining the truce,” he told the cabinet. “It seeks to improve its conditions – a removal of the blockade, receiving a commitment from Israel that it won’t attack and extending the lull to the Judea and Samaria area [the West Bank].” In other words, had Israel wanted calm, it could have avoided invading Gaza simply by renegotiating the truce on more reasonable terms.

Israel, however, had little interest in avoiding a confrontation with Hamas, as events since the Islamic group’s takeover of Gaza in early 2006 show.

It is widely agreed among the Israeli leadership that Hamas represents a severe threat to Israel’s ambition to crush the Palestinians’ long-standing demands for a state in the West Bank and Gaza. Unike Fatah, its chief Palestinian political rival, Hamas has refused to collude with the Israeli occupation and has instead continued its resistance operations. Although Hamas officially wants the return of all the lands the Palestinians were dispossessed of in 1948, at the establishment of Israel, it has shown signs of increasing pragmatism since its election victory, as Diskin’s comments above highlight. Hamas leaders have repeatedly suggested that a long-term, possibly indefinite, truce with Israel is possible. Such a truce would amount to recognition of Israel and remove most of the obstacles to the partition of historic Palestine into two states: a Jewish state and a Palestinian one.

Rather than engaging with Hamas and cultivating its moderate wing, Israel has been preparing for an “all-out war”, as Ehud Barak, the defence minister, has referred to the current offensive. In fact, Barak began preparing the attack on Gaza at least six months ago, as he has admitted, and probably much earlier.

Barak and the military stayed their hand in Gaza chiefly while other strategies were tested. The most significant was an approach espoused in the immediate wake of Hamas’ victory in 2006. Dov Weisglass, former prime minister Ariel Sharon’s fixer in Washington, gave it clearest expression. Israel’s policy, he said, would be “like an appointment with a dietician. The Palestinians will get a lot thinner, but won’t die.”

John Wolfensohn, envoy to the Quartet of the United States, the United Nations, Europe and Russia through most of 2005, has pointed out that the US and Israel reneged on understandings controlling the border crossings into Gaza from the moment of Israel’s disengagement in summer 2005. In an interview with the Israeli media, he attributed the rapid destruction of the Gazan economy to this policy. However, while the blockade began when Fatah was still in charge of the tiny enclave, Weisglass’ “diet” was designed to intensify the suffering of Gaza’s civilians. The rationale was that, by starving them, they could be both reduced to abject poverty and encouraged to rise up and overthrow Hamas.

But it seems the Israeli army was far from convinced a “diet” would produce the desired result and started devising a more aggressive strategy. It was voiced last year by Israel’s deputy defence minister, Matan Vilnai. He observed that, if Hamas continued firing rockets into Israel (in an attempt, though he failed to mention it, to break the blockade), the Palestinians “will bring upon themselves a bigger shoah because we will use all our might to defend ourselves.” The Hebrew word “Shoah” has come to refer exclusively to the Holocaust.

Though his disturbing comment was quickly disowned, Vilnai is no maverick. He is a former major general in the army who maintains close ties to the senior command. He is also a friend of his boss, Ehud Barak, the Labor leader and Israel’s most decorated soldier. The reference to the “shoah” offered a brief clue to the reasoning behind a series of policies he and Barak began unveiling from summer 2007.

It was then that hopes of engineering an uprising against Hamas faded. The diet regime had patently failed, as had a Fatah coup attempt underwritten by the United States. Hamas struck a pre-emptive blow against Fatah, forcing its leaders to flee to the West Bank. In retaliation the Israeli government declared Gaza a “hostile entity”. Barak and Vilnai used Gaza’s new status as the pretext for expanding the blockade of food and medicines to include electricity, a policy that was progressively tightened. At the same time they argued that Israel should consider cutting off “all responsibility” for Gaza. The intenton of Barak’s blockade, however, was different from the Weisglass version. It was designed to soften up Gazan society, including Hamas fighters, for Israel’s coming invasion.

Far from being threatened by the intensifying blockade, Hamas turned it to its advantage. Although Israel controls two of the land borders and patrols the coast, there is fourth short land border shared with Egypt, close by the town of Rafah. There Gaza’s entrepreneurs developed a network of smuggling tunnels that were soon commandeered by Hamas. The tunnels ensured both that basic supplies continued to get through, and that Hamas armed itself for the attack it expected from Israel.

From March 2008 Barak and Vilnai began pushing their military strategy harder. New political formulations agreed by the government suggested the whole population of Gaza were to be considered complicit in Hamas actions, and therefore liable for retaliatory military action. In the words of the daily Jerusalem Post newspaper, Israeli policymakers took the view that “it would be pointless for Israel to topple Hamas because the population [of Gaza] is Hamas”.

At this point, Barak and Vilnai announced they were working on a way to justify in law the army directing artillery fire and air strikes at civilian neighbourhoods of Gaza, as has been occurring throughout the current Gaza campaign. Vilnai, meanwhile, proposed declaring areas of the tiny enclave “combat zones” in which the army would have free rein and from which civilians would be expected to flee – again a tactic that has been implemented over the past two weeks.

Although Israel is determined to crush Hamas politically and militarily, so far it has been loathe to topple it. Israel withdrew from Gaza precisely because the demographic, military and economic costs of directly policing its refugee camps were considered too high. It will not be easily dragged back in.

Other options are either unpalatable or unfeasible. A Fatah government riding in on the back of Israeli tanks would lack legitimacy, and no regime at all – anarchy – risks loosing forces more implacably opposed to a Jewish state than Hamas, including al-Qaeda. Placing Gaza under a peacekeeping force faces other hurdles: not least, the question of which countries would be prepared to take on such a dangerous burden.

Instead Israel is planning to resort to its favourite diplomatic manoeuvre: unilateralism. It wants a solution that passes over the heads of Hamas and the Palestinians. Or as Tzipi Livni, the foreign minister, put it: “There is no intention here of creating a diplomatic agreement with Hamas. We need diplomatic agreements against Hamas.” The formula being sought for a ceasefire will face stiff opposition from Israel unless it helps achieve several goals.

Israel’s first is to seal off Gaza properly this time. Egypt, although profoundly uncomfortable at having an Islamic group ruling next door, is under too much domestic pressure to crack down on the tunnelling. Israel therefore wants to bring in American and European experts to do the job. They will ensure that the blockade cannot be broken and that Hamas cannot rearm. At best, Hamas can hope to limp on as nominal ruler of Gaza, on Israeli sufferance.

The second goal has been well articulated by the Harvard scholar Sara Roy, who has been arguing for some time that Israel is, in her words, “de-developing” Gaza. The blockade has been integral to achieving that objective, and is the reason Israel wants it strengthened. In the longer term, she believes, Gazans will come to be “seen merely as a humanitarian problem, beggars who have no political identity and therefore can have no political claims.”

In addition, Gazans living close to the enclave’s northern and southern borders may be progressively “herded” into central Gaza – as envisioned in Vilnai’s plan last year. That process may already be under way, with recent Israeli leafletting campaigns warning inhabitants of these areas to flee. Israel wants to empty both the Rafah area, so that it can monitor more easily any attempts at tunnelling, and the northern part because this is the location of the rocket launches that are hitting major Israeli cities such as Ashkelon and Ashdod and may one day reach Tel Aviv.

The third and related goal is, as Barak and Vilnai proposed more than a year ago, to cut off all Israeli responsibility for Gaza -- though not oversight of what is allowed in. Ghassan Khatib, a Palestinian analyst, believes that in this scenario Israel will insist that humanitarian supplies into Gaza pass only through the Egyptian crossing, thereby also undercutting Hamas’ role. Already Israel is preparing to hand over responsibility for supplying Gaza’s electricity to Egypt – a special plant is under construction close by in the Sinai.

Slowly, the hope is, Gaza’s physical and political separation from the West Bank will be cemented, with the enclave effectively being seen as a province of Egypt. Its inhabitants will lose their connection to the wider Palestinian people and eventually Cairo may grow bold enough to crack down on Hamas as brutally as it does its own Islamists.

The regime of Mahmoud Abbas in the West Bank, meanwhile, will be further isolated and weakened, improving Israel’s chances of forcing it to sign a deal annexing East Jerusalem and large swaths of the West Bank on which the Jewish settlements sit.

The fourth goal relates to wider regional issues. The chief obstacle to the implementation of Israel’s plan is the growing power of Iran and its possible pursuit of nuclear weapons. Israel’s official concern – that Tehran wants to attack Israel – is simple mischief-making. Rather Israel is worried that, if Iran becomes a regional superpower, Israeli diktats in the Middle East and in Washington will not go unchallenged.

In particular, a strong Iran will be able to aid Hizbullah and Hamas, and further fan the flames of popular Arab sentiment in favour of a just settlement for the Palestinians. That could threaten Israel’s plans for the annexation of much of the West Bank, and possibly win the Palestinians statehood. None of this can be allowed to pass by Israel.

It is therefore seeking to isolate Tehran, severing all ties between it and Hamas, just as it earlier tried – and failed – to do the same between Iran and Hizbullah. It wants the Palestinians beholden instead to the “moderate” block in the Arab world, meaning the Sunni dictatorships like Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia that in turn depend on Washington for their security.

The prospects of Israel achieving all or even some of these goals seems improbable. Too often Israeli meddling in its neighbours affairs has ended in unintended consequences, or “blowback”. It is a lesson Israel has been all too slow to learn.

Jonathan Cook lives in Nazareth, Israel. His latest book is “Disappearing Palestine” (Zed, 2008).

http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=7928
The Israeli War on the Gaza Strip: "The Birth Pangs of a New Palestine/Middle East”
by Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya

Global Research, January 15, 2009

To truly understand the specific you must understand the general and to master knowledge of the general you must understand the specific.

What is taking place in the Palestinian Territories is related to what is taking place across the Middle East and Central Asia, from Lebanon to Iraq and NATO-garrisoned Afghanistan, as part of a broader geo-strategic objective. All the events in the Middle East are part of a mammoth geo-political jigsaw puzzle; each piece only shows you one picture or a portion of the picture, but when you put all these pieces together you see the grand picture of things.

For these reasons at times more than one event must be discussed to gain greater understanding of another event, but this at times comes at a risk of diverging or extending one’s focus in different directions.

The following text is based on several key sections of an earlier and broader text; this text is brief in form but comprehensive in its scope and more focused on the events in the Palestinian Territories and their role in the broader chain of regional events in the Mediterranean region and the Middle East.

The photograph above: Mahmoud Abbas (PA and PLO head) introducing Jalal Talabani, the president of Iraq, to Ehud Barak, the defence minister of Israel.

Operation Cast Lead: The “Birth Pangs of a New Palestine”

The Israeli attacks on the Gaza Strip against the Palestinians are part of a larger geo-strategic project. They are part of the “birth pangs of a new Palestine and Middle East” in the eyes of the U.S. and Israel. but this project will not proceed as envisaged by the U.S. and Israel. There is a wind of change and revolt throughout the Middle East and the Arab World. This process is unleashing a new wave of popular resistance directed against the U.S. and Israel, both within and beyond the Arab World.

“Operation Cast Lead” has been planned for almost a year. The “Shoah” (Hebrew word for holocaust) that Matan Vilnai, an Israeli official, promised the Palestinians has been exposed even though many media sources have attempted to whitewash it.

Israeli officials had warned that they would enter the Gaza Strip since the election of Hamas. The underlying rationale for a campaign against Gaza was that Fatah fighters (supported by the U.S. and Israel) had failed to oust the Hamas-led Palestinian government through a coup d'etat. The idea of a coup directed against Hamas was endorsed by the U.S., Britain, Israel, and several Arab dictatorships including Saudi Arabia, Jordon, and Egypt.

The publication NATO and Israel: Instruments of America’s Wars in the Middle East clearly documents Tel Aviv’s strategic objective to invade Gaza and overthrow the democratic political system of the Palestinians in favour of Palestinian clients.

The Israeli objective is also to "internationalize" the Gaza Strip on the model of South Lebanon, requiring the involvement of NATO and other foreign military forces as so-called peacekeepers.[1] This modus operandi is very similar to that of Anglo-American occupied Iraq and NATO-garrisoned Afghanistan. The former Yugoslavia is also a relevant example, where a political and economic restructuring process (including a privatization program) was implemented under the surveillance of U.S. and NATO troops. The difference with Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories is that political figures, such as Mahmoud Abbas, willing to implement these agendas are already in place.

From the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative to the Annapolis Conference

The events at issue start with the 2002 Arab Initiative that was proposed by Saudi Arabia in Beirut during an Arab League conference in Lebanon. Saudi Arabia's initiative was in effect handed over to Riyad by London and Washington in 2002 as part of an Anglo-American military-political roadmap for the Middle East and as part of the Project for the “New Middle East.”

The Hamas-Fatah split, the calculated deceit behind Saudi Arabia’s role in the Mecca Accord, and the long-term objectives of America and its allies in the Middle East and the Mediterranean littoral have been in the backdrop of the fighting in the Palestinian Territories.

The struggle in Palestine, like in Iraq and Lebanon, does not solely pertain to sovereignty and "self-determination." What is at stake is the imposition of a global neo-liberal economic agenda through force. The latter constututes a modern form of debt-ridden slavery and privatization, imposed by military force in the Middle East and worldwide.

What is not always understood, is that the Palestinian struggle is being waged on behalf of people everywhere. The Palestinians are in the forefront in the battle against, speaking in a political and economic sense, the “New World Order.”

To understand where the path advertised at Annapolis is intended to lead the Palestinians and the entire Levant one must also understand what has been happening in Palestine since the onslaught of the “Global War on Terror” in 2001.

Act I: Dividing the Palestinians through a Hamas-Fatah Split

America and the E.U. have come to realize that Fatah does not represent the popular will of the Palestinian Nation and that representative power will eventually be taken away from Fatah.

This is a central issue for Israel, the E.U., and America, which require a corrupt proxy Fatah leadership to carry out their long-term objectives in the Palestinian Territories and the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as in the broader Middle East region.

In 2005, Washington and Tel Aviv started preparing for a Hamas victory in the Palestinian general elections. Thus, a strategy was created before the political victory of Hamas to neutralize not only Hamas but all legitimate forms of resistance to the foreign agendas that the Palestinians have been held hostages to since the “Nakba.”

Israel, America, and their allies, which includes the E.U., were well aware that Hamas would never be a party to what Washington foresaw for the Palestinians and the Middle East. Simply stated, Hamas would oppose the Project for the “New Middle East.” This geo-political restructuring of the Middle East required in the Levant, the concurrent implementation of the Mediterranean Union. All along, the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative was a gateway for the materialization of both the “New Middle East” and its implementation through the Mediterranean Union.

While the Saudis played their part in America’s “New Middle East” venture, Fatah was manipulated into confronting and fighting Hamas. This was also done with the knowledge that Hamas’ first reaction as the governing party in the Palestinian Territories would be to try to maintain the integrity of Palestinian unity. This is where Saudi Arabia comes into the picture again through its role in arranging the Mecca Accord. It is also worth noting that Saudi Arabia did not give Hamas any diplomatic recognition before the Mecca Accord.

Act II: Entrapping the Palestinians in Mecca and via a Gaza-West Bank Divide

The Mecca Accord was a setup and a means to entrap Hamas. The Hamas-Fatah truce and the subsequent Palestinian unity government that was established, was not meant to prevail. It was doomed from the outset, when Hamas was deceived into signing the agreement in Mecca. The Mecca Accord had set the next stage; it was meant to "legitimize" what would happen next: a Palestinian mini-civil war in Gaza.

It is after the signing of the Mecca Accord that elements within Fatah led by Mohammed Dahlan (supervised by U.S. Lieutenant-General Keith Dayton) were ordered to overthrow the Hamas-led Palestinian government by the U.S. and Israel. There probably existed two contingency plans, one for Fatah’s possible success and the other contingency plan (and more probable of the two) made in the case of Fatah’s failure. The latter plan was a preparation for two parallel Palestinian governments, one in Gaza led by Prime Minister Haniyah and Hamas and the other in the West Bank controlled by Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah.

The objective of Israel and the U.S. was to divide the Gaza Strip and the West Bank into two political entities under two very different administrations. With the ending of the Hamas-Fatah fighting in the Gaza Strip, the Israelis started talking about a “three nation solution.”

As a result of the Gaza-West Bank split, Mahmoud Abbas and his associates also called for the creation of a parallel Palestinian parliament in the West Bank, a rubber stamp all but in name. [2] Other plans for this so-called “three nation solution” included handing over the Gaza Strip to Egypt and dividing up the Israeli-occupied West Bank between Israel and Jordon.

Furthermore, the Mecca Accord effectively allowed Fatah to rule the West Bank in two strokes. Since a unity government was formed as a result of the Mecca Accord, a Fatah withdrawal from the government was used to depict the Hamas-led government as illegitimate by Fatah. This was while the renewed fighting in Gaza made new Palestinian elections unworkable.

Mahmoud Abbas was also put in a position where he could claim "legitimacy" in the process of forming his own administration in the West Bank, that would otherwise have been seen, by international public opinion, for what it really was: an illegitimate regime, without a parliamentary base. It is also no coincidence that the man picked to leed Mahmoud Abbas’ government, Dr. Salam Fayyad, is a former World Bank official.

With Hamas effectively neutralized and cut off from power in the West Bank, the stage was set for two things; proposals for an international military force in the Palestinian Territories and the Annapolis Conference. [3]

Act III: The Israeli-Palestinian Agreement of Principles and the Annapolis Peace Conference

Prior to the Annapolis Conference, "agreements of principles" were drafted by Mahmoud Abbas and Israel which guaranteed that the Palestinians would not have a military force, if the West Bank were to be given some form of political self-determination.

The agreements also called for the integration of the economies of the Arab World with Israel and the positioning of an international force, similar to those stationed by NATO in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, to supervise the enforcement of these agreements in the Palestinian Territories. The objective was to neutralize Hamas and legitimize Mahmoud Abbas.

The visit of the Secretary-General of NATO, Jakob (Jaap) de Hoop Scheffer to U.A.E. , shortly after the visits of George W. Bush Jr. and Nicholas Sarkozy, were conducive to the signing of military agreements between the U.A.E., and the U.S., as well as with France.

While in the U.A.E., Secretary-General de Hoop Scheffer stated, in substance that it is only a matter of time before NATO gets involved in the Arab-Israeli Conflict.[4] The Secretary-General of NATO also mentioned that this would happen once a viable Palestinian state was formed. What de Hoop Scheffer really meant was that NATO would become involved in the Palestinian Territories once a Palestinian proxy state under Mahmoud Abbas would be formed. He also mentioned that there would be no recognition of Hamas by NATO.

Hamas has outlived its usefulness to Israel and its partners. Fatah could also have been used to attack the Gaza Strip again. Fatah is also an Israeli partner in the campaign against the Gaza Strip. Israeli media had reported in September 2008 about the attacks on the Gaza Strip as being a joint Israeli-Fatah plan to militarily oust the Hamas-led Palestinian government.[5]

When the Annapolis Conference was hosted by the U.S. government, pundits and analysts worldwide termed the summit as without substance and as a move to undue everything that it owed to the Palestinians, including the right for Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and lands. The Annapolis Conference was only an extravagant do over of the carefully crafted 2002 Saudi-proposed Arab Peace Initiative tabled to the Arab League.

Act IV: Coming Full Circle, back to the Saudi Arabian 2002 Arab Peace Initiative

The people of the Middle East must open their eyes to what has been planned for their lands. The Agreement of Principles, the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, and the Annapolis Conference are all a means to the same end. All three, like Israel, have their roots in establishing economic hegemony in the Middle East.

This is where France and Germany converge with Anglo-American foreign policy. For years, even before the “Global War on Terror,” Paris had been calling for a troop contingent from either the E.U. or NATO to be deployed to Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories.

In February 2004, France's then Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin stated that once the Israelis left the Gaza Strip foreign troops could be sent there and an international conference could legitimize their presence as part of the second phase of the Israeli-Palestinian Roadmap and as part of an initiative for the Greater Middle East or the “New Middle East.” [6] This statment was made before Hamas came to the scene and before Mahmoud Abbas’ Agreement of Principles. However, it did follow the 2002 Saudi-proposed Arab Initiative.

It is clear that the events unfolding in the Middle East are part of a military roadmap drawn before the “Global War on Terror.” Even the economic donor conferences held for Lebanon after the Israeli attacks in 2006 and the ones being talked about now for the Palestinians are linked to this restructuring agenda.

It is now time to study Nicolas Sarkozy’s proposals for a Mediterranean Union. The economic integration of the Israeli economy with the economies of the Arab World will further the web of global relationships being tightened by the global agents of the Washington Consensus. The 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, the Agreement of Principles, and Annapolis are all phases for establishing the economic integration of the Arab World with Israel through the Project for the “New Middle East” and the integration of the entire Mediterranean with the European Union through the Mediterranean Union. The presence of troops from both NATO and E.U. members in Lebanon is also a part of this goal.

Towards Establishing a Palestinian Dictatorship: More Plans to Oust Hamas underway?

The Israeli attacks against the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian people are an attack against democracy and freedom of choice. Israel, the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and their allies have wasted no time in recognizing Mahmoud Abbas as the legitimate leader of the Palestinians even though his term of office has finished.

Despite claims of supporting democracy and self-determination throughout the Middle East, the foreign policies of the U.S., Britain, France, Germany, and the E.U. are opposed to any genuine self-determination or democracy in the Middle East because any freedom of choice for the populations of the Middle East would act as a barrier and spoiler to the economic interests of these powers. This is exactly why dictatorships are the ideal form of government in the Middle East in regards to Anglo-American and Franco-German foreign policy interests.

The Palestinian Territories are not an exception to this. The U.S., Israel, their allies, and the corrupt oligarchs of the upper circle of power within Fatah are set on establishing autocratic rule in the Palestinian Territories. To the satisfaction of planners in Israel and the U.S. the Hamas-Fatah split has helped push back the democratic path that the Palestinians were following through the election of their own leadership and has cleared the way for attempts to establish dictatorial Palestinian proxy administrations in the future. The process has already started in the West Bank.

By late-2008 Hamas had clarified that it intended to field its own candidate for the the post of Palestinian Authority president in the Palestinian election that was supposed to be held in January, 2009. This is a direct challenge to the power that Mahmoud Abbas and the leaders of Fatah hold through control of the office of Palestinian Authority president. Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah had rebuffed Hamas, before the Israeli attcks on the Gaza Strip, by declaring that such an election would not take place until Hamas surrenders its authority to Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian prime minister and government in the West Bank that Mahmoud Abbas has handpicked outside the democratic process.

In retalation the Hamas-led government in the Gaza Strip declared that it will refer to the Palestinian legal code. Palestinian law which stipulates that in such situations the role and post of president would be transfered to the speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), the parliament of the Palestinians, for an interim period. Ahmed Bahar, a member of Hamas, is currently in the position of speaker of the PLC.

Crushing Palestinian Democracy: Middle Eastern Geo-Politics and Palestinian Governance

In link to this move to oust Hamas are the broader geo-political and strategic initiatives for encircling and confronting Syria and Iran. [7] Israel with the help of Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, had been trying to negotiate a one-sided truce with the Hamas-led Palestinian government in the Gaza Strip for months. This move was launched simultanously with Israeli initiatives linked towards Hezbollah, Lebanon, and Syria.

These Israeli initiatives are a means to dismantle and dissolve the Resistance Bloc, a coalition of nation-states and non-state actors againts foreign control and occupation within the Middle East. This grouping includes, amongst others, the Arab resistance movements in Anglo-American occupied Iraq, the Palestinian Territories, and Lebanon. It has challenged the Washington Consensus and the economic reconfiguration of the Middle East that is being implemented through such actions as the Anglo-American invasion and occupation of Iraq.

Tel Aviv was going nowhere in its negotations with Hamas and now appears to favours the establishment of an autocratic Fatah administration in the Gaza Strip that will readily comply to Israeli edicts. This would also free Tel Aviv for any confrontations with Lebanon, Syria, or/and Iran.

The Final Act: The Power of the People: The Act yet to be Played Out

The breaches of the Rafah Crossing between Egypt and the Gaza Strip were a sign of the crumbling of tyranny, but there is still a long way to go. [8] The mass protests worldwide from Egypt and the Arab World to Europe and Asia are a sign that the “Second Superpower” — the power of the people — is rearing its head.

In the end it will be the people who will decide, against the interest of the politicians and their economic power brokers.

The people see beyond the issues of nationality, ethnic division and man-made boundaries. They believe in justice and equity for all and they feel a pain in their hearts when they see the suffering of others, no matter the differences.

Worldwide, those that are just and honourable are a nation to themselves — whether they are Israelis or Arabs or Americans — and it will be their choices that will decide the direction of the future.

The Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, which includes a diverse spectrum of groups from Hamas to Communists (e.g., the Marxist Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine) and Christians, have done what the military foces of Jordan, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq could not do.

The Israeli massacres in the Gaza Strip will prove to be a historic turning point and the catalyst behind change.

The political and strategic map of the Middle East and the Arab World will be changed, but not in favour of Israel, the House of Saud and the dictators of the Arab World.

Change is coming.

NOTES

[1] Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, NATO and Israel: Instruments of America’s Wars in the Middle East, Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG), January 28, 2008.

[2] Khaled Abu Toameh, PLO to form separate W. Bank parliament, The Jerusalem Post, January 14, 2008.

[3] Emine Kart, Ankara cool towards Palestine troops, Today’s Zaman, July 3, 2007.

[4] Jamal Al-Majaida, NATO chief discusses alliance’s role in Gulf, Khaleej Times, January 27, 2008.

[5] Avi Isaacharoff, PA chief of staff: We must be ready to use force against Hamas to take control of Gaza, Haaretz, September 22, 2008.

[6] Dominique René de Villepin, Déclarations de Dominique de Villepin à propos du Grand Moyen-Orient, interview with Pierre Rousselin, Le Figaro, February 19, 2004.

[7] Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, Beating the Drums of a Broader Middle East War, Centre for Reseach on Globalization (CRG), May 6, 2008.

[8] Days after the Rafah Crossing was opened to free movement Mahmoud Abbas, the Israel government, and the Egyptian government all pushed for Fatah to take armed control of the Rafah Crossing and close it to the Palestinian people. Not only is this a sign that none of these players care about the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip it also illustrates that Mahmoud Abbas has no interest in the welfare of Palestinians. The Rafah Crossing also has an E.U. monitoring security force that implicates the E.U. as an accomplice in the oppression of the Palestinians.

http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=2824
The War on Lebanon and the Battle for Oil
by Michel Chossudovsky

Global Research, July 26, 2006

Is there a relationship between the bombing of Lebanon and the inauguration of the World's largest strategic pipeline, which will channel more than a million barrels of oil a day to Western markets?

Virtually unnoticed, the inauguration of the Ceyhan-Tblisi-Baku (BTC) oil pipeline, which links the Caspian sea to the Eastern Mediterranean, took place on the 13th of July, at the very outset of the Israeli sponsored bombings of Lebanon.

One day before the Israeli air strikes, the main partners and shareholders of the BTC pipeline project, including several heads of State and oil company executives were in attendance at the port of Ceyhan. They were then rushed off for an inauguration reception in Istanbul, hosted by Turkey's President Ahmet Necdet Sezer in the plush surroundings of the Çýraðan Palace.

Also in attendance was British Petroleum's (BP) CEO, Lord Browne together with senior government officials from Britain, the US and Israel. BP leads the BTC pipeline consortium. Other major Western shareholders include Chevron, Conoco-Phillips, France's Total and Italy's ENI. (see Annex)

Israel's Minister of Energy and Infrastructure Binyamin Ben-Eliezer was present at the venue together with a delegation of top Israeli oil officials.

The BTC pipeline totally bypasses the territory of the Russian Federation. It transits through the former Soviet republics of Azerbaijan and Georgia, both of which have become US "protectorates", firmly integrated into a military alliance with the US and NATO. Moreover, both Azerbaijan and Georgia have longstanding military cooperation agreements with Israel.

Israel has a stake in the Azeri oil fields, from which it imports some twenty percent of its oil. The opening of the pipeline will substantially enhance Israeli oil imports from the Caspian sea basin.

But there is another dimension which directly relates to the war on Lebanon. Whereas Russia has been weakened, Israel is slated to play a major strategic role in "protecting" the Eastern Mediterranean transport and pipeline corridors out of Ceyhan.

Militarization of the Eastern Mediterranean

The bombing of Lebanon is part of a carefully planned and coordinated military road map. The extension of the war into Syria and Iran has already been contemplated by US and Israeli military planners. This broader military agenda is intimately related to strategic oil and oil pipelines. It is supported by the Western oil giants which control the pipeline corridors. In the context of the war on Lebanon, it seeks Israeli territorial control over the East Mediterranean coastline.

In this context, the BTC pipeline dominated by British Petroleum, has dramatically changed the geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean, which is now linked , through an energy corridor, to the Caspian sea basin:

"[The BTC pipeline] considerably changes the status of the region's countries and cements a new pro-West alliance. Having taken the pipeline to the Mediterranean, Washington has practically set up a new bloc with Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and Israel, " (Komerzant, Moscow, 14 July 2006)

Israel is now part of the Anglo-American military axis, which serves the interests of the Western oil giants in the Middle East and Central Asia.

While the official reports state that the BTC pipeline will "channel oil to Western markets", what is rarely acknowledged is that part of the oil from the Caspian sea would be directly channeled towards Israel. In this regard, an underwater Israeli-Turkish pipeline project has been envisaged which would link Ceyhan to the Israeli port of Ashkelon and from there through Israel's main pipeline system, to the Red Sea.

The objective of Israel is not only to acquire Caspian sea oil for its own consumption needs but also to play a key role in re-exporting Caspian sea oil back to the Asian markets through the Red Sea port of Eilat. The strategic implications of this re-routing of Caspian sea oil are farreaching.

What is envisaged is to link the BTC pipeline to the Trans-Israel Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline, also known as Israel's Tipline, from Ceyhan to the Israeli port of Ashkelon. In April 2006, Israel and Turkey announced plans for four underwater pipelines, which would bypass Syrian and Lebanese territory.

"Turkey and Israel are negotiating the construction of a multi-million-dollar energy and water project that will transport water, electricity, natural gas and oil by pipelines to Israel, with the oil to be sent onward from Israel to the Far East,

The new Turkish-Israeli proposal under discussion would see the transfer of water, electricity, natural gas and oil to Israel via four underwater pipelines.

http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1145961328841&pagename=JPost%...

“Baku oil can be transported to Ashkelon via this new pipeline and to India and the Far East.[via the Red sea]"

"Ceyhan and the Mediterranean port of Ashkelon are situated only 400 km apart. Oil can be transported to the city in tankers or via specially constructed under-water pipeline. From Ashkelon the oil can be pumped through already existing pipeline to the port of Eilat at the Red Sea; and from there it can be transported to India and other Asian countries in tankers. (REGNUM )

Water for Israel

Also involved in this project is a pipeline to bring water to Israel, pumping water from upstream resources of the Tigris and Euphrates river system in Anatolia. This has been a long-run strategic objective of Israel to the detriment of Syria and Iraq. Israel's agenda with regard to water is supported by the military cooperation agreement between Tel Aviv and Ankara.

The Strategic Re-routing of Central Asian Oil

Diverting Central Asian oil and gas to the Eastern Mediterranean (under Israeli military protection), for re-export back to Asia, serves to undermine the inter-Asian energy market, which is based on the development of direct pipeline corridors linking Central Asia and Russia to South Asia, China and the Far East.

Ultimately, this design is intended to weaken Russia's role in Central Asia and cut off China from Central Asian oil resources. It is also intended to isolate Iran.

Meanwhile, Israel has emerged as a new powerful player in the global energy market.

Russia's Military Presence in the Middle East

Meanwhile, Moscow has responded to the US-Israeli-Turkish design to militarize the East Mediterranean coastline with plans to establish a Russian naval base in the Syrian port of Tartus:

"Defense Ministry sources point out that a naval base in Tartus will enable Russia to solidify its positions in the Middle East and ensure security of Syria. Moscow intends to deploy an air defense system around the base - to provide air cover for the base itself and a substantial part of Syrian territory. (S-300PMU-2 Favorit systems will not be turned over to the Syrians. They will be manned and serviced by Russian personnel.)

(Kommerzant, 2 June 2006, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=IVA20060...

Tartus is strategically located within 30 km. of the Lebanese border.

Moreover, Moscow and Damascus have reached an agreement on the modernization of Syria's air defenses as well as a program in support to its ground forces, the modernization of its MIG-29 fighters as well as its submarines. (Kommerzant, 2 June 2006). In the context of an escalating conflict, these developments have farreaching implications.

War and Oil Pipelines

Prior to the bombing of Lebanon, Israel and Turkey had announced the underwater pipeline routes, which bypassed Syria and Lebanon. These underwater pipeline routes do not overtly encroach on the territorial sovereignty of Lebanon and Syria.

On the other hand, the development of alternative land based corridors (for oil and water) through Lebanon and Syria would require Israeli-Turkish territorial control over the Eastern Mediterranean coastline through Lebanon and Syria.

The implementation of a land-based corridor, as opposed to the underwater pipeline project, would require the militarisation of the East Mediterranean coastline, extending from the port of Ceyhan across Syria and Lebanon to the Lebanese-Israeli border.

Is this not one of the hidden objectives of the war on Lebanon? Open up a space which enables Israel to control a vast territory extending from the Lebanese border through Syria to Turkey.

It is worth noting that the US War Academy had already contemplated the formation of a "Greater Lebanon" which would extend along the coastline from Israel to Turkey. In this scenario, the entire Syrian coastline would be annexed to an Anglo-American Israeli protectorate.(See Map of The New Middle East below).

Israeli Prime minister Ehud Olmert has stated that the Israeli offensive against Lebanon would "last a very long time". Meanwhile, the US has speeded up weapons shipments to Israel.

There are strategic objectives underlying the "Long War" which are tied to oil and oil pipelines.

The air campaign against Lebanon is inextricably related to US-Israeli strategic objectives in the broader Middle East including Syria and Iran. In recent developments, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice stated that the main purpose of her mission to the Middle East was not to push for a ceasefire in Lebanon, but rather to isolate Syria and Iran. (Daily Telegraph, 22 July 2006)

At this particular juncture, the replenishing of Israeli stockpiles of US produced WMDs points to an escalation of the war both within and beyond the borders of Lebanon.

Michel Chossudovsky is the author of the international best seller "The Globalization of Poverty " published in eleven languages. He is Professor of Economics at the University of Ottawa and Director of the Center for Research on Globalization, at www.globalresearch.ca . He is also a contributor to the Encyclopaedia Britannica. His most recent book is entitled: America’s "War on Terrorism", Global Research, 2005. To order Chossudovsky's book America's "War on Terrorism", click here.

http://bbsnews.net/article.php/20060810235514962
Shebaa Farms Belongs to Lebanon
Thursday, August 10 2006 @ 11:55 PM EDT
Edited by: Michael Hess
Syria Should Make it Official to the United Nations

BBSNews 2006-08-10 -- Shebaa Farms has a long history of dispute involving Syria, Israel and Lebanon in spite of some claims from the right-wing in the US that it is only recently come up as a Hezbollah "pretext" for continued fighting against Israeli occupation. The fact is Shebaa Farms belongs to Lebanon. There has been evidence uncovered of this fact since 2002.

Area map showing Lebanon and surrounding countries and indicating the area of Shebaa Farms.
Area map showing Lebanon and surrounding countries and indicating the area of Shebaa Farms.

Image Credit: BBSNews.
At one point in time, Israel highly valued Shebaa Farms because of its strategic position. Undoubtedly this is why Israel wanted to occupy this land, adjacent to the Golan Heights, regardless of whether Syria or Lebanon held actual ownership of the land. One thing is crystal clear. The land simply does not belong to Israel and they should hand it over to the United Nations.

Ynetnews reported today in an analysis [originally from The MediaLine] that considered the strategic value of Shebaa Farms:

"When looking at the topography of the region, Shebaa Farms is located on the western slopes of Mount Hermon. Higher than the immediate areas surrounding it to the north, south and west, the area has enabled Israel so far to have good strategic control over the Beqaa Valley to its north. Intelligence surveillance equipment located in Shebaa also gives Israel good coverage over the valley below."

But what seems to really concern the Israeli's would be a cease-fire agreement that included handing back Shebaa Farms back to Lebanon would be the "symbolic" value. In other words, Hezbollah might be seen as actually getting something in turn for armed resistance; Lebanon's own land back. For some reason though, most media simply focus on what a resistance group may or may not get instead of actually focusing on the long stated issue of illegal Israeli occupation of land that does not belong to them.

The Ynet article continues to explain through an anonymous IDF officer why the strategic value is less than the symbolic:

"Today, the techniques at hand do not necessitate points on the ground," added the officer, who asked to remain anonymous. The officer further explained that while the strategic value of the topographic location of Shebaa could be taken lightly, it was, however, more a question of the symbolic meaning.

"If Israel withdraws it will mean a great victory for Hizbullah. It will prove that forceful measures carried out by a terrorist group can force Israel to withdraw from territories."

Conveniently leaving out the central fact underlying the entire Arab-Israeli problem. The Israeli's appear to be incapable of recognizing that it is they who are standing on ground that does not belong to them outside of their internationally recognized borders. It is not "territory" that belongs to Israel. Under the current understanding of the United Nations, the land is Syrian. Another retired IDF officer is quoted anonymously in the article as saying the tiny area that is Shebaa Farms would be but a "drop in the bucket" if Hezbollah is able to operate along the entire Lebanese border. Of course if the occupation is completely removed there would be no reason for the existence of an armed militia.

Hezbollah, as are the other groups that keep springing up, are born from the dirty well of occupation; they came about as a result of invasion and land grabbing. Hezbollah did not exist prior to 1982. On March 15th, 1978 Israel invaded Lebanon in retaliation for a bus attack in Tel Aviv that killed 35. Israel said the attack was in response to the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Yasser Arafat's old organization. He's now dead. But the Palestinian refugees and their decendants in Lebanon remain. Then on June 6th, 1982 Israel again invaded Lebanon to drive out the PLO. That goal happened in August 1982 but on September 17th, 1982 a horrible massacre occured where it was reported that 800-3500 people were slaughtered under Israeli supervision. Hezbollah was born of the Israeli occupation in 1982. Then Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon resigned on February 8th, 1983 because an Israel government report placed the blame for the massacre on Sharon personally. [See the BBC historical news files for deeper detail] Ariel Sharon is now in a coma and thought to not be far from death. Yet the hatred and the occupation still lives on much to the detriment of world security.

Terror used by either side, by both Israel and Hezbollah, should be soundly condemned. Past and recent history shows that Israel's hands are not clean in this regard. It's not even clear which side of the border the Israeli soldiers were captured. Many of the first reports said the operation happened on Lebanon's side of the border near Ayta a-Shab. These "cross-border" raids must stop, UNIFIL has documented many instances of Israeli incursions, usually by air, into Lebanon prior to July 12th, 2006. A just and lasting peace will only come when these decades long illegal occupations and incursions of land end.

So Who Really Owns Shebaa Farms?

Prior to his death in February 2005, Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri gave an interview to Margaret Warner of the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) on April 16th, 2002. One issue discussed was Shebaa Farms and who actually is entitled to it. The year 2002 was about as volatile as any other year in the region and once again the central issue was Israeli occupation of land that does not belong to them. Warner probed Hariri's stance about former US Secretary of State Colin Powell insisting that the "Blue Line," the UN border line settled in UN Resolution 425, be respected by all sides. Warner asked if Hariri would do anything to restrain Hezbollah especially as pertains to Shebaa Farms. Hariri replied:

"I said that we respect the blue line, which is equivalent to the borders but Shebaa Farm is a Lebanese territory. And because it is Lebanese and because it is occupied by Israel so the Lebanese people had the right to have it back, by all means including the resistance."

The current Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora in May 2006 was "on a mission" to have Shebaa Farms returned to Lebanon according to the BBC:

"Mr Siniora told the BBC that his mission is to convince world leaders to pressure Israel into withdrawing from the area of Shebaa farms.

He added that he is convinced that such a withdrawal will lead to the disarmament of Hezbollah."

According to Reuters on July 23rd, 2006 Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Fayssal Mekdad said that Syria wants a dialogue with the US aimed at achieving a lasting peace:

"The root of the crisis, Mekdad said, was Israel's occupation of Arab land, including Shebaa Farms, an area near the Golan Heights still under Israeli control after Israel pulled out of south Lebanon in 2000.

Lebanon and Syria say Shebaa Farms is Lebanese" ... "The basis must be found for a just and comprehensive peace and the return of the occupied land in Golan, Palestine and south Lebanon," Mekdad said.

"America and Israel are mistaken to think that destroying Lebanon will bring peace. What Israel is doing with U.S. involvement will only produce more violence and hatred."

Asked if Syria could see Hizbollah disarmed at one point, Mekdad said this was only possible with a peace deal that gives back Arab territory occupied by Israel in 1967."

But most of all, some scholarly work by a respected Israeli researcher found the maps and facts from the 1930's that everyone had been searching for. A Hebrew University scholar Asher Kaufman found the disputed documentation from the period when maps were drawn under the French Mandate. According to an article in The Age on August 3rd, 2006:

"Four years ago, while rummaging through government archives in Paris, a historian at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Asher Kaufman, stumbled on documents that appear to resolve the dispute.

Kaufman, who bears a slight physical resemblance to Indiana Jones, discovered a set of papers from the French mandate era from 1920 to 1941 that show that French officials in the 1930s had accidentally put the Shebaa Farms in Syria.

The papers reveal that the officials realised their error and wanted to correct the maps, which had been drawn without surveyors or cartographic equipment, but the mistake was never fixed."

US Secretary of State Rice must surely know this, and France must know this, this indicates why the return of Shebaa Farms is on the diplomatic table. Returning it would be the right thing to do, returning Shebaa Farms would be the just thing to do.

And Syria could help by going around the intractable US ambassador to the UN John Bolton and appealing in writing to the United Nations directly and officially letting the world know that Syria believes Shebaa Farms belongs to Lebanon.

Also See:
Take a Walk Through Gaza at YOUNGFOX CANADA
and
From Creekside:
UK Jewish MP : Israel acting like Nazis